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To the Right Honble. The Earl of Minto,
First Lord of the Admiralty,
from the Author—

THE
NAVAL BATTLES
OF
GREAT BRITAIN,

FROM
THE ACCESSION OF THE ILLUSTRIOUS HOUSE OF HANOVER
TO THE THRONE

TO
THE BATTLE OF NAVARIN,

REVIEWED BY
CHARLES EKINS,
REAR ADMIRAL, C.B. C.W.N.

“ England is a land which can never be conquered whilst the Kings thereof have the dominion of the sea.”—SIR W. RALEGH.

“ The honour and safety of this nation, under the providence of God, chiefly depend upon our strength at sea.”

ADDRESS OF PARLIAMENT TO KING WILLIAM III.

THE SECOND EDITION.

LONDON:
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1828.

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C. Baldwin, Printer,
New Bridge Street, London.

TO
HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS,
WILLIAM HENRY, DUKE OF CLARENCE,
LORD HIGH ADMIRAL OF GREAT BRITAIN,
&c. &c.

May it please Your Royal Highness,

To the gracious condescension of Your Royal Highness it is principally owing that I now offer to the public a work which, in its present form, I presume to hope, may be found less exposed to the objections of the former edition, and, at the same time, be rendered more worthy of Your Royal Highness's patronage and protection.

In venturing to lay before Your Royal Highness a tactical treatise upon the Naval Battles of Great Britain, I am fully aware both of the temerity in undertaking, and of the difficulty in executing the task.

To Your Royal Highness, bred and educated in the Royal Navy of England, deriving from actual service and experience in its various ranks an intimate knowledge of the profession, and now with unrivalled ability presiding at the helm of its naval power, it is at once a source of pride, yet of apprehension, to

appeal : a pride, from knowing that the subject of these pages (unless it receive injury in the development), will be perfectly understood by him to whom it has the sanction of being addressed ; and dread, lest it should fall far short of his expectations.

'To the favourable consideration and indulgence of Your Royal Highness, therefore, it is humbly submitted, with a perfect reliance on that Princely candour and liberality which in an eminent degree has distinguished Your Royal Highness's public life and measures.

With the utmost respect,

I have the honour to subscribe myself,

Sir,

Your Royal Highness's most obedient,

And devoted humble servant,

THE AUTHOR.

Bishopsteignton, Devon,

Aug. 1, 1828.

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P R E F A C E.

IN the "Historical Sketch" of Mr. Clerk's Essay on Naval Tactics is related the following circumstance:—"Dr. Adam Smith, the celebrated author of the 'Wealth of Nations,' after reading his Essay, as it was first printed, said, the only thing which tempts one to entertain a doubt with respect to your system is, that the beneficial effects are so manifest, that one wonders they should not have occurred to professional men.'"

An anxiety to rescue the profession at the present day from the severity of the imputation, in some measure gave rise to this undertaking; on which account, it is hoped, every liberal allowance will be made.

Of that "Essay," it is justly observed by Professor Playfair, that "the analysis of those actions forms a most interesting part of Mr. Clerk's book, and furnishes a commentary on the naval history of Britain, such as we seek for in vain in the treatises written expressly on that subject." (See a "Memoir," in the ninth volume of the Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh.) Should this opinion be well grounded, it is presumed that it may be applied with an equal degree of truth to the present work.

In treating of this important subject, it is proposed to give some account of the Naval Battles of the last century, down to the close of the war in the year 1814, divided into two parts or periods: the first commencing with the capture and destruction of the Spanish fleet on the memorable expedition to Sicily, and ending with the battle of Sir Edward Hughes and Mons. Suffrein, in 1783.

The Second Part will commence with the celebrated battles of Earl Howe

with the Revolutionary Fleet of France, in 1794, and close with the attack upon Algiers, and the battle of Navarin.

A late learned naval historian, in the first page of his Preface, insinuates that competency for the task is to be estimated by the length of time the mind has been engaged upon it. If this claim be admissible, the writer has the advantage of him by a period of full seventeen years; for his attention was given to the subject of Naval Tactics from the year 1797, when he commanded a frigate, to the present time, and no *single* action;* but the battle off *Cape St. Vincent*, was the first object of his enquiry.

Extracts from the public dispatches, as they are the bases upon which the descriptive figures are formed, were necessary to his purpose, but every part of them not strictly applicable is carefully excluded.

The Naval Chronicle, notwithstanding a vast quantity of miscellaneous matter, contains, to a sea officer, much interesting and important information; and, scattered through its forty octavo volumes, is to be found the detail of Naval Warfare, from 1799 to 1818.

The present object is to treat of the great battles alone; accompanied with explanatory figures, notes, observations, and remarks.

What is sufficient to afford a tactical and general description of them is carefully selected; what is unnecessary is avoided.

By this method it is hoped that a considerable store of naval information will be reduced into a small compass; which, by being entirely separated from all other subjects, may be found useful to professional men; and, to enliven the otherwise monotonous catalogue of naval transactions, dear to those who cherish in their memory what is so closely interwoven with the true welfare of their country; to keep alive a just sense of the importance of our maritime pre-eminence, such traits of character as relate to the brave men whose deeds are here recorded, have been introduced, to contribute by precept and example in forming a succession of naval heroes for days to come.

Unless some such undertaking should, from time to time, appear, our Blakes,

* See "James's Naval History."

our Drakes, our Rookes, our Russells, our Ansons, our Boscawens, and our Hawkes, would have lived only to render service in their generation : but, so long as the pages of history are open, their great examples will live, and serve to guide others, no less ambitious of honourable distinction, in the paths of fame and glory.

In Mr. Clerk's "Introduction" are many remarks incident to our geographical position and national character, which deserve particular attention ; the following is one which leads to a subject of great importance.

"From our *insular* situation, we are led to avail ourselves of a naval force in some such manner as that in which all animals are directed to make use of the weapons or talents with which nature has furnished them, whether for support or defence."

Our ancestors, by sad experience, were at length taught the necessity of absolute command on the narrow seas. What does the historian say ?*—"The heroic Henry V. was almost as victorious at sea as at land, and in his reign the fleets of England rode triumphant on the narrow seas. His brother, John Duke of Bedford, obtained one naval victory, A.D. 1416, and the Earl of Huntingdon another, A.D. 1417, over the united fleets of France and Genoa, taking or destroying almost all their ships (see Henry's History, vol. x, p. 244), which effectually secured the dominion of the sea."

"The reign of Richard III. was so short and turbulent, that he had little opportunity of shewing his attention to the dominion of the sea. It is, however, certain that if he had guarded the narrow seas with greater care, he might have prevented the landing of his rival, the Earl of Richmond, and preserved both his life and crown." (Page 246.)

The dominion of the sea is not less the national interest than it is the national taste, manifested by the annual display of nautical skill in such a fleet of yachts † as no other country in the world can produce : where, from our

* And what did Buonaparte say ? Let us be masters of the Streights (of Dover) six hours, and we shall be masters of the world. (Lord Collingwood's Corr. p. 90.)

† The Royal Yacht Club in the year 1824, consisted of about eighty vessels, and employed no less than 500 seamen and seafaring men, who, it may be said, were, and are, in that service

munificent, and much-loved monarch on the throne, so distinguished for his high patronage of all that can promote the welfare of his kingdom, or the happiness of his people, down to the private gentleman, is shown the genius, and leading propensity, in this the fashionable amusement of the great and wealthy; and from the numerous regattas of which that beautiful exhibition is the prolific source, enabling all classes of the community to partake of an enjoyment so congenial to their feelings, while it contributes to preserve our maritime character and pre-eminence.

Many attempts were made during the war, and even since, to persuade a nation surrounded by *water*, that its best, nay, almost only defence, must be by *land*; many have laboured to show that, however formidable we were at sea, the coasts of this country were always liable to invasion, and consequently were to be protected only by a land force. In endeavouring (ineffectually) to establish this principle, a very singular mode of reasoning has been resorted to; namely, that, by the frequent "*sudden changes of the wind*," the coast could not, at all times, and in all places, be protected by its navy. Any seaman must know that this very circumstance is the strongest argument *against* the danger; for in the *changes* lies our security, as in them we might hope for, at least, an equal chance with the enemy; now, should the wind be fixed constantly, or for a considerable time to *one* point (say from the south), and blowing strong, then, indeed, the ships might issue from the ports of France, and those of England be kept at home; but they would even then contribute to the defence of the ports in which they are placed; nor could the fleet of an

becoming pilots for the coast of the British Channel. In this light they can be considered of no small importance, nor are the yachts to be looked upon as mere toys or objects of pleasure, as they are ready upon every occasion to render their assistance to ships or vessels in distress.

A frigate having a Commander-in-Chief on board from a foreign station, coming through the Needles in thick and blowing weather, got into a difficulty. The Ruby yacht, Sir G. Leeds, Bart., immediately weighed or slipped from Cowes Road and ran to her relief, received on board the Commodore and the dispatches, and landed them at Portsmouth.

For this service he was gratified by the well-merited and handsome acknowledgments, by letter, of the first Lord of the Admiralty.

enemy, with a force embarked of sufficient magnitude to effect a landing, accomplish it, and gain a footing, but in a sheltered position; in any other, defeat and destruction must follow their attempt.

It must first be remembered that a force for the invasion of this country must be a considerable time in collecting; if in one place, it would be remarkable; if in several, it would carry the appearance of still greater importance, and cause proportionate vigilance on the part of this country: and to collect an armed force by water, the changes of the wind must contribute. For instance, should the Isle of Wight be the object of attack, with a view to the Roadstead of Spithead and our principal arsenal, an easterly or northerly wind is necessary to carry the ships thither from the Downs; but other winds are requisite for the ships and vessels from the westward. A very strong east wind might, indeed, bring a powerful force over from the ports of Holland; but it would, at least, be followed by the squadron watching its motions; nor is there any secure place of anchoring on that coast, at which a formidable army could make good a landing. Boats can cope with boats* where ships cannot act; and where ships, by a fortunate breeze springing up after a calm, or by a change of wind, can happily be brought to act amidst a flotilla, their entire destruction must be inevitable, and invasion, by such means, could never show its head again.

To place this in the strongest point of view, shall be stated, in part, the opinion of a most gallant and highly distinguished seaman, the late Captain Philip Beaver; to whose merits and abilities it is not in the power of the writer to do justice.

Bearing the signature of "Nearchus," Captain Beaver† inserted a letter in the "Courier" of the 16th of February, 1804, which (as it well might) tended very considerably to quiet the fears of the timid in this country upon the "threatened invasion."

* Whether steam-boats, or others, is of no consequence.

† Captain Beaver was a principal projector of a settlement upon the Island of Bulam (or Bulama) on the coast of Africa; of which he published in 1805, under the title of "African Memoranda," a most interesting narrative.

It is divided into three parts, under the following heads; namely, of "The Enemy's quitting their Ports," "Their crossing the Sea," and "Their landing on our Shores."

Under the first head he observes, "The troops intended to be sent against England will, I conceive, issue from all the *small* ports between Flushing and Cherbourg. If the attempt is to be simultaneous, they must have a wind which will be fair from each of those ports. Suppose S. E., this is an *off-shore* wind, which will enable our cruisers to keep close off their harbours' mouths, watch all their motions, and transmit early intelligence. If the wind is such as to render the shore a *lee one*, and oblige our cruisers to keep at a greater distance, the enemy *cannot come out*: so that it is clear, that if our enemy can quit their ports, our cruisers can keep close in with them; and that if our cruisers *cannot keep close to the shore*, the enemy cannot come out," &c.

"On the enemy's crossing the sea," he goes on to say, "the fleets which it has been supposed might have escaped from the ports of Brest and of the Texel, *may arrive* at their assumed respective destinations, and *may possibly* there do much mischief; but, from the vigilance and activity of our numerous cruisers, employed in watching and communicating intelligence of the enemy's motions, the *probability* of their being fallen in with by some of our squadrons before they reach the places of their destination is *greatly in our favour*; and if they once meet, there is *an end to that part of the enemy's undertaking*."

Of this justly admired letter, but one extract more shall be given; it is in the following energetic language:

"The day on which the attempt shall be made will be glorious to England; will be dreadful to France. Death itself shall walk upon the face of the waters. What has hitherto been done upon the sea shall appear but the amusement of children, when compared to the dreadful carnage of that eventful day; the floating carcasses of slaughtered myriads, thrown back on their own shores, shall be the mute harbingers of their compatriots' fate."

In Mr. Clerk's "Historical Sketch," are also the following powerful arguments against any attempt by large ships:—

“ That an estimate may be made of the probable success, or of the consequent hazard and risk to which a numerous armament of great ships, engaged in a hostile enterprize of this kind, may be exposed, the British Channel should be carefully considered.

“ In the first place, as a barrier, or boundary, defending and dividing us from all the rest of the world.

“ In the next place, as a sea, narrow, winding, and contracted by headlands, in which the navigation, with all the skill and attention that can be given, is both difficult and dangerous to mariners, even the most familiar with it.”

“ Considering the Channel as a sea, narrow, winding, contracted, and broken by headlands, it is affected by rapid tides, forming innumerable dangerous shelves and banks. By the climate, and by its form, it is subject to tempestuous and sudden changes of wind; so that the boldest and most experienced mariners, from arriving in soundings, in approaching the mouth of the Channel, even with a leading wind, and keeping in the fair way, till they get into port, seldom are at ease. This is meant in case of a single ship; but let any one so conversant in this navigation, with every advantage of ports in his favour, say what his feelings have been, when on board of a British fleet cruising in the Channel; and then we may judge with respect to a numerous fleet of large ships, strangers, with dark nights and blowing weather.”

To resume the thread of prefatory matter, and before entering more fully into the nature of Naval Evolutions, may be introduced the opinion of an honourable gallant Admiral, to whom the writer is indebted for many valuable remarks, and much useful information.

“ An Admiral must, in the formation of his fleet, begin with the rudiments; he should know the relative points of sailing of his fleet before any connected enterprise can be undertaken; and the orders of sailing, well attended to, appear the best sort of drill for this purpose. The numerous chops and changes to which all naval evolutions are liable, are only to be met with the eye of experience, seconded by the study of former examples brought to their

view by publications such as yours. It has been attempted by the French to bring all their practice under stated rules: Mons. de Grasse, after the action of the 12th of April, justified himself against the charges brought against him by the other flags of his fleet, by pleading his compliance with the Ordonnance du Roy, which specified a particular line of conduct under similar circumstances."

"The case was this; * Rodney's fleet, being to leeward of the enemy, was enabled, by a shift of wind during the action, to lead through the enemy's fleet; the Ordonnance said, that the French fleet was then to tack together; De Grasse made the signal for that purpose, which was not obeyed by Mons. De Vaudreuil, the second in command and his squadron, under the pretence that no man in his senses would have ordered such a manœuvre under an enemy's fire. Had it been executed we should not, however, have closed with them so soon.

"One disadvantage of being compelled to perform certain operations is, that the enemy may anticipate all your motions by becoming possessed of your rules of action; and so the recipe for a good Admiral is found in the person who combines theory and practice, is blessed with a clear head, and has his heart in the right place."

The writer considers that he should not do justice to the subject if he omitted to introduce, in this place, the opinions of other distinguished sea officers upon it.

"No man is more sensible than I am of the advantages to be derived from an intimate knowledge of naval tactics and evolutions. The more we are *au fait* on these points, and the more we are accustomed to manœuvre and change our divisions into different forms the better, although perhaps we should practise them less on the day of battle; we want a something to enable us to *think with advantage before the time comes*, and to *act upon it when it arrives*; and nothing is more calculated to give us those essentials than a sensible and clear detail of naval actions and manœuvres."

* See Remark at the end of Preface.

"In whatever arts other nations have excelled, it seems to be universally agreed among maritime powers, that Britain has been most successful in improving the management, and exerting the force employed in ships. This is evinced by the applications which have been made by the different courts of Europe, during a course of many years, to admit *foreign sea officers to be instructed in the art of naval defence in British ships of war.** How far wisdom required a compliance with those requests is not doubtful among sea officers, who are also seamen, and well acquainted with the progress of defensive naval knowledge. But, unfortunately, it seems to be impossible to convince landmen, who are indebted for very extensive blessings to the surrounding sea, that any quality but courage is necessary to those who are to prevent an enemy from setting his foot in this island. Because stupidity and ignorance have, by accidents, returned victorious; because fortune has changed the most gross blunders into success; and because something must always depend upon sudden or unforeseen alterations in the wind and weather, does it, therefore, follow that where so many complicated objects present themselves for consideration, much must not depend upon skill, penetration, and experience? But the feeble attempts of seamen to elucidate the value of professional attainments are still doomed to be neglected and lost; because thousands of authors, who have written well upon subjects of which they had a perfect knowledge, have likewise presumed to write, and have obtained credit for their opinions, upon what they could not possibly understand."

We are told by Mr. Clerk, in his Introduction, that, "in the first of three dreadful wars with the Dutch, we had nine pitched battles; in the second, five; and in the third, not less than five also; making in all nineteen general engagements:" yet he has never once mentioned the mode, then practised, of

* Should we imprudently continue the practice of admitting foreign officers into our ships, to teach them the art of offensive and defensive warfare, the publication of a work of this nature, impolitic as it is considered by some, cannot be objectionable. A policy too liberal for our future security seems to have dictated this indulgence; it is much to be wished, that in this, and many other respects, it were followed by one more strictly and exclusively *British*.

cutting through each other's line, descriptions of which are given in the treatise of Le Père Paul Hosta.

One of these battles, Mr. Clerk observes, " was renewed for three additional days successively; * another, for two days; and a third, for one day, which may fairly be stated for other six engagements; making, when taken together, twenty-five days of general actions." And, after speaking of the renowned Blake, he continues, " In all of these enterprizes, whether with the Spaniards or the Dutch; whether in making the attack on castles, ships in harbours, or encountering ship with ship in close action, and *formed in line of battle*, we shall find the British seamen, whether equal or inferior in number, victorious or worsted, invariably fired with such enthusiastic courage, that these battles, though not always decisive, were constantly marked with strong effect; ten, twenty, thirty, or more ships being taken or destroyed; two thousand men killed, and as many taken prisoners."

In all his reasoning he shows, with truth and success, that our defeats were never owing to a want of spirit, but to a deficiency of tactical knowledge and experience; such as an inquiry, like his, was calculated to remove.

To a design so beneficial, an attempt has been made in the present work to contribute.

Strongly impressed with the magnitude of the subject, the writer submits it to the judgment of the Naval Profession, and to the liberal consideration of the first maritime people in the world.

He cannot better express his own sentiments than in the language of Mr. Lediard,† who, in the beginning of his Preface, observes, " that our trade

* " From the great improvements in gunnery, all future naval contests must be speedily decided. The three days' battle off Portland may be settled in as many hours; and therefore he who best knows how *to go at it* must win the day—hence the greater value of your work."

Another professional friend observes, " Taking the general tenor of your book, I think it is the first that has been published for the purpose of exciting a temperate and manly discussion upon the various defects attaching to particular systems, and of the different modes of remedying them. I know of no other at the present day, and I look upon it with hope as the commencement of a series that may perchance follow."

† See Lediard's Naval History.

is the mother and nurse of our seamen—our seamen the life of our fleet—and our fleet the security and protection of our trade—and that both together are the wealth, strength, and glory of Great Britain.” A modern intelligent writer has similar “Thoughts” upon the same subject.

“After an Englishman has passed a year on the burning soil of India and again treads the deck of an English ship, listens to, and looks upon her brave and active crew, feels her bounding over the ocean, and thinks of home and the wooden walls which defend it, he has a throb of heartfelt delight and innocent pride, which none but a Briton can know. The sea is his element; * it encircles, it guards his native land; it bears him forth from pole to pole to do her pleasure, to carry out the fruit of her labour, and bring her back the produce of distant lands; it bears him to protect her friends, to assail her enemies, or to do her blessed errands of charity and peace; it brings him home to her with the rich harvests of wealth and glory, or the yet richer of gratitude.” (“Thoughts on Board Ship,” *Sketches of India*. 2d. Edit. By an Officer, 1824.)

They who may expect a regular series of historical events will be disappointed; as those treated of are, in themselves, separate and distinct cases, examined upon their own merits, with such lights and illustrations as, during a considerable period, have presented themselves.

The reasoning of the writer, or of others, will either be blended with the subject itself, or given immediately afterwards. The *notes* will be placed at the bottom. What is not the writer's will be distinguished by inverted commas. That which is copied or borrowed is acknowledged; for the rest the writer himself is accountable.

While some additions have been made in different parts of the work, a new arrangement, and a considerable reduction has taken place in others, which it is hoped will render the whole less objectionable.

* This character is strongly portrayed in the English male children, who are never so happy as when they can make or procure a little cutter or boat, and run to the first stream or pool of water, or even a tub, to sail in. What are the playthings of children on the continent? Drums, and muskets, and long swords, in which the parents delight to dress their boys at a very early age.

All that is *exclusively* tactical, or not connected with the battles, has in this volume been omitted; at the same time a little improvement will be found in some of the plates, which may offer, in a few instances, different modes of proceeding: and an entirely new plate is given of the battle of the Nile; with the addition of the battle of Navarin.

Remark. “ I doubt whether, on the 12th of April, the breaking the line came within Rodney’s plan of attack; or he never would have allowed his van to have run to leeward of the enemy.

“ I strongly suspect it was change of wind, and the Captain of the fleet, that caused the ‘ Formidable ’ * to do it.

“ Was the chance of our English fleet passing through a French line ever contemplated in the Ordonnance du Roy, and did De Grasse ever tack after Rodney passed through his line? ”

* The Formidable was the ship that bore the flag of Sir G. B. Rodney on the 12th of April, 1782.

GENERAL CONTENTS.

PART I.

	Year.	Page
DEDICATION		iii
List of Subscribers		v
Preface		vii
Explanation of Sea Terms		xxv
Some Account of the Battle of Beachey Head, from a Manuscript in the possession of, and favoured by Viscount Torrington	1690	1
———— of a violent Storm, from ditto	1703	3
Attack upon Gibraltar, ditto	1704	5
Battle of Malaga, ditto	1704	9
———— Messina, from Corbett's Narrative, &c., ditto	1718	12
———— Mathews and La Court	1744	16
———— Anson and La Jonquiere	1747	22
———— Hawke and L'Etendiere	1747	23
———— Knowles and Reggio	1748	32
———— Hon. John Byng, with Extracts from Ramatuelle	1756	35
———— Pococke, three Actions	1758, 1759	39
———— Boscawen and De la Clue, with a manuscript Account, and of the Use of Cables and Umbrellas, and on driving a-shore ..	1759	45
———— Hawke and Conflans	1759	59
———— Keppel	1778	66
———— Lord Howe and Mons. D'Estaing, off Sandy Hook	1778	72
———— Barrington and D'Estaing, with Remarks from Ramatuelle ..	1778	91
———— Hon. John Byron, with Extracts from the Journal of an Officer on board the Flag-ship	1779	95
———— Hyde Parker and De la Motte, with Remarks from the Journal of the Princess Royal, and Ramatuelle	1779	98
———— Rodney and Langara, with Extracts from Paul Hoste, &c.	1780	100
———— Hyde Parker and De Guichen, Manuscript, with Drawing and Plan, by an Officer present	1780	109

GENERAL CONTENTS.

	Year.	Page.
Battle of Rodney, in April, with Remarks from the Journal of the Princess Royal	1780	112
———— Rodney,	May, 1780	116
———— Arbuthnot, with Remarks upon Naval Gunnery by Sir H. Douglas, and by Ramatuelle	1781	124
———— Sir Samuel Hood, with a manuscript Letter	1781	131
———— Parker, Dogger Bank, with Manuscripts, &c.; some Mis-statements by Ramatuelle of the Attack at Port Praya, and Remarks on " <i>l'abordage</i> ."	1781	137
———— Hon. W. Cornwallis and La Motte Piquet	1780	148
———— Mons. Terney	1780	150
———— Admiral Graves	1781	152
———— Sir Samuel Hood at St. Kitts', with a Mis-statement of Ramatuelle	1782	156
Manuscript Journal of the Capture of Nevis	1782	159
Battle of Lord Rodney, on the 9th and 12th of April; with further Extracts from Paul Hoste and Ramatuelle	1782	170
———— Sir Edward Hughes	February, 1782	180
————, with Remarks by Ramatuelle	April, 1782	185
————	July, 1782	187
————	September, 1782	191
————	1783	195
———— Lord Howe with the Combined Fleets, and Remarks by Ramatuelle	1782	199

PART II.

Introduction		*203
Battle of Earl Howe with the Revolutionary Fleet of France	1794	207
————, a French Account		217
———— Lord Hotham, off Genoa, with Extracts from Paul Hoste	1795	221
————, off the Hieres	1795	226
———— Lord Bridport, off L'Orient	1795	228
Retreat of the Hon. W. Cornwallis, with Remarks upon Waring and Manœuvring a Fleet	1795	230
Battle of Earl St. Vincent, with a manuscript Letter, and Remarks by Officers present	1797	239

GENERAL CONTENTS.

xxi

	Year.	Page.
MS. Letter from Sir W. Parker		242
Battle of Lord Duncan	1797	250
MS. Letter from Captain W. O'Brien Drury, of H. M. Ship Powerful		252
Battle of the Nile, with two manuscript Letters by Officers present	1798	257
———— French Account		265
Track of the Ethalion, &c. to the Battle off Tory Island	1798	268
Battle of Sir John Warren, with Remarks upon " James's Naval History"	1798	270
———— Sir James Saumarez, with Remarks from Ramatuelle	1801	273
Captain Ferris's Account of the Loss of the Hannibal, at Algeziras		274
Battle of Sir James Saumarez in the Straits of Gibraltar	1801	278
Extract of a manuscript Letter from Lord Nelson to the Right Hon. J. Trevor	1801	283
Battle of Sir Robert Calder	1805	283
———— Trafalgar, with Manuscripts, and Remarks upon " James's Naval History "	1805	287
The Use of Fire-ships		305
Battle of Sir Richard Strachan	1805	313
———— Sir John Duckworth	1806	315
———— at the Dardanelles	1807	318
Fitting and Orders for the Attack upon Algiers, with Traits of Lord Exmouth	1816	322
Bay and Battle of Navarin, by an Officer in the Battle	1827	333
Appendix, No. I., an Umbrella		351
———— No. II., Defensive Armour		353

LIST OF PLATES.

No.	Description	Page.
I.	Battle of Mathews and La Court	21
II.	the Hon. John Byng	35
III.	Admiral Pococke	39
IV.	Hawke and Conflans	65
V.	Hon. Admiral A. Keppel	71
VI.	Lord Howe, Sandy Hook	87
VII.	Hon. Admiral S. Barrington, St. Lucie	94
VIII.	Hon. Admiral John Byron	97
IX.	Admiral Hyde Parker and De Guichen, by an Officer present	111
X.	Sir George Rodney and De Guichen	113
XI.	Rodney (in May) and Arbuthnot with De Guichen	117
XII. } XIII. }	Hon. W. Cornwallis and Mons. Terney	151
XIV. } XV. }	Admiral Graves, from the Log of the Flag Ship	153 156
XVI. } XVII. }	Sir Samuel Hood, at St. Kitt's	157 158
XVIII. } XIX. }	Sir George Rodney, on the 9th and 12th of April, 1782 ..	172 180
XX.	Sir Edward Hughes and Mons. Suffrein	184
XXI.	second Battle	186
XXII.	July 15th, 1782 ..	190
XXIII.	September 30, 1782, ..	194
XXIV.	with a Shift of Wind, July 25, 1783 ..	194
XXV.	Lord Howe with the Combined Fleets, October, 1782 ..	202
XXVI. } to } XXX. }	Earl Howe with the Revolutionary Fleet of France; with a Mode of Attack Proposed	208 209 214
XXXI.	Admiral Hotham, off Genoa ..	222
XXXII.	off the Hieres	226

LIST OF PLATES.

No.		Page.
XXXIII. } XXXIV. }	Retreat of Admiral the Hon. W. Cornwallis	231
XXXV. } XXXVI. }	Battle of Sir John Jervis, off Cape St. Vincent	{ 239 246
XXXVII. } XXXVIII. }	——— Admiral Duncan, off Camperdown, by an Officer present ..	{ 254 256
XXXIX.*	——— Nelson, at the Nile, by an Officer present	262
XL.	Track of the Ethalion, &c	269
XLI.	Battle off Tory Island	272
XLII.	——— according to Sir Edward Thornborough	ib.
XLIII. } XLIV. }	Battle of Sir James Saumarez in the Straits of Gibraltar	279
XLV.	——— Sir Robert Calder	284
XLVI. } XLVII. }	——— Trafalgar, supposed Attack	{ 289 290
XLVIII. } XLIX. }	——— real Attack, by an Officer present at the Battle ..	{ 299 308
L.	——— Sir John Duckworth, at St. Domingo, by an Officer in the Battle	316
LI.	——— at the Dardanelles	322
LII.	Town and Batteries of Algiers	327
LIII.	Bay and Battle of Navarin, by a British Officer distinguished in the Battle	349
LIV.	Situations at different Parts of the Engagement	ib.

ERRATA.

Page 158, line 8 from bottom, *for presents read present.*

—— 190, *for Plate XIV. read XXII.*

—— 191, note, *read upon the parallel lines C D.*

—— 200 and 202, *for Plate XXIV. read XXV.*

—— 202, line 20, *for Steward read Stewart.*

—— 214, note, *for Plate V. read Plate XXX.*

—— 215, head line, *for Admiral Hotham read Earl Howe.*

—— 229, head line, *for Admiral Hotham read Lord Bridport.*

—— 273, line 8, *for and read et.*

N. B. In plate XLIX., the left hand figure, the ship *Temeraire*, is marked as Spanish instead of English.

* This plate has been inadvertently printed without a *number*.

EXPLANATION OF SEA TERMS

USED IN THIS WORK.

TO READERS not acquainted with Professional Language, the following Explanations may be necessary.

To be *Athwart hawse*, is to lie across the fore-foot or bows of another ship.

To *Answer the helm*. A ship is said not to answer the helm well, if she be found slow in complying with its movements; this may arise from various causes, and a quality that differs in different ships; depending either upon the form or build of the ship, the placing of the masts, the trim or stowage, a defective rudder, the state of the weather, and an unskilful or improper disposition of the sails.

*A-beam.** *Abaft* the beam, is a situation or position between the direct line a-beam and the quarter. *Before* the beam, is between the beam and the bow. A vessel bearing directly a-beam, or *a-breast* of you, when within a moderate distance, is the same thing.

Abaft, generally signifies the after-part of a ship or boat; or that nearest the stern.

To *Bear away*, is, when upon a wind, to shape a course more to leeward; to keep away from the wind. In this manner Lord Howe bore up, to bear down upon the enemy on the 1st of June; Lord Duncan at Camperdown, and Lord Nelson at Trafalgar.

Bearing up, and *Bearing down*, although seemingly *opposite*, frequently mean the same thing, and may consequently confuse those not conversant with sea phrases; for instance, one ship (or fleet) *close hauled*, right to windward of another, and wishing to speak or bring it to action, must first *bear up* (sail large or before the wind) and is then *bearing down* upon the ship or fleet to leeward.

Bent, and *unbent*. The sails of a ship are said to be *bent* when they are attached to the yards ready for use; and *unbent* is the reverse.

To *Box off*, is when a ship, having got up in the wind, or being taken with the wind a-head, the head-yards are braced round to counteract its effect, and prevent the ship from being turned round against your inclination; if this be done promptly, and the *after-sail*, i. e. that upon the main and mizen-masts, and helm, are properly attended to, the ship is continued on the same tack; but making a course so many points to leeward of her former one as the wind may have shifted.

To *Bring-to a vessel*, is, by firing a shot over or across her, to cause her to shorten or

* Any object is said to be on the *Beam*, when it is situated in a line drawn through the main-mast, at right angles with the keel, or other fore and aft line; or in the direction to which the *midship beam* of the ship points, on either side.

reduce her sail ; and, backing her main or fore-top-sail, to wait for you. You bring or *heave-to*, your *own* ship, but can only *bring-to* another.

To *Broach-to*, is when, by the violence of the wind or a heavy sea upon the quarter of the ship, she is forced up to windward of her course or proper direction, in defiance of the helm.

Cap. The lower cap is a thick block of elm, with a round hole in the fore-part for the top-mast to enter, and a square one shaft to fit the lower mast-head : the round hole is generally leathered within, &c.

Cat-head, is a strong projection from the fore-castle on each bow of every ship (furnished with *sheaves* or strong pulleys), to which the anchor is lifted, after it has been hove up to the bow even with the surface of the water. The anchor is then *catted*, and afterwards *fished* by means of another, a temporary projection from the fore-chains (or channels), called a davit, whence proceeds a large hook and tackle ; the hook being applied to the inner arm of the anchor, it is then *fished* and brought into its place.

The *Chains* (or channels) of a ship, are those strong projections from the ship's sides below the quarter-deck and fore-castle-ports in large ships, but above the guns in small ones, to which the shrouds and rigging of the lower masts are carried, and secured by means of wooden blocks or *dead-eyes*, strongly chained and bolted to the ship's sides below it ; forming a sufficient angle of support. They are distinguished, by main, fore, and mizen-chains.

Clue-garnet, main or fore, is a rope running double from nearly the centre of the main or fore-yard, to the clues or corners of the sail to which the tack and sheet are affixed : and is the principal means of cluing up, or taking in the sail.

“ And while the lee *clue-garnet's* lowered away,
Taut *aft* the *sheet* they tally and belay.”—SHIPWRECK.*

Clinch. The outer end of the cable is *clinched* to the ring of the anchor ; the inner end, of the inner cable, to the main-mast, or main-beam. It is a particular mode of *fastening* by *seizings*. (See Darcy Lever.)

Close-hauled. A ship or fleet is said to be close hauled, when, with the yards braced up, on either tack, it is sailing as near the wind as it is possible to approach it. It is the contrary of sailing *free*, *large*, or *before the wind*.

Conning a ship, is to *direct* the principal man at the wheel in steering the ship. This is usually done by a superior seaman termed a quarter-master ; but, in all difficult cases and anxious times, it is performed by the captain or master.

To *Double upon*, is by getting both to windward and to leeward of your enemy, to place him between two fires, and to prevent his escape in either direction ; or it is from one position to gain the other.

To *Fill and stand on*, is a signal made after lying by, to direct the fleet to fill their main-top-sails and continue the course.

* For a beautiful introduction of sea language in a poem, see “ *Falconer's Shipwreck*.” See also a copious explanation of sea terms in the Appendix to “ *Campbell's Admirals*,” vol. viii.

Forward, means the fore part of the ship or towards the bows; *aft*, that towards the stern.

In the *Grain of*, is immediately preceding another ship in the same direction.

To *Gripe*, is when, by carrying too much sail in the after-part or stern of the ship, she is found to incline too much to windward, and to require a constant application of the *weather-helm*, or the helm moved to windward, to counteract its effect. It is the reverse of carrying a lee-helm.

Hauling the wind, or *coming to the wind*, on the starboard or larboard tack, is, when sailing free, or large, or before the wind, by a movement of the helm and a correspondent disposition of the yards and sails, to bring the ship's head up to six points from the wind, to starboard or port.

Hawse, or *hawse-holes*. Those apertures in the bows of a ship through which the cables communicate with the anchors.

To *Heave-to*, is to change from an advancing or progressive motion, to that which is stationary or lying-to.

Heaving to an anchor, is the process, by means of the capstan, &c., of taking in all the cable until the ship is brought immediately over her anchor, preparatory to its being weighed out of the ground. If proper sail be set on the ship, and the cable then *cut*, she could not drift, but proceed in the direction required. When the water is deep, it requires a considerable time to heave the anchor to the bows and to stow it; this must be done before any considerable degree of velocity can be given to the ship's motion.

Knotting. In Darcy Lever's excellent work, "The Young Sea Officer's Sheet Anchor," are described and illustrated with Plates, fifteen different kinds of knots, of which the *shroud knot* is one. "This knot is used when a shroud is either shot or carried away.


The *knotting* and *splicing* is spoken of in the detail of the battle of Trafalgar.

Shrouds are *knotted*, *cables* are *spliced* when cut by shot.

Lasking, signifies a course steered by a ship in a slanting or oblique direction from the wind; it is the same as going free, or large.

To *Leeward* of an object, is when it is between you and the point of direction of the wind; for instance, A, the wind; B, a bluff, or point of land; C, a ship sailing close under the lee of it, and to windward of others at D and E; which are to leeward of her.

In this manner, Hawke was to leeward of the Island of Belleisle, but to windward of the fleet of Mons. Conflans.



To *Lye-to*, is so to dispose the sails that the ship becomes nearly stationary.

Luffing up, or *Luffing up under the lee of*, is, by a sudden movement of the helm to leeward, to cause the ship's head to approach nearer to the wind or to the object you wish to close with.

In this manner Lord Howe, after passing through the French line, luffed up close under the lee of the Montaigne to engage her close. The same was done by Lords Nelson and Collingwood at Trafalgar, and by Lord Duncan and Sir Richard Onslow at Camperdown.

Main-sheet, is a large rope affixed to the lower corner of the main-sail, by which it is hauled aft, into its place when set.

Main-tack, is another large rope affixed to the same corner of the sail, but to haul it on board, or down to the chess-tree on the fore-part of the gangway, when set upon a wind or close-hauled. When the tack fixed to one corner of the sail is hauled on board, the *sheet* of the *other* corner is hauled *aft*. In large ships they are both generally double, running through blocks (or pulleys) fixed to the roping of the sail.

The *fore-sail* also is furnished with similar *gear*.

To *Overhaul*, is to examine. If applied to ships in chase, it signifies that one is gaining upon another very fast.

Preventer. Preventer *braces* are necessary as well in bad weather as in battle; and are applied in both cases to prevent accidents arising from the original braces, or brace-blocks, &c. giving way; they are, at the same time, an additional support to the yard.

To *Rake fore and aft*, is so to place one ship against another, that by her whole broadside she can sweep the decks of the other without being exposed to more of her guns than she can bring to bear from her *bows* or *stern*. It is to lie athwart the *hawse*, or across the stern of a ship.

To *Round-to*, is, when going large or before the wind, to come round towards the wind by the movement of the helm. To *Pay round off*, is, when near the wind, to fall off from it against the helm, and in spite of every effort to prevent it.

Slipping the cable. This is done by ships when it is necessary, for a particular object, to get under sail with every possible dispatch. For instance, Admiral Hyde Parker, with the squadron under his command, slipped and put to sea from Gros-Islet Bay, St. Lucia, to protect a convoy from the superior force of the Count de Guichen, then in sight. It is done by unsplicing the cable within, to the end of which has previously been affixed a buoy and buoy-rope, to show where the ship has left her anchor: sometimes boats are left with the end of the cable in them for the same purpose, when it can be again received into the ship with still greater facility.

Slings to the yards are chains or ropes for suspending them by the centre. The lower yards are slung upon preparing for sea; the top-sail-yards only upon going into battle; as a *preventer* to their coming down when they are required to keep their place, and when *tyes*, *halliards*, &c. are shot away. The lower-yards are slung with a chain only on going into action.

Splice. Ropes are joined together for different purposes, by uniting their strands in particular forms, which is termed splicing. "A splice is made by opening and separating the strands of a rope, and thrusting them through the others which are not unlaid." See Darcy Lever's work.

A *Spring*; to *Anchor with a Spring*, is, before coming to an anchor, to cause the end of a smaller cable or hawser, passed out of a stern or quarter-port, and taken outside of

the ship, forward, to be bent (or fastened) to the ring of the anchor you intend to let go, and left clear and ready for running with it.

By means of a spring, when anchored in any place *head to wind*, you can, by heaving it *taught* (or tight) and *paying out cable*, bring the ship's *broadside* to bear upon a battery, or upon an enemy when approaching you on the bow, or a stern.

A spring may also be clapt upon the *cable* of a ship already anchored, and, when hove taught, and the cable payed out as before, answers the same purpose.

In this manner, the ship, the cable, and the spring, form a triangle, of which the broadside is the base presented to the object of attack.

It may sometimes be necessary to clap on two springs upon the same anchor or cable; by this means the ship is hove whichever way is best, and will present either side you please to the enemy.

To *Spring* a mast. A mast or yard is said to be sprung, when a flaw has been discovered in it, or a sudden rend or split, occasioned either by carrying too great a pressure of sail upon it, or by a heavy pitch or jerk of the ship in a head-sea; sometimes, from want of attention in setting up, or tightening the rigging of it.

To *Stand on*, signifies a ship continuing in the same direction, when others may be acting differently.

Starboard, Larboard, and Port. Starboard means to the right-hand, when looking towards the ship's head: larboard the left-hand. To-port means also to the left; but applied to different things, for instance, *put the helm a-port*, is to move it to the larboard side; but it is never said, *put the helm a-larboard*; although usual to say, *starboard the helm*, or *put the helm a-starboard*: a ship veers, or pays round to starboard, and *to-port*, but not to larboard.

Starboard and Larboard Tacks. With the starboard tacks on board, or standing on the starboard tack, a ship is braced close with the wind on her starboard side, six points from the line of her direction. The larboard tack is the contrary; *port* in this case is never applied.

To be in *Stays*, or to *heave in Stays*, is to commence the operation of tacking, or *going-about*. A ship is said to *miss stays* when she has attempted to tack, and failed; either from the state of the weather, or from want of skill and attention on the part of the directing officer. A French line of battle ship is seen *in stays*, reconnoitring the British squadron, in Plate IX.

Stoppers, for rigging, are short pieces of rope, knotted at each end, to which *lanyards* are affixed for the purpose of applying them to a *stay* or a *shroud*, when shot away, as a temporary support.

Stoppers. Dog and deck stoppers are strong pieces of rope; the former securely fixed to the main-mast, or a beam below; the latter to the cable-deck ring-bolts, and knotted at the outer end, with a suitable lanyard affixed to it, for passing round the cable, to stop its running out. The dog-stopper is long, and without a knot. Both are applied to the cable in a particular, but in a different manner.

In the *Wake of*, is immediately following in the same track, or close behind another ship.

To *Tack*, signifies the operation of turning the ship's head round, against and in opposition to the direction of the wind. See Plate IX, a ship *tacking*. She has hauled round the *after-yards*; the head-yards are *a-box*.*


Taught "a corruption of tight."—Darcy Lever. At the end of Darcy Lever's most useful work, is an excellent "Dictionary of Sea Terms," to which the reader is referred for further particulars.

To *Turn*, in or out, or up, is said of ships when they are close-hauled and *tacking* from time to time, to reach a particular object to windward, whether it be an enemy, an anchorage, or otherwise. It is to contend with an adverse wind.

To *Ware* (or *Veer*), is to do the reverse; or to turn round by going *from* the wind and hauling to it gradually; or, as it is termed, *coming to the wind* upon the other tack. To *veer* is more properly applied to paying-out or giving out more cable, or hawser; as, when the anchor is let go, they *veer* away the cable, &c.

Windage of shot, is the space left by a shot not exactly fitting the bore of the gun it is intended for, and which alters its direction.

To *Windward*, is that position which is between the point of direction of the wind and another object; for instance, A, the point from whence the wind blows; B, position of a ship; C, point of land. The ship B, is to windward of the land C, and will therefore, should the wind not draw forward upon her, in all probability *weather* it.



To *Yaw*, is to cause a temporary deviation from the course the ship holds, for a particular purpose, and without making any alteration in the trim, or position of the sails.

* The ship in Plate IX, having reconnoitred the British squadron, is *going about*; she has already *hailed main-sail*, or braced about the *after-yards*; when the after-sails become nearly full upon that tack, she will *haul-of-all*, or haul round the *head-yards*, and the operation is completed. The head-yards in the Plate are still *a-back*, or *a-box*, and continue so until the ship has payed off sufficiently to fill the *after-sails*.

NAVAL BATTLES.

PART I.

NAVAL BATTLES.

THE naval battles of Great Britain, from the accession of the illustrious House of Hanover, commence with the name of *Byng*.

In the auspicious reign of George the First, Admiral Sir G. Byng, afterwards Viscount Torrington, was charged with an important mission to the court of the two Sicilies, on the part of the "Quadruple Alliance;" to execute which, a powerful fleet was equipped, and full instructions were given him to guard and defend its interests in the Mediterranean. That the reader may become in some degree acquainted with the character of this great officer, before he assumes the part of an ambassador, or appears as a commander-in-chief and a conqueror, it will be necessary to go back a little into some of the naval battles of the two preceding reigns, in which he acted in a less responsible situation; but at all times was distinguished for his patriotism, zeal, perseverance, and intrepidity. From a manuscript now in the possession of the family, kindly afforded for this work, to which His Royal Highness the Lord High Admiral has been graciously pleased to extend his fostering and paternal hand, the following extracts have been made, whereby some traits of the character of Sir G. Byng will be shown, and a judgment be formed of the battles in which it was his lot to bear a part; taken from journals, and other the purest sources of information kept by him, or found in his possession. If, with the manuscript before him, the writer had indulged himself as freely as he felt inclined, he would have been induced to invade the province of the historian or the biographer; but adhering to his original design, he has merely selected such parts only as he considers may contribute to a further illustration of the characters of celebrated men, and the achievements of former days.

The first of this description in which, then Captain, Byng distinguished himself in a ship of the line, was in

THE BATTLE OF BEACHY HEAD.

1690.

In this, we are told, that, "It was about nine o'clock when the Dutch, who led the van with their starboard tacks on board, began the battle at cannon-

shot distance at first, but afterwards much nearer; and half an hour after the blue squadron in the rear; the red squadron was then at random-shot from the enemy, and at no time came nearer the French than half cannon-shot, which was partly occasioned *by a bow that was in the centre of both fleets*, and the whole engaged by backing and filling their topsails.

“ Sir Ralph Delaval, Vice-Admiral of the blue, kept his line at first with Lord Torrington (late Admiral Herbert); but when my Lord brought-to at the distance of twice cannon-shot, he however bore right down upon the French, receiving their shot fore and aft, and did not bring-to till he was within musket shot, and then engaged D'Etrée's squadron half an hour after the Dutch had began in the van; he pressed so much upon them, that, as they edged from him, he came at last almost into their line, and the French set all their sail, and were bearing away when the calm came, and then they towed from him with their boats. *Delaval having bore up when Lord Torrington hove-to, caused that great space between the van of the blue squadron and the rear of the red, which there was all the action; and the reason given for Lord Torrington not going nearer than he did, though he had wind enough for two hours after, was, to avoid being raked fore and aft.*”

“ As the Dutch did not stretch up to the head of their line before they began to engage, but left nine of the French ships a-head of them; these nine ships, about one o'clock, had *stretched a-head and weathered the van of the Dutch*, by which *they were engaged on both sides*, and then it fell so hard upon them that Admiral Vandeput was obliged to put all his division out of the line; they were very much shattered and disabled, in great confusion, and in danger from their own firing. It then falling calm, Lord Torrington gave orders to anchor, having himself, with several others, towed down between them and the enemy, and then anchored upon the tide of ebb. The French not anchoring, in about an hour after drove out of gun-shot, and so ended the battle, in which one Dutch ship was lost; for, having no anchors, she drove amongst the French. Captain Byng being second to the admiral of the red, was in the centre, had eight men killed, ten wounded, and eight guns split in the engagement.”

Arthur Herbert, created Earl of Torrington by King William, was the commander-in-chief in this battle, was tried by a court martial, and unanimously acquitted.

Captain Byng next commanded the Royal Oak, and formed one of the division of Sir John Ashby at the memorable battle of La Hague; but, owing entirely to circumstances, this division was not materially engaged. An excellent account is given of this celebrated defeat by Admiral Russell himself, in his

"Letter to Lord Nottingham," in "Campbell's Admirals;" we are there informed that the "Sandwich," one of Sir Cloudesley Shovel's division, drifted through the enemy's fleet, from not having *an anchor ready to let go*, when the division anchored, and that her Captain (Hastings) was killed.

From this period, Captain Byng will be brought before the reader as a flag officer; and, upon the following occasion, although neither arrayed against the enemies of his country, nor appearing in the brilliant career of victory, be no less distinguished in his professional character. The recital will serve to keep alive our interest and our regard for him, until he be again seen employed in the more active and important duties of his station.

In returning from the Mediterranean, in 1703, on board the Ranelagh, of eighty guns, when, on the morning of the 26th of November, about three leagues from the Lizard, they met with a dreadful gale, such as the oldest seaman amongst them had never before witnessed. It is thus related:—

"It now began to blow very hard; and, having made the land plain, he (Admiral Byng), judging it more advisable to shape a course up the channel, than to lay-by, stood away accordingly with the foresail the wind S. W., and the night was very dark. At about twelve o'clock a violent storm came down upon them at S. W. by S. and S. S. W., so violent that nobody could be heard but in the ear; and, though the ship scudded with but part of a foresail, it blew entirely from the yard, and soon after the ship broached-to to the southward, and then lay a hull, not being able to ware her, notwithstanding all the endeavours used, unless they had cut the main and mizen-masts by the board, as Baker did in his ship who lay along, and was expected to be lost every minute: but Admiral Byng, who, even in that great extremity, did not care to be deprived of his masts, was not convinced that it was reasonable to cut them away while any hope remained of saving the ship, though they had six feet of water in the hold, part of which was occasioned by a gun of the middle tier, which, breaking out of the carriage, went overboard out of the port to leeward: they had very great difficulty in securing the port again.

"They were not only thus pressed by the storm, almost without hopes of saving themselves, but an accident happened which had soon brought them to their end, but for the extraordinary exertion of one of the ship's company, who put them in a condition to continue pumping and bailing; for the chain-pump broke, and this man boldly undertook to repair it, by going down to the bottom, and had the good fortune to put it in order, for which great service he was preferred to be a gunner. They continued pumping and bailing for their lives till they were jaded, and, the water still gaining on them, they were ready to give it over.

Admiral Byng himself was quite spent with fatigue, and went into his cabin, and, sitting down in one of the lashed chairs, gave all over, and was now, for the first time, sensible that men might be rendered unable to stir, which he had never thought possible before. While he sat in this way, expecting every minute the ship would go down, *Davenport*, his lieutenant, came to acquaint him that not a man was able to work, and that they had given themselves over; but that, if he had any *brandy* to give them, it might spirit them up some little time longer. Admiral Byng ordered him what brandy they could get at; and *Davenport*, *lashing himself to the mast, doled it out himself to every man, exhorting them to struggle a little longer for their lives*: this he did in a strain of oratory peculiar to himself; part of it in a religious way, pointing out to them, in lively colours, how little they were prepared for the next world, and, therefore, how much *they ought to endeavour to preserve themselves in this; for, if the ship sunk, they would certainly be damned!!* The height of the gale was at about two o'clock in the morning.

“What with the brandy and his exhortations, the men acquired strength and resolution to renew their labours: they pumped and bailed, so as to keep the water from gaining any further upon them; by that time it was day, and the extremity of the weather began to abate; the wind slackened, and the pumps gained upon the ship, but, the tiller being broke in the head of the rudder, they lay till almost noon before they got in another; then they wore and stood in for the land. They saw no ship but the *Torbay*, which had her foretop-mast blown by the board, and had no sail upon her, for they were all blown from her yards, though furled.

“So great a sea was running, that no assistance could be given, and they made the Isle of Wight, still blowing a heavy gale, and anchored in the road of St. Helen's, being glad to get in where they could, for such a storm had never been in the memory of any man living. Spithead, and the shores around, were covered with wrecks.”

“In 1705, Sir G. Byng was very near sharing the unhappy fate of Sir Cloudeley Shovel, by being not more than a ship's length from the rocks upon which his ship struck. ‘The topsails of the *Royal Anne* were set in a minute of time,’ when one of the rocks was under her main chains; thus rescued from destruction by presence of mind, and the skill and activity of the officers and crew.”—(Campbell's Admirals, by Mr. Readhead Yorke, vol. vi. p. 122.)

THE ATTACK UPON GIBRALTAR.

1704.

AFTER the council of war, held by Sir G. Rooke in the Bay of Tetuan, it was determined to make an attack upon Gibraltar, and resolved that Admiral Byng should proceed with a part of the fleet immediately, and that the rest should follow upon the springing up of an easterly wind :—

“ These dispositions being settled, Sir G. Rooke made the signal for Admiral Byng to proceed with the squadron appointed, and he accordingly made sail for Gibraltar. The next morning, the wind being easterly, the whole fleet stood after him, and that afternoon came to an anchor there : Admiral Byng with his squadron before the town, and Sir G. Rooke with the rest of the fleet anchored from him, along in the *bite** of the bay towards the river. When Admiral Byng anchored, the town fired, and the shot went over them, but the main-mast of his ship was wounded, and, having orders not to attack the town before the Prince of Hesse had sent a summons and an answer was returned, he ordered the ships with him to warp a little further out. In about an hour after the fleet came to anchor, the signal was given to land the marines, which was done without any more opposition than by a party of about fifty horse, who went out of the town to the place where they landed at, and made an effort to oppose, but upon the fire of the grenadiers that first landed they returned into the town with the loss of one of their troopers. After this, the marines marched in good order to the mills that are within shot of the north part of the town, and posted themselves there ; then the Prince of Hesse sent a summons to the town to declare for King Charles the Third. But no answer returning that night, nor by break of day, Admiral Byng made the signal to draw into a line before the town, as before directed, which was to be as near one another as possible, and no ship to leave the line, though disabled, before he was acquainted with it. Accordingly, they all proceeded, warping to their stations, it being calm, and the town kept firing upon them now and then.

“ While this was doing, the Governor sent his answer to the Prince of Hesse, that he would defend the town to the last for King Philip the Fifth, to whom he had sworn.

“ Sir G. Rooke then sent five ships more to Admiral Byng, who had now twenty-two, and who disposed them in a line as near one another as possible, from the head of the New Mole to the southward, to the Old Mole, and to the

* *Bite*, or *bight*, further advanced into the bay, where it may be said to form a *bite*, or the shape of a *horse-shoe*.

northward of it. The English to the southward, and the Dutch to the northward; he placed two bombs with the Dutch, and the other just without his own ship. In this form they kept warping in all the next night, sending their boats before them to sound; and in the morning most of them had placed themselves pretty regular.

“In the night, Sir G. Rooke sent Captain Whitaker with boats manned and armed, to burn a French privateer within the Old Mole, which he performed; at the same time Admiral Byng ordered the bombs to play upon the town. The nature of the place did not admit of all the ships taking up the exact positions assigned them, and Admiral Byng’s ship, off the middle of the town, was in less than three fathoms and a half at low water.

“About five o’clock in the morning, 23d of July, the town began to fire at the ships, and Admiral Byng commenced the attack with a very furious fire, at which all the inhabitants, frightened, ran up the hill out of the town. The smoke in a short time was so great that they could not see any object to fire at, upon which Admiral Byng sent orders along the line to forbear, and fire only now and then; and at noon he caused them to cease altogether, to see if their fire had produced any effect.

“Captain Whitaker being at that time on board him, was sent with these orders, and while on board the Lennox, that lay nearest the Mole, he and Captain Jumper observing that several of the cannon of the castle and batteries were dismounted, and the men beat from their guns, Captain Whitaker returned to Admiral Byng with this information, upon which he immediately sent the boats of the line manned and armed, and Captain Whitaker he sent to Sir G. Rooke for more boats, when the signal was made for the boats of the fleet. In the mean time the boats of the line, under Captain Hicks (the senior officer), were ordered to land to the southward of the Mole head; soon after he was joined by Captain Whitaker and others, with the boats of the fleet, with orders to take possession of, and to reduce the place if possible.

“As the boats were proceeding to the shore, the inhabitants returned from the hills to the town again, and Admiral Byng perceived a number of *priests, women, and children*, who, to avoid danger in the town, had got out of it, and were going towards the *Chapel of our Lady of Europa*, but who, seeing the boats rowing for the shore, were making all haste into the town again.

“Sir Cloudesley Shovel happened to be on board with Admiral Byng at that time, and when the women were perceived in the narrow passage of the rocks, conducting back by the priests, he desired, out of *gaiété de cœur*, that a cannon shot might be fired that way, to frighten them, when they all ran away to the Convent of our Lady of Europa.

"Upon this gun being fired, the ships, taking it for a signal, renewed their attack upon the town, and under the cover of the fire, the sailors landed on the New Mole, and marched up to the castle and fortifications.

"*Davenport*, a brother of the General's, and one of Admiral Byng's lieutenants, with about thirty men, landed to the left of the covered way, and at the breach that was made, got over to the eastward of the castle, while the main number, finding the gates shut, and the drawbridge up, mounted the wall and palisades, and clambered over every thing they met, thinking of nothing but getting on; the nature of the places they got over were such as surprised the Prince of Hesse and every body who went afterwards to view them; while some were getting over, and others mounting, the castle blew up, and killed and wounded several: there were about 100 lost on this occasion.

"It seems uncertain, whether this was by accident or design, yet it so discouraged the sailors, that they made the best of their way to the boats. In their retreat they were met by Captain Whitaker, who turned them back, landed again, and marched up with little opposition, and took possession of the remaining part of the castle and bastion adjoining, with the redoubt, half-way between the New Mole and the town, and there he planted a union jack, determined to defend his post in the best manner he could.

"Admiral Byng and Sir G. Rooke, observing what was passing, sent Captain Whitaker all the support in their power, with orders to strengthen himself all he could, in his position, his force then amounting to 1500 men.

"Admiral Byng now went on board Sir G. Rooke, to consult upon what step to take next; when it was determined that Admiral Byng should send a drum with a summons to the town, by the south gate, from his camp of sailors, at the same time that the Prince of Hesse should send a summons from his camp of the marines, in the name of the King of Spain. Sir G. Rooke wrote accordingly to the Prince of Hesse to that effect, and gave orders to Admiral Byng as agreed upon, who immediately went on shore to the seamen's camp, and sent in the summons Sir G. Rooke had directed; he then went and viewed the different posts; and, as the women of the best fashion, with others, and their children, and some priests were at the Chapel of our Lady of Europa, Admiral Byng ordered the out-guards and centinels not to suffer any person to pass that way, lest they might be insulted.

"In the evening, the governor sent back the drums, with his answer, that they would deliver up the town, and the next morning would send out hostages, and capitulate on the terms that were promised him should be honourable. And the greatest inducement to the citizens to oblige the governor to this was, *from*

the English being between them and their women, for whom, lest any injuries might be offered them, they were in the greatest apprehensions. The next morning Admiral Byng went to the Prince of Hesse, to inform him of their position to the southward, and of the measures that had been taken.

"At this time the hostages arrived from the governor, in order to capitulate, and desired that their women might be kept from the rudeness of the sailors, and that he would release them; this seemed to be their great concern; and chiefly upon their release, offered one of the gates of the town. Admiral Byng assured them that no insult had been offered them, and told them of the care he had taken to protect them, by the guards he had posted; and this gave those gentlemen great satisfaction. After talking with the Prince of Hesse, Admiral Byng assured them, upon his honour, that he would immediately visit the women, and take them himself to the gates of the town; and, upon the performance of this, they promised to deliver up the gate to the Prince of Hesse; and then the articles of capitulation were agreed upon.

"Upon the signing of these articles, the governor delivered up the north gate, bastions, and fortifications, of that part of the town to the Prince of Hesse, who took possession of it with the marines; and, at the same time, Admiral Byng, keeping strictly to his word, delivered up the women to the south gate himself, but he did not let them pass him without *unveiling*."

The terms of capitulation may be found in the "Memoirs of Sir G. Rooke," Vol. iv. Campbell's Admirals, with a description of the attack, omitting, however, what has here been considered an interesting and an essential part of it.

"The same evening, the seamen embarked from the camp, leaving only 200 men in the castle and 50 men in the redoubt, where they remained until they were relieved by the marines. Thus the fleet unexpectedly took the town of Gibraltar, very much owing to the gallantry of the sailors, with the loss only of 61 killed, and 260 wounded. It must also be attributed to the incident of having the *women* in their possession; for that furious cannonading, in which it is reckoned they fired 14,000 shot, did so little injury to the town, that orders were going to be sent (if they were not sent) to cease firing, and to draw off the ships; but when, fortunately, the women were intercepted, and at the mercy of the enemy, it was enough to alarm the Spaniards sufficiently to give an unexpected turn to this affair, and to be the principal cause of the surrender."

It may here reasonably be asked, how is it that Gibraltar has not been always *garrisoned* by marines? the same of Malta; what eligible depôts of marines for the British fleets.

An "Historical review of the Royal Marine Corps," from its establishment in

1684, down to 1803, appears to have been written by a lieutenant, Alexander Gillespie, twenty-four years an officer in it, dedicated with permission to His Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence. This corps was first termed His Royal Highness the Duke of York and Albany's "*Maritime Regiment of Foot*," and commanded by the Honourable Sir Charles Littleton. It was also called the "*Admiral Regiment*."—For some account of this work see the 14th Vol. of the Naval Chronicle, page 50; the extracts there given are short, but interesting.

When the Mediterranean is so much the seat of naval war, what advantages might accrue from supplies of royal marines so near as at Gibraltar and Malta? * *Voltaire*, in some part of his writings, declares that Great Britain upon one occasion *went to war for a few acres of snow in Canada*; with this exception, and our wars with America, hostilities may be said generally to commence in the Mediterranean.

BATTLE OF MALAGA.

1704.

In the battle of Malaga in the same year, the manuscript informs us, that Sir G. Rooke was obliged to send to Gibraltar for some of the marines that had been left to garrison it, and by means of the fire ships and small vessels 1,000 marines were again embarked on board the fleet, to enable him to face the enemy, considerably superior in force, daily threatening an attack. Perceiving that the Count de Thoulouse by his manœuvres endeavoured to get between the British fleet and the Rock of Gibraltar, Sir G. Rooke, notwithstanding the weakened state of his ships from their want of ammunition, and of his inferiority in every respect, determined to attack him.

"He immediately bore down in line of battle with all the sail he could set, the wind blowing then east, with small gales, and while they were drawing near, the French were forming their line with their heads to the southward; Cape Malaga N. W. by W. eight leagues, all that night light winds and calms, next morning easterly gales, when they again bore down upon the French, who were still in line, with their heads to the southward, and braced-to, when they had formed it to their intention, and lay to receive the English fleet, giving them the opportunity of coming as near them as they pleased. *Their line was formed circular; their centre in a very great bite or half moon*, which the

* Were our colonies garrisoned by royal marines, the ships and colonies might recruit each other, and the health of all be much more materially preserved than by the present system.

Admiral supposed they did with an intent to gain the wind of the van or rear of the confederate fleets, with the help of their gallies if it should be little wind. They had fifty ships of the line, in which were 23,000 men, besides fire ships and frigates, and twenty-two gallies with 11,900.

"Some of these small frigates lay to leeward of their line, with the same flags or signals hoisted by their flag ships, which Admiral Byng supposed was with intention to repeat all signals made in action when, from the smoke, they could not be seen from the flag ships: this disposition Admiral Byng thought might be of great use in large fleets where the line is much extended.

"Their white and blue squadron led the van. In the centre was the Count de Thoulouse, and in the rear was the blue. Each squadron had an admiral, with vice and rear-admirals; in all nine, besides some chiefs of squadrons. They were strongest in the centre, for which reason their gallies were posted in the van and rear, but a small detachment of them attended Count Thoulouse ready to tow where there should be occasion.

"The English and Dutch consisted of fifty-three ships, of which Sir G. Rooke ordered two fourth rates, with two frigates and two fire-ships to lay to windward of him, that if *the enemy's line should endeavour to pass through the line* with their gallies and fire-ships, they might prevent them.

"Of the confederate fleet, Sir Cloudesley Shovel led the van. In the centre was Sir G. Rooke, and in the rear was the Dutch, commanded by Admiral Callemberg; but the superiority of the French was so manifest that great disinclination was shown both by Sir G. Rooke and the Dutch to bear down upon them too closely. Sir C. Shovel engaged the van within half-gun shot. Admiral Byng sent frequently to the Dutch to desire they would come nearer the enemy to assist him; but this part of the French line so much surpassed them in the bigness of their ships and number of guns, that none of them were so ready to engage them, though they all did by degrees at last very warmly. When the Count de Thoulouse saw that Sir G. Rooke brought to so far to windward, he made the signal for the van and rear of his fleet to make sail, then got both his tacks on board, and all the fleet made sail at once as if with design to weather the English; but it was to move up as near to them as the wind would permit. Upon this Sir G. Rooke made signal to engage, thinking the enemy were going off; and so the battle began, and was continued with great fury on both sides; and with various success; for it seems, though the van and rear of the enemy towards night gave way, the centre, so much stronger than the division of Sir G. Rooke, maintained its position and caused it to suffer severely. So did those of Admiral Byng and Admiral Dilks, who were obliged to haul to windward of

the line for want of shot, which had not been equally distributed through the fleet after the expenditure at Gibraltar.

"In short, the British fleet suffered very much in this unequal contest. Sir G. Rooke and Sir George Jennings particularly distinguished themselves, with others before-named, and Admiral Callemberg behaved with great bravery, his ship getting very roughly treated. The battle continued until after sun-set, when the French turned from them out of shot, and both sides left off firing, standing on under easy sail all night."

It appears the Count de Thoulouse kept his lights abroad, and which Sir G. Rooke did not; upon which an awkward circumstance was nearly befalling Admiral Byng, who, mistaking the lights of the French admiral for those of his own, put off in his boat to pay him a visit; he went so near the French admiral as to be hailed several times, when, perceiving his mistake, he rowed away from him as fast as he could, and regained his own, the only flag ship carrying lights. The next morning the French had the wind of the English, and formed their line, but did not appear inclined to approach, but lay-to at the distance of three leagues; the English fleet also formed in line to leeward, awaiting the attack, should it be the intention of the enemy to make it; but both fleets seem to have had enough of it; nor indeed could the English fleet have engaged with any prospect of success. After repairing their damages as well as they could, and making an equal division, too, of the stores and ammunition remaining in the fleet, it was resolved in a council of war to proceed to Gibraltar, and, at all hazards, to make their way through the French fleet, should it oppose itself to their design: however, the French supposed themselves beaten, and had no intention to renew the fight.

In their progress to Gibraltar it appears that the Albemarle of sixty-four guns, in which ship Admiral Callemberg had fought, but had removed from, after she had been filling of powder, *blew up*, and but nine men, who were taken up in the water, were saved. Two days after the fleet anchored in a line in Gibraltar Bay, and received the salutes from the garrison, which fired a salvo of great guns and small arms for the victory. Besides the size of their ships, the French in this battle had a superiority of 600 great guns, with clean ships, lately out of port, and much better supplied with ammunition.

The manuscript is declared to be written and formed from the most impartial view of the whole of the proceedings, and from the purest sources of information; namely, the journals, papers, and other authentic documents of Admiral Byng, who was a party in all he relates. Much is said of the bravery of many of the French officers, particularly of the Bailli de Loraine, one

of the seconds to the Count de Thoulouse, who encouraged his men to do their duty when he had but a few hours to live. Sir George Jennings in the *St. George* was latterly opposed to him; had twenty-five guns disabled on the fighting side, and got others over to supply the loss, and though having suffered very severely himself, obliged the other to quit the line, assisted by their gallies.

“Admiral Byng had near the same usage with the rest, and Cowe, the captain of his ship, had his head shot off; he suffered the more by the Dutch squadron keeping at the great distance they did until the afternoon: this made Admiral Byng take upon himself to send to them to desire they would bear down, some of them laying to windward of the rear of his division, and *some of them got on the other side of his division and fired over at the French*, which obliged him to desire they would forbear, some of his ships being struck by the Dutch; this made one of the captains of his division set down in the report he made of the condition of his ship after the battle—*two shot received from the Dutch to one of the French!*—But the Dutch afterwards bore down, and some of them, especially Admiral Callemberg’s own ship, took their share of the battle!”

After a council of war, all the marines that could possibly be spared from the ships were to be relanded at Gibraltar, sixty great guns, with their carriages, as many gunners, and twelve carpenters, pursuant to the request made by the Prince of Hesse. The two bomb ships with their tenders were also left, with such a proportion of the fleet as were in a condition to remain the winter; all under the command of Sir J. Leake. In pursuance of these resolutions 2,000 marines were sent on shore; forty-eight cannon, in addition to the hundred that were in the town before, with a quantity of stores and provisions. It was then determined to quit the straits the first fair wind; the fleet, or most disabled ships, to return to England with Sir G. Rooke, while those to be left were to repair to Lisbon, under Sir J. Leake, to be refitted.

BATTLE OF MESSINA.

In the year 1718, England was involved in a rupture with Spain, and for the purpose before-mentioned a fleet of twenty-one ships was equipped with all expedition, under the command of Sir G. Byng, and directed to sail to Naples, then threatened with a Spanish army. He was there informed that the Spaniards, to the amount of 30,000 men, had already landed in Sicily; upon which he

immediately resolved to sail thither, and to pursue the fleet in which they had embarked under Don Antonio De Castaneta.

Upon rounding Cape Faro, he perceived two small Spanish vessels, and following them closely, they led him to their main fleet, which before noon he discovered in line of battle, amounting in all to twenty-seven sail. The Spaniards attempted to get away, but the British, as this historian (Goldsmith) observes, "had for some time acquired such expertness in naval affairs, that no other nation would attempt to face them but with manifest disadvantage." An ardent pursuit then commenced, their commanders behaving with courage and activity; notwithstanding which, all excepting six were taken. These six were saved by the conduct of Cammock, their vice-admiral, a native of Ireland.—(See some account of him in Campbell's Admirals," Vol. vi.) Mr. Corbett informs us, that the conduct of the Spanish Government to the English merchants in their ports and harbours was cruel and unwarrantable, and that *our* merchant ships were compelled to become transports for *their* troops, or their masters were liable to the severest punishments if they refused. They were made prizes of when met at sea though bound to Italy; and upon one occasion, "Rear-Admiral Cammock pressed no less than sixty men for his own ship, and one of the masters, endeavouring to keep his men, *had both his ears cut off!!*" (Expedition to Sicily, p. 41.)

Sir G. Byng appears to have accomplished this service with equal resolution and address; the King wrote him a letter with his own hand, approving of his conduct. He also received distinguished honours from the Emperor and from the King of Sardinia.

The British Admiral was drawing fast up with the Spanish fleet, having four rear-admirals, when a rear-admiral, with six ships of war, some gallies and store-ships stood in for the Sicilian shore, upon which Captain Walton in the Canterbury, with five more, were dispatched after them, and a running fight succeeded.

The Santa Rosa and Santa Carlos struck to the Orford and Kent; the Grafton warmly attacked the Prince of Asturias and left her to be taken by the Bredah and Captain; for, being one of the best sailing ships, she passed on to others of the enemy.

The Kent and Superb came up with and attacked the Spanish Admiral, who, after making a resolute defence, surrendered. The gallies, it appears, were made use of in towing the line of battle ships, as the wind was very light the whole time.

The British Admiral pursued the flying enemy until night. Rear-Admiral

Delaval took the *Isabella* of sixty guns, the *Essex* captured the *Juno* of thirty-six, and the *Rupert* took the *Volante* of forty-four guns; the battle was fought about six leagues from Cape Passaro.

While Sir George Byng, who, in the *Barfleur*, had got up with the Spanish Admiral, lay-to repairing damages; Captain Walton had taken four Spanish ships of war, one of which was of sixty-four guns, bearing the flag of Rear-Admiral Mari, a ship of fifty-four, one of forty, and one of twenty-four guns, with a bomb vessel and a ship laden with arms. He had also burnt four ships of the following descriptions; namely, one of fifty-four, two of forty, and one of thirty guns, with a fire ship and a bomb vessel.

It was upon this occasion that a letter was written, so remarkable for its point and brevity, as to become proverbial in the navy, but frequently attributed to a wrong person; it was Captain Walton who reported his services to the Admiral in the following modest and laconic style:—

“ SIR,

“ We have taken and destroyed all the Spanish ships and vessels which were upon the coast, the number as per margin.

(Signed) “ G. WALTON.

“ Canterbury, off Syracuse, Aug. 16, 1718.”

Mr. Corbett in speaking of it says, “ The Captain (Walton) was one whose natural talents were fitter for achieving a gallant action than describing one, yet his letter on this occasion carries in it such a strain of military eloquence that it is worth preserving.”

He was knighted for this, and some time after made a flag officer. (Expedition to Sicily, p. 32. Tindal's Continuation of Rapin, Vol. vi. p. 569.)

In the same works is also given the following—

“ *Letter of His Majesty George First, to Sir G. Byng, on his Success over the Spanish Fleet.*

“ MONSIEUR CHEVALIER BYNG,

“ Though I have not heard from you directly, I am informed of the victory which the fleet has gained under your command, and I was unwilling to delay the satisfaction that my approbation of your conduct might afford you. I thank you for it, and desire you to express my satisfaction to all the brave people who have signalized themselves on this occasion. Secretary Craggs has

orders to inform you more at large of my intentions, but I am pleased to assure you myself that I am,

“ Monsieur le Chevalier Byng,

“ Your good friend,

(Signed) “ GEORGE R.

“ Hampton Court, Aug. 28, 1718.”

The Spaniards, in a council of war, before the engagement, determined to meet the British fleet in a regular order of battle, but on its nearer approach soon abandoned their resolution.

Admiral Castaneta and Rear-Admiral Chacon made a brave defence; the former was wounded in both his legs. Rear-Admiral Cammock had given it as his advice to remain at anchor in the road of Paradise, ranging their ships in order of battle, in which case the British fleet, from the boldness of the shore and the strength of the currents, would have had more difficulty in attacking them: this advice, it appears, was not regarded.

By the activity of Sir G. Byng, in transporting German troops into Sicily, the town and citadel of Messina were recovered, and the Spaniards made overtures for evacuating the island. The recovery of Sicily was followed in 1720 by the surrender of Sardinia. In the Spanish *complaint* upon this occasion, published by authority, it is said that,

“ On the 10th he (Admiral Byng) entered the Faro, with his whole squadron, standing to the southward, our fleet being gone the same course before; he held on his way till he came into the height of Syracuse; and on the 11th, coming up with rear-guard of Marquis Mari, he committed *downright hostility*, and all the actions of open war.” (History of Modern Europe, Vol. v. p. 6. Annals of the Reign of George First. Corbett's Narrative of the Expedition to Sicily.)

ADMIRAL VERNON AT PORTO-BELLO AND AT CARTHAGENA.

In the year 1739, Admiral Vernon, with only six ships, destroyed the fort and harbour of Porto-Bello in South America, and returned with scarcely the loss of a man.

In 1741 he failed in the attack on Carthage, with a land force under General Wentworth.

The next important battle upon record is, that of the brave, unfortunate, but calumniated Mathews, with Monsieur La Court.

The reader is requested to bear in mind, that *the plan of this work being an endeavour to get at the general design, in the modes of attack or defence; or at the effects produced, or likely to be produced by such design, the cases or situations of particular ships, loss of masts, &c., unless it lead to something of more importance, will not generally be taken notice of.*

The writer thinks it necessary to repeat this preliminary notice, from having found by a late naval historian, the nature and object of the "Naval Battles," was entirely misunderstood.

BATTLE OF ADMIRAL MATHEWS AND MONSIEUR LA COURT.

In the Gazette dated Whitehall, March 21st, 1743-4, it is stated that 'Late last night a courier arrived here with an account from Admiral Mathews, (dated the 29th of February, O. S. in Mahon harbour) of what passed in the engagement near Toulon, between his Majesty's squadron under his command, and the combined fleets of France and Spain; together with his proceedings subsequent thereto.'

Plate I, Fig. 1, represents "the Namur, Admiral Mathews, who at one o'clock, three hours after the signal for battle, having broke the line,* bore down, accompanied only by the Norfolk and Marlborough, his second a-head and a-stern, and began the engagement with the Royal Philip and his seconds."

"The van, under Mr. Rowley, not yet engaged, but watching carefully to prevent the van of the enemy from getting the wind," and Mr. Lestock in the rear, and to windward.

The second figure is all that appears necessary to show how an attack *might* have been made, with better prospect of success; but in this, as in the former case, it is essential that the divisions of the second and third in command do their duty.

* By this is meant standing out of his own line.

Mr. Clerk has displayed the want of conduct and spirit in this action throughout five figures, in which it is apparent that the brave Mathews, and his two seconds, with the Rear Admiral, and "gallant Mr. Hawke," in the Berwick, were almost the only persons who behaved in a becoming manner: but, strange to tell, Mathews was disgraced for breaking his own line, or rather for setting a noble example to his fleet!!

Lestock was tried by a court-martial and acquitted; Rowley was left in command of the fleet: several of the captains were dismissed the service.

In "A Narrative of the Proceedings of his Majesty's Fleet in the Mediterranean, and the Combined Fleets of France and Spain, from the Year 1741 to March 1744," are the following remarks, "By a Sea Officer:"

"Our centre attacked their rear, while the van of our fleet was left exposed to nineteen ships, and our rear was a great way off. Undoubtedly this was like aiming at a victory in one place, while there was a certainty of a defeat in another. After all, if it was possible for thirteen ships, with a fire ship, to destroy five in four hours, it was practicable for our center to have done it: but it is certain that had the ships been stretched and closed into a line of battle, and had all of them, from the van to the rear, had it in their power to have taken up their adversaries successively, their duty could not have been mistaken; on the contrary, we seemed to be in a perfect maze, in a conflict between obeying the signal for the line of battle, which was kept abroad (without the signal to give chace, or to come to a closer engagement), and going down nearer the enemy.

"Notwithstanding there was little wind when the French doubled upon us, which was lucky considering our confused disposition, yet they preferred saving the Spanish squadron, the rear of their fleet, to the destruction of our van, which they could have easily executed.

"On our part, as there cannot be reckoned more ships to have been engaged than six sail, if we rank them according to the greatness of their losses, they must be mentioned in the following manner: the Marlborough, Barfleur, Norfolk, Princess Caroline, Namur, and Berwick.

"Captain Cornwall had both his thighs shot off, and he had only life to express the agony he was in, by shaking his head at the surgeon below. This gentleman (Captain Cornwall), who was the idol of the navy, and a great ornament to it, expired becoming a man of his spirit.* He had been directed

* The following short dialogue passed between Admiral Mathews and Captain Cornwall, immediately before the action, and sets in a clear light what *they* thought of the conduct of Lestock:

by the Admiral, immediately before he bore down, to attack the Real, in which he was determined either to conquer or die; this was his inflexible resolution, and he strictly adhered to it to his last gasp. Courage was far from being his only endowment; his genius and knowledge were equal to any task that could be set him in his profession: few persons came up to him, and none surpassed him.

"Captain Godfrey of the marines was killed. The hammocks, rails, and quick-work having been knocked clear away fore and aft, the quarter deck cleared three times, only one man remaining upon it, the few mariners that were left alive, and not wounded, who, poor fellows, had been some time without any manner of shelter, loading their firelocks upon their bellies and firing, were ordered below to the great guns. The master, Mr. Robert Caton, had both his legs shot off, and lived to get on shore to the hospital. He was a good able master, an excellent stout mariner, and a sober bold officer.

"According to the Captain of the Poder's account, the first broadside which the Berwick gave him killed twenty-seven men, and dismounted seven of the lower deck guns; but, on the French fleet *doubling upon our van*, the Berwick was fain to make sail, leaving on board of the Poder her fourth lieutenant and twenty men, who, in that situation, became prisoners.

"It was observed that the enemy aimed their shot at our masts: no doubt dismasting is a material point; but what helped to this was, their being to leeward of us, with a considerable swell, which might possibly throw the shot so high, without being always designed.

"To conclude, the fleet received more damage in the bad weather than from the enemy; some part of it occasioned from waring twice in two hours, in a very dark, violent, stormy night; and mistaking the signals made so soon one after another."

One gallant officer is of opinion in this case, that "the better to prevent the van of the enemy from going to the assistance of his centre and rear, it will be advisable to engage him to *leeward*, and for the following reasons:"—namely, "in the first place, that the van of the enemy, when engaged to windward, can

Mathews was walking his stern gallery, when he was saluted by Captain Cornwall thus: Cornwall—"How do you do, Sir?" Admiral Mathews—"Do! I can do nothing; look at the Vice-Admiral!" Cornwall—"I have looked at him with concern." Mathews—"By G—d, every one of these ships will get away from me." Cornwall—"I think if you attack these here (meaning the Spaniards directly to leeward), you may stop them." Mathews—"Do you think so; and will you second me?"—The Captain answering in the affirmative, they immediately bore down into action.

ware, when it is unable to *tack*; and secondly, because it has been frequently seen, that the enemy has gone off to leeward, leaving our ships in too disabled a state to follow him; and thirdly, if you engage to windward, the enemy by waring will be much sooner in action with your ships in the rear than he could be by tacking, because he must then go round the sternmost of his own ships." All this reasoning is perfectly sound, and the writer is gratified in having excited a discussion upon the subject, the principal object he has in view: at the same time he must observe, in defence of his "Mode of Attack Proposed," that the British van is brought close down to windward of that of the enemy to prevent what we are informed afterwards took place, namely, that the van of the enemy "*doubled upon*" ours.

In all the modes of attack proposed, they are by no means to be considered arbitrary: officers are left to examine the positions with care, and to form or select such as may appear the most eligible.

Another observes, that "No plan of attack in this case can be properly given, unless the position of the *whole fleet* is shown;* however, this appears to be the best disposition possible, because fourteen are described as about to overthrow the center and rear, consisting of only eleven, while the van will occupy the attention of that of the enemy, and keep it in check.

"I do not know that I agree with the officer whose opinion is previously given, in the idea that being to leeward of your enemy is the best way to prevent his escape. If the ship about to fly is less disabled than her opponent in masts and rigging, and is to *windward*, she will get clear off; but if she is forced to attempt her escape to leeward, her adversary can hobble after her before the wind, while preparations are making to set all possible sail.

"If a ship is very much disabled, she can escape *only* before the wind, whether she has fought to windward or to leeward of her enemy."

"I by no means think Clerk's tactics perfect; there are many errors in them, and I doubt if they instruct how two fleets, wishing to fight each other, should do so in the best possible way; his plan only goes to show how to bring on a *pêle-mêle* action, which he thought the enemy always wished to avoid, under the idea that to get close was sufficient to give us the victory. If I commanded an English fleet opposed to a French one, I should not have the least objection to

* Where the whole number of ships cannot be given in the figures, the proportion of difference in force is observed in the respective fleets. In this plate proportionate numbers have been taken from both the fleets, leaving the comparative force nearly the same: besides, as in all large fleets, the whole are seldom engaged, it is of less consequence to be particular.

their cutting my line ; I should probably myself break all *order* of battle, in order to prevent their cutting off any particular ships ; and then behold the old story, I have them in action ship to ship. This is the great secret of *our* tactics ; that of the French it to prevent it : that they succeeded in doing so for many years is certain, and though Rodney might have found out how to bring them to close battle without Clerk's assistance, yet Clerk was the first to make public the plan, and therefore is entitled to the thanks of the country.

" I fairly own to you, that I hope *close action*, ship to ship, will ever be the first object of a British naval Commander in Chief."

This is bravely said by the gallant son of a noble chief, and let the British navy say *Amen* !

We are told that Mr. Mathews passed the short remainder of his days in peaceable retirement, and died at last considered by most people as entitled to their honourable compassion ; which is the tribute in degree next valuable to regret and public applause. (For a more particular account of this action, see Beaton's " Naval and Military Memoirs," Vol i. p. 187, &c.)

The fate of Admiral Mathews seems to have been peculiarly hard, and to have made a strong impression upon the mind of the unfortunate Byng ; who, as will be seen, was extremely cautious, in bearing down upon the enemy, not to risk any separation from his rear ; and, that a proper British spirit might again be infused into the naval service, it was found necessary to *shoot him*, as the witty Voltaire observed, " pour encourager les autres !"

It evidently appears that mistakes were committed through the defective state of our signals, those in the " fighting " being at variance with others in the " sailing, instructions," then the only guides to the British fleet. By a misunderstanding arising from this source, Vice-Admiral Lestock brought-to in the night, when he should have continued his course, or kept in line of battle ; by which, on the morning of the action, he found himself with his division so far removed from the body of the fleet, that the wind being light, he could not reach his station in time to render assistance in the battle. The *Poder* struck to the *Berwick*, but was afterwards retaken by the French van, abandoned, and burnt.

A fire-ship had been sent against the *Real* by Admiral Matthews, but blew up, and was sunk by *Navarro* before she could take effect ; he had sent a launch, with intention to tow her to the *Marlborough*, then an unmanageable wreck upon the water, and unprotected. Fire-ships seem to be doubtful engines of destruc-

Fig. 1.





Fig. 2.



tion, and frequently endanger friends as well as foes; on this account they are perhaps better dispensed with. In latter times, excepting in harbours, and against the *materiel* of war, they have been laid aside.*

Admiral Mathews, at eight o'clock in the evening, shifted his flag to the Russell, the Namur having suffered very materially in the battle.

MATHEWS AND LA COURT.

Plate I, Fig. 1, represents Clerk's second position, in which a few ships of the centre only are engaged.

British, 31 ships of the line, and two 50 gun ships.

French and Spanish, 28 ships, and four frigates.

Fig. 2, represents the mode of attack proposed. The centre and rear of the British fleet bear down upon the centre and rear of the enemy, and engage them to leeward, while the van bring the van of the enemy to close action to windward; to prevent its making any movement in support of its centre and rear.

The unappropriated ships support their friends engaged.

REMARK.

"If the enemy make no endeavour to impede your bringing him to close action in your own way, it matters little if you engage to windward or to leeward; much must be left to unavoidable circumstances; having witnessed the best exertions to pass through the enemy's line from to windward defeated, although the ultimate object was attained in bringing on a close action."

* "Steam fire-ships, or steam-vessels to tow fire-ships, may be in use next war."

ANSON AND DE LA JONQUIERE.

May 3, 1747.

THE pursuit and defeat of M. de la Jonquiere by Admiral Anson, and of M. de L'Etendiere, by Hawke; as well as that of De la Clue, by Boscawen, although they offer nothing of a tactical nature, should by no means be overlooked. They contributed not a little to the national glory, and tend to perpetuate the names of men illustrious in their time; and who by their zeal and ability upon these occasions added many ships of war to the British navy.

Extract taken from the Supplement to the London Gazette.

“ Admiralty Office, May 16.

“ Captain Denis, of his Majesty's ship Centurion, arrived this day with an express from Vice-Admiral Anson, giving an account that, on the 3d instant the squadron under his command, consisting of the following ships,” [here follows a list of their names, &c.] “ being off Cape Finisterre, which bore S. E., distant twenty-four leagues, fell in with a French fleet, consisting of thirty-nine ships; nine of which shortened sail, and were drawing into a line of battle, when the rest, appearing to be under their convoy, made all sail to the westward.”

It is not necessary closely to follow this long narrative, but to select such parts of it only as will afford us the most direct and important information.

Seeing it was the intention of the enemy to escape, if possible, by cover of the night, Admiral Anson made the signal to chase and engage as the ships came up, without regard to established order. By this method, the Centurion, Namur, Defiance, and Windsor, soon brought the sternmost ships to close action, and having disabled them, left them to the care of others coming up, and went on to those further a-head.

The Yarmouth, Devonshire, Rear Admiral Warren, and Prince George, having got also into action, the latter being close alongside of the French Invincible, of seventy-four guns; all the ships in the enemy's rear struck their colours, when the Vice Admiral detached the Monmouth, Yarmouth, and Nottingham, to pursue the convoy; having before sent the Falcon sloop to keep sight of them, and to make known their position and motions to the Commander in Chief.

The superiority of force was greatly in favour of the British fleet ; but unless it had been skilfully, promptly, and bravely applied, little success might have been reaped from it. By the decisive measures of the Admiral, so ably seconded by the Rear Admiral and his captains, all the ships of war fell into the hands of the British Admiral.

The gallant and estimable Captain Grenville, of the *Defiance*, fell upon this occasion ; and Captain Boscawen was wounded in the shoulder by a musket ball. *La Jonquiere* was shot under the blade-bone of both his shoulders ; one of his captains was killed, and another lost a leg.

The following is a statement of the comparative force. British : one of ninety guns, one of seventy-four, one of sixty-six, three of sixty-four, eight of sixty and fifty, and one of forty. French, one of seventy-four guns, one of sixty-six, four of from fifty-six to forty-four, and four of from thirty to twenty.

Through a private correspondent, we are further informed, that the *Bristol*, the Hon. Captain Montague, and *Pembroke*, Captain Fincher, were active competitors for fame on this day.

The *Bristol* having got up to the *Invincible*, and brought her to action, the *Pembroke* attempted to get between them, desiring the captain of the *Bristol* to put his helm a starboard, or he should be on board of him ; to this Captain Montague replied, " Run on board and be d—d, neither you nor any other man shall come between me and my enemy."

Upon the coming up of the *Prince George*, the ship of the Vice Admiral, the *Bristol*, made sail to the *Diamant* of fifty-six guns, which, after a desperate resistance, and great slaughter, surrendered.—(See the *Gentleman's Magazine*, for May, 1747.)

HAWKE AND M. DE L'ETENDIERE.

IN the "Memoirs of Lord Hawke," in the "Lives of the Admirals," is an account of an action and capture, by that great officer, of five ships of the line and a fifty gun ship, from the French under De L'Etendiere, off Cape Finisterre. The exact force of either squadron is not mentioned ;* the chase was arduous, and the battle warm ; but the object of the French Admiral, having a large convoy under his care, appeared to be to escape if he could. A few extracts from Admiral Hawke's letter are given, to show the zeal and gallantry

* The force on both sides may be found in Schomberg's "Naval Chronology," Vol. iv. p. 52.

he displayed in the attack ; and also to prove to us the great importance of protecting the *wheel*,* as much as possible, and the men who are stationed at it.

The meeting took place on the 14th Oct. 1747.—(See “Campbell’s Admirals,” Vol. vi. p. 432.)

“ Finding we lost time in forming our line, while the enemy was standing away from us, at eleven made the signal for the whole squadron to chase. Half an hour after, observing our headmost ships to be a proper distance, I made the signal to engage, which was immediately obeyed. The *Lion* and *Princess Louisa* began the engagement, and were followed by the rest of the squadron as they could come up, and went from rear to van. The enemy having the weather-gage of us, and a smart and constant fire being kept up on both sides, the smoke prevented my seeing the number of the enemy, or what happened on either side for some time. In passing on to the first ship we could get near, we received many fires at a distance, till we came close to the *Severne*, of fifty guns, whom we soon silenced, and left to be taken up by the frigates a-stern. Then perceiving the *Eagle*, and *Edinburgh*, who had lost her fore-top-mast, engaged, we kept our wind as close as possible, in order to assist them. This attempt of ours was frustrated by the *Eagle*, falling twice on board us, having had her *wheel shot to pieces*, and *all her men* at it *killed*, and all her braces and bowlines gone. This drove us to leeward, and prevented our attacking *Le Monarque*, of seventy-four, and the *Tonnant* of eighty guns, within any distance to do execution: however, we attempted both, especially the latter. While we were engaged with her, the breechings of all our lower deck guns broke, and the guns flew fore and aft, which obliged us to shoot a-head, for our upper and quarter-deck guns could not reach her. Captain Harland, in the *Tilbury*, observing that she fired single guns at us in order to dismast us, stood on the other tack between her and the *Devonshire*, and gave her a very smart fire. By the time the new breechings were all seized, I was got almost alongside the *Trident*, of sixty-four guns, whom I engaged as soon as possible, and silenced by as brisk a fire as I could make.

“ Seeing some our ships at that time not so closely engaged as I could have

* The Hon. Keith Stewart (uncle of the present Earl of Galloway,) when Captain of the old “*Cambridge*” of eighty guns, *without a poop*, barricaded the wheel by a light wooden frame work at the sides and back part, to which were lashed the cots and hammocks of the officers; this afforded considerable shelter in the engagement with the combined fleets in 1782. In the “*Correspondence*” of Lord Collingwood, lately published, is the following remark by that distinguished officer:—“*Thornborough* is here, with the *poopless* *Royal Sovereign*. What ingenious contrivances they have in England to spoil the ships! but were those great artists to *fight them*, they would be glad of a poop.” (Letter to Sir A. Ball, p. 242.)

wished, and not being able well to distinguish who they were, I flung out the signal for a close engagement. Soon after I got alongside, within musket shot of the Terrible, of seventy-four guns, and 700 men. Near seven at night she called out for quarter.

"Thus far I have been particular with regard to the share the Devonshire bore in the action of the day.

"Having observed that six of the enemy's ships had struck, and it being very dark, and our ships dispersed, I thought it best to bring-to for that night; and seeing a great firing a long way a-stern of me, I was in hopes to have seen more of the enemy's ships taken in the morning; but, instead of that, I received the melancholy account of Captain Saumarez being killed, and that the Tonnant had escaped in the night by the assistance of the Intrepide, who, by having the wind of our ships, had received no damage that I could perceive.

"As the enemy's ships were large, except the Severne, they took a great deal of drubbing, and lost all their masts, except two, who had their fore-masts left; this has obliged me to lie-by these two days past in order to put them in a condition to be brought into port, as well as our own, who have suffered greatly.—Of the ships captured, three were of seventy-four guns, two of sixty-four, and one of fifty; manned with 3900 men."

The British fleet, upon this occasion, was considerably superior to that of the enemy, namely, fourteen sail in the line to eight; but the latter were composed of the heaviest ships; one of seventy-four guns being the largest in the British squadron; that of the Admiral mounting but sixty-six, and two were of fifty guns.

We cannot but admire the spirit with which the Admiral pursued his object, leaving the ships, as he had beaten them, to be taken charge of by others; in this manner it appears that three fell to the Admiral's share alone. The slaughter was great on the part of the French, showing no deficiency in our naval gunnery, as but two masts were left standing in the French squadron, and two only of their ships of war escaped.

It was for this service the gallant Hawke was created a Knight of the Bath, and that the word "*drubbing*"* was, as the writer of Campbell's Admirals informs us, "*promoted*" into the English language. (See note, page 435, in the Memoirs of Lord Hawke.)

The Admiral's letter is also distinguished from almost every other upon similar

* The word *drubbing* is used by the author of *Hudibras*.

occasions, by boldly accusing one of his Captains (Fox) of neglect of duty, and requesting that his conduct may undergo inquiry by Court Martial.

This appears to be a manly mode of proceeding, worthy of imitation, by which the guilty are most likely to meet their desert, and none are left to suffer by calumny or slander.

It was the fate of this officer to fall under suspicion through the defect of signals; and although he had fought and captured a ship of equal force, and brought another to action, he was sentenced to be dismissed his ship, so tenacious were they in those days of any thing like equivocal conduct in battle. He died a superannuated Admiral. (See Schomberg's Chronology, vol. i. p. 244.) At this period, it appears, councils of war were held in the navy, but since happily discontinued.

In this battle the British navy lost one of its brightest ornaments in the death of Captain Philip de Saumarez, of the Nottingham. Owing to the failure of some others, which is shown in the inquiry that followed, more than a single share of the fighting fell to his lot; unsupported, he was considerably separated from the rest of the fleet, and the ships with which he was engaged escaped. An interesting memoir of this officer is to be found in the 31st volume of the Naval Chronicle, and a description of the monument and inscription in Westminster Abbey, in volumes 3d and 30th.

The following are extracts from private sources (English and French), of the engagement which has just been related; and though it appears that the Frenchman speaks of the distance kept by the British ships as the cause of rendering the use of small arms in some cases unnecessary, it should not be forgotten that the French squadron being to *windward* had it in its power to come as close as it thought proper, while the British fleet was obliged to make use of every exertion to bring them to action, upon any terms.

“ His Majesty's ship Yarmouth, Portsmouth Harbour.

“ Though the Yarmouth, without dispute, had as great a share as any ship of the fleet, if not a greater, in the engagement with the French, October 14, yet in all the accounts I have seen she is not so much as mentioned, as if no such ship had been there. It is something surprising that Admiral Hawke should see and mention in his long account the behaviour of the Lion, Louisa, Eagle, and Tilbury, and yet could discover nothing of the extraordinary courage and conduct of Captain Saunders in the Yarmouth, who lay two hours and a half close engaged with the Neptune, a seventy gun ship, with 700 men, and never quitted her till she struck, although the Monarch, a seventy-four gun ship, who

struck to us likewise, lay upon our bow for some time, with another of the enemy's ships upon our stern. When the Neptune struck, after killing them 100 men, and wounding 140, she was so close to us that our men jumped into her; and notwithstanding so long warm work, and his ship much disabled in masts and rigging, with twenty-two men killed and seventy wounded, his courage did not cool here; he could not with patience see the French Admiral and the Intrepide, a seventy-four gun ship, getting away, and none of our ships after them; nor could he think of preferring his own security to the glory and interest of his country, but ardently wished to go after them, and proposed it to Capt. Saumarez, in the Nottingham, and Captain Rodney in the Eagle, who were within hail of us; but Captain Saumarez unfortunately being killed by the first fire of the enemy, the Nottingham hauled her wind, and did no more service; and the Eagle came not nigh enough to do any; so that the Yarmouth had to deal with both of the enemy's ships for some time, till at length they got out of reach of our guns. I think so much bravery and noble spirit ought not to lie in oblivion. I shall only observe from the two late battles which we have had with the French, that, *fighting them close, we shall constantly get the better of them*, which is confirmed in the behaviour of the Neptune's men, who all quitted the upper deck and ran below when the Yarmouth came near her; and that *at a distance, by the superior skill of their gunnery, and the length of their guns, they will always get from us.*

"Yours, &c."

French Account of L'Etendiere's Action, by Authority.

"We sailed together from the Isle of Aix on Tuesday, October 17, (6th) with an E.N.E. wind, which ceasing, we were obliged to anchor in the Road of Rochelle, from whence we sailed next morning with 252 merchant ships. As all the motions of a large fleet are slow, we did not get out till five in the evening. M. de L'Etendiere directed his course off Rochebonnes to get into the latitude of Belleisle. The wind favouring, we were on the 21st W. of that isle 24 leagues. That day we saw two ships, one large, which after reconnoitring us at two leagues distance, sailed to the south. On the 25th, (14th) we saw in the horizon 20 sail making swiftly after us, and took them for some of our own fleet; it happening daily, that in spite of all our vigilance, many ships of our convoy in the night lose company to sail more at liberty. We examined these ships, but they being just in our track, and presenting only their heads, we could form no judgment of their force. We were not sure they were enemies till one of them came alongside of us and fired a gun, under English colours.

That instant M. de L'Etendiere ordered the signal for the trade to make the best of their way, and that for the order of battle to the King's ships, who formed between the merchantmen and the enemy.

“ It was of great consequence that this line should form suddenly ; but the preservation of the merchant ships being the principal object, it was necessary to leave intervals, so that before 252 vessels could pass through, a considerable time elapsed, during which the enemy made their dispositions.

“ All the fleet being passed, and sailing N.N.W., we tacked and stood with our heads to the S. W., the wind S. E. ; we were not well in order when the rear-guard was attacked a little before noon. M. de L'Etendiere made the signal for closing the line, and the combat in a short space of time became general. The enemy's main view seemed to be to disable us, in which they perfectly succeeded, discharging with every ball a prodigious quantity of case shot. We could not answer them in this manner, ill custom having established it as a rule, to allow only four charges of that sort for every gun, which were soon consumed. The cannonade lasted three hours before any thing remarkable happened ; but then we saw the Fougueux without her fore-top-mast : this ship and the Neptune having been attacked by five, the Severne by two, of which the English Admiral was one ; the Monarque by two, the Tonnant by three : those of the vanguard having yet only four upon three. M. de L'Etendiere had made the signal for the said vanguard to slacken sail. We beat down the fore-top-mast of the ship that attacked us first (the Edinburgh), and the fore-top-sail of one of those (the Eagle) on the starboard side was fallen upon the foremast. 'Tis true, by this time we were very ill treated ; our foremast was down (this is wrong*), and by its fall prevented some of our guns from firing, which we remedied as soon as possible, by cutting away all that incumbered it. We had already 250 shot in our main-sail and mizen : all our masts and yards were shot through in several places, and we could no longer work the ship.

“ At four o'clock we saw the Neptune, as smooth as an open boat, not a mast standing, obliged to strike ; and soon after, the Monarque also without main or mizen. The Fougueux and the Severne surrendered also at the same time ; the little squadron that fired alternately upon us in the Tonnant, none of which staid aside of us above fifteen minutes at a time, was augmented to five. The Commandant at last honoured us with his company, but his visit was short ; he received two of our broadsides, and then went to the succour of seven of his own ships which were engaged with our three of the vanguard. M. de Vaudreuil

* This remark is inserted by an English officer who was present.

then tacked about in the *Intrepide* towards us, and passed through the midst of all these ships, firing on both sides. The *Trident* and *Terrible* attempted to follow his example, by tacking also; but they were so disabled, that it was impossible for them to execute their design. We saw at sun-set the *Trident*, having been engaged for some time against five, make up to the *Commandant*, and after giving him a broadside, surrender.

“ Then six of the enemy fell upon the *Terrible*, who at half after* continued to make a brisk fire; night prevented our seeing what followed, but her silence afterwards makes us also judge that she was overpowered.

“ As the English have suffered very much, as well as the captured ships, it will require some days to put them in a sailing condition; so that the fleet will have three or four days to get away, with a fair wind; and if, as we hope, they have the good luck to escape, we shall be partly comforted for the loss of our ships of war, which devoted themselves to the sacrifice for the support of commerce. A little more equality had put us out of danger of insult, &c. &c.

“ To return to what concerns ourselves in the *Tonnant*: the moment the *Intrepide* joined us, she got under our stern, and we continued fighting together for half an hour with the five ships that environed us, and which fell back behind our rear ship that sailed after us. We were then left quiet till near eight, when three fresh ships (*Eagle*, *Yarmouth*, *Nottingham*), being those said to have joined the enemy that evening, came and fired upon us: their firing ceased in less than an hour, and they retired also. A little before, *M. L'Etendiere*, who had seen six ships subdued, his own extremely impaired, and expecting every moment that his main-mast would fall, being held up only with wounded tackle, sailed to the westward, and at midnight tacked to the N. W. and at four in the afternoon to the north; not so much with a view of escaping by these different routes, which we thought scarce possible, but in order to disperse the enemy, for the fleet to get to a distance. We made the dispositions in the mean while to give them a good reception in the morning, and to make them pay dearly for the taking our two last ships.

“ Our astonishment was great, when at day-break we saw only three ships at a vast distance.

“ This battle was fought eighty-eight L. N. of Cape Finisterre. We fired in the *Tonnant*, 1,842 cannon shot, and 10,000 ball cartridge; the distance at which many of the ships chose to engage us, in order to avoid being hurt, did not always permit us to use our small arms. We stood 4,000 of the enemy's cannon

* Query, after sun-set?

shot, but the sea which was rough caused a great part to miss ; notwithstanding we received 800 in our masts and rigging ; 134 shot of lower tier guns were told in our sides, of which only one came through.

“ It was owing to our having a ship extremely well timbered and put together, that our loss was so small, for so long and so sharp an engagement.

“ It consisted of only 100 men killed and wounded. The casks of provision on the second deck saved abundance of people.*

“ Sixteen different ships engaged us alternately ; the Commandant, from whom we expected the worst treatment, staid by us the least of any one. (Mem. he carried away his breechings.) Five or six English Captains distinguished themselves, chiefly he who commanded the headmost ship of the vanguard (Scot of the *Lion*, or Watson of the *Louisa*). Our officers and men in all our ships fought with a courage and valour worthy of more happy success,” &c.

Extract of a Letter from the Princess Louisa, at sea, October 16th, 1747.

“ Our Admiral and most of our largest ships being greatly to leeward, and a-stern of us, except the *Defiance*, *Monmouth*, *Lion*, and *Tilbury* ; he first made a signal to form a line a-head, but in less than a quarter of an hour, being near eleven o'clock, altered it to chase and engage ; though I am pretty certain, we, with some of the ships above mentioned, could have weathered the enemy. During this interval, the *Lion*, bearing more away than we, began the fight, though the French fired first :—this was a quarter before twelve.

“ It was our turn next, and we fairly ran the gauntlet : for coming up with the enemy's sternmost ship of seventy-four guns, within pistol shot, gave her, and received, three broadsides ; then stood on for the enemy's headmost ships, engaging as we past them. As we got a-head the wind shifted three or four points, which obliged us to tack and make more sail by hauling our main tack on board ; at the same time the French headmost ships clung to the wind, which was a circumstance in our favour, for they had it in their power to come down upon us, being then partly alone ; however, in order to double their van, our fire ceased above an hour ; in which time we shot so far a-head, that we tacked and gained the wind of the enemy.

“ We then went down and engaged the *Terrible* very close, till our Admiral in the *Devonshire* came up, at which time we were situated on her weather-bow, very near : but as our Admiral was very close to her on her lee-quarter, we were

* Encumbering the decks with provisions is a practice little known in the British navy.

afraid to make use of that advantage. Half an hour after he engaged her, she struck to him, and so did some others before, as he passed by them; and indeed it was high time, for it was now near six o'clock, and so dark we could not do much more. No ships behaved better than the enemy's, or sold their liberties dearer. The Admiral, after the Terrible struck, brought to. At about eight o'clock we heard and saw the flashes of guns on our lee-quarter, which appeared the next morning to be the Yarmouth, Eagle, and Nottingham, engaging the Tonnant and Intrepide, which by the favour of the night, and the shattered condition our ships were in, Captain Saumarez in the Nottingham being killed, got off. The frigate, after giving us a broadside at the beginning, followed the convoy. No mortal could be more cool and intrepid than our Captain during the whole of the day: I must do him the justice, though I am a late acquaintance, &c. We have twelve killed and sixty-two wounded. At day-break, the sight was pleasing though horrid; for never were ships in such a condition, &c. One of the French said to have lost 200 men, and I believe it is the Severne: the smallest ship which we have in tow lost upwards of sixty killed and seventy wounded. The Louisa had all her standing masts shot, and almost all the yards and booms in the ship wounded. We are likewise wounded in many places;—sixty shot through the fore-top-sail alone. I believe every ship in our fleet is damaged much the same, except one ship, very well known, commanded by *Sir Thomas Wholebones*; who lost one poor boy and had one port wounded. Three of the French ships would have struck an hour sooner than they did, had they not waited for our Admiral, to pay him the compliment. Though our number of ships and guns were superior to the enemy, their greater weight of metal and number of men made very little difference between us.

“All their ships, I am informed, carried forty-two-pounders, except the Severne.—Our four best ships carried thirty-two, and all the rest only twenty-four.”

REMARK.

“Hawke's letter leads to a remark I have often made; that Naval Commanders in Chief, in their official accounts, dwell too much on the proceedings of their own flag-ships, and forget that it is the manœuvre of the fleet they should describe: Hawke had more excuse, however, than others for particularizing the services of his own ship.—What became of the convoy of the enemy; surely it did not escape?”

KNOWLES AND REGGIO.

In the year 1748, Rear Admiral Knowles fell in with and engaged a Spanish squadron under Admiral Reggio, of equal force (seven ships); and was reprimanded by the sentence of a court martial, for not carrying his squadron into action in a proper manner; as it appeared upon the trial, that he could have attacked it with *six* instead of four of his ships; and for *not shifting his flag* when the Cornwall was disabled.

The battle was ably supported on both sides, and the Conquistador fell into the hands of the British Admiral; the Africa, another Spaniard, was destroyed, to prevent her sharing the same fate.

The sentence of the court martial is remarkable, but not the slightest imputation was thrown upon the Admiral's courage. (See Beatson's "Naval and Military Memoirs," vol. i. p. 383, 385.)

The writer has since been favoured with the following private account of this action; and with a Spanish account, which is at the close of it.

Extract of a Letter from H. M. S. Lenox, Captain Holmes, arrived at Spithead, November 23rd, 1748.

" We sailed from Jamaica, August 25th, with convoy for England, and were obliged to run through the Florida Gulph. The 29th of September, in the morning, we spied seven sail of large ships bearing down upon us; which proving to be Spanish men of war, our Captain made the signal for the convoy to provide for their safety; we then stood towards the enemy until it was almost dark, when it was prudent to provide for our own safety, having near 200,000*l.* on board. We had hopes of meeting with Admiral Knowles, who was off Tortuda Bank, with six ships, to intercept the Spanish Plate fleet from Vera Cruz. We joined him the next morning, and informed him of what had happened. We made sail to meet them, and October 1st came up with the Dona. The Tilbury led the van, the Strafford next, and the Lenox in the third place: Admiral Knowles in the Cornwall, perceiving by the enemy's line that the Spanish Vice Admiral must fall to our share, bid us fall astern of him, that the two Commanders might engage each other; we did accordingly, and so became the fourth ship, the Warwick next, and the Canterbury last. The enemy having at this time their frigates out of the line, the Oxford, our smallest ship, was also ordered out. At a little past twelve, the Spaniards began to fire, but at too great a distance to do execution:

soon after, the Admiral made the signal for the Tilbury to bear down nearer the enemy ; but that not being complied with, he fired a shot or two at her. However, he himself in the Cornwall edged down close upon the Spanish Vice Admiral ; we did the same, being very near him ; when all hands played away, except the Warwick and Canterbury, who were so far astern that they could not come up ; nor did they fire a shot for upwards of two hours. You will perceive we were four upon six, and, what added to our disadvantage, about an hour after the action began, the Cornwall had her main-top-mast shot away, and other damage, which occasioned her to haul out of the line, and she never came into it again. We then shot up into her place abreast of the Spanish Admiral, where we had warm work, three of the enemy's ships playing on us for an hour ; when the Warwick and Canterbury came up very seasonably to our assistance. At this juncture, one of the Spaniards was fairly beaten out of the line, as well as the Cornwall out of ours. Admiral Knowles having refitted, bore down upon the Spanish disabled ship, and took her with no resistance. The action was now closer and hotter than ever, and the Spaniards being sick of it, edged away for the Havannah, it being but a little way from them ; and we bore up after, yard-arm and yard-arm. The enemy bearing more away, threw us partly astern of them, when we raked the Spanish Vice Admiral, giving him several broadsides. About nine o'clock, not being able to distinguish one ship from another, we left off. The Spanish Admiral, having lost his main and fore-mast, ran ashore ; the rest, though greatly disabled, got into port ; off which we remained with the Conquistador our prize, until the ships were rigged, and then we stood towards the Spanish Vice Admiral's ship, on shore. On our approach, he set fire to her, and in an hour she blew up. English tars had never more reason to blame fortune, than now ; for if she had favoured us with only two hours' day-light more, we should have taken or destroyed the whole Spanish squadron, and finer ships were never built."

The following Extract is from an Account of this Affair given in the Hague Gazette, April 16, 1749, detailing the Movements of the Spanish Admiral.




" The 12th at day-break he descried the enemy, consisting of seven ships of war, and astern of them two large ships taking care of the convoy. He immediately formed his line of battle, and waited for Admiral Knowles, who, notwithstanding he had the wind, did not appear in haste to make use of that advantage ; however, at length he did, and the action began at two o'clock in the afternoon, with a brisk fire on both sides. Admiral Knowles having singled out

Admiral Reggio, and having got within pistol shot, he discharged all his artillery and musquetry at him, with eight cohorns; but he was so warmly received by the Spanish Admiral, that in something more than half an hour he was obliged to fall astern of his own squadron, with the loss of his main-top-mast, and the yard shot in two. So fine a beginning seemed to promise Admiral Reggio a complete victory; and he probably would have made it so, notwithstanding the enemy's superiority in ships and guns, had not the Conquistador had her main-top-sail-tyes shot, by which, after the example of Admiral Knowles, she dropped astern of the Spanish squadron, but not in safety; for Admiral Knowles, when he had got the assistance of another ship, came to attack her. The action was long and bloody; and the second Captain, who defended her well, did not surrender till the granade-shells had set her on fire three times: the other ships continued the action until eight in the evening, when they were separated by the darkness of the night. After this obstinate engagement, the ship of Admiral Reggio remained master of the field of battle, having no ship to engage, with the loss of all his masts, and with his *sprit-sail* anchored in the Gulph of Viviras,* where he was surprised by the English squadron, and set fire to his own ship. The conduct of Admiral Reggio cannot be too much applauded," &c. &c.

In the sentence of the court martial upon Admiral Knowles for his conduct on this occasion, it is declared that the Court "*were unanimously of opinion*" that he ought to have *shifted his flag* when the Cornwall was disabled; but that it arose from mistake, and not from any want of zeal or personal courage. The Court also *unanimously* condemn him for not bringing his ships into action, in closer order, for which he is *unanimously* adjudged to fall under part the 14th Article of War, implying *Negligence*; and therefore *reprimand* him. In every part of this sentence it is seen that the opinion of every individual member of the Court is disclosed, which, however authorised by custom in some cases, is a violation of their oath. The Court consisted of eight members: William Rowley, John Forbes, and Edward Hawke, were of the number.

Several other trials followed in consequence of this, but of no particular importance. Some duels were fought on this subject, and one Captain (Innes) was killed. Knowles and Holmes fought; and four other challenges were sent to the Admiral, when the King interfered.

* The name of the place is indistinctly given.



ADMIRAL BYNG'S* ACTION.
1756.

THE next in order appears the engagement of Admiral Byng; a few extracts from his letter are here given :

“ I called in the cruizers, and when they had joined me I tacked towards the enemy, and formed the line a-head. I found the French were preparing theirs to leeward, having unsuccessfully endeavoured to weather me. They were twelve large ships of the line and five frigates.

“ As soon as I judged the rear of our fleet to be the length of their van, we tacked together, and immediately made the signals for the ships that led to lead large; and for the Deptford to quit the line, that ours might become equal with theirs. At two I made the signal to engage, as I found it was the surest method of ordering every ship to close down on the one that fell to their lot; and here I must express my great satisfaction at the very gallant manner in which the Rear Admiral (West) set the example in the van, by instantly bearing down on the ships he was to engage with his second, and who occasioned one of the French ships to begin the engagement, which they did by raking ours as they went down.

“ I bore down on the ship that lay opposite to me, and began to engage him after having received their fire for some time in going down.”

“ The Intrepid unfortunately in the very beginning had his fore-top-mast shot away, and as that hung on his fore-sail, and backed it, he had no command of his ship; his fore-tack and all his braces being cut at the same time; so that he drove on the next ship to him, and obliged that, and the ships a-head of me, to throw all back.”

“ This obliged me to do so for some minutes, though not before we had *drove our adversary out of the line*; who *put before the wind*, and had several shot fired at him from his own Admiral,” &c. &c.

“ I found the enemy *edged away constantly*; and as they went three feet to our one, they would never permit our closing with them, but took the advantage of destroying our rigging,” &c. &c.

Plate II, Figure 1, describes the position of the two fleets about one p. m.; Fig. 2, the van bearing down to engage; and Fig. 3, a mode of attack proposed; which appears all that it is necessary to say upon this subject. Mr. Clerk has displayed the misconduct and misfortune of this day through five figures.

* The Honourable John Byng, fourth son of Sir George Byng, Viscount Torrington.

OBSERVATIONS.

It would seem advisable, that in the movements of fleets upon all important occasions, a flag-officer should lead; not only from what might naturally be expected by the authority of his example, but probably as being best informed of the intentions of the Commander in Chief. Were this practice more generally adopted, failures might be less likely to arise. Where the chiefs themselves have led, success has invariably followed.—(See Fig. 3, Plate II.)

In the trial of this unfortunate Admiral, it is stated in the evidence of the Captain of his ship (Gardiner), that in conducting the British fleet into battle, his mind was continually occupied with the fate of Admiral Mathews, who was condemned for departing from the strict line of battle, to set a noble example to his fleet, by bringing the Spanish Admiral to close action.

Admiral Byng observes, “You see, Captain Gardiner, that the signal for the line is out; and that I am a-head of the ships *Louisa* and of Captain Durell, of the *Trident*. You would not have me, as Admiral of the fleet, run down as if I was going to engage a single ship? It was Mr. Mathews’s misfortune to be prejudiced by not carrying down his force together, which I shall endeavour to avoid.”—(See “Byng’s Trial,” p. 307.)

In the translation of a “Treatise upon the Naval Tactics of M. D. Morogues,” published in 1767, edited by an experienced Naval Officer (whose name does not appear), with a “Supplement,” addressed to his son, is the following remark, upon placing flag-officers in the line of battle.

“But to elucidate this subject still further. Admit a fleet of ships commanded by three flags; I ask, if the leading ship have the post of honour, according to some, why do not the two junior flags lead upon each tack as a guide for the commanding officers to follow? to which the answer is obvious, the like was never known.”

This valuable little work is dedicated to Sir Edward Hawke, then presiding over the maritime affairs of this country; it is written by an officer who had served under Sir George Rook and Sir John Norris, and had been in many of the engagements of that period.

Mr. J. Bennet observes in No. 3 of “Papers on Naval Architecture,” that “neither in the action of Byng, Byron, Arbuthnot, or of Graves, has Admiral Ekins recommended the windward fleet to fill up the intervals left by the alternate ships of the leeward fleet, when they quitted their first position, to form another line of battle to leeward, although he recommended it in the supposed case before discussed.”

To this it is replied, that had any of those examples or instances been *at all similar*, he should most certainly have recommended the *same mode of proceeding*. In all cases the movements of one fleet, with a view to attack, must assuredly be regulated by the position or movements of its opponent. In the battles named, Admiral Ekins considers that he has made the best choice; for how can openings in the line be occupied, where none are made? In this case, "the enemy edged away continually," and, "went three feet to our one."

REMARKS.

"I should be inclined to propose that an attack under the circumstances described should be made by the fleet to leeward coming up in two divisions; cutting the enemy's line in two places, and overpowering the rear and centre: thereby securing a victory by bringing all your force on a part only of the enemy's wherever it can be done."

Plate II, Fig. 1, represents Clerk's first position, (Plate VI,) the French forming their line to leeward, "having unsuccessfully endeavoured to weather me."

Fig. 2. Admiral Byng's attack; Clerk's second position. "At two I made the signal to engage, and the van under Rear Admiral West, in a very gallant manner, instantly bearing down on the ships he was to engage."

Fig. 3. Mode of attack proposed. The leading ship, as she crosses the van of the enemy, followed by the others in succession, bearing up, and breaking through between the ships of the enemy's line, engaging them to leeward on the same tack.

REMARKS.

"This is obviously the best method of securing a close action, but F and S, wishing to avoid it, would bear up together, and form a new line to leeward." It is therefore further proposed, that C and D should be flag-ships, and each to lead a division of the fleet B to the attack, as denoted by the dotted lines. C, the Commander in Chief, followed by those a-stern of him, should keep away, and pass through the enemy's line wherever they find a convenient opening; the van acting as before described.

Fig. 1.





Fig. 2.



prendre quelques vaisseaux ; et en cela elle s'est plus rapprochée du véritable but que l'on doit supposer à la guerre.

“ Que seroit-ce en effet pour les Anglois que la perte de quelques batimens ? Le point capital est de les attaquer dans leur possessions, principe, immédiat de leur richesse commerciales et de leur puissance maritime. La guerre de 1778 fournit des exemples, qui prouvent le devouement des généraux française aux véritables intérêts de la patrie. La conservation de l'île de la Grenade, la réduction d'York-town, ou l'armée Anglaise se rendit prisonnière, la conquête de l'île St. Christophe et ses dependences, ont été le resultat de grand combats, où l'on a laissé l'ennemi faire tranquillement sa retraite, pour ne pas s'exposer à lui laisser la faculté de jeter des secours dans les points attaqués.”

ADMIRAL POCOCK'S FIRST BATTLE. 1758.

Extract of Letters upon this subject, but apparently not from the Admiral.

“ The enemy began to fire upon the English as they were going down, but the Admiral did not make the signal to engage, till he was within half musket shot of the Zodiaque ; which was about three o'clock. A few minutes after, perceiving the ships were not all got close enough to the enemy, he made the signal for a closer engagement, which was immediately complied with by the ships in the van. At half-past four, observing the rear of the French line had drawn up pretty close to the Zodiaque, the Admiral made the signal to the Cumberland, Newcastle, and Weymouth, to make sail up, and engage close. Soon after, Monsieur d'Aché broke the line and put before the wind : his second a-stern, who kept on the Yarmouth's quarter most part of the action, then came up alongside, gave his fire, and bore away. The other two ships in the rear came up in like manner, and then bore away ; and a few minutes after, observing the enemy's van to bear away also, the Admiral hauled down the signal for the line, and made the signal for a general chase,” &c.

And thus the action ceased.

Mr. Clerk has employed five figures to describe a battle much better forgotten, and which is here noted in one ; Figure 2, Plate 3, being a form of attack proposed.

OBSERVATIONS.

This engagement was certainly very ill conducted, and one in which the gallant Admiral was not supported by his rear. Admiral Pocock and the van set a noble example to the rest ; and in so small a squadron, it was a peculiar hardship to find three captains to fail in their duty ; these, it appears, were disgraced ; but this by no means repaired the injury to the national character ; nor could it make amends for the opportunity that, by their cowardice or disobedience, had been lost, of crushing the power of the enemy in India.*—(See Beatson's "Naval and Military Memoirs," vol. ii. pp. 192, 193, for a more detailed account of this battle.)

SIR GEORGE POCOCK'S SECOND BATTLE.

Of Sir George Pocock's second action with M. d'Aché, which took place on the 3d of August, in the same year, the writer will relate what he has been able to collect from a French account, given in the "Gentleman's Magazine" for March, 1759 ; of which the following are extracts ; and then quote from "Beatson's Naval and Military Memoirs," vol. ii. pp. 205, 206, 294, 295.

Paris, March 9.

"The Marquis de Montmorency Laval, Colonel of foot, arrived from the East Indies with the following particulars of the success of the King's forces against the English in that part of the world." Then are related the operations of M. de Lally and Count d'Estaing at Pondicherry and Gondeleur.

"The Diligente frigate is since arrived express, and hath brought a journal of Count d'Aché's squadron, of which the following is an extract." It then states the force, and details its proceedings in conjunction with M. de Lally ; but which it is unnecessary to insert. All that is said of the first engagement is, that "it commenced at two o'clock in the afternoon, and continued till night, with great vivacity on both sides." From this time the journal proceeds until the

* Of Sir George Pocock, the following trait is related by one who was an eye-witness. In the heat of the battle, a shot that took off the head of one of the seamen on the quarter-deck had thrown all the contents of the skull directly into the Admiral's face ; he, with the greatest composure, called, "Boy, go and get me some vinegar and water to wash my face : " this was a youngster, stationed upon the quarter-deck as a little aid-de-camp.

third of August, " on which last day, at one in the afternoon, a fresh engagement began, which continued with the utmost fury for above two hours.

" The English squadron suffered greatly in this second action, and Count d'Aché would have had the whole advantage, had it not been for the accident that happened on board his ship and the Comte de Provence, by the combustibles (or fire arrows) which the English, contrary to all the rules and customs of war, threw on board. The Comte de Provence was the first that suffered; all her sails on the mizen-mast took fire, and the flames spread to the quarter-deck; so that the whole ship would have been consumed, had not the Captain of the Duc de Bourgogne shot in between the Comte de Provence and the English vessel, which continued firing broadsides after expending all her combustibles. It was with the utmost difficulty the Captain of the Comte de Provence extinguished the fire on board his ship.

" The same thing happened to the Zodiaque, with this difference, that the fire having gained the powder-room, she was on the point of blowing up, but was saved by the diligence of the officers.

" After these accidents the squadron was obliged to retreat, the Zodiaque forming the van.

" Annexed to this account is a state of the loss which the French fleet suffered. The number of the killed amounts to 251, and that of the wounded to 602; of which, it appears that the Zodiaque, the Admiral's ship, had 70 killed, and 190 wounded, including the Admiral."

The conflict this time was short, but severe; and the force, according to Schomberg's " Naval Chronology," vol. i. p. 322, nearly equal. Admiral Pocock pursued the enemy until he found that, by the superior sailing of the French ships, who cut away their boats (towing a-stern) to facilitate their escape, it became useless to continue it; and he came to an anchor off Carical.

Upon this occasion Admiral Pocock, Commodore Stevens, and Captain Martin, were wounded; as were also M. d'Aché and his Captain.

In all the battles of Sir George Pocock appears the respected name of Kempenfelt, Captain to the ship of Admiral Stevens; who closed his useful and honourable career by the unfortunate sinking of the Royal George at Spithead in 1782, where his flag was flying.

The nation is indebted to the late Admiral Kempenfelt, from whose genius and labour the art of manœuvring a great fleet was put in practice, and brought to a degree of perfection never known before. Signals were also methodised, and were at once rendered distinct, comprehensive, and intelligent.

Of the Second Action the following is related by Beatson.

“ At noon, the sea breeze sprung up, which gave the British the weather-gage. Both fleets formed their lines anew to the wind, and at twenty minutes past twelve, Admiral Pocock made the signal to bear down on the enemy and engage. The Elizabeth and Comte de Provence began the engagement; but soon after, the mizen of the latter happening to take fire, she was obliged to quit the line, and her people were constrained to cut away the mast in order to save the ship. The Duc de Bourgogne then attacked the Elizabeth, but was so overpowered by her fire, that Count d'Aché himself, at that time warmly engaged with the Yarmouth, endeavoured all he could to push up to her assistance: but his intention was thwarted by the steering wheel of the Zodiaque being shattered by a shot from his antagonist; to repair which she passed under the lee of the Duc d'Orleans; and no sooner had she returned into the line, than one of her lower deck guns in the gun-room burst, and beat through the deck above. This misfortune was soon followed by another of a much more serious nature, and dreadfully alarming. The bulk-head of the powder-room was set on fire; and whilst they were busy in extinguishing it, the newly repaired wheel gave way, whereby the ship fell on board the Duc d'Orleans, her second a-head. Both, while trying to extricate themselves, were exposed to a most severe cannonade from the Yarmouth and Tyger; to which the enemy, for a considerable time, were unable to make any return. The Condé and Moras were by this time beat out of the line, and at eight minutes after two, the Zodiaque having got disentangled, M. d'Aché bore away, and in fifteen minutes afterwards the rest of his ships followed his example; on which Admiral Pocock made the signal for a closer engagement. This signal was obeyed with alacrity by all the ships, and the enemy were severely raked by means of this well-timed manœuvre; but, as they crowded all the sail they could set, the Admiral soon after hauled down the signal for the line, and made the signal for a general chase. On this, the enemy cut away all their boats, that their ships might have no impediment to retard their sailing, and stood to the N. N. W.”

THIRD BATTLE OF POCOCK AND D'ACHÉ, September, 1759.

This third battle of Pocock with Monsieur d'Aché, was fought on the 10th of September, 1759. In the first volume of Schomberg's Naval Chronology, some account is given of it; and in the fourth volume is stated the force on both sides: by which it appears the advantage was considerably on the part of the French, they having eleven to nine sail of the line, with a superiority of 200 guns: however, the British Admiral having the weather-gage, bore down with great resolution; and at eleven the *van under Admiral Stevens brought the enemy to action*, which soon after became general, and continued with great bravery on both sides until four o'clock, when the French gave way. Monsieur d'Aché being wounded and his Captain killed, his ship wore out of the line, which the rest mistaking for an intention to retreat, made all sail away, and were pursued by the British fleet until dark. This last proves to have been the most severe of all these actions, as a much more serious list of killed and wounded follows the account.

The Captain of the Newcastle and other officers were killed, and Captains Brereton and Somerset were wounded.

The loss of the enemy amounted to 1500 killed and wounded; amongst the former were the Captains of the Zodiaque and Centaur, and Monsieur d'Aché was severely wounded.

"The Newcastle was much damaged in her masts, yards, and rigging. The Cumberland and Salisbury, in the rear, were not in a condition to make sail. The Yarmouth had her fore-top-sail yard shot away in the slings; and the Grafton and Elizabeth were greatly disabled in their masts, yards, and rigging. The Sunderland and Weymouth, in short, were the only ships capable of pursuing the enemy, so that only seven of our ships received the whole fire of the enemy's fleet, till towards the conclusion, and even then only eight."

At day-break on the 11th, the Admiral stood under an easy sail to the S. W., the Sunderland having the Newcastle in tow; the Weymouth the Tyger; and the Elizabeth the Cumberland.

Of the Third Battle, the following is stated by Beatson.

"At six in the morning, on the 10th, the enemy's squadron bore S. E. by S. distant eight or nine miles, and was formed in a line of battle a-head on the

starboard tack. Admiral Pocock continued bearing down on them in a line of battle a-breast, with the wind about N. W. by W. At ten the enemy wore, and formed a line of battle a-head on the larboard tack; and at eleven our squadron did the same. Rear Admiral Stevens, in the *Grafton*, being then opposite to the *Zodiaque*, began the action on our side, when, perceiving Admiral Pocock in the *Yarmouth* was coming close to that ship, after giving her a few broadsides he left her; then, pushing on, he attacked the *Vengeur*, which having drove out of the line, he went to the assistance of the *Tyger* and *Newcastle*, two ships a-head of him, that had suffered very much from the superiority of the ships of the enemy which they had engaged. One of these, the *St. Louis*, did not long withstand the fire of the *Grafton*, but retired out of the line. The Rear Admiral then attacked the *Minotaur* and the *Duc d'Orleans*, and continued to engage both these ships till the battle ended. Admiral Pocock bestowed his first fire on the *Comte de Provence*; and then shot a-head, and engaged *M. d'Aché* in the *Zodiaque*. The action now became general with seven of the headmost British ships; but the *Sunderland*, sailing very ill, kept back the *Weymouth*.

“ At four o'clock, the only French ships which kept the line, and continued the engagement, were the *Minotaur* and *Duc d'Orleans* against the *Grafton*; the *Zodiaque* against the *Yarmouth*; the *Illustre* against the *Cumberland*; and the *Fortunée* and *Centaur* against the *Salisbury* and *Sunderland*. Soon after the *Fortunée* and *Centaur* quitted the line. The French Admiral being at this time rendered insensible by a very bad wound he had received in his thigh from a grape shot, and the Captain of the *Zodiaque* being killed an hour before, the officer next in command ordered the ship to be wore, in order to join those who had gone off;* when the other French ships soon followed their Admiral; which having joined, their whole squadron bore away and stood to the S. S. E. with all the sail they could crowd. The four ships that composed our van had sustained so hot a fire, during two hours, from six of the enemy's largest ships, that they were in no condition to pursue. The *Tyger* had her mizen-mast and main-top-mast shot away, besides being in other respects greatly disabled.”

* It would seem by the result of this battle, that to kill or disable a Commander-in-chief and his Captain was a sure road to success.

POCOCK'S BATTLE WITH D'ACHÉ IN THE EAST INDIES,
April 29, 1758.

Plate 3, Fig. 1, represents Clerk's fifth position. Ships making an attack from the windward should do it under all sail, to prevent a disappointment by such a manœuvre as this, as they are then in the best condition to follow.

Fig. 2. Mode proposed. The whole of the British fleet on the starboard line of bearing should have borne down upon the centre and rear of the French squadron, placing two ships upon that of the French Admiral; this would have left one to act as occasion required: or raking the enemy as at C, while the van of the enemy would be left unoccupied.

REMARKS.

"No plan or mode is given here to the enemy for repelling such an attack."

To bear up and form a closer line to leeward appears the most eligible mode of defence; or that the van of the squadron, F, should tack and double upon the van of B.

Plate 3, Fig. 2. "The mode of attack proposed is good, if the enemy will allow it; but what would the three headmost ships be about? If the enemy allow me to come down in that way, I should prefer attacking the three sternmost ships with my whole force, cutting through the line and beating them if possible before they could get any assistance from the van: as a small squadron is more easily manœuvred than a larger one; and as the line is shorter and the van ships sooner brought to assist the rear, and *vice versa*, so it is more difficult to cut off a part of it, though an attack on a certain number of ships only will be more likely to bring on a general action."

BOSCAWEN AND DE LA CLUE.

*Extract of the Admiral's Letter, dated Namur, off Cape St. Vincent,
August 20, 1759.*

"I acquainted you in my last of my return to Gibraltar to refit. As soon as the ships were near ready, I ordered the Lyme and Gibraltar frigates, the first

to cruize off Malaga, and the last from Estepona to Ceuta point, to look out and give me timely notice of the enemy's approach.

" On the 17th, at eight in the evening, the Gibraltar made the signal for their appearance, fourteen sail, on the Barbary shore, to the Eastward of Ceuta.

" I got under sail as fast as possible, and was out of the Bay before ten, with fourteen sail of the line, the Shannon, and Etna fire-ship. At day-light I saw the Gibraltar, and soon after seven sail of large ships, who, on our not answering their signals, made all sail from us. We had a fresh gale and came up with them fast. About half-past two, some of the headmost ships began to engage; but I could not get up to the Ocean* till near four. In about half an hour the Namur's mizen-mast, and both top-sail yards, were shot away: the enemy then made all the sail they could. *I shifted my flag* to the Newark, and soon after the Centaur of seventy-four guns struck. I pursued all night, and in the morning of the 19th saw only four sail of the line standing in for the land. We were not above three miles from them, and not more than five leagues from the shore; but with very little wind.

" About nine the Ocean ran amongst the breakers, and the three others anchored. I sent the Intrepid and America to destroy the Ocean; Captain Pratten, having anchored, could not get in; but Captain Kirk performed that service alone. On his first fire the Ocean struck. Monsieur de la Clue, having one leg broke and the other wounded, had been landed; but they found the Captain, &c.

" Captain Kirk, finding it impossible to bring her off, set her on fire; and Captain Bentley, of the Warspight, brought away the Temeraire, of seventy-four guns: at the same time Vice Admiral Broderick, with his division, burnt the Redoubtable, and brought off the Modeste, of sixty-four guns, very little damaged," &c.

In this affair it is seen that two of the enemy's ships were burnt and three were taken; nor can we sufficiently admire the conduct of Admiral Boscawen; who, when his ship was disabled, *shifted his flag* to the Newark; by which he continued to direct by his skill, and to animate by his example, the spirited exertions of those under his command. A practice so meritorious, and so conducive to the public good, cannot, under similar circumstances, be too strongly recommended. The spirit of de la Clue is also highly conspicuous; for, desperately wounded as he was, he preferred running his ships upon the rocks, rather than surrender them entire to the British fleet; and throughout the whole of

* Ocean, ship of the French Admiral.

this arduous and unequal contest, conducted himself with a perseverance and bravery that never were surpassed.

De la Clue did not long survive his disaster, and the fate of the Toulon fleet. It had been long and unremittingly watched by Boscawen in the Bay of Hieres; and some of his ships having suffered materially by an attack made upon the outer ships of the enemy, obliged him to return to Gibraltar. This gave an opportunity to the French Admiral to slip out.

(See Harvey's Naval History, and the Gentleman's Magazine for August 1759.)

Here shall be introduced some examples from our battles with the Dutch in former times, of the custom of flag-officers, when the ship in which their flag was flying was disabled, removing to a second, and even to a third and fourth ship.

It is unnecessary to dwell upon the merit of these noble proofs of heroism; the reader will find them more particularly detailed in Ledyard's Naval History, and Campbell's Admirals.

We have but one instance, since the time of Boscawen, of a commanding officer shifting his flag to continue the engagement; that of Commodore Nelson, on the 14th of February; but several for the accomplishment of a particular purpose: Nelson from the St. George to the Elephant, at Copenhagen; Duckworth, at Minorca; Mitchel, at the Helder; Lord H. Seymour, at the capture of Surinam; and Lord Collingwood after the battle of Trafalgar. It was also necessary in our late war with America; where the Admirals frequently shifted their flags, the better to conduct the joint operations of the land and sea forces. Commodore Nelson, after the battle of the 14th February, 1797, shifted his pendant to the Irresistible, Captain George Martin. See Part II.

“ Three engagements between the English under Prince Rupert, and the Dutch under De Ruyter.

“ The Golden Lion, in which Van Tromp was, had above a hundred men killed and wounded, and was very much shattered; and in this condition she was very near being burnt by a fireship set upon her by Sir William Reeves. Van Tromp was then obliged to hoist his flag on board the Prince on Horseback; and her main-mast being shot by the board, he removed to the Amsterdam, and afterwards to the Comet.” (Ledyard, page 601.)

In this battle Sir Edward Spragge greatly distinguished himself by the destruction and slaughter of the enemy.

On another occasion, Spragge and Cornelius Van Tromp were opposed to each other with the greatest fury, and were both obliged to leave their ships and go

to others; Sir Edward Spragge, again being compelled to quit his ship (the *St. George*) by the fall of her main-mast, put himself into his barge to go to another, intending to continue the fight in the third ship; when a cannon ball sunk the boat, and the gallant Admiral was drowned.

(Ledyard, book iii, page 603. See also Campbell's life of this extraordinary man, volume iii.)

In a fight between the Duke of York and De Ruyter, the Duke was obliged to leave his ship (the standard being shot down with the main-top mast of the *St. Michael*) and go on board the *Loyal London*. In this engagement the Earl of Sandwich was very hard pressed in the *Royal James*, and had given signal proofs of courage; and after sustaining with the most intrepid valour an unequal combat for five hours, was again beset by numbers; and a fire-ship of the enemy grappling with the *Royal James*, set her in a flame; and thus perished the gallant but unfortunate Earl.

(Ledyard, book iii, page 598.)

There is also another instance in the person of Vice Admiral Sir Ralph Delaval; who, in Russel's celebrated defeat of the French fleet, commanded by Monsieur Tourville, in order to follow some of the enemy's ships close in shore, shifted his flag from the *Royal Sovereign* to the *St. Albans*, of fifty guns; and, assisted by some others with armed boats and fire-ships, destroyed several of them. The following extract is taken from Sir R. Delaval's letter to the Earl of Nottingham, May 22, 1692:

"And that no time might be lost, I went immediately on board the *St. Albans*; where, for the encouragement of the seamen, I hoisted my flag; and having ordered the *Ruby*, with two fire ships, to attend me, I stood in with them, leaving the great ships without, as drawing too much water," &c.

Finding he could do nothing with the third and fourth rates, he went "himself with all the barges and tenders, and three fire-ships, to attempt the burning them," &c.

The *Royal Sun*, Tourville's ship, the *Conquérant*, and the *Admirable*, were destroyed by this party, conducted by the Vice Admiral; whilst Russell was himself occupied in following up his blow on another division of the enemy's fleet, and in sight of the French and Irish camp formed on the heights, destined for the invasion of England.

"Thus at La Hogue and Cherbourg were burnt two ships of 104 guns each; one of ninety; two of eighty; four of seventy-six; four of sixty; and two of fifty-six guns, making a total of fifteen large ships."

(See Ledyard, pages 663, 664.)

Extract of a Narrative of the Defeat of de la Clue, by a Midshipman then belonging to his Majesty's Ship Guernsey, of fifty Guns, one of Admiral Boscawen's Fleet, kindly contributed by his Son, a Captain in his Majesty's Navy.

The writer is persuaded that the interest it will excite in the seaman's mind renders no apology for its insertion necessary.

“ On the evening of the 16th of August, the Gibraltar, of twenty-four guns, Captain M'Cleverty, stationed in the Gut, made the signal for seeing the enemy's fleet to the eastward. A signal was immediately made on board the Admiral for our fleet to unmoor.

“ It is somewhat remarkable, that Admiral Boscawen and some of the principal officers of his fleet were that day dining with the Governor of St. Roque, a Spanish garrison town a few miles from Gibraltar. Seeing the signal above-mentioned, they left the town in a hurry, and immediately repaired to the shore; where it has been said they found their barges hauled up upon the beach; done either by, or at the instigation of the Spaniards, to delay as much as possible the Admiral's return on board; the enemy's fleet being at that very instant making the best of their way through the Gut: whether premeditated or not is uncertain; but the circumstance was singular.

“ A signal for the fleet to *cut* or *slip* was immediately made on the Admiral's return; and great was the hurry and confusion which ensued: some ships having their sails unbent, and their yards newly tarred; others, I think, with their yards and top-masts struck, overhauling their rigging; and almost all having seamen and officers on shore, either on pleasure or on the several duties of the fleet, little expecting at that moment the approach of an enemy. These, unwilling to be left behind, embarked in any boat they met with, and got on board the first ship they could.

“ Notwithstanding the unprepared situation of the fleet, so great were the exertions of the officers and seamen on this animating occasion, that the whole was got out of the bay with wonderful expedition; and during the night continued in chase with every thing ready for immediate action.

“ On the morning of the 17th, some ships were seen a-head. The wind was strong at east; the weather fine, the water smooth; and we soon perceived that we gained exceedingly fast upon the enemy; which were now plainly discovered to be seven large ships of the line, and one of them carrying a French Admiral's flag.

“ About ten o'clock, a. m. the Admiral threw out the signal for battle; the

ships to engage as they came up, without regard to the line of battle. The enemy's ships were formed in a line a-head, and crowding away from us under a press of sail.

" Soon after three, the Culloden, of 74 guns, Captain Callis, brought one of the sternmost of the enemy to action, and was supported by the rest as they came up. Admiral Boscawen, in the Namur, never stopped until he came alongside of the French Admiral, Monsieur de la Clue, and the combat was dreadful. For a time the good fortune of the latter protected him, and prolonged his fate; for the Namur having had her *mizen-mast* and *main-top-sail yard shot away*, unavoidably dropped a-stern.

" Admiral Boscawen, thus mortified and disappointed, immediately *shifted his flag to the Newark of 80 guns*, and continued the chase with unremitting vigour. About four, the Guernsey began to engage, and directed her fire to the nearest of the enemy's line; but, at that instant, our Admiral making our signal to proceed, we stood on for the headmost of their line, and engaged such of the ships as came within our reach. We were very roughly handled; for, being the smallest ship in our fleet, the enemy took us for a *fire-ship*, and treated us accordingly. The sternmost ship of the enemy (the Centaur) then struck her colours to the Edgar, of 60 guns, Captain Drake. As night approached, the enemy's ships seemed insensibly to steal away, and by degrees got out of the reach of our guns; and the wind, as is usual in sea-fights, was greatly abated: but the chase was continued all the succeeding night; and it is extraordinary that the Guernsey, though in general a heavy sailer, yet on this occasion was the headmost ship of the British fleet, and displayed the lights in her stern, to notify that the enemy was still in sight.

" We had now time to examine into the state of our ship; and found that her hull, masts, rigging, and sails, had suffered considerably, but particularly the latter. One large shot, from a lower decker, had gone through the centre of our main-mast, and we were apprehensive that it would go over the side, the wound being about midway between the deck and the top.

" In the night I went down into the cockpit, where the wounded are always carried; and was there witness to a scene shocking to humanity. I ascended precipitately, and endeavoured to banish from my mind the melancholy impression of the sight; but this was extremely difficult. I must not forget to relate a fact which bears the character of being very singular.

" A heavy shot, from an enemy's lower-deck gun, penetrated the side of our ship just between wind and water, abaft the main chains; forced its way through the purser's store-room into the cockpit; and, having there taken off the leg of

our surgeon, Mr. Beckley; another from Mr. Evans, surgeon's mate; another from John Bull, a marine, who was assisting them; and lastly the leg of a chair; made its way through the cockpit deck, and lodged itself in the *brandy-room*. I saw Mr. Beckley long after on the Royal Exchange in London, with his wooden leg; and he told me he had then the shot in his possession. Another shot was taken out of the ship's side, that weighed 74 pounds. We had none in the fleet that weighed more than 32 pounds.

"The 18th, at day-light, the enemy was discovered a few miles a-head of the British fleet; but some of them had separated, or had fallen a-stern. The French ships stood in immediately from the coast of Portugal, at the distance of six or eight leagues. At nine o'clock the largest of the enemy's ships ran on shore with all her sail set; when every mast went by the board, and fell over the bows: this was the *Ocean*, of 80 guns, the ship of M. de la Clue. The *Redoubtable* followed soon after, and met a precisely similar fate.

"Two others came to anchor under the protection of some Portugese forts, near the bay of Lagos, a few miles distant from three which had run on shore.

"The British fleet was brought to, and dispositions made by the Admiral for attacking the ships which had anchored, and for detroying the two on shore. The Guernsey's signal, amongst others, was made; and Captain Kearney went on board the flag-ship in the only boat that could swim, to receive the Admiral's commands; and soon returned, signifying that his instructions were, to proceed with the Guernsey, and at the hazard of our ship and lives, to destroy the French ship (*Redoubtable*) without any regard to the laws of neutrality.

"We immediately made sail in company with the *Prince*, Vice Admiral Broderick, and the *St. Albans*, of 60 guns, Captain Vernon. The *Prince* came to anchor near the French ship, and with a few broadsides drove her crew on shore; when the boats, manned and armed, proceeded to board and to burn her. I went again as a volunteer with Lieutenant Carteret: we boarded the *Redoubtable*, and speedily set this fine ship in flames, in the doing of which, Mr. Carteret, who was an excellent officer, was principally instrumental.

"In the mean time some other ships were employed in bringing, or attempting to bring off the remaining ships of the enemy. The *Ocean* was set on fire by the *America*, Captain Kirk; the *Temeraire* was brought off by the *War-spight*, Captain Bentley; and the *Modeste* struck to the *Jersey*, Captain Barker; the Portuguese firing occasionally at our ships in defence of the French squadron, which had sought protection under their guns, by the laws of neutrality. That they fired *shot* from their guns was not ascertained; as no damage was received by the British squadron from that quarter.

“ Between eight and nine at night, the wind being moderate, the sea smooth, we beheld with admiration one of the finest sights in the world—the Redoubtable at that instant blew up. We were at the distance of a few miles, but the report was tremendous ; the sight, however, was but for a moment, and all was dark and still !” &c.

“ Admiral Boscawen, having thus successfully accomplished the object of his cruise, and there being now no longer any occasion for so large a fleet in the Mediterranean, sailed on the 26th with six sail of the line, two fire-ships, and the prizes, for England ; where, greatly to the misfortune of his country, that great and gallant officer died.

“ The squadron was then reduced to seven sail of the line and some frigates under Vice Admiral Broderick ; and made sail to the eastward, to block up five sail of the line and three frigates of the squadron of Monsieur de la Clue, that had taken shelter in the port of Cadiz : but the Guernsey was ordered to Gibraltar with the prisoners, and to repair and refit ; our main-mast in particular being in momentary danger of falling over the side ; yet a Midshipman was constantly stationed at the mast-head :* and one day, the wind blowing fresh with a head sea, and my turn to be posted there, I was extremely glad when the officer of the watch ordered me to come down from so dangerous a situation ; and none was afterwards sent up during our way to Gibraltar ; where we arrived soon after, and landed our wounded and prisoners.

“ In November, the squadron under Vice Admiral Broderick, which had been cruising in the bay of Cadiz to watch the motions of the remaining part of de la Clue’s squadron, which had sheltered there, received considerable damage ; and was in imminent danger of being driven on shore by a heavy gale of wind. The Prince, Newark, and Culloden, were totally disabled and laid up in the Carraccas, to be refitted at the convenience of the Spaniards. By this unexpected event the French squadron became superior to the British ; and the Guernsey received orders to proceed immediately to Cadiz to join the Admiral.

“ In pursuance of these directions, having previously taken on board a large anchor for the Prince, we sailed from Gibraltar ; and the next day were attacked by a severe gale of wind from the westward.

“ The suddenness of the attack prevented all possibility of getting a good offing ; and we found ourselves in a few hours dangerously encumbered with a lee shore, and at no great distance : we crowded a press of sail, but all to no purpose ;

* “ A good practice, which should be respected and observed.”

the ship drawing rapidly to land. We soon discovered, to our great mortification, that it could not be weathered on either tack.

“ Meanwhile, the gale, as well as our danger, was momentarily increasing ; our fate appeared inevitable. To anchor in a gale of wind, in an open sea, upon a lee shore, appeared chimerical in the extreme ; and nothing but the total absence of hope could have warranted the measure : this was, however, our last resource, and one of our anchors was let go ; the effect appeared no more than if a pebble had been thrown into the sea. Another anchor was dropped ; and after the cables of both had run out to their utmost extent, to our infinite joy they happily brought us up. The sheet-anchor, now the only one remaining, was instantly prepared, to use as occasion might require.

“ The yards and top-masts were struck, and preparations made for cutting away the masts if our anchors should not hold. A dangerous shoal on which the sea most furiously broke, appeared at a small distance a-stern, ready to swallow us up in a moment, should our anchors prove unequal to their task : and this shoal, being a considerable distance from the land, precluded all possibility of being saved, even supposing a few might escape with life, and get through the surf that broke with such violence upon it.” (*Note*.—“ If you had gone inside of it, you might have anchored in safety.”)

“ In this terrible and very critical situation we rode for the space of two days ; braving the violence of the winds ; and exposed without any shelter to the fury of the Atlantic Ocean ; at the end of which time, the wind not only abating, but coming a few points more in our favour, we hove up with extreme difficulty our anchors (one of which we found had lost a fluke), got under sail, and in a day or two afterwards, to our great joy, came to an anchor in the Bay of Cadiz.

“ The scene of our danger and deliverance was between Cape Trafalgar, which is the N. W. boundary of the Straits, and the Bay of Cadiz ; nearly a-breast of a little town or village marked upon our charts Conil.

“ On our arrival at Cadiz, we found Admiral Broderick, with his flag on board the *Conqueror*, of seventy guns, Captain Lloyd, with only two other ships of the line and four frigates. The *Guernsey* arrived in a lucky hour ; for the French squadron consisted of five ships of sixty-four and sixty guns, and three frigates. The ships were intermingled with each other at anchor ; and, from the mutual good offices and civilities which passed between the officers, it did not appear that they belonged to nations at war. A single mile from the port would doubtless have presented a different scene ; the two nations, with the fury of lions, endeavouring to destroy each other ; and happy the party which could send the other to the bottom.

“ The regulations of this neutral port, respecting the sailing of the two squadrons, were in substance as follows :—

“ First.—Each squadron had in turn its day to sail.

“ Second.—The squadron which should sail first was not to be pursued by the other within the space of twenty-four hours.

“ When the French made preparations to sail, which they frequently made parade of we always assisted them with hawsers, &c. ; made similar, but I believe more *serious* preparations ourselves ; it being generally understood by our ships, that whenever the enemy went out of port, we should immediately pursue them, without paying any more deference here to the laws of neutrality, than we had done to the Portuguese ports. The French were twice actually under way ; but, on Admiral Broderick's dispositions for doing the same being observed, they immediately came to an anchor again. But they were never complaisant enough to repay us with the same attention.

“ It plainly appearing, at length, that the French Commodore, notwithstanding his superiority, would never leave the port whilst we continued in it ; the British Admiral signified to his captains his determination to sail and wait for the enemy *without*.

“ Our ships were extremely well manned ; officers and seamen from the three disabled ships were distributed amongst them, and the Guernsey received on board a midshipman (Mr. Nimme) and forty seamen from the Newark ; so that we had many more than our complement.

“ British seamen never want *spirit* ; but on this occasion they seemed particularly animated, and wished to be “ *alongside Monsieurs* ;” never in the least doubting but they would speedily give a good account of them.

“ French officers are, I believe, frequently *good* ; but their seamen are indifferent. They were rudely treated, we were informed, by the Spanish populace in the streets of Cadiz : and the news, which first then arrived, of the defeat of their *grand fleet* under Mons. de Conflans, did not a little contribute to depress their spirits.

“ We sailed from Cadiz Bay, 26th December ; and, when arrived at a proper distance from the shore, waited with anxious expectation the approach of the enemy's squadron. Our people were employed in the exercise of the great guns ; the marines in the use of their small arms ; and in short every disposition was made that was necessary, in order to ensure success in the approaching battle.

“ The spirit and ability of our officers and seamen were considered as more than adequate to the evident superiority of the enemy ; and we flattered ourselves that a consciousness of that superiority would induce the French Chef d'Escadre to

hazard a trial : but Providence ordered it should be otherwise. Scarcely had the British squadron arrived upon its station off the port of Cadiz, when a heavy gale of wind from the westward commenced. The Admiral, remembering his recent escape from the dangers of a lee shore (as well as our own, which I have already described) was anxious to get from the land as fast as possible, and have the straits of Gibraltar *open*. With this view we carried a press of sail, and happily effected that purpose. The Guernsey, however, had nearly been sacrificed in the attempt: she was always considered as extremely *crank*; and a sudden squall having laid her down almost on her beam-ends, we were under the greatest apprehensions that she would *overset*. The lee side of the quarter deck was two or three planks under water; an arm-chest went to leeward; a hawser washed from the fore-castle; and the mizen-top-mast stay-sail blown out of the netting. In this very critical situation, the fore-sheet very providentially gave way; the fore and other sails blew to pieces, and the ship immediately *righted*. The Admiral and the rest of the squadron soon after came safely to an anchor in Gibraltar Bay. We had not long continued there, when on the 3d of January, 1760, the Admiral received advice that the French squadron had sailed from the port of Cadiz; and shortly after, signals were made at the Spanish watch-towers along the shore, that a fleet was then approaching the straits.

“Admiral Broderick, on the receipt of this interesting information, immediately made a signal for his ships to unmoor; which was obeyed with wonderful expedition; and every one sanguinely anticipated in his own mind a complete and glorious victory. The conflict, it was considered, might be sharp; the squadrons being so nearly equal; but the event was never so much as doubted, I am persuaded, by any one in the fleet.

“Our ships were *hove short*, and every thing prepared for immediate pursuit; the people in the highest spirits, impatiently waiting for the expected signal to *weigh* or *slip*. The enemy's ships were that instant passing through the Gut, in a manner within reach of our guns; but the Admiral did not think proper to weigh or go in pursuit of the enemy!!! We were astonished at this conduct; for which no probable reason could be assigned. It seemed to be considered in the same light at home; for he was immediately afterwards recalled, and never employed again.”—See the account of this battle given by Monsieur de la Clue, in a letter to the French Ambassador at Lisbon, Annual Register, 1759.

Of the benefit of anchors, or even of cables without anchors, to ships at sea in heavy gales, the following is a proof.

When the present Admiral Sir Israel Pellew was Captain of the *Cleopatra*, of thirty-two guns, upon the coast of America, (in 1797 or 8,) in the month of

September he was overtaken by a violent hurricane about 500 miles from the island of Bermuda; and the main-mast, which was before defective, being carried over the side about ten feet above the quarter-deck with the increasing violence of the gale, soon after was followed by the fore-mast, mizen-mast, and bowsprit; leaving the ship entirely at the mercy of the waves. In this situation, when, from the heavy and deep rolling of the ship, no person could keep his feet, it was proposed to the Captain to ease the ship by throwing the guns overboard; but this he resolutely forbade; and resolved to have recourse to an expedient, which to him was known only by tradition or report, and to that time had been little or never practised; as it is hoped the necessity for it had been rare. The Captain immediately ordered the cable of the best bower to be cut at the clinch, and payed out until a sufficient scope had been given, to cause the ship to ride easy to the sea: with seventy fathoms, this was effected, and the ship rose over it in such a manner, that her fore-castle remained perfectly dry; the people could stand to their duty, and they soon got rid of the wreck of masts and rigging. In this manner she continued for three days, and had drifted about forty miles: the gale had then abated; and they proceeded to raise jury-masts by means of the top-masts, and top-gallant-masts, &c.; and having completed her equipment, hove in the cable and made sail for Halifax.

Few seamen have formed a right estimation of the value of anchors and cables in situations like this. It requires a well authenticated fact to fix the circumstances strongly on the mind; and the writer received this account from the gallant Admiral himself. Examples of this nature are very rare, and little known; but, when given from the purest sources of information, may become useful.

When in a similar situation as that related above, the Centaur of seventy-four guns was suffering after the dreadful hurricane in 1782, Captain Inglefield informs us that, "The ship lying in the trough of the sea, laboured prodigiously. I got over one of the small anchors, with a boom, and several gun carriages, veered out from the head door by a large hawser, to keep the ship's bow to the sea; but this, with a top-gallant-sail upon the stump of the mizen mast, had not the desired effect." (Captain Inglefield's Narrative of the Loss of the Centaur. Page 11.)

Steering ships by the ends of cables payed out a-stern, with tackles to them when without a rudder, is too well known to require a description. Ships have also been steered by *boats* towing a-stern. His Majesty's ship Crown of sixty-four guns, having lost her rudder by striking on the *Kentish Knock*, was in this

manner conducted in safety through the *Gull Stream* by five pilot-boats that came to her assistance. *Umbrellas* have been used with good effect.

A gallant young officer, who assisted at the capture of the President frigate, relates the following circumstances.

“ Two days after she fell into our hands, in a very heavy gale, in the Gulph Stream, she lost her three masts ; and, having several shot-holes between wind and water not plugged up, was near foundering ; the crew exhausted at the pumps, and the water gaining on them ; the bowsprit remaining, keeping the ship off in the trough of the sea. In this perilous situation, Captain Morgan veered out an umbrella with two hawsers an-end on it, from the hawse-hole (or bridle port), which immediately had the effect of causing the ship to bow the sea, and enabled the crew, by great exertion of bailing and pumping, to keep her free. When the umbrella had been out eight or ten hours, the hawser parted ; but the gale had then moderated, and the sea had abated ; the ship rigged jury-masts, and was safely conducted to Bermuda.”

The American ships are furnished with two of these umbrellas, for the purpose of warping. In this way, or by kedge anchors, the Constitution is said to have escaped from Sir P. Broke, in July, 1812.

Umbrellas, the contrivance of a friend of the writer, were tried upon a barge on the river Thames, thirty years ago, and warped her a-head at the rate of three miles an hour ; they were made of stout canvass, strongly secured by iron braces, buoyed up by a wooden ball, fired from a mortar. (See Appendix.)

Umbrellas were used in the year 1759. Two of them were constructed in this year on board a man of war commanded by Captain Moore ; and, in order to animate the crew in the labour of working them, were called, the one “ *St. Andrew*,” and the other “ *St. Patrick*,” and were respectively worked by Irish and Scotchmen. His Majesty’s ship *Levant*, off the Western Islands, commanded by the Honourable George Murray, in pursuit of an American schooner, and having no means of getting a-head, it being calm, attempted to effect her purpose by sending out *tubs* with hawsers attached to them. The boatswain of the *Levant*, however, having sailed with Captain Moore, and witnessed the effect of the umbrellas, mentioned it, and two of them were caused to be constructed accordingly. Admirals Sir Henry Baynton and Sir Charles Penrose were midshipmen in the *Levant* at this time ; to the former of these officers the writer is indebted for this anecdote.

While Sir Henry commanded the *Leviathan*, seventy-four, in the Mediterranean, he had two umbrellas made of large dimensions, and took them with

him to the Milford. They were eventually left at the Dock-yard, Plymouth.

The late Captain Sir George Collier related to the writer the following circumstance ; although not treating of the effect of umbrellas, yet connected with the subject.

In the course of the last long war, when a strong squadron was constantly employed upon the coast of Holland, a ship of sixty-four guns, riding at anchor off one of the enemy's ports, in a very heavy gale parted her cables. Endeavouring to bring the ship up with the sheet anchor, they found, when it was too late, that they had neglected to *clinch* the inner end of the sheet cable, and were unable to stopper it, or to prevent its running out of the *hawse*. The ship, left to her fate, drifted on shore.

In this extremity it occurred to the captain, with a view to ground the ship upon the sand-banks as far off shore as possible, to *deepen* the ship as much as he could in the water, in hopes still of saving her. He therefore used every exertion in his power to fill the ship with water as fast as he could, so that by means of the cock, and of every bucket that could be had, he succeeded so far as to bring the ship down in the water at least a foot. This of course occasioned her to take the ground sooner than she otherwise would have done, and furnished them with an easy means of lightening her by all that she had been deepened ; and upon the return of fine weather a rising tide enabled them to get her afloat again. Sir G. Collier had forgotten the names both of the captain and of his ship.

The inner ends of inner cables have been *spliced together*, that ships may upon necessity veer *all* upon *one* anchor : care must be taken to *rouse up* cable in time.

A seventy-four gun ship commanded by the writer, once, in working into the Downs through the " Gull Stream," with the tide of ebb, and the wind at S.S.W. or S.W., late in the evening of a winter's day, tailed (when in stays) upon the "*Brake*" sand. The pilots, by whose inadvertency, in standing on to six when they should have approached no nearer to the shoal than seven fathoms, recommended to the captain to *let go an anchor*, to prevent, as the flood-tide should make, the ship being driven further upon the bank. A bower anchor was therefore let go, to preserve her if possible in her then situation : this, however, was not to be done ; as the ship was lightened, and the tide rose, she became uneasy and unmanageable : in defiance of the fore-sail and close-reefed fore-topsail kept flat a-back to prevent it, the ship was turned round by the course and violence of the tide, which appeared to be running in circles. In turning from her anchor, and beating heavily upon the sand, she unavoidably

beat at last upon her anchor, the stock of which fortunately gave way to the superior strength and firmness of the ship's bottom. By starting water, and throwing overboard, as far from the ship as possible, a great quantity of shot, by the time of high water she seemed sufficiently light to be forced from her perilous situation. As the tide still rose, the falls of the ship upon the ground became more alarming, and the masts were violently agitated, yet nothing gave way. This was the critical moment to seize; and watching the opportunity when the wind was abaft the beam, the main-top-sail was in an instant let fall and sheeted home, the cable cut, and with many tremendous jumps the ship was again forced into deep water. Being at no great distance from the floating light of the "*Bunt Head*," little space or time was left for deliberation; the sails were scarcely filled upon the ship before it became necessary to take them in again, and she was brought up with the other bower anchor in safety, and came-to in the Downs on the following morning.

The ship was docked at Plymouth, her copper removed, and the bottom examined, and no injury was at first discovered. The ship never made any water until she was again re-stored and re-victualled, guns on board, and sails bent and ready for sea. It was, notwithstanding, found necessary to clear the ship and dock her again, when it appeared she had started a *butt* * in the *garboard streak*.

HAWKE AND CONFLANS.

We are now to consider the memorable encounter, amidst the rocks and shoals of a coast then very imperfectly known, between the above Admirals, on November the 20th, 1759. British, twenty-three sail of the line; French, twenty-one.

The following being an enterprise of a most daring and peculiar character, it has been thought necessary to insert almost the whole of Sir Edward Hawke's letter upon that occasion; nor will naval men, to whom it must be interesting, consider it too long. From it the figures of description have been formed.

The enemy was first discovered between the island of Belleisle and the Main;

* A *butt* is the *junction* of the two ends of timbers or planks; or the point of union between them, in ship-building.

The *garboard strake* is that line of planking in the ship's bottom that is nearest the keelson and keel.

and under the most unfavourable circumstances of weather ; but nothing checked the undaunted resolution of the British Admiral. Not inclined to risk an engagement with the British fleet in the open sea, Mons. de Conflans employed a more artful method of proceeding, by endeavouring to entangle it with the dangers of the French coast ; with which he knew the English must be but imperfectly acquainted : in this, however, partly by his own want of decision, but principally by the skill and determined conduct of the British fleet, he was entirely baffled ; and, “ fluctuating between a resolution to fight and an inclination to fly, he allowed the British ships to come up with him ; and then crowded his sail when it was too late to escape.”*

The van of the British soon came up with the rear of the enemy ; and a desperate conflict ensued ; the French Rear Admiral behaving with great Resolution. Sir Edward Hawke reserved his fire, and directed his ship to be carried alongside of the French Admiral : the master observing that it could not be done without imminent risk of running on a shoal ; the brave Admiral replied, “ You have done your duty in pointing out the danger : you are now to obey my commands and lay me alongside the *Soleil Royal*.”

In the mean time, two French ships of the line were sunk, by taking seas into their lower-deck ports ; and two others struck their colours. Darkness came on, and the rest fled to their own ports ; thus rescued from the destruction otherwise awaiting them by the British fleet, which anchored to the westward of the island of Dumet. In a situation of great danger and distress, it contrived to ride it out the whole night.

The morning shewed them the ship of the French Admiral on shore, and set on fire by her own men. Two English ships were lost upon a bank called *Le Four* ; but most of their men and part of their stores were saved. (See plate VI.)

*Extract of a Letter from Sir Edward Hawke to Mr. Cleveland, dated
“ Royal George, off Penvis Point, November 24th, 1759.”*

“ In my letter of the 17th, by express, I desired that you would acquaint their Lordships with my having received intelligence of eighteen sail of the line and three frigates, of the Brest squadron, being discovered about twenty-four leagues to the N. W. of Belleisle, steering to the eastward : all the prisoners, however, agree that on the day we chased them, their squadron consisted, according to the accompanying list, of four ships of eighty, six of seventy-four, three of seventy,

* See “ Campbell's Lives of the Admirals.”

eight of sixty-four, one frigate of thirty-six, one of thirty-four, and one of sixteen guns; with a small vessel to look out. They sailed from Brest the fourteenth instant; the same day I sailed from Torbay. Concluding that their first rendezvous would be Quiberon, the instant I received the intelligence, I directed my course thither with a press of sail. At first the wind blowing hard, at S. by E. and S. drove us considerably to the westward. But on the eighteenth and nineteenth, though variable, it proved more favourable. In the mean time, having been joined by the Maidstone and Coventry frigates, I directed their Commanders to keep a-head of the squadron, one on the starboard, and the other on the larboard bow. At half-past eight o'clock in the morning of the twentieth, Belleisle, by our reckoning, bearing E. by N. $\frac{1}{2}$ N. the Maidstone made the signal for seeing a fleet. I immediately spread abroad the signal for a line a-breast, in order to draw all the ships of the squadron up with me. I had before sent the Magnanime a-head, to make the land. At $\frac{1}{2}$ past nine, she made the signal for an enemy. Observing, on my discovering them, that they made off, I threw out the signal for seven ships nearest them to chase, and draw into a line of battle a-head of me, and endeavoured to stop them till the rest of the squadron should come up; who were also to form as they chased, that no time might be lost in the pursuit. That morning they were in chase of the Rochester, Chatham, Portland, Falkland, Minerva, Vengeance, and Venus; all which joined me about eleven o'clock; and in the evening the Sapphire from Quiberon bay. All the day we had very fresh gales at N. W. and W. N. W. with heavy squalls. M. Conflans kept going off under such sail as all his squadron could carry, and at the same time keep together; while we crowded after him with every sail our ships could bear. At half-past two, P. M., the fire beginning a-head, I made the signal for engaging. We were then to the southward of Belleisle; and the French Admiral, headmost, soon after led round the Cardinals, while his rear was in action. About four o'clock the Formidable struck, and a little after, the Thesée and Superbe were sunk.*

* The late Admiral Philip Pattan, in his admirable "Strictures on Naval Discipline and the Conduct of a Ship of War," p. 151, has the following observation. "In the action with Mons. Conflans in 1759, the Thesée and Superbe, of 74 guns each, were sunk, entirely by a want of dexterity in hauling in the guns, and letting down the ports of the lower deck; by which, not only the ships, but about 1500 men, perished in a few minutes. I was myself an eye-witness of this disaster, which has, in many accounts of the action, been erroneously attributed to the fire of the British fleet, but was evidently the effect of a squall of wind; which, but for the dexterity and alertness of our seamen, must also have been fatal to some of Admiral Hawke's ships. In this instance, the consequence of a deficiency of seamanship was the complete destruction of two capital ships." This little treatise by that able man, cannot be too much read by sea officers.

" About five the Heros struck, and came to anchor; but, it blowing hard, no boat could be sent on board her. Night was now come; and, being on a part of the coast among islands and shoals, of which we were totally ignorant; without a pilot, as was the greatest part of the squadron; and blowing hard on a lee shore; I made the signal to anchor; and came to, in fifteen fathoms water; the island of Dumet bearing E. by N. between two and three miles; the Cardinals W. half S. and the steeple of Crozie S. E. as we found next morning.

" In the night we heard many guns of distress fired; but, it blowing hard, want of knowledge of the coast, and whether they were fired by a friend or an enemy, prevented all means of relief.

" By day-break of the 21st, we discovered one of our ships dismasted ashore on the Four; the French Heros also; and the Soleil Royal, which under cover of the night had anchored among us, cut and ran ashore to the westward of Crozie. On the latter's moving, I made the Essex's signal to slip and pursue her; but she unfortunately got upon the Four, and both she and the Resolution are irrecoverably lost, notwithstanding we sent them all the assistance that the weather would permit. About eighty-four of the Resolution's company, in spite of the strongest remonstrances of their Captain, made rafts, and, with several French prisoners belonging to the Formidable, put off, and I am afraid drove out to sea.* All the Essex's are saved (with as many of the stores as possible) except one lieutenant and a boat's crew, who were drove on the French shore, and have not since been heard of. The remains of both ships are set on fire. We found the Dorsetshire, Revenge, and Defiance, in the night of the 20th, put out to sea; as I hope the Swiftsure did; for she is still missing. The Dorsetshire and Defiance returned next day, and the latter saw the Revenge without. Thus, what loss we have sustained, has been owing to the weather, not the enemy; seven or eight of whose line of battle ships got to sea, I believe, the night of the action.

" As soon as it was broad day-light in the morning of the 21st, I discovered seven or eight of the enemy's line of battle ships at anchor, between Point Penvis and the river Villaine; on which I made the signal to weigh, in order to work up and attack them; but it blowed so hard from the N. W. that, instead of daring to cast the squadron loose, I was obliged to strike top-gallant-masts. Most of those ships appeared to be a-ground at low water; but on the flood, by lightening them, and the advantage of the wind under the land, all, except two, got that night into the river Villaine.

* They got safe to the French shore, and are already exchanged.

“ The weather being moderate on the 22d, I sent the Portland, Chatham, and Vengeance. to destroy the Soleil Royal and Heros. The French, on the approach of our ships, set the first on fire; and soon after the latter met the same fate from our people. In the mean time, I got under way, and worked up within Penvis Point, as well for the sake of its being a safer road, as to destroy, if possible, the two ships of the enemy, which still lay without the Villaine. But before the ships I sent a-head for that purpose could get near them, being quite light, and with the tide of flood, they got in.

“ All the 23d we were employed in reconnoitring the entrance of that river; which is very narrow, and only twelve feet water on the bar, at low water. We discovered at least seven, if not eight, line of battle ships about half a mile within, quite light, and two large frigates moored across to defend the mouth of the river; only the frigates appeared to have guns in. By evening I had twelve long boats fitted as fire-ships ready to attempt burning them, under cover of the Sapphire and Coventry; but the weather being bad, and the wind contrary, obliged me to defer it, till at least the latter should be favourable; if they can by any means be destroyed, it shall be done.

“ In attacking a flying enemy, it was impossible, in the space of a short winter's day, that all our ships should be able to get into action, or all those of the enemy brought to it. The commanders and companies of such as did come up with the rear of the French, on the 20th, behaved with the greatest intrepidity, and gave the strongest proofs of a true British spirit. In the same manner, I am satisfied, would those have acquitted themselves, whose bad-going ships, or the distance they were at in the morning, prevented them from getting up. Our loss by the enemy is not considerable; for, in the ships which are now with me, I find only one lieutenant and thirty-nine seamen and marines killed, and about 202 wounded. When I consider the season of the year, the hard gales on the day of action, a flying enemy, the shortness of the day, and the coast we are on, I can boldly affirm, that all that could possibly be done has been done. As to the loss we have sustained, let it be placed to the account of the necessity I was under of running all risks to break this strong force of the enemy. Had we had but two hours more day-light, the whole had been totally destroyed, or taken; for we were almost up with their van when night overtook us.”

REMARK.

“ Hawke's pursuit and defeat of Conflans appears to me one of the best managed of our Naval Exploits.”

OBSERVATIONS.

The Plate will sufficiently display the hazardous nature of this attack ; for whether we consider the ardour and the mode adopted in the pursuit, or the steady intrepidity and perseverance which marks its whole progress ; we are at a loss to decide on which to bestow our greatest admiration. It remains, like other glorious deeds of more recent date, a proud memorial of British enterprise, and an object upon which sea officers may always dwell and reflect with peculiar benefit and gratification.

It should not be overlooked, that the gallant Admiral directed the chasing ships to form into line as they proceeded towards the enemy, but without in any manner impeding their progress ; by this means, no time was lost ; and the ships which were at first nearest to the French fleet, by putting themselves into line as they advanced, were at once enabled to attack an equal number, whenever they could reach them ; perhaps commencing the attack by inverting the line ; as shown in the Figure.



From the season of the year, and the state of the weather, it was of infinite importance to do promptly that which, otherwise, could not have been done at all. The British Admiral did it, and did it effectually ; for that squadron could never appear again at sea.

REMARKS.

“ It seems a curious fact, which indeed may be reduced to an effect of climate, that all the long drawling actions are confined to the East and West Indies ; the prompt, vigorous, decisive blows, to more northern regions ;* I think it was Hawke who said, that only two signals were necessary when an enemy was in sight ; namely, ‘ general chase and close action.’ And when a Chief, confident in himself, and inspired with the love of fame and his country’s weal, boldly outstrips the line of cautious prudence ; kind Providence (as if pleased by being trusted) graciously interferes, and crowns the measure with success.”

“ Of Hawke’s battle with Conflans, I’m pleased to see you dwell with warm praise. I always reflect on this important victory *con amore*. It was the first, and truly may I add, the last general action I was present at. Although sixty-one years ago, I have as perfect a recollection of the glorious scene as if it had

* The author of this remark will forgive the making of at least one exception to it, when he is reminded of an action (in the West Indies) in which he himself bore a conspicuous part.



passed recently before my sight.”—(See Monsieur de Conflans’ account, Annual Register, 1759.)

When Sir Edward Hawke was a Captain, advancing to the top of the list, at a time when a promotion of Flag Officers was in agitation; the expediency of passing over several, or, as it was familiarly termed, of “Yellowing” them, was talked over very freely at the Admiralty, and in the hearing of Admiral or Captain Boscawen.

Upon its being proposed to *yellow* Captain Hawke, Boscawen immediately interposed, and declared that if they yellowed him, they would lose one of the bravest men and finest fellows in the service.

Plate IV, Fig. 1, exhibits the situation of the fleets at half-past two p. m. when the Admiral (see his Letter, page 61, line 26) made the signal for engaging.

Fig. 2, exhibits their situation at day-light, on the morning of the 21st, where

B, shows the British squadron at anchor.

G, the four British ships that kept the sea on the night of the 20th.

C, the ships on Le Four.

D, the Soleil Royal, lost near Croize.

F, the French ships at anchor.

In 1762, a successful expedition was undertaken against Martinico, under General Monckton, and Rear Admiral Rodney, followed by the capture of St. Lucia, the Grenades, and St. Vincent.

In this year also the celebrated attack upon the Havannah was at length crowned with complete success. In this dreadful siege, three line of battle ships were anchored against the strong fortress of the Moro, commanding the entrance; after seven hours of incessant firing, and extreme suffering, it was necessary to withdraw them, with heavy loss. (See Annual Register for 1762.)

In 1763, the memorable capture of Manilla, and the Phillippine Islands, by “General Draper,” and “Admiral Cornish.”

There is also a private expedition against Buenos Ayres, commanded by Commodore Macnamara, in the ship *Clive*, which ship took fire, and was destroyed with the great loss of lives, under peculiar circumstances of horror and distress. (See Annual Register for 1763.)

ADMIRAL THE HON. AUGUSTUS KEPPEL, AND THE FRENCH FLEET UNDER D'ORVILLIERS.

Extract of Admiral Keppel's Letter, dated Victory, at sea, July 30, 1778.

“ My letters by the *Peggy* and *Union* cutters acquainted you, for their Lordships' information, that I was in pursuit of a numerous fleet of French ships of war.

“ From that time till the 27th, the winds constantly in the S. W. and N. W. quarters, sometimes blowing strong, and the French fleet always to windward going off, I made use of every method to close in with them that was possible; keeping the King's ships at the same time collected, as much as the nature of a pursuit would admit of, and the disinclination that appeared in the enemy to come to close action. The morning of the 27th the wind admitted of the van of the King's fleet under my command leading up with, and closing with their centre and rear.

“ The French began firing upon the headmost of Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Harland's division as they led up; which cannonade the Vice-Admiral and the rest of the ships returned as they could close up. The chase had occasioned their being extended; nevertheless they were all soon in battle.

“ The fleets being upon different tacks, passed each other very close: the object of the French seemed to be the disabling the King's ships in their masts and sails, in which they so far succeeded as to prevent many ships of my fleet being able to follow me when I wore to stand after the French fleet; this obliged me to wear again, to join those ships, and thereby allowed of the French forming their fleet again, and ranging it in a line to leeward.”

OBSERVATION.

Although it appears that the wind had been variable, and the weather

unsettled during the pursuit of the French fleet, yet no mention is made in the Admiral's letter of a change of wind, upon the approximation of the two fleets.

Mr. Clerk, in his account of this battle, states, that "the wind veering a little about to the south at this critical moment, favoured the fleet of the French by enabling them to lie better up, while of course the British fell off."

Plate V, Fig. 1, describes the position of the fleets when passing on opposite tacks, and when the change of wind takes place; showing the effects of it in the different directions of the heads of the leading ships in both lines.

Fig. 2 is intended to show in what manner the action might have been renewed by the British fleet.

Extract from the "Remembrancer," vol. 6.

"The circumstances of the engagement are very easy to be understood.

"The French were standing off against the wind; Admiral Keppel was following them: and while the French were standing one way, and he another, he managed by means of good seamanship, and a little shifting of the wind, to bring up a great part of the ships of his line so near to the centre and rear of theirs, that they were enabled to carry on a smart engagement as they passed.

Mr. Keppel's bringing up his ships in this manner, without regard to regularity, against a fleet of superior force, drawn up in perfect line, and to windward of him, is considered as a most daring manœuvre, and such as could proceed only from a determination to bring the enemy to action on any terms, and a thorough consciousness of naval superiority. When the two lines had completely passed, Mr. Keppel gave the signal to ware.

"His own ship, and a few others of his division, were the first that got round, and were very near the French; but before the others could form the line (the time necessary for which may partly be conceived, by considering that Mr. Keppel's line was at one time ten miles in extent) the day was beginning to close," &c.

In the same book are to be found different accounts of the proceedings of the French fleet upon the same occasion, translated from the "Journal of the King's fleet," published in the Gazette of France, and from an officer in the French fleet. A few extracts are selected.

"No sooner was the line formed, than Admiral d'Orvilliers plainly perceived the intention of the English Admiral was to fall upon the rear of the French

fleet, and to extend his line alongside of it: to prevent which, he caused the whole fleet to tack together, and that the former order of the line should be reversed; the blue squadron to compose the van, the white the centre, and the blue and white the rear-guard. By this bold manœuvre, which was extremely well executed, he was enabled to counteract the designs of the English Admiral, to assist the blue squadron, and take of the enemy the same advantage they intended taking of the French fleet; which was now drawn up in the best order on that line. When the van of the English fleet came up, they found it upon the other tack in order of battle," &c. "The fire was very hot on both sides for about three hours, during which it was evident that the *fire from the French ships was quicker* than of the English. The position of the English to leeward, gave them the advantage of using their lower-deck guns, which Admiral d'Orvilliers was anxious to deprive them of; he therefore made a signal for the blue squadron to veer by a successive movement, and for the rest to follow and range in order of battle upon the starboard tack. That movement was afterwards well executed, but nevertheless was too much delayed to follow close, and extend the line from rear to van of the English fleet as the Admiral intended." These accounts are too diffuse and contradictory to afford any further information; but with respect to the firing, it is but justice to make a short extract from the letter of an English officer in the same engagement.

"Sir Hugh Palliser was persuaded, that if the wind and the situation of the ships would have admitted of his being alongside of the *Bretagne* for ten minutes, she must have struck; as her decks were cleared of men, and she returned only about twenty-five guns, very slowly, in return for near three broadsides which he fired at her," &c.

In the "Universal Magazine" for August, 1778, it is positively asserted, by a writer of "cool thoughts" on that engagement, that Admiral Keppel had received orders *not to take a single ship* from the enemy—that it was resolved, "rather to suffer the British navy to perish in the sea, than to let the laurel of victory crown the brow of a Whig Admiral,* warm with zealous feelings, ripe

* An order of this nature may have been given to Admiral Keppel when he sailed on his first cruise: and from the conduct of the *Licorne*, French frigate, to the *America*, and that of the *Arethusa* to the *Belle-Poule*, each country laid the *aggression* at the door of the other. Admiral Keppel returned on the 26th of June, and sailed again probably with fresh instructions, on the 9th of July.—(See State Papers, and the letters of Admiral Keppel, upon this subject dated at sea, June 18th and 20th, in the "Maritime Campaign of 1778," by J. M., Lieutenant in the fleet.)

to execute a glorious revenge:" but that these instructions were not opened until he was actually in chase of the French fleet. "That the Admiral had orders not to make a single capture, I positively aver."—(See, ~~as~~ above, p. 96, from the "Gazetteer," "Cool Thoughts on the late Naval Engagements," signed with the initials D. G.)

These are mysteries into which the writer does not intend to enter—certain it is, that little impression was made upon the French fleet. The apple of discord was thrown into the British navy; distrust followed all the measures of the government; while at the same time the character of one brave officer was blasted for ever, and the other certainly acquired no additional merit in the estimation of his countrymen.

The French fleet, it is shown, passed round the rear of the British fleet, and formed in line of battle to leeward, on the starboard tack.

At this period both our code of signals and our naval discipline were very defective; and the delay consequent upon the mode of communicating orders, that of messages by boats or ships, and the unaccountable conduct of Sir H. Palliser and his division, appear to be the only reasons why the British Admiral did not fall upon the enemy to leeward of him.

Of a cannonade when passing on opposite tacks, it may be observed, that we are too apt to consider it of more importance than it deserves; for when ships are passing each other at the rate of five miles an hour, or even at a less rate, little real effect can be expected from it. Mr. Clerk has very clearly shown, that to go much less than five miles per hour, under such circumstances, would not be prudent, and at that rate of going, ships are firing at an object passing them at the rate of *ten*; and, with all the imposing appearance of fighting, much ammunition must be wasted: the remarks of Mr. Clerk upon this subject strongly merit the attention of sea officers.

REMARKS.

"In the account of this action, it is asserted that Keppel had orders not to take a single ship: this is at least very improbable, or at all events it is clear that he did not intend to have obeyed them. The very circumstance of his being a *Whig* would have urged him for his country's sake to have gained a victory, which would have insured his popularity, and the disclosure of the order in question must have ruined the Tory party; besides, had such an order existed, he would have produced it at his trial.

“ The proposed plan to tack the British fleet *together* would certainly have been the best ; but it appears they were not in a condition to effect it, as many were prevented following the Admiral when he wore to stand after the enemy.

“ Admiral Keppel lost his chance of a victory by not *passing through* the enemy's line with his *van* before the shift of wind ; which, as it took place afterwards, prevented any support being given from the van to the enemy's rear.

“ Admiral Keppel lost another opportunity of defeating the French fleet, by not attacking it in the night. ‘ By night or by day,’* in fine weather or foul, no opportunity should be lost, of bringing the adverse fleet to a close decisive action. Such are the chances of shifts of wind, &c. in nautical proceedings, that delay is more than dangerous ; it is almost certain ruin in the presence of an enemy's fleet. See the truth of this in the case of single ships.

“ The Renown, Captain Dawson, by not engaging the Languedoc in the night, lost an opportunity of destroying the ship of the French Commander-in-Chief ; Captain Dawson resolved to lie by her till the morning, when six French ships hove in sight. Commodore Hotham, in the Preston of fifty guns, fell in with the Tonnant of eighty guns, with only her main-mast standing ; he engaged her with great advantage till night obliged him to draw off, with the same intention as that of Captain Dawson ; but met with the same disappointment and from the same source—the sudden appearance of more of the enemy's fleet.”



Mr. Clerk, in his Recapitulation of his Remarks on this battle, comes to the following just conclusions :

“ Suppose, for example, that two, three, or more ships, are passing each other on opposite tacks at the rate of five miles per hour ; then will the velocity of the transit be equal to ten ; or, which is the same thing, let us suppose, for the sake of demonstration, the one fleet at rest, and the other in motion, at the rate of ten miles per hour ; then each ship of the squadron in motion will pass through 880 feet in one minute of time.

“ According to which, then, each ship of the squadron A, will pass each ship of the enemy F, with the interval between ships included, in one minute ; that is, she will make a transit of 880 feet, or 300 yards (the general allowance of

* “ If I fall in with the French fleet in the night I shall engage them immediately ; they do badly in the day, but much worse by night.”—*Lord Nelson*.

This was said by the great Chief during his memorable pursuit of a superior force to the West Indies in 1805.



space for ships drawn up in line of battle), *in one* minute.—(See his Plate IV, Fig. 13.

“ Therefore, if the two fleets did pass one another on the 27th of July, 1778, at the rate of five miles per hour, and if it were possible that the loading of a ship's gun could be repeated once every minute of time, still each British ship could be exposed to the fire of each French ship during the space of one quarter of a minute only ; that is, while the two ships were in direct opposition ; and as there were twenty-six ships of the enemy, each ship, on the whole, could be exposed to a cannonade of six minutes only. And if the fleets had passed each other at the rate of two miles and a half per hour (a motion absolutely necessary to make a ship answer the rudder well) each ship would then be exposed to a fire of 18 minutes' duration.

“ By such investigation only can it be explained, how two adverse fleets, amounting to thirty ships of the line each, carrying above 36,000 men, after having been brought in opposition of battle, and mutually sustaining a furious cannonade from above 4,000 guns, besides musquetry ; how I say, they have been brought to, to be separated again, without effect ; without the smallest apparent decision, &c.

“ From all which it must be concluded, that the most artful management of sails, the closest approximation, or the most spirited cannonade, will avail nothing under such circumstances ; and that it is in vain to hope that ever any thing material can be effected against an enemy's fleet keeping to windward, passing on contrary tacks, and desirous to go off, unless his line of battle can be cut in twain, or some such other step can be devised, as has already been described.”

Mr. Clerk has left nothing further to be said upon this subject. We shall therefore proceed with pleasure to give some account of the conduct of Lord Howe in America ; and afterwards of that of the Honourable Samuel Barrington with the Count d'Estaing in the West Indies.

Plate V, Fig. 1. The fleets on opposite tacks, exchanging fire on passing, when a change of wind takes place.

A, the direction of the wind, when the centres of the opposing fleets meet and exchange fire.

D, the change of wind ; by which the van of the British fleet falls off, while

that of the enemy, wishing to avoid an action, lies higher up. The change of wind drawing forward on the British fleet, and aft upon the French fleet, affects them differently (on opposite tacks), as described in the figure.

Fig. 2. Proposed mode of attack by the British fleet tacking together. By this method it is apparent, that every ship of the British fleet would most likely succeed in getting closely engaged with those of the enemy, either to windward or to leeward.

A, the direction of the wind as before, which brought the French fleet down upon that of England.

D, the direction of the wind after the change, which enables the fleet B, after tacking together, to lie up for the enemy, as in the figure; and, should the enemy, taking advantage of the change, haul their wind together, as at E, G; still, by carrying a press of sail, the fleet B may bring him to action upon equal terms.

Should the disabled state of the leeward fleet render this difficult, the windward fleet will have time to form a new line of battle; or if of equal or superior force, it might draw out into two lines. The ship of the Commander-in-chief hauling up to lead the weather division. The body of the leeward fleet would then advance between them. The weather fleet forming upon the dotted lines, as in the Plate (5).

LORD HOWE AND D'ESTAING,

OFF SANDY HOOK.

As the conduct of Lord Howe on the coast of America is little known, and therefore cannot be properly estimated, some account of the operations of the squadron under his command, as given by an officer serving in the fleet, cannot be unacceptable. It is contained in a small, scarce pamphlet, published soon after the events took place; and is accompanied by a plan of the situation of the fleet at Sandy Hook.

All matter not relative to the positions, or hostile intentions of the two fleets, has been carefully avoided, for the pamphlet contains much on the neglect shown them by the naval authorities at home.

"A candid and impartial Narrative of the Transactions of the Fleet, under the Command of Lord Howe (in 1778), from the Arrival of the Toulon Squadron on the Coast of America to the Time of his Lordship's Departure for England. With Observations, by an Officer then serving in the Fleet."

"ADVERTISEMENT.

"The design of the following narrative is to do justice to a great and good man, by the best mode of justification that can be offered in his favour; a plain statement of facts, an impartial account of his actions, submitted to public view.

"The writer acknowledges, that he has not the honour of being in Lord Howe's secrets, or of being even distantly connected with him: yet the facts he relates will bear the strictest scrutiny, in point of truth; and his observations on those facts shall be such as he formed on the spot; such as arose from his own feelings at the time, or were suggested to him by officers of the first character, both in the navy and army. If he assign the reasons and motives of any of his Lordship's operations, or advert to the instructions and intelligence communicated to him from home, he does it from subsequent information, and chiefly from his Lordship's public letters."

"He thinks the public have a right to be informed of the important services Lord Howe has rendered to his country.

"The narrative is confined to that period in which the writer had the honour to serve under his Lordship."

"A CANDID AND IMPARTIAL NARRATIVE.

"In consequence of the advices from England, with which the Porcupine arrived in the Delaware, in the beginning of May, Lord Howe began immediately to collect his scattered force. To the surprise of those who were ignorant of his motives, he called in his cruizers from the Chesapeak, and the other parts of the coast: and ordered the large ships from Rhode Island and New York to assemble at the mouth of the Delaware. The transports and victuallers were cleared from the wharves of Philadelphia with as much expedition as the moving of the army would admit; and on the 18th of June, Sir H. Clinton having completed the evacuation of Philadelphia, and entered

the Jerseys on his route to New York, the whole fleet assembled below Reedy Island.

“ On leaving the Delaware, which calms and contrary winds rendered impracticable till the 28th of June, Lord Howe divided the fleet into different squadrons ; each squadron under the immediate inspection of particular Captains : and ordering Captain Hammond to remain about the Capes, with some light cruizers proceeded in the Eagle to New York, attended by the Trident, carrying the Commissioners, and the Maidstone frigate.

“ The fleet was particularly fortunate in its passage. The Eagle anchored at the Hook, the day (June 29th) after she had cleared Cape Henlopen ; and we all joined her the following evening. By equal good fortune, Sir H. Clinton gained the heights of Neversink the succeeding morning, after a long and fatiguing march. Washington had for several days hung on his rear, and harassed him by small parties ; till, by endeavouring, on the 28th, to cut off the baggage of the English army, he brought on a sharp action at Freehold ; wherein our rear-guard repulsed two large detachments under La Fayette and Lee, and beat them back to the main body of the rebel army ; pursuing them for four miles with much slaughter. The chief loss sustained by the British was the death of Col. Monkton, one of the bravest officers in the army, and of the best beloved.

“ June 29th, the morning of the day on which Lord Howe arrived at the Hook, he was met at sea by the Grantham packet, express from England.

“ She brought advice that the Toulon squadron had sailed for America on the 13th of April ; and informed his Lordship, that she had been chased by them, in a southern latitude, at no great distance from the coast. Her dispatches, bearing date the 2d of May, mentioned a strong reinforcement to be sent immediately, under Vice Admiral Byron, for Hallifax.

“ The utmost expedition was now requisite to take off the troops ; that, with the transports and victuallers, they might be placed in safety, and the fleet got in readiness for sea, to act as circumstances should require ; and with a view to the destination of the squadron under Admiral Byron. The enemy did not dare to pass the heights of Middleton : the sick and wounded were therefore embarked without molestation, and the artillery and baggage taken off, while a bridge of boats was throwing over the channel that separates Sandy Hook from the main.

“ This work was entrusted to Captain Duncan, and executed with the usual zeal and promptitude of that vigilant and industrious officer. On the 5th of July, the whole army passed into the island, and from thence were carried in flat boats on board the fleet, without the loss of man. a Lord Howe attended in

person, as usual; and by his presence animated the zeal, and quickened the industry, of officers and men.

“ This important service was scarcely performed, and Commodore Hotham, with the men of war that lay off the town of New York, arrived at the Hook (July 7th), when a lieutenant from Captain Gardiner, whom the Vice Admiral had dispatched to the southward on the 1st of July, returned in a letter of marque, acquainting his Lordship, that the Toulon squadron was seen by the Maidstone, on the coast of Virginia, the 5th of the month; that, by their course, they seemed at first to be bound for the Chesapeake; but that on attending their motions to the morning of the 8th, Captain Gardner had left them at anchor in the Delaware. This account was confirmed the same evening, by the arrival of the Roebuck, and some of our small cruizers; and while the Vice Admiral was employed, in consequence, in collecting his small force, and preparing for every emergency, the Captain of the Zebra arrived (July 11th) on board the Eagle; bringing intelligence, that a fleet of 12 sail of two decked ships, and three frigates, appeared the evening before, under French colours, holding their course for New York. At 12 o'clock the same day, a signal was made from one of our frigates without the bar, that they had hove in sight; and in the afternoon they were observed to come to anchor off Shrewsbury Inlet, about four miles from Sandy Hook.

“ It is not in the power of words to do justice to the spirit that blazed forth throughout the navy and army on this occasion. Six sail of sixty-four gun ships, three of fifty, two of forty, with some frigates and sloops, for the most part wretchedly manned, were all the force Lord Howe had to oppose to twelve sail of two-deck ships, and three frigates. Of these, one carried ninety guns, one eighty, six were of seventy-four guns, three of sixty-four, one of fifty; the least of the frigates mounted thirty-six. Their complement in men was above eleven thousand. Yet the spirit of Britons, roused by the superior genius of one man, and influenced to second his exertions to a height of emulation scarcely paralleled in history, set them at defiance.

“ A thousand volunteers from the transports presented themselves to man the fleet. Scarce could the agents detain sufficient hands for the watch of their respective ships. Many, whose names were omitted in the lists given in to the Adjutant of the fleet,* were found concealed in the boats, which carried their more fortunate companions on board the several men of war. *The army, idolatrous of the Admiral's character, were equally forward and impatient to*

* Probably the Admiral's Captain, as there is no such officer in a British fleet.

signalize their zeal, in a line of service, new, and, independent of the spirit that animated them, unpleasant and disgusting to men unaccustomed to a sea life. The grenadiers and light infantry, scarcely recruited from the fatigues of a toilsome and dangerous march ; many of the officers with their wounds still green ; were obliged to cast lots, to determine the companies which, with the General's approbation, were accepted to *serve as marines*. The masters and mates of the merchantmen and traders in the harbour, solicited employment with equal earnestness and spirit.

“ Several of them took their stations at the guns with the common sailors : others obtained permission to put out to sea in their small swift-sailing shallops, to alarm such ships as might be bound for the port, and to look out for Byron's fleet, if fortunately it should reach the coast. One, in particular, his name was Duncan, with a spirit of disinterested bravery, and in language worthy of an old Roman, wrote for leave to convert his ship, the whole hopes of his fortune, into a fire-vessel, to be conducted by himself ; rejecting every mention of reward !

“ What then must have been the feelings of that man, who shared the glory with his country ; and who, notwithstanding the unaffected modesty of his character, must have been conscious that all this zeal and emulation, in both corps, was as much personal to himself, as he boasted it to be national !

“ Encouraged by such earnestness of determined bravery in the men, and assured of the merit and skill of his seconds and officers, he lost not a moment in forming his disposition. The Eagle and Trident, the Isis, Roebuck, Phoenix, and Pearl, which had moved up to Staten Island to take in water, with the Ardent, from which Gambier had been ordered to shift his flag ; fell down from the watering place on the first intimation of the approach of the French. A contrary wind preventing them from joining the detachment of the squadron that had been left at the Hook, with all the expedition the danger seemed to require, the Vice-Admiral quitted the Eagle, and throwing himself into his barge, hastened to the ships below. But d'Estaing, instead of crossing the bar immediately, in the hope of surprising our fleet, which it was natural to suppose he came prepared to attempt, anchored, as is before mentioned, at the distance of four miles from the Hook.

“ Here he remained for several days, employed at times in sounding the bar, and wearing every appearance of a determination to enter and attack the port. Lord Howe improved this interval, by placing his ships in the strongest position the channel within the Hook would admit. He sounded its several depths in person ; he ascertained the different settings of the currents ; and, from the observations thus made, formed different plans with a view to the points of wind with which

d'Estaing might resolve to cross the bar. These plans, with the grounds on which they rested, he daily communicated to the Commodores and Captains; soliciting their opinions, and desirous of profiting by their objections. His line he lengthened by the addition of the Leviathan store-ship, manned by volunteers for the occasion, and supplied with cannon from the train. A battery of two howitzers, and one of three eighteen-pounders, was erected on the point, round which the enemy must have passed to enter the channel; while four regiments, under the command of Colonel O'Hara, were ordered by General Clinton to the Hook, lest the enemy should attempt to possess it, and annoy us from so dangerous a quarter.

"In the mean time, we had the daily mortification to see several of our traders fall into the enemy's hands. The Stanley, armed brig, commanded by a gallant young man, son to Sir Charles Whitworth, with five prizes, anchored in the midst of their fleet during the night, thinking them to be British; and was boarded before he could discover the mistake. Several tenders, however, and advice-boats, escaped over the flats, and prevented the Hope, with a convoy from Hallifax, from adding to our losses and indignation.

"From the time the French squadron first anchored off Shrewsbury, boats and small vessels were seen constantly passing to and from the shore, for supplies of water and provisions. On the 21st of July this intercourse was observed to cease; and it was, in consequence, supposed that some movement was in agitation. The succeeding day proved our conjectures to be well founded. The wind blew fresh at north-east; and by eight o'clock, d'Estaing, with all his squadron, appeared under way. He kept working to windward, as if to gain a proper position for crossing the bar by the time the tide should serve. The wind could not be more favourable for such a design; it blew from the exact point by which he could attack us to the greatest advantage. The spring tides were at the highest, and that afternoon thirty feet on the bar. We consequently expected the hottest day that had ever been fought between the two nations. On our side all was at stake. *Had the men of war been defeated, the fleet of transports and victuallers must have been destroyed, and the army, of course, have fallen with us; yet, under Heaven, we had not the least doubt of success.* D'Estaing, however, had not spirit equal to the risk; at three o'clock, we saw him bear off to the southward, and in a few hours he was out of sight.

"The French fleet had a tedious passage. After arriving on the coast, twenty-four hours were thrown away in chasing the Mermaid; and they afterwards remained forty-eight hours at anchor in the Delaware. Lord Howe (for this depended on his own vigilance and activity) had the earliest intelligence of

their approach; and was instantly informed of all their movements. He had time to place the fleet of transports in safety; to see the army equally secure; to concentrate his forces, and form such dispositions, as, in the end, effectually disappointed the sanguine hopes of the rebels, and their faithless allies; and defeated the chief object of this boasted and admirably concerted expedition. We experienced, no doubt, the worst of insults and mortifications. A British fleet blocked up by a squadron of Frenchmen! and in our own harbour! Vessels bearing English colours, daily captured in our sight! To have gone out to their assistance, even had it been practicable, would have been the extreme of madness; since to have been able to defend ourselves where we lay, would, in the opinion of the most gallant officers in the fleet, have been the utmost that human valour could accomplish.

“ The French squadron continuing to stand to sea, on the afternoon of the 22d of July, instructions were sent to the advice-boats that were stationed on the flats without the bar to follow and observe their motions. From the unanimous report of the people of the country, who escaped to us from the Jersey shore, as well as from d’Estaing’s movements previous to that afternoon, it was gathered that the enemy’s design was to force the port of New York. It was not unreasonable therefore to suppose, that their bearing away to the southward was owing to the appearance of an easterly gale, which, as it should blow directly on the coast, must have rendered their former situation extremely dangerous; and that their return might speedily be expected. Advice, however, was received, that they were seen on the morning of the 23d, about thirty leagues from the land, in the latitude of the Delaware, steering by the wind, which was then at East, on the larboard tack. The Delaware frigate was ordered on the look-out; and we at the same time received an unexpected accession of force, by the arrival of the *Renown* from the West Indies (July 26th). Even a single fifty gun ship was then of such infinite consequence to us, that it was matter of exultation in the fleet, to learn that she had passed unnoticed through the rear of the French, in the dusk of the preceding evening.

“ The same day, the Dispatch returned from Hallifax. As the Admiralty had given Lord Howe to understand, that Byron’s squadron was destined for that port (why they should have been destined for that port, was not within the powers of common sense to guess),* his Lordship had ordered this sloop thither on the first certain knowledge he had that the French fleet were advanced to the Delaware. Her dispatches brought no mention of Byron; but they made

* A mistake;—see Note at the end

some amends, by informing the Admiral, that the *Raisable* and *Centurion* were on their way to New York ; and in two or three days they both joined us in safety. The *Raisable* so narrowly escaped the French fleet, that she saw them the evening of the 27th, steering for Rhode Island. Had those ships appeared a few days sooner, either they must have been prevented from forming a junction with our squadron, and forced again to sea ; or we should have had the mortification to see them increase the triumph of our enemy.

“ The same would also have been the fate of the *Cornwall*, a seventy-four gun ship of Byron's squadron, that crossed the bar on the 30th.

“ The fortunate junction of so many detached ships, and their arriving at so happy a moment, counterbalanced, in some degree, this alarming intelligence. It was now known for certain, that the French fleet had sailed for Rhode Island ; and whatever little prospect of success our force, even after the late addition, could open to us, *yet the post was of such importance, and the fate of so large a portion of the British army as formed the garrison of such infinite consequence to the general cause, that it was imagined the Admiral would not lose a moment in making some attempt for their relief.* The accounts received by his Lordship, subsequent to the report of the *Raisable*, as appears from the public letters, favoured such an attempt. These accounts intimated, that on the morning of the 29th, the French fleet had appeared off Newport Harbour ; that two of their frigates had entered the *Seconnet* passage the same day ; that the next morning two line of battle ships had run up the *Naraganset* passage, and anchored off the North end of *Conanicut* ; and that the remainder of the squadron were at anchor without *Brenton's Ledge*, about five miles from the town. In this divided situation, some opportunity might offer, of which advantage could be taken, for the relief of the garrison ; and the preparations for sea were hastened with this view. The 23d regiment, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel *Balfour*, came down volunteers to serve on board the fleet ; relieving the grenadiers and light infantry, whom Sir H. Clinton had withdrawn to be re-embodied. Two additional fire-ships, constructed by the Vice Admiral's orders, joined him at the same time, and all things were in readiness for sea by the 1st of August.

“ But the signal to weigh had scarce been made, when the wind veered round to the southward, and not returning fair so as to correspond with the time of high water on the bar, till the morning of the 6th, we could not make Rhode Island before the evening of the 9th ; when we anchored between point *Judith* and the light-house. From the report of the frigates sent on a-head, the French fleet were at anchor within the harbour. By this means, the communication with *Brenton's Neck* was open, and the Vice Admiral had an opportunity of receiving

immediate intelligence, both from Sir R. Pigot and Captain Brisbane. They informed him that d'Estaing, after having remained at anchor off Brenton's Ledge from the 29th of July, had, the afternoon before we arrived, entered the harbour under an easy sail; cannonading the town and batteries as he passed, and receiving their fire, without any material effect on either side; and anchored above the town, between Goat Island and Conanicut: that the two line of battle ships still kept their stations in the Naraganset, and the frigates in the Seconnet: that the Wednesday before we appeared, it had been found necessary to destroy the Orpheus, Lark, Juno, and Cerberus frigates; that several merchantmen had been sunk in the channel, to prevent the enemy from approaching near enough to attack the batteries to advantage; and that, on d'Estaing's entering the harbour, the Flora and Falcon had also been sunk; that the men belonging to the several ships were all on shore, and encamped by themselves, to be disposed of at the General's pleasure.

"From Sir R. Pigot he learned that the rebel army, with which the Toulon squadron was to co-operate, was assembled on the Connecticut shore, all round the island. Small parties of them had taken possession of Conanicut, from whence he had previously withdrawn his troops, as he had also from all the out-posts on the northern extremity of Rhode Island. Craft of all kinds were ready to transport the enemy to whatever part they should mark out for the descent. Sir Robert had caused several additional works to be thrown up on the heights adjacent to Newport; to which he meant to confine his defence; and was himself posted, with his chief strength, on Tommeney Hill, a very high eminence, that commands the principal approaches to the town.

"Various were the conjectures throughout the fleet, with regard to the probable resolutions which the Vice Admiral might form in consequence of those advices. The French, with all their former superiority of force, now enjoyed a position infinitely stronger than that on which we depended at Sandy Hook. The rebels were possessed of the left-hand shore, the whole length of the harbour. They consequently could not only annoy us on our entrance and approach from the craggy heights of Conanicut, close to which we must have passed, but in the course of an attack against d'Estaing, as he then lay, bring whatever number of guns they chose to bear upon us from the northern extremity of that island. The most skilful officers were therefore of opinion that the Vice Admiral could not risk an attack; and it appears by his Lordship's public letter, that this was also his own opinion: under such circumstances, he judged it was impracticable to afford the General any essential relief.

"The next morning totally altered the scene. The wind had changed to the

north-east, and blew directly out of the harbour. About eight o'clock, a heavy cannonade was heard towards the town; and, in a short time, the French squadron appeared standing out to sea with all their sail abroad. Ten sail formed a line of battle a-head, advancing through the middle channel, and were joined without the light-house by the two ships from the Naraganset. Lord Howe immediately made the signal to get under way; and the British fleet stood to sea. By this movement it was evident his Lordship had two objects in view; to get time and space to form his disposition to his wishes; and, either to profit by the sea-breeze, should it set in, as from every appearance it was conjectured it would; or by manœuvring to gain the weather-gage from the enemy. This was an object of the greatest importance. Should his Lordship await the French Admiral, and attack him from the leeward, the fire-ships, in which were placed the greatest hopes of success against a force so superior, not only could not have been brought into action, but would have also obliged the large frigates, which had them in charge, to remain inactive. The whole of that day was therefore employed in endeavouring by several masterly manœuvres to throw the enemy to leeward. But they appeared to be equally attentive to the same object; and discovered as great solicitude to preserve their advantage, as the English Admiral to wrest it from them.

“Night came on. The Apollo was ordered to stand between the two fleets, within view of our lights, and by private signals to intimate the enemy's situation, as long as she could keep them in sight. By these means, we found ourselves at the dawn of the next day in the same relative position; though at somewhat a greater distance than the preceding evening. The wind still hung to the eastward, blowing fresh. The weather was extremely thick and hazy; no prospect of a change appeared. The Vice Admiral therefore ordered the frigates which had the charge of the fire-ships to be informed, that should the enemy continue to preserve the weather-gage, he should await their approach, with the squadron formed in a line of battle a-head, from the wind to the starboard. At the same time, the fleet beheld him, with infinite satisfaction, take a decisive step that strongly marks his character; and shows him to be above the little fears and apprehensions of those who, to avoid the whispers of the ignorant, act against their own judgment. It has ever been acknowledged, that any station in the line is the most improper a Commander-in-Chief can choose in the time of action. As soon as the ship, in which he is embarked, engages, his abilities can be of no more consequence or service than those of any other Captain in his fleet. But to break through established customs, and be the first to try the experiment, where malice might throw a sneer at his personal bravery, required a man who possessed other qualities of mind than are merely requisite to form the seaman.

Lord Howe was convinced of the utility of the measure; and this alone determined him to pursue it. In his situation, indeed, the expediency was particularly obvious. Engaged with such unequal force, the chief hope of success was placed in the skill and abilities of the Commander-in-Chief; in his taking advantage of every fortunate occurrence, and drawing every scruple of his little force into its proper point. He therefore shifted his flag on board the *Apollo* frigate; leaving the *Eagle* in the centre; and moved to a convenient distance, to take a view of the whole line. As he gained by this a nearer observation of the French fleet, his Lordship, perceiving, as we supposed, that d'Estaing had placed his largest ships in his van, thought proper to strengthen the rear of the British to receive their attack; and made a signal for the *Cornwall* to move from the centre and change stations with the *Centurion*. About four o'clock, the French Admiral altered his bearing, and now formed his line to engage to leeward. Lord Howe crossed through the interstices of our line with the frigates and fire-vessels, and, in a few minutes after, made a signal for the ships to shorten sail, and close to the centre. In this movement he was obeyed to the admiration of the oldest officer; as indeed he had been in the several manœuvres he had put in practice, either to gain the wind, or preparatory to the intended attack. We now expected every instant to hear our rear engaged with the French van; but in a short time they again altered their course, and, bearing away to the southward, were soon, from the state of the weather, entirely out of sight.

“ The wind at this time blew so fresh, that our ships were under close-reefed top-sails; and the sea ran so high, that Lord Howe would not venture on board his own ship. He therefore made the signal from the *Apollo*, that he meant to lie to, for the night, on the starboard tack, to prevent separation. Yet so dark and hazy was the weather, and to such violence did the gale increase, that in the morning the Blue Division was totally divided from the fleet. The centre and van, with most of the frigates and fire-ships, still kept together. At noon, the squadron was alarmed by a signal of distress from the *Apollo*, and, in a few minutes after, her main-top-mast was seen to go overboard. The ship in which the writer of this narrative served, kept sight of the flag until eleven o'clock that night; from which time, till the 17th, in the evening, the greater part of the fleet were ignorant of his Lordship's situation, and under the greatest anxiety for his fate. It afterwards was known to us, that, the *Apollo* having lost her fore-mast also on the night of the 12th, he had been tost about till the next day; when, as the gale moderated, he was taken up by Captain Hammond, and carried on board the *Phoenix*, then in company with the *Centurion*, *Ardent*, *Richmond*, *Vigilant*, and *Roebuck*. On the 15th, he discovered the French fleet, partly at

anchor, about twenty-five leagues to the eastward of Cape May; and after having viewed their position, and left the *Centurion* to direct the dispersed ships of his own squadron, or such of Vice Admiral Byron's as might arrive, to follow him, he directed his course for the rendezvous at the Hook. Here he found the rest of the fleet, which had also been much dispersed.

"The *Roebuck* appeared without her mizen-top-mast. The *Raisable* brought in her bowsprit; the *Cornwall* her main-mast sprung. The fire-ships were so much damaged by the wet, as to be, for some time, totally unfit for service. Besides those damages caused by the storm, the *Isis* returned much shattered and disabled, from a gallant action she had sustained for an hour and a half with a French seventy-four. The French fleet were much more severely handled. On the evening of the 13th, towards dusk, Captain Dawson, in the *Renown*, of fifty guns, fell in with the *Languedoc*, carrying Monsieur d'Estaing, totally dismasted. He ran down close under her lee, and being there hailed, and ordered to show his colours, gave her all his upper-deck guns. He then stood off to windward, and opening his lower ports, wore round under her stern, and at half a cable's length poured in three broadsides. Among other damages, he shot away her rudder. It then was so dark, and blew so fresh, that Dawson resolved to lie-to for the night, in the resolution of renewing his attack the next morning. But at the first dawn, six French ships hove in sight; three of which gave him chase, and three remained with the wreck.

"The same evening, and about the same hour, Commodore Hotham, in the *Preston*, of fifty guns, also crossed the *Tonnant*, their eighty gun ship, with only the main-mast standing. He engaged her, with the greatest advantage, till night forced him to draw off, in the same design that Dawson had formed, and with the same certainty of success. But he was disappointed by a similar unfortunate intervention of part of the French squadron.

"A third action, as brilliant as any on record in the history of the English navy, was fought the same day between the *Isis*, of fifty guns, commanded by Captain John Raynor, and the *Cæsar*, of seventy-four, with a flag at her mizen-mast, in complete order. Raynor, returning to the rendezvous, first discovered her force about three in the afternoon, and endeavoured to escape her; but she proved the fastest sailer. In a short time they were close on board each other, and engaged for an hour and a half within pistol shot. The skill and address of the British Captain; his intrepidity and resolution during so unequal a contest; seconded by the ardour and bravery of his men and officers, who all placed the utmost confidence in his abilities; at length forced the Frenchman to put before the wind, and fly with all her sails. The *Isis* was incapable of pursuing him;

having suffered greatly in her masts and rigging, at which the enemy pointed all his guns. Raynor directed his to better purpose. Bougainville lost his arm, the first lieutenant his leg; and they acknowledged seventy men killed and wounded.*

“ The modesty and reserve that strike us in Raynor’s public account of this glorious action add new lustre to his gallantry; recommend him the more forcibly to the public; and are characteristic of the true hero. The Duke of Ancaster, though arrived from England only the day before we sailed, obtained leave to serve on board the *Isis*, and was greatly distinguished during the action.

“ On the fleet being re-assembled, the attention of the Vice Admiral was instantly directed to the speedy repair of the disabled ships. The *Isis*, with the *Apollo* and fire-ships, was sent up to New York; and such stores ordered down as were requisite for the supply of the ships that could be repaired at the Hook. The *Experiment* was dispatched (August 18) to explore the state of affairs at Newport, and the condition of the garrison; and the *Ariel* and *Galatea* sent to cruize, the one to the southward, and the other to the northward. The same day, the *Monmouth*, one of Byron’s ill-fated squadron, with her main-mast sprung, and her men wasted with disease, joined the fleet. The essential repairs requisite for so many ships unavoidably employed several days; during which the Vice Admiral received information that the French squadron had returned to Rhode Island. The *Experiment* (23d) had been chased into the Sound by three of their large ships, and had returned to New York through Hellgate; the first two-decker that had ever attempted that dangerous passage. The *Venus* and *Galatea* confirmed the accounts. The latter had seen eleven sail of the line, including the two dismasted ships, at anchor off the harbour of Newport, on the evening of the 20th, and left them in the same situation the following day.

“ The morning after Lord Howe had received this intelligence, and while he was waiting for the tide, to begin crossing the Bar, the disabled ships, except the *Isis* and the *Apollo*, being then nearly completed; Lieutenant Stanhope arrived from Rhode Island, from whence he made his escape in a whale-boat, the Friday before, at the utmost risk of his life.† His information was, that he had left the French fleet at anchor off the harbour’s mouth; that, as the wind had since then continued at east, it was not probable they could be got in; that the rebels, in number more than 20,000, were advanced within 1,500 yards of

* “ In the *Isis*, fourteen were wounded, and one man of the 23d killed in the tops.”

† “ He had passed unperceived through the body of the French fleet, and coasting along the outward shore of Long Island met with so heavy a sea, as exposed his boat to be swamped at each instant.”

our works; that Sir R. Pigot was under no apprehensions from any of their attempts in front; but that, should the French fleet come in, he ordered him to say, it would make an alarming change. Troops might be landed at Brenton's Neck, according to the original plan agreed upon between the rebels and the French, and advance upon his rear; and in that case he could not answer for the consequences.

"On this information Lord Howe immediately crossed the bar; and, being joined in the night by the *Experiment* and fire-ships from New York, and a number of volunteers for the Monmouth, sailed the next morning for Newport. A reinforcement from Clinton's army was at the same time to be sent through the Sound for the relief of the garrison. Lord Howe was to favour their approach by drawing off the French fleet, and endeavouring to bring them to action: but being met at sea by the *Galatea*, with dispatches from General Pigot; by which it appeared that d'Estaing had, on the night between the Friday and Saturday, sailed from his anchorage off Point Judith, and steered in a course for Boston; he detached the *Nautilus*, *Sphynx*, and *Vigilant*, to Rhode Island, and stood on with his squadron in quest of the enemy. As it was not probable that they would attempt to navigate their large ships, in their disabled state, through the South Channel within George's Bank; the Vice Admiral was in hopes, that by following that course, he might intercept them in their approach to Boston Bay. These hopes were confirmed by the Captain of the privateer brig *Resistance*, taken by our fleet on the 28th. He had been sent from Boston the preceding Monday, to look out for the French squadron, and pilot them into Boston. But as he had sailed down the channel, and seen nothing of them, he supposed they had steered round the Bank.

"The morning of the 30th brought us into Boston Bay. The fleet continued under sail, while the *Roebuck* and *Experiment* were sent forward to look into the harbour, and by private signals to intimate to the Admiral, whether the French squadron were arrived or not; or, if arrived, where anchored. Between four and five we had the mortification to learn, by a signal from the *Experiment*, that they were lying in Nantasket Road.

"The next day the Vice Admiral, meaning to take advantage of a leading wind to view their position, was prevented by the *St. Alban's* running on shore near the point of Cape Cod. He effected his purpose, however, on the 1st of September; when finding them so strongly posted under cover of the strong works constructed on the islands which command the Nantasket Road and Channel, that no attempt could be made upon them with the least prospect of success; he lost not a moment in returning to the assistance of Newport. But

he had already effectually relieved that important garrison; Sullivan, on the retreat of his allies, and the account of the British fleet having sailed in pursuit of them, thought proper to retire from before the place, charging his ill success to the failure of promise on the part of d'Estaing.

“Thus, by a happy mixture of prudent and bold measures; by a series of manœuvres, which the naval tactic was scarcely thought capable of exhibiting; by an indefatigable zeal, and an ardent attention to take advantage of every occurrence; by the unconquerable and persevering spirit with which his example inspired every officer and seaman under his command; Lord Howe having, with forces so unequal, defeated all the great designs of the enemy, protected the army and the fleet of transports at New York, raised the siege at Rhode Island, and driven the French squadron into the port of Boston; whence their shattered condition would not suffer them to venture for a length of time; returned to New York, and to the infinite regret both of navy and army, resigned the command into the hands of Rear Admiral Gambier.”


OBSERVATIONS.

Nothing certainly can surpass the conduct of Lord Howe throughout the whole of this anxious and difficult service; and the disposition of his little force at anchor at Sandy Hook is of the most seamanlike and masterly description. By the Plate it will be seen, that the stern anchors enabled the ships to bring their broadsides to bear upon the direct line of approach in the narrowest part of it: when, by veering again, they resumed their situations, and continued to command the long line of course which the enemy must pursue as he advanced; while the smaller vessels were so placed as to harass and distress him from inaccessible positions.

Of the step afterwards taken by the brave Chief,* much difference of opinion has existed in the navy; namely, of the propriety or expediency of removing from the line of battle, the better to direct the movements of his fleet. The writer considers that the intention of Lord Howe, when he shifted his flag to the Apollo, was simply to enable him to get a nearer view of the enemy's fleet; by which he became better acquainted with its force and disposition; and from which he could better form a judgment in the management of his own, since it appears that he soon after made two of his ships exchange places

* The Apollo parted company in bad weather, and might have fallen into the hands of the enemy.

PLATE VI



in the line of battle. There is no reason to suppose that he intended to continue in the *Apollo*, if d'Estaing had thought fit to bring him to action; which was so much in his power, and so anxiously expected by the British squadron.

The writer ventures to offer it as his opinion, that, for a purpose like the preceding, such a measure was highly judicious, and might have been beneficial; but he considers that, where it is expedient, in the presence of an enemy, to withdraw from the line for a particular object, it should be done in a line-of-battle ship, capable of taking her share in the battle wherever it may be found necessary.

As in different parts of these pages it is recommended that flag officers should take the lead upon all important services, an opposite doctrine will not be advanced upon the present occasion; but the taking of a ship of the line for obtaining a nearer view of the enemy, and a more distinct sight of his own line, is, under certain circumstances, worthy of imitation. It must, however, by no means be with an intention to keep out of the action: such a conduct would never be relished in the British navy: yet a Commander-in-chief, going as described, and rendering his personal assistance where most required, would tend greatly to animate the combatants, and contribute much to the success and glory of the day.

For noble proofs of the efficacy of this system, let us take the examples of Howe, Duncan, Cornwallis, Nelson, Collingwood, Strachan, Duckworth, Exmouth, and lastly Codrington. Admiral Cornwallis's reasons for leading were given when he chased the French fleet into Brest.

Lord Howe, in a code of signals which are considered his, and were issued to the navy at a subsequent period, had a signal to direct, "that the fleet was to continue in the same form or order it then was, although the Commander-in-chief should act otherwise; and that the motions of the flag ship were no longer binding on the fleet." This of course continued in force until it was annulled, when he would probably resume his station.

Plate VI.—"The anchors laid out on the larboard side of the ships in the line were designed as springs to heave their broadsides up, to oppose any force that might attempt to come up the channel.

"The *Vigilant*, *Phoenix*, and *Preston*, were advanced, to command the bar, to

annoy the French fleet in passing it, and to endeavour to throw them into confusion ; after which they were to drop into the rear of the fleet.

“ The four galleys were ranged across the narrow part of the channel, abreast the Hook ; from which situation, in case of an attack, they could row in upon the shoal, and cannonade at such distance as should be most convenient for the purpose of annoying the enemy ; their situation on the shoal would effectually prevent their being cut off.

“ The St. Alban's and frigates were designed for a moving and occasional force, and lay within the line.

“ The figures mark the depth at low water.”

REMARKS.

“ Lord Howe, in the presence of d'Estaing, shifted his flag into a frigate ; whether he would have kept it there, had the action taken place, is uncertain. I agree that an Admiral should do so for particular purposes ; but I am of opinion that it should be done generally in a ship that can take her share in the battle ; keeping himself at liberty to withdraw from the line to observe the motions of his fleet and give the necessary directions ; yet in going into battle the chief should lead.

“ By the Plate I think it appears that d'Estaing might have destroyed the Vigilant, Phoenix, and Preston, without risking a general action, if he did not like it.”

Some particulars of the proceedings of the British fleet under Vice Admiral Byron, taken from the journal of an officer on board the flag ship, the Princess Royal, of ninety guns, Captain Blair.

“ In the storm on the 3d of July, the cause of the dispersion of the fleet, it is remarkable that the Admiral's barge was washed overboard from the booms, or at least had disappeared during the night ; no one being able to give any account of her. The Russel having damaged her rudder, and being very sickly, went back to England. The Albion, losing all her masts, bore away for Lisbon, where she refitted, and rejoined in America. The Invincible, after losing her foremast and bowsprit in a second gale on the banks of Newfoundland, put into St. John's, and thence went to England ; the remainder got into New York at different times, and were all in a very sickly state.

“ Towards the end of October, the Admiral sailed to cruize off Boston with thirteen sail of the line, and a fifty gun ship. The Diamond was sent to reconnoitre the enemy in Nantucket roads. On approaching Boston, a violent storm arose, by which the Somerset was driven on shore and lost on Cape Cod; the crew made prisoners. The Bedford was dismasted and obliged to be taken in tow by the Cornwall to New York. The Culloden, which ship had a *knack* at parting company, was heard of no more till her arrival in England. The day after the storm the Diamond re-joined, and reported d'Estaing's fleet ready for sea, and by a brig captured on the following day, it was learnt that d'Estaing had sailed.

“ Ships were soon after seen, and chase given, when at the same moment came on a most tremendous snow-storm, which put an end to it: the ships proved to be part of d'Estaing's fleet, then off for the West Indies. Admiral Byron on this proceeded to Rhode Island to refit. Here he was detained by storms and foul winds for three weeks, when at length, on the 14th December, he put to sea with ten sail for the West Indies, leaving the Bedford to be re-masted. Before many days another storm arose, which dismasted the Fame, and separated that ship and the Diamond from the fleet. Several sprung their masts. On the 9th of January, 1779, the fleet made Barbadoes, when, on gaining intelligence, the Admiral thought it necessary to proceed without anchoring to St. Lucia, lately captured from the French, and which d'Estaing had fruitlessly attempted to re-take. Anchored the next day in the Grand Cul de Sac, where Vice Admiral Barrington was then lying in the same line of battle which had recently proved so formidable to the enemy.

“ A squadron of five men of war, with 5,000 troops, had sailed from New York for the West Indies the same day that d'Estaing left Boston, and a curious circumstance occurred to prove how close these two fleets had approached each other on the passage. A Newfoundland dog was taken up swimming by the Languedoc, the French Admiral's ship, which had belonged to one of the British men of war, from which it had fallen, and was afterwards seen by an officer of the Princess Royal when sent on board the ship of the French Admiral with a flag of truce at Martinico; and by his collar discovered to have been the property of an officer in the convoy.

“ On the 10th of March, a squadron under Commodore Rowley having arrived from England, the French put to sea from Fort Royal, and Admiral Byron immediately weighed to meet them, but was again unfortunate in not bringing them to action; owing chiefly to making a *wrong signal*, and which occasioned a great deal of sensation in the fleet.

“ When about half way across the channel, between St. Lucia and Martinico, the Admiral directed the signal to be made for the line a-head, which was a *union flag* at the mizen-peak ; his Captain ordered a *Dutch flag* to be hoisted, without telling the officer what it was intended to convey, who, had he done so, would have corrected the error. The Dutch flag was hoisted, and of course *no line was formed*, while the Admiral shortened sail for the ships to take their stations, and at length ordered some shot to be fired at ships that appeared to be the most disobedient ; when *happening to look up*, he discovered the mistake, but too late to remedy it, as by this time the enemy had *nearly got back to Fort Royal* ! Much complaint was made of the Captain, but to no purpose ; he retained his situation in the ship.

“ On the 25th of May, having received intelligence that a fleet of seven sail of the line were expected at Martinico, Admiral Byron cruized to windward, in hopes of intercepting it, but was disappointed, as he quitted the station to proceed to St. Kitts to take the Trade (the largest fleet that was ever collected) to the northward ; immediately upon Admiral Byron leaving his cruising ground, the French fleet got safe into Fort Royal. At St. Kitts occurred a disaster which threatened much injury to both ships of war and merchantmen. The Supply, store ship, which lay within the whole, caught fire forward, and the flames quickly ran up the fore-mast, which became a column of fire : the boats of the men of war boarded her in a few minutes ; her main-top-sail was set, her cable cut, and she was steered through the fleet, crowded as it lay, a burning mass, and ran upon the mud to leeward, where towards evening she blew up. The officers, amongst whom was the late Admiral Kelly, who were employed in this service, gained great credit. It was they who loosed the sails, and took the helm on this critical occasion.

“ The fleet left St. Kitts on the 15th of June, and seeing the convoy safe through the passage of the Dog and Prickly-pear, left it under the care of the St. Albans and Isis, and returned to St. Lucia.”

BARRINGTON AND D'ESTAING,

At the Grand Cul de Sac, St. Lucia, December, 1778.

COMMODORE HOTHAM, with five men of war, a bomb vessel, some frigates, and a large convoy, left Sandy Hook the same day the Count d'Estaing sailed from Boston with a large force by sea and land, to make a conquest of the British West India Islands. They were in the near neighbourhood of each other, and steering the same course for many days; but entirely ignorant of each other's situation: when a violent storm dispersed the French fleet, and gave the advantage to the British squadron; which by great care and exertion had kept together, and suffered little from the gale.

They arrived on the 10th of December at Barbadoes, where they joined Admiral Barrington; who without permitting the troops under Major General Grant to land, immediately determined upon the reduction of St. Lucia.

This force, joined by others under Brigadier Generals Meadows and Prescott, was landed at the Grand Cul de Sac on the 13th in the evening; and pushed forward to the heights; while General Prescott took a position that commanded the environs of the Bay. In the morning General Meadows advanced, and possessed himself of the important post of the Vigie, which commanded the north side of the Carénage.

“Celerity in execution, and prudence in securing and immediately turning to account every advantage obtained in war, was never more necessary, nor ever more eminently displayed, than upon this occasion. It affords an useful lesson, in a striking instance, that nothing should ever be committed to chance in warfare, which any industry could secure from so doubtful a decision.”—(See the “Annual Register,” for 1779.)

It is necessary to proceed to the operations of the fleet. Admiral Barrington, upon the success of the troops, had intended to have removed the transports into the Carénage Bay, as a place of much greater security than the Cul de Sac; but was prevented by the sudden appearance of the French fleet; and was occupied the whole night of the 14th in warping the transports into the bottom of the bay, remote from danger; while the ships of war were employed in arranging themselves in a line of battle at the entrance of it, the better to resist the attack of so formidable an enemy.

His squadron consisted of the following ships; the Prince of Wales, of seventy-four guns, bearing the flag of Rear Admiral Barrington; the Boyne, of

seventy; the Preston, Commodore Hotham; St. Albans, and Nonsuch, of sixty-four; the Centurion and Isis, of fifty guns each, and three frigates.

Such was the force that, by skill, activity, and resolution, prepared to await the encounter of the Count d'Estaing. The line, formed as in the plan, was defended in its most vulnerable point (to leeward) by the ship of the intrepid Chief, and flanked at each end by a powerful battery.

The Isis, supported by the frigates, guarded the in-shore approach to windward. Such was the masterly disposition of this little band, when the French fleet commenced its attack.

The French Admiral, after being painfully convinced that the island was no longer theirs; having suffered materially from the fire of one of the batteries on his approach; bore down with ten sail of the line upon the British squadron; and a warm conflict ensued, supported on the side of the British fleet by the two batteries on shore.

Coolness, firmness, and resolution, were never more conspicuous in repulsing the enemy; but d'Estaing, forming a new disposition, renewed the attack at four in the afternoon with twelve sail of the line, and directed his principal efforts from the British Admiral in the rear to the centre.

This was continued with sensible effect on both sides for a considerable time. The cannonading from the enemy was heavy and concentrated; but nothing could shake the firmness and determination of the British force. After a long and warm contest, the French fleet fell into disorder and retired; without having made any effectual impression upon the British line.—(See the plan, Plate VII.)

In this manner ended an engagement which, for conduct and intrepidity, never was surpassed; and which added another ray of glory to the British arms.

(The plan is formed from a drawing taken by an officer present.)

REMARK.

“ While the British deserve every credit for their skill and gallantry, I cannot but think the failure of the attack was owing more to the *lack* of both on the part of the enemy.”

In the second volume of the “Field of Mars,” has been found the letter of the gallant Barrington upon the subject of the attack of d'Estaing at St. Lucia.

To confirm the statement already made, and to stamp it with official

authenticity, such extracts shall be given as appear necessary; without entering into the co-operative part taken by the British troops; which, for boldness, decision, and celerity, never was excelled. To say more would be to pass the limits of the present design.

“ H. M. Ship Prince of Wales, Grand Cul de Sac,
“ St. Lucia, Dec. 23, 1778, at night.

“ You will now please to acquaint my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that the Commodore (Hotham) arrived at Barbadoes on the 10th instant, with his Majesty's ships Nonsuch, St. Albans, Preston, Centurion, Isis, and Carcase, bomb, and fifty-nine transports, having on board 5,000 troops under Major General Grant.

“ To save time, and prevent the confusion naturally arising from a change of signals among the transports, I adopted those of the Commodore; and directing him to lead with the landing division, put to sea the 12th in the morning, in order to carry into execution their Lordships' secret instructions; and about three o'clock on the day following, anchored there* with the whole squadron, except the Ariadne, Ceres, Snake, Barbadoes, and Pelican; which I had stationed along the coast to intercept any vessels attempting to escape from the land, &c.

“ More than half the troops were landed the same day, and the remainder the next morning, the 14th; when they immediately got possession of the Carénage; and it was my intention to have removed the transports thither as soon as possible, had it not been prevented by the appearance of the fleet of the Count d'Estaing, of which I received notice by signal from the Ariadne.

“ It therefore became necessary to secure the transports as well as we could in the bay; and the whole night was accordingly employed in warping them within the ships of war, and disposing of the latter in a line across the entrance; the Isis to windward, rather inclining into the bay; and the Prince of Wales, being the most powerful ship, the outermost and to leeward; and the Venus, Aurora, and Ariadne, flanking the space between the Isis and the shore, to prevent the enemy's forcing a passage that way.

“ Almost all the transports had fortunately got within the line before half-past eleven in the morning of the 15th; when the Count d'Estaing thought proper to bear down and attack us with ten sail of the line; and at four in the afternoon he made a second attack with twelve sail of the line, &c.

“ The next day, the 16th, the Count shewed a disposition to attack us a third time: but on the appearance of a frigate standing for his fleet, with signals

* The Admiral must mean the Cul de Sac, whence his letter is dated.

flying, he plied to windward ; and in the evening anchored in Gros Islet Bay, about two leagues from us : where he still continues with ten frigates and twelve sail of the line, &c.

“ This being the situation of the squadron, and the army being in the possession of all the strong holds in the neighbourhood of the bay ; such a spirit of cheerfulness, unanimity, and resolution, actuates the whole of our little force both by land and sea, notwithstanding the amazing fatigue they have undergone, that we are under no apprehensions from any attempts the enemy may meditate,” &c.

Plate VII.—A, the British squadron at anchor at the entrance of the Grand Cul de Sac.

B, the transports.

C, the frigates.


D, Admiral Barrington.

E, Commodore Hotham.

F, the French fleet and transports.

G, a French frigate reconnoitring.

In the “ *Cours Élémentaire*,” it is observed of this mode of defence, that however easy it was to have attacked the fleet in Basseterre Road, St. Christopher’s, it was by no means so at this place, in consequence of the position and local circumstances ; for, although Admiral Barrington opposed but seven to eleven ships of the line, he describes the situation as “ *un enfoncement*,” where one is very frequently becalmed, and where the British line was supported at both extremities by batteries on shore. He however declares that the destruction of this force would have decided the fate of the British colonies in the Antilles, and that this motive determined the French Admiral to attack it ; at the same time he says it should have been “ *une attaque décisive*,” either by anchoring upon the buoys of the British fleet, or by boarding ; in which mode of warfare, by his account, the French are so superior to us. With such superiority, why did they not attempt it ? the sea breeze brought in our fleet, so it might another !—See “ *Cours Élémentaire*,” page 477.



ADMIRAL BYRON'S ACTION.

July 6th, 1779.

Extracts of Admiral Byron's Letter.

(Date not found.)

"IT being my intention to be off St. George's Bay, soon after day-break, I drew the ships of war from among the transports; leaving the Suffolk, Vigilant, and Monmouth, under Rear Admiral Rowley, for their protection.

"Soon after day-light on Tuesday the 6th, the French squadron was seen off St. George's, getting under way, seemingly in great confusion, and with little or no wind. The signal was immediately made for a general chase, and for the ships to engage and form as they could get up. In consequence of which, Vice Admiral Barrington, in the Prince of Wales, with Captain Sawyer, in the Boyne, and Captain Gardner, in the Sultan, being the headmost and carrying a press of sail, were soon fired upon at a great distance; which they did not return till they got considerably nearer. But the enemy getting the breeze, drew out their line by bearing away and forming to leeward on the starboard tack; when it was plainly discovered they had thirty-four sail of ships of war.

"The general chase was continued, and the signal made for close engagement; but the enemy industriously avoided it, by always bearing away when our ships got near them," &c. "and being to leeward they did great damage to the masts and rigging, when our shot could not reach them. The ships that suffered most were those the action began with; the ships of Captains Collingwood, Edwards, and Cornwallis: the spirited example of Admiral Barrington exposed them to a severe fire in making the attack. The Monmouth likewise suffered exceedingly, by Captain Fanshawe's having bore down, in a very gallant manner, to stop the van of the enemy's squadron, and bring it to action. The Suffolk also, having suffered considerably by the attack of Rear Admiral Rowley on the van, I took in the signal for chase, but continued that for close action; formed the best line which circumstances would admit of; and kept the wind, to prevent the enemy from doubling upon us, and cutting off the transports," &c.

This is all that is necessary of Admiral Byron's letter; but from the journal on board the Princess Royal, we collect that "the enemy on their approach drew out of the cluster they were in, and advanced, forming a close line a-head on the starboard tack; but it was certainly not very easy to count them, as they were nearly *end on*; and particularly after the van ships

began to engage. The Prince of Wales, Sultan, and Boyne, were the first in action, and after passing the enemy's line, wore after them, thus meeting the rest of their own advancing fleet. The Cornwall, Grafton, Lion, and Fame, from being the leewardmost ships, were the next and closest engaged. In this manner the two fleets passed each other; the British force much spread, and at very different distances from the enemy. The Monmouth, Captain Fanshawe, received an order (that was never given) to leave his convoy and bear down; upon which he attacked the enemy in the most gallant manner, and the health of the Captain of the *little black ship* (the Monmouth) was drank by the officers of the Languedoc afterwards.

"As the French sailed much better than the English ships, they might certainly have gained the wind if they had tried for it; but that was not their object. On tacking they *looked up* for the Lion, with some prospect of cutting off the Cornwall and Grafton, so disabled as to be far astern and to leeward: the Lion, knowing her critical situation, bore up before the wind for Jamaica. Admiral Byron openly declared that if d'Estaing detached any ships after the Lion, or had he cut off the other two, he would have borne down to renew the action.

"On waring the fleet, to place it on the same tack with the enemy, the Princess Royal passed very near the Lion, and the Admiral ordered her to be hailed, as her sails were a perfect cullender, to know if she was in want of any thing. Captain Cornwallis himself took the speaking-trumpet, and in his cool way answered, 'We are all pretty well, but you had better not come too near us, for we don't steer very well.' At that moment his main and mizen-top-masts went over the side, and the Princess Royal stood on."


OBSERVATIONS.

With such an inferiority of force (21 to 26 or 27 ships of the line), it was certainly indiscreet in the British Admiral to attempt to bring on a general action by endeavouring to stop the van of the enemy. He probably would have made more impression by acting as described in Fig. 2, Fig. 1 showing the manner in which the British fleet bore down in chace to attack the van of the French fleet.

By the method proposed, an advantage might have been gained upon the enemy's rear; while, by the judicious and steady position of the British van and centre, he would have been prevented in making an attempt upon the convoy. This battle is described by Mr. Clerk in five figures.


Convoy of Transports.

Fig. 1.



Convoy of Transports.

Fig. 2.



REMARKS. (By different officers.)

“ The observation is very just, and with British intrepidity it might have ended gloriously.”

“ I agree with the proposed mode of attack, on account of the object of securing the transports ; otherwise the whole of the British fleet should in my opinion have attacked the centre and rear of the enemy. A certain number of ships should always be cut off, to insure a victory where fleets are equal ; but if the attacking one is inferior, this object should never be lost sight of ; and if circumstances did not allow of more than three or four of the rear being overpowered, still I should be content with that number. The van should never be attempted unless with a very superior force.”

Plate VIII, Fig. 1, exhibits the van, under Admirals Barrington and Rowley, under a press of sail, bearing down upon the enemy.

C, Convoy of Transports.

Fig. 2, exhibits the mode of attack proposed: the van and centre of the British fleet keep their wind ; while the rear, and perhaps part of the centre, carry a press of sail and bring the rear of the enemy to close action before it can have time to form.

REMARKS.

“ The double object, of securing an important fleet of transports, and of engaging an enemy's force of considerable superiority, requires a series of skilful manœuvring, the nature of which must be left to the exigency of the case.”

In the “ *Cours Élémentaire*,” it is observed of this battle, that had the van of M. d'Estaing carried sufficient sail, it would in all probability, by tacking in succession, have got between the British fleet and the convoy, and have cut off the disabled ships. (*Cours Élémentaire*, page 384.)

The Plates in that work, giving the positions of the two fleets, bear no resemblance to the British Admiral's account, although both are agreed in the dangerous situation of Admiral Byron's disabled ships.

HYDE PARKER AND DE LA MOTTE, December 18, 1779, off Martinico.

THE vigilance and activity of Rear Admiral Hyde Parker (who afterwards beat the Dutch on the Dogger Bank) about this time should not be forgotten.

The Admiral was lying with a squadron of ten or eleven sail of the line in Gros Islet Bay, St. Lucia; when, at eight a. m. the signal was made, by a ship looking out, of a fleet to windward. The squadron instantly slipped, leaving boats with the ends of their cables, and stood over to Fort Royal.

The chase was an enemy's convoy; which, on the appearance of the British fleet, was thrown into great disorder. About four in the afternoon, nine or ten sail were run on shore on the coast of Martinico, and set on fire; and the Boreas had brought a French frigate to action in Fort Royal Bay, when M. de la Motte slipped his cables, and with two other seventy-four's, came to her relief.

The French Admiral, by this bold and judicious manœuvre, saved part of his convoy, but not without risk of endangering himself: as the Conqueror, with several other ships, brought them to action on opposite tacks, as they were working back to their anchorage. Eight valuable ships were taken.

In this affair the brave Captain Griffith, of the Conqueror, lost his life. Night put an end to all further attempts; and the British Admiral returned with his prizes to St. Lucia, each ship receiving again the end of her own cable.

By the French account of this affair, to be found in the "Political Magazine" for 1780, it is stated that La Motte Piquet slipped from Port Royal with the Annibal, Vengeur, and Réfléchi, and with these he *fought seven sail of the English fleet!*

REMARK.

"I don't see any thing particular worthy of notice in this affair; that a fleet should slip to destroy a convoy, and then take in the ends of their cables again, having allowed three seventy-four's to save part of it. I don't mean even to hint, that Sir Hyde Parker could have done more, but only that he could not have done less; the French Admiral seems to deserve most credit."

OBSERVATION.

Every credit is due to the French Admiral; but the gallant commentator, perhaps not having local knowledge of the positions of the two fleets, does not seem to be aware that the most prompt execution and great exertion were

necessary, to enable the British fleet to reach the convoy, *right to windward of them*, in time to do any thing.

Upon opening the N. E. end of St. Lucie, ships have in general to encounter a fiery sea breeze, and a strong lee current ; while ships from the windward haul close in to the island of Martinique.

Audibert Ramatuelle gives great and just credit to Monsieur La Motte Piquet for his spirit and activity upon this occasion. It appears that his ships were undergoing a complete refit when the convoy made itself known round Cape Solomon, with the British fleet in chase from St. Lucie. They rigged, bent sails, took on board their powder, and slipped their cables to protect their convoy. The three French ships, he says, after having saved the greater part, returned to Fort Royal, amidst the acclamations of the colony ; and that on the following morning Admiral Parker sent over a flag of truce to compliment the French Admiral upon his conduct. (*Cours Élémentaire*, p. 461.)

From the journal before mentioned we learn that the fleet heretofore under Vice Admiral Byron was now commanded by Admiral Hyde Parker, and who was “ always on the alert.” In the chase which ensued, and the skill and exertion used by La Motte Piquet to protect his convoy and his squadron, his account is very similar to that of Monsieur Ramatuelle : he observes, that “ It was an interesting spectacle to the rest of the fleet to see those ships, followed by the Conqueror, making short tacks with a fresh breeze within the bay, in order to regain their anchorage under cover of the forts, which opened a heavy fire on the British ships as they advanced. Night, however, put an end to the pursuit, l’Annibal having had a very narrow escape. Captain Griffiths, of the Conqueror, with the trumpet at his mouth, *putting the ship in stays*, received a cannon shot between the shoulders, and never spoke more. This was the only loss sustained, but one much to be deplored ; for both as a man and as an officer, Captain Griffiths was universally esteemed.”

“ As the fleet was returning to Gros Islet, during the night, the General commanding the heights sent to inform the Admiral that three large ships had been seen at sunset some leagues to leeward, standing for Martinico. Admiral Rowley, without anchoring, was immediately dispatched in search of them, with four sail of the line, and when day dawned found himself within a short distance of them, who lay becalmed, while he carried the breeze up with him. He captured the whole, and proved to be three French frigates of from twenty-four to twenty-eight guns, who had been in the battle off Grenada. Fortune seemed at length inclined to smile on the fleet under its new flag, and console us for all its former disasters.”

In February, 1780, De Guichen arrived with a considerable fleet at Martinico, and much at the same time Admiral Rodney arrived at Barbadoes with four *copper-bottomed* ships of the line. Upon this information Admiral Parker removed from Choque Bay to Gros Islet, and anchored the ships in a "*crescent-shaped line*," with springs on their cables.

RODNEY AND LANGARA.

WE come now to a relation of Sir G. Rodney's defeat of the Spanish Admiral Langara; of which there is also an account in the "Political Magazine" for 1780, with a translation of the Spanish account.

*Extracts from Sir G. B. Rodney's Letters from Gibraltar Bay, dated
H. M. ship Sandwich, January 27th, 1780.*

" Having received repeated intelligence of a Spanish squadron, said to consist of fourteen sail of the line, cruising off Cape St. Vincent, I gave notice to all the captains, upon my approaching the said Cape, to prepare for battle; and having passed it on the 16th in the morning, with the whole convoy, at one p. m., the Cape then bearing north four leagues, the Bedford made the signal for seeing a fleet in the S. E. quarter.

" I immediately made the signal for the line of battle a-breast, and bore down upon them; but before that could be well effected, I perceived the enemy were endeavouring to form a line of battle a-head upon the starboard tack; and as the day was far advanced, and unwilling to delay the action, at two p. m. I hauled down the signal for the line a-breast, and made the signal for a general chase; to engage as the ships came up by rotation; and to take the *lee-gage* in order to prevent the enemy's retreat into their own ports.

" At four p. m., perceiving the headmost ships very near the enemy, I made the general signal to engage, and close. In a few minutes, the headmost ships began the action; which was returned with great briskness by the enemy. At forty minutes past four, one of the enemy's line of battle ships blew up with a dreadful explosion; every person perished. At six p. m. one of the Spanish ships struck. The action and pursuit continued with a constant fire till two o'clock in the morning; at which time the Monarca, the headmost ship of all the

enemy's ships, having struck to the Sandwich, after receiving one broadside ; and all firing having ceased ; I made the signal, and brought to.

“ The weather during the night was very tempestuous, and with a great sea ; which rendered it difficult to take possession of, and shift the prisoners of those ships that had surrendered.

“ It continued very bad weather the next day ; when the Royal George, Prince George, Sandwich, and several other ships, were in great danger, and under the necessity of making sail to avoid the shoals of St. Lucar ; nor did they get into deep water till the next morning ; when, having joined the convoy, and made Cape Spartel, I dispatched two frigates to Tangier to acquaint H. M. Consul of our success ; that Great Britain was again Mistress of the Straits ; and desiring him to hasten a supply of fresh provisions for the garrison. At sun-set we entered the Gut.

“ I may venture to affirm, though the enemy made a gallant defence, that had the weather proved but even moderate, or had the action happened in the day, not one of their squadron had escaped.”

Here follows a list of the two fleets, from which the relative force can be collected. It appears the Spanish fleet consisted of eleven sail of ships of seventy and eighty guns, and two frigates. The force of the British fleet was greatly superior ; being composed of eighteen ships of the line, besides frigates ; number not mentioned. Of the Spaniards, five were taken and brought into Gibraltar ; two were taken and afterwards lost upon the rocks ; and one was blown up in action. From the prompt and spirited manner in which the attack was made, little doubt can be entertained, that, under the circumstances supposed by the gallant Admiral, the result would have been such as to justify his conclusion.

From Sir G. Rodney to the Earl of Sandwich.

“ Gibraltar, 7th February, 1780.

“ I have the sincere satisfaction to assure your Lordship, that the five Spanish men of war are as fine ships as ever swam ; they are now completely refitted, manned, and put into the line of battle ; and, I will answer for them, will do their duty as English men of war, should the enemy give them an opportunity.”

The British fleet suffered comparatively very little by this daring pursuit ; the whole loss amounting to but four top-masts, one top-gallant-mast, and other trifling damages ; thirty-two men were killed, and 102 wounded in the fleet ; many of the ships not having received any loss or damage whatever.

OBSERVATIONS.

It seems the enemy was directly to leeward of the British fleet ; the day was far advanced (in the month of January), and a dangerous coast to run upon, having a port to receive the Spanish ships ; and blowing very strong with a rough sea.

Under these circumstances we cannot too much admire the spirit and professional skill shown by the British Admiral and his fleet. The superiority of his force was little, compared to the otherwise discouraging position in which he found himself ; sufficient to have appalled many a manly heart less courageous than his : but he, like Sir Edward Hawke, never considered the “ perils of a lee-shore ” until he had effected all he could, in the capture and destruction of the enemy.

We are likewise to observe, that finding the enemy were first disposed to form in line of battle, it was the intention of Sir G. Rodney to have *passed through it*, and engage them to *leeward*, the better to prevent their escape.

The result shows what may be expected from a happy union of skill, judgment, and intrepidity, upon similar occasions : this is remarkable, from being the first instance in latter times of a decided intention to break through the enemy's line and engage him to leeward.

Mr. Clerk, in his “ Essay,” appears to have taken to himself the entire credit of recommending this practice to our British Admirals ; nay, from the tenour of his work, we are led to consider that to break through the line of the enemy, or, as he terms it, to cut it in twain, is purely a discovery of his own.

That Lord Rodney and other Admirals may have profited by reading his book, no one can doubt ; and Mr. Clerk is justly entitled to the merit of having recalled the attention of the British navy to a subject of so much importance ; but the practice seems by no means a new one ; nor to have been a discovery of Mr. Clerk's ; as it was frequently put in practice in our former wars with the Dutch ; proved in “ *L'Art des Armées Navales, ou Traité des Evolutions Navales, &c. par le Pere Paul Hoste, Professeur des Mathématiques dans le Seminaire Royal de Toulon ;* ” published at Lyons in 1727 ; and since in part translated by Christopher O'Bryen, Esq. a Lieutenant in the Royal Navy, in 1762.

Professor Playfair observes of this work, “ It is an elementary and distinct exposition of the *ordinary* manœuvres at sea, and has no pretensions to any thing more. It was, however, highly regarded at the time.”

See the “ Memoir ” in the Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, volume ix. (read in 1818).

We are, however, informed in the title page, that it is a "Traité des Evolutions Navales, qui contient des Régles utiles aux Officiers Généraux et Particuliers d'une Armée Navale; avec des Exemples tirez de ce qui s'est passé de plus considerable sur la Mer depuis Cinquante Ans."

Now as the book was published in 1727, he was treating of events that had taken place, some of them at least, in his own life-time; and in which perhaps he had been present; for in his Preface he tells us—"J'ai pris occasion de faire le recit des principaux combats qui se sont donnez sur la mer, depuis qu'on a mis de gros vaisseaux dans les armées navales à la place de galères, qui on faisoient autrefois toute la force." and he concludes in the following words:—

"Au reste, on ne trouvera pas étrange, qu'un homme de ma profession ait travaillé sur ces matières; si on sçait que depuis *douze ans* j'ai eu l'honneur d'être *auprès* de Maréchal d'Estrées, de Mons. le Duc de Mortemart, et de Mons. le Maréchal de Tourville, dans *toutes les expéditions qu'ils ont faites, quand ils commandoient nos armées navales*; et que Mons. le Maréchal de Tourville a bien voulu me communiquer ses lumieres, en m'ordonnant de composer sur une matière que je pense n'avoir pas encore été traitée."

To the writer it appears to be a work which embraces in the most comprehensive manner every part of the subject; and to be the root from which all other treatises upon naval tactics have grown. The fifth part treats expressly "Des mouvemens de l'armée navale sans toucher aux ordres;" among others, "Disputer le vent à l'ennemi." "Eviter le combat." "Forcer les ennemis au combat." "Doubler les ennemis." "S'empêcher d'être doublé." "Recevoir les ennemis." "*Traverser l'armée ennemie*," &c.

The following is taken from the original; * (see also extracts from "Ledyard's Naval History," and "Whitlock's Journal," which are given at the conclusion of this account.)

"On trouve dans les relations des combats donnez dans la manche entre les Anglois and les Hollandois, que leur armées *se traversoient souvent*; c'est à dire que l'armée C, H, D, qui étoit sous le vent, aiant un peu couru de l'avant reviroit par la contre-marche, et coupoit l'armée A, B, au point E, et aiant reviré une seconde fois au point C, gagnoit le vent à l'ennemi; mais celui-ci reviroit à son tour, et coupoit l'armée qui lui avoit gagné le vent. De cette manière les deux armées se traversoient plusieurs fois; ce qui leur donnoit lieu de se couper, de se prendre, de se faire perir mutuellement plusieurs vaisseaux."

* See part v. page 388, of L'Art des Armées Navales, &c.

“ REMARQUE.

“ Cette manœuvre est également hardie et delicate, et il faut être consommé dans le métier, pour y reussir aussi heureusement que fit le Comte d'Estrées, Vice Amiral, dans le combat du Texel l'an 1673 : car il traversa l'Escadre de Zelande, lui gagna le vent, la dissipa, et mit les ennemis en un si grand desordre, qu'il fit déclarer la victoire, qui étoit encore en balance.”

He further says, that “ Admiral de Ruyter put this sort of traverses in practice to the greatest advantage when he beat the English fleet, under General Monk, in the year 1666, three days successively, on the north coast of England.” (Page 43 of Christopher O'Brien's “ Naval Evolution.”)

This appears to be the first year after the form of a *line*, in battle, had been adopted ; and attributed to the Duke of York, afterwards James II.

In speaking of the advantages and disadvantages of the weather-gage, Paul Hoste observes in his “ *Premiere Partie*,” page 53 :—

“ Si quelques vaisseaux de l'armée qui est sous le vent, sont desemparez ou à la tête, ou à la quai, ou même au malieu ; l'armée qui est au vent, leur envoie plus aisément des Brulots, fait plus aisément des détachmens pour fondre sur les fuyards. Ainsi quand plusieurs vaisseaux de l'armée A, B, qui est sous le vent seront desemparez ; l'armée C, D, detachera des vaisseaux et des brulots, pour fondre sur eux, et tâchera de couper la tête, ou la queue de l'armée ennemie ; et le vent lui donnera un si grand avantage pour cela, qu'il sera mal-aisé à l'armée A, B, de s'en défendre.” And Plate XVI describes a windward fleet passing through that of an enemy to leeward, and two ships burning together to leeward of them ; with a disabled ship close to them.

This can be understood to be nothing else but a fire-ship sent *through* the enemy's line, followed and supported by a detachment of ships ; and setting fire to one of the disabled ships of the leeward fleet.

Fire-ships, had there been any, might have been applied with the same success at the battle of Trafalgar, and by either party ; the disabled of the British fleet, after drifting to leeward of the enemy's line, being equally exposed to them. Of these an opinion will be given, after describing the battle of Trafalgar. Among the “ *ordinary manœuvres*” given and taught by Paul Hoste, is the frequent and horrible application of *fire-ships* ; and this “ *Treatise*”—of “ *no pretensions to any thing more*”—comprises every thing to be known upon sailing, forming in different lines and orders, fighting and manœuvring a fleet ; and the subject is treated in a seaman-like manner.

No explanatory figures appear necessary to accompany this account.

The diligence, so kindly exerted by a naval friend, to forward the present undertaking, has furnished the writer with the following striking passages from Ledyard and Whitlock.

BREAKING THE LINE.

(In the reign of Charles II. in the year 1652.)

Extract.—"In the mean time, Sir George Ayscough cruizing off Plymouth, with about forty sail, was met the 16th of August by the Dutch Admiral De Ruyter, with a fleet of men of war convoying a fleet of merchant ships. Both Admirals immediately prepared to engage; and the engagement proved very smart from four in the afternoon until night parted them. Sir George behaved himself very bravely; and, *with nine of his headmost ships, charged through the Dutch fleet, and got the weather-gage.* Having this advantage, he renewed the attack, and continued it warmly for some hours; but some of the rest of the ships not seconding him as they ought to have done, and the night coming on, he thought fit to retire to Plymouth. The Dutch, having likewise enough of it, made the best of their way up the Channel, having had two captains killed, two ships sunk, and a considerable number of men killed.

"The English lost only one fire-ship.

"The Dutch confessed that their own fleet was so disabled, that De Ruyter was obliged to send home fifteen, including his own ship." Ledyard's Naval History, book iii. page 542.

"In all these engagements with the Dutch, fire-ships were very useful on both sides; in that of the 3d of June, 1665, four Dutch ships having fallen on board one another, were destroyed by a single fire-ship." See Ledyard, book iii. p. 577.

Whitlock's Journal says, "Sir George and four others charged through the whole body of the enemy's fleet, and was much damaged; but Sir George tacked about and weathered them, and charged them all again, and so continued engaged until night."

DOUBLING ATTEMPTED.

(In the reign of William III. in the year 1692.)

"The sun having dispersed the fog, Tourville's fleet were seen by Admiral Russell, forming their line on the same tack with the British. Admiral Russell bore away so far to leeward, that every one in the fleet might fetch

into the wake or grain of his own ship, then bringing to, and lying by with his fore-top-sail to the mast. The British line stretched from S.S.W. to N.N.E. The Dutch in the van, the Admiral in the centre, and the Blue in the rear. By nine, the enemy's van had *almost* stretched as far southward as ours; their Admiral and Rear Admiral (who were in the rear) closing the line, and their Vice Admiral of the same division standing towards the rear of our fleet. Between ten and eleven, they bore down and made the signal for battle. The French were inferior in number; and (as the attack appears to have been directed on the rear) Admiral Allemande, the Dutch Commander of the van, was sent to, *to tack and get westward of the French*, as soon as any of his ships could weather them; and the rear was directed to close the line. The French would have been thus completely doubled on; but the fleets had not long been engaged before it became quite calm; so that the manœuvre was not completed.

"In the close of the day a fog came on, and the fleets were thrown confusedly together." Ledyard's Naval History, book iv. page 659, &c.

DOUBLING.

(Sir George Rooke's action off Malaga, 1704.)

"The Marquis de Villette observing that the Admiral, as he bore down, was at some distance from the centre, and thinking that he might get a-head of that squadron with his foremost ships, made a signal to the headmost ships of the French line to crowd all the sail they could. Admiral Shovel, still bearing down upon the enemy with the van, insensibly found himself in their line a-head of them; which the French judging to be a favourable opportunity, resolved to make their advantage of it, by keeping their wind, and crowding all the sail they were able, in order to cut off the van of the Confederates from the rest of their fleet; hoping, with reason, that if it grew calm, which usually happens in a sea-fight, their gallies might tow them off, so as that they might make a double, and, weathering Sir Cloudesley Shovel, fire upon him on both sides. But Admiral Shovel having discovered the enemy's intention, immediately clapped upon a wind; and Sir George Rooke, foreseeing what would be the consequence if his van was intercepted, bore down upon the enemy with the rest of the Confederate fleet, and put out the signal for the fight; which was immediately begun by Admiral Shovel." Ledyard's Naval History, book v. page 794, *note*.

"The English Blue squadron charging through the enemy, De Ruylre's

division suffered much ; and himself was in the greatest danger of being taken or sunk by Lawson, till relieved by Tromp." Ledyard, book iii. page 552. In this bloody fight, Dean was killed ; and, Monk covering his body with a cloak, the battle continued with great fury.

"In a subsequent action, in which Monk had issued orders to give no quarter, thirty Dutch men of war were sunk, Evertzen made prisoner, and Van Tromp was killed." Ledyard, book iii. page 555.

"Sea-fight between the English under the Duke of York, and the Dutch under Opdam.

"This memorable battle began on the 3d of June, 1665, at three in the morning. To give a particular account of it would be too long to find a place here. Though the English had, in the beginning, the weather-gage, and the two fleets had several times *charged through each other* with great fury and intrepidity ; there was no visible advantage till about one o'clock at noon ; when the Earl of Sandwich, with his Blue squadron, happening *to fall into the centre* of the enemy's fleet, *separated it into two parts*, and thereby made a great step towards the victory." Ledyard, book iii. page 577.

In this action several of the Dutch ships were destroyed by the English fire-ships, and the Dutch Admiral's ship blew up. The Duke, in the Royal Charles, was in the greatest danger.

Again, in action with the Dutch under Cornelius Van Tromp, Evertzen, and others ; the English commanded by the Duke of Albermarle and Prince Rupert ; the following is related :—

"In the evening of the third day, the Duke discovered Prince Rupert's squadron hastening to his assistance. Being joined, the two Admirals resolved to attack the enemy again immediately ; and setting their course towards them, with drums beating and trumpets sounding, *charged through and through* the Dutch squadrons." Ledyard, page 583.

In the life of James II, written by himself, and found in Macpherson's "Original Papers," it appears that in this year's war the English and Dutch fleets were first drawn up into line or order of battle. *Note.*—"If there was no line before, how could it be broken?"

REMARKS

ON RODNEY'S DEFEAT OF LANGARA.

“Allowing all possible credit to Rodney in the defeat of Langara, I shall only observe, upon the ‘Observations’ of the writer, of its being the *first* instance in modern times of ‘a decided intention to break the enemy’s line and engage him to leeward,’ that I fancy this action took place after the explanation of Clerk’s system to Lord Rodney; who, on being asked his opinion, replied, ‘you shall see what I think of it the first time I meet an enemy’s fleet.’

“Clerk certainly takes to himself the entire merit of recommending the breaking of the line to our Admirals, and also claims the discovery of the manœuvre, to which I am convinced he is justly entitled.

“P. Hoste, in the extracts given, informs us that the English and Dutch made frequent traverses through the lines; but fleets were then in no order of battle, but crowds of ships charging and re-charging through each other; this I maintain is not the manœuvre treated of by Clerk; even P. L. Hoste speaks of it as ‘*egalement hardie et delicate*,’ and he must have known, what I believe to be correct, that in the Dutch wars alluded to a regular line of battle was not known. The fleets were formed into a number of divisions, drawn together, rather than formed in line; and in all their charges and re-charges, do not appear to have had any ultimate plan in view; any object of cutting off and overpowering particular parts of the enemy’s fleet; nor indeed any object but that of showing individual valour.

“Clerk recommends the breaking through a regularly formed line, to throw into confusion what was in order before, and to cut off and overpower a certain part of your enemy’s force before the other can come to its assistance: he continually urges the adoption of this system, and says it is the only way to bring on a decided action with an enemy wishing to avoid one.

“Sir G. Ayscough’s action is open to the same argument.

“Russell’s action shows a disposition to double on the enemy, but does not discover any knowledge of putting it in practice after the manner of Clerk.

“Sir G. Rook’s action off Malaga does not prove that the French knew of the attack by breaking the line. They took a favourable opportunity, by our van having separated itself from the rest, to try to cut it off; but, had Shovel passed through their line, they would not have had that opportunity.”

Between conflicting opinions, it is for the reader to decide.

HYDE PARKER AND DE GUICHEN.

Some proceedings of the English Fleet, under Rear Admiral Hyde Parker, March, 1780, by an Officer present.

“ WE had in the mean time proceeded from Antigua to Barbadoes, and seen the Jamaica convoy as far on their way as Antigua. General Vaughan had arrived from England with four new regiments, and an expedition was planned against St. Vincent's or Grenada. For this purpose the troops were ordered up from Antigua and St. Kitt's, except a small body left for the defence of those islands. The fleet had been at St. Lucia, and, with Commodore Collingwood's squadron, proceeded to windward of Martinico; as well to meet our troops from the leeward, as to intercept any fleets from France. The 21st of March we fell in with the convoy with the army; and having intelligence by the Alert brig, who had fallen in with a French convoy under four sail of the line, steering to the West Indies, Commodore Collingwood was left with an equal number to intercept them, and we bore away with the transports for St. Lucia. Every thing was nearly ready for sailing on the meditated expedition, and the fleet had dropped down to Choque Bay (between Gros Islet and the Carénage) when a number of large ships were seen from Morne Fortunée in the afternoon, going into Fort Royal, Martinico. A frigate was immediately sent to reconnoitre them, and returned with an account to the Admiral of their being a convoy under many line-of-battle ships. It was now without doubt that the ships in question were the squadron expected from Europe under the Comte de Guichen, consisting of sixteen sail of the line; of which the Admiral had received very particular information.

“ I should have observed that, on our arrival at St. Lucia, a frigate met us with dispatches from Sir George Rodney, who was arrived at Barbadoes, with four sail of coppered line-of-battle ships, which he had sent to cruise to windward of Martinico, on receiving the same information which the Alert had brought to Admiral Parker.

“ Choque Bay being an improper place to sustain an attack in, the fleet weighed the next morning and anchored in line in Gros Islet Bay. The troops, which had been drawn from St. Kitt's and Antigua, were also embarked in the frigates and sloops of war, and sailed for those islands by night. Commodore Collingwood joined us as we were anchoring; and informed the Admiral that he


had fallen in with the enemy's newly arrived convoy under sixteen sail of the line, and had been chased by several of them, till they were recalled by signal, when they might have brought him to action; that he had also fallen in with the four sail detached as before mentioned by Sir George Rodney; who, on the information he gave them, returned to Barbadoes.

“ *March 23.*—The day after our anchoring at Gros Islet, the enemy's fleet came out, and stood over to St. Lucia. In the afternoon the body of their fleet came within two gun shots of us, and then tacking, made sail to windward. We counted twenty-six sail of the line, and ten large frigates; and they all seemed full of troops; from which it was supposed they meditated an attack on the island. Every precaution was forthwith taken in case of such an attempt being made. A small schooner arrived on the 23d from Barbadoes, who brought the Admiral information, that the troops lately arrived were to sail the following day from thence for St. Lucia under one frigate's protection only. As the French were completely masters of the whole Channel by being to windward a league or two, the capture of this convoy appeared inevitable.

“ The next morning the signal was made from Pidgeon Island, that they were in sight. Most fortunately the enemy's fleet, whether from their shortening sail, or a lee current stronger than ordinary, had fallen by day-light in the morning about three leagues to leeward; but two of their line were well advanced, getting to windward of Gros Islet Bay, and in full chase of the convoy as soon as they discovered them. In this very critical situation Admiral Parker called the flag officers together, and represented to them the state of the two fleets and convoy; at the same time asking their opinion, whether he ought to put to sea at all risks, for the preservation of the latter, so important to the safety of the West India Islands. The Admiral was said to have waited but for one assent, and instantly made the signal to slip and form line, without regard to station, as they got out. Animated by one spirit, this signal had been so well anticipated, that in ten minutes from its being made, every ship was under sail, and quickly formed in close line as they rounded Pidgeon Island. The moment our headmost ship made its appearance, the two advanced French ships, who were well to windward, and so near to the convoy that they were on the point of running the transports on shore, immediately bore up with a press of sail, and never hauled up until they had reached their fleet, which also bore up to join their leewardmost ship, when they formed the line.

“ By this manœuvre the convoy were enabled to proceed in safety to the Carénage; and the English fleet, at one o'clock p. m., tacked, and stood back to Gros Islet Bay; where, at five o'clock, they came to, each ship taking up its





own anchorage, the cables having been left with buoys to them; the enemy's fleet at this time being able to fetch into the bay, and not four miles from us.

" This affair was highly creditable to the Admiral and the whole fleet; being executed with inexpressible alertness and good order, and manifesting the most perfect discipline and finest spirit. Nothing could exceed the beauty and precision of the line of battle; nor was our gallant Chief in any hurry to return; for we continued standing over to Martinico, long after the security of the convoy had been effected, and in the face of so superior a force.

" Immediately on our return the Admiral issued public thanks to the officers and men of the fleet. A small vessel was sent in the night to apprise Sir G. Rodney how we were situated, and the fleet was kept in constant readiness to push out the moment his ships appeared to windward.

" On the 28th the enemy's fleet, then far to windward, suddenly bore up for Fort Royal; at the same moment the signal was made from Pidgeon Island for five sail of English line-of-battle ships coming down; and to them, that they might approach with safety. In the afternoon Sir George Rodney anchored in the bay, and took the command of the fleet.

" Had the French chosen it, they might have easily prevented this junction, which could not have been made without a battle, in which they would have had so many circumstances in their favour."

Plate IX.—A, Gros Islet Bay, in the island of St. Lucia.

B, Pidgeon Island.

C, the English fleet under Rear Admiral Parker, consisting of seventeen sail of the line, lying at anchor in line of battle; the Yarmouth, of sixty-four guns, the sternmost of the rear division, being close to the Islet Foureux.

D, an English convoy of thirty sail of transports, with troops, under the Pegasus frigate, coming from Barbadoes, and on the point of running on shore.

E, two French ships of the line, who had got to windward of their fleet, during the night of the 24th, and had discovered, and were in chase to intercept, the convoy.

F, the French fleet of twenty-seven sail of the line under the Comte Guichen; with their heads in this direction, under a press of sail, but about three leagues to leeward, at eight o'clock in the morning. Their present position anticipates their advance in the course of the afternoon.

G, it being resolved by the Rear Admiral to save the convoy at all hazards, the signal was made to cut or slip at half-past nine o'clock; and in ten minutes the whole were under weigh (excepting the Yarmouth, who was not in condition, and remained at anchor) and formed a line a-head as they came out, on the line G.

H, the two French ships in chase, who would have reached the convoy on the next tack; the moment they saw our first ship coming round the point of Pidgeon Island, bore up under all sail to join their own fleet, which likewise bore up to join their leewardmost ship.

I, the course of the convoy to the Carénage; the English fleet stood on till half-past one o'clock, when they tacked, and at five p. m. were all anchored in their former line; the French fleet then distant about a couple of gun shots.

SIR G. RODNEY WITH THE FRENCH FLEET, UNDER
MONSIEUR DE GUICHEN.

April 17, 1780.

Extracts of a Letter from Sir George Rodney, April 26th, 1780, off Fort Royal, Martinico.


" On the 16th we got sight of the enemy about eight leagues to leeward of the Pearl Rock: a general chase followed, and at five in the morning we plainly discovered that they consisted of twenty-three sail of the line, a fifty gun ship, and three frigates. When night came on, I formed into line of battle a-head, and directed the Venus and Greyhound to watch the enemy's motions, which was admirably attended to by that veteran officer, Captain Fergusson, &c.

" At day-light of the 17th, the enemy were forming the line a-head. I made signal for the line at two cables' distance. At forty-five minutes after six, I gave notice by public signal that my intention was to attack the enemy's rear with my whole force; at seven a. m. I made signal for the line at one cable's distance only. At thirty minutes after eight, a. m. I made signal for the line a-breast, each ship bearing from the other N. by W. and S. by E., and bore down upon the enemy. The enemy discovered my intention, wore, and formed line on the

Fig. 1.



Fig. 2.



other tack. I immediately hauled the wind, and formed line a-head at two cables, on the larboard tack, &c.

“ At 11, a. m., I made signal to prepare for battle, to convince the whole fleet I was determined to bring the enemy to an engagement. At fifty minutes past 11, I made signal for every ship to bear down and steer for her opposite in the enemy's line, agreeably to the twenty-first article of the additional fighting instructions. At fifty-five minutes past eleven, the signal for battle, and that it was my intention to engage close, and *of course the Admiral's ship to be the example*. At one p. m. the Sandwich in the centre began to engage. Perceiving several of our ships engaging at a distance, I repeated the signal for close action.

“ In the centre the battle continued till fifteen minutes after four ; when the Couronne, Triumphant, and Fondant, bore away, &c.

“ The Sandwich had, before being attacked by them, beat three ships out of their line of battle, had entirely broke it, and was to leeward of the wake of the French Admiral,” &c.

Thus ended Sir George Rodney's first encounter with the enemy in the West Indies, and certainly much to the discredit of the British fleet. (See Annual Register for 1780.)

Plate X, Fig. 1, shows the attack by the British Admiral ; in which it clearly appears he was by no means properly supported. If he had been so, a very different result might have been expected. This was the case in the battle of Matthews, and the same mode of attack is recommended in both.

The British force consisted of twenty ships of the line, one fifty, and four frigates ; that of the French, twenty-three ships and eight frigates.

OBSERVATIONS.

The remarks of Mr. Clerk upon this affair are perfectly just ; and had Sir George Rodney been able to carry his first intention (of attacking the rear) into execution, success might probably have crowned his endeavours.

We should never for a moment suffer ourselves to believe that the enemy, because some of his ships, or even the whole line, bear away to form again to leeward, is *therefore beaten*. This has been frequently practised by the French, with a view to profit by a second similar attack of the windward fleet : from which they have never failed to reap considerable advantage.

This should teach us, that nothing but closing with the enemy to leeward, in whatever part of the line you can penetrate it, is the way to conquer him. In

this rencontre there was great misconduct in many of the Captains, while Rodney set a noble example in the Sandwich. By his eagerness for close action, he had got to leeward of the French Admiral's wake.

Rodney, after the battle, shifted his flag to the Montague.

REMARK.

“ The ill success of that day is to be ascribed to the injudicious extension of our van, unchecked by the officer commanding in that post.”

Audibert Ramatuelle, in his account of this affair, gives the superiority of force to Lord Rodney, and highly compliments Monsieur De Guichen for his conduct.

There is, as usual, much incorrectness in the statements, which finish by saying that an English ship of seventy-four guns sunk afterwards at St. Lucie. (P. 442.)

The same author observes, that a fleet to leeward of superior force to his opponent, might leave an open space in the centre of his line, where it is supposed the enemy has placed his heaviest ships, and as a snare, or inducement to the windward fleet to bear down, to penetrate, and cut off some ships.

NOTE.

In this affair it is related of a *woman* on board the Sandwich, that she worked at a twenty-four pounder all the action ; and, what was still more to her praise, that she set up all night afterwards with the wounded.

The Sandwich had seventy shot in her hull, seventeen of them between wind and water : the crew were kept at the pumps for twenty-four hours.

“ On the 17th, when the day broke, the French were about four miles on the lee-bow of the Princess Royal (commanding the van division of the British fleet). Sir G. Rodney then informed his fleet, by signal, that he intended to attack the enemy's rear, and soon after made the signal to bear away in line a-breast on a particular bearing, steering for their rear. Mons. De Guichen immediately wore to the northward, and the British fleet hauled up to the southward ; both at this time not more than three miles asunder. When the van of the British fleet as then formed came opposite to the rear of the enemy, Sir G. Rodney

made the signal to *ware together*, and form on the same tack with the enemy, in line to the north. At twelve o'clock the signal was made to bear down, *every ship to engage her opponent*.

“ As the French were carrying a press of sail, preserving their line, going a little from the wind, it took some time to approach near enough for action ; nor was it until one o'clock that the battle commenced, in the van, and quickly ran through the whole fleet.

“ Rear Admiral Parker, who commanded the van, not finding himself a-breast of the flag ship of the enemy's van, was nearly so of her second a-stern, a sixty-four, but he was most anxious to reach the former, an eighty gun ship ; which ship, averse to accept the challenge, did not exchange her place with the sixty-four ; the sixty-four thereupon fell to the lot of the Princess Royal, and in a short time was so roughly treated, that a frigate very gallantly came up and towed her to leeward.

“ After about two hours' action the whole of the enemy's van broke and pressed to leeward—Admiral Parker followed, but as the repeating frigates had the signal flying for the line of battle, he thought it his duty to haul his wind, to support the centre, coming up and warmly engaged. Upon this the centre and rear of the enemy broke and bore away. The Commander-in-Chief's ship, the Sandwich, was much disabled, not having been properly supported by her seconds, although there never was a more gallant officer than Captain Edwards, of the Cornwall, who was one of them : he lost twenty-one killed and forty-nine wounded, which proved he had not been idle, though perhaps he might have lost sight of his Admiral. Captain Young, of the Sandwich, had great credit with the fleet, as no ship was ever better fought.

“ Sir G. Rodney, in his public letter, speaks of the van and rear of his fleet as being at too great a distance from the centre ; affording a reason for not pursuing the enemy that night, and casting a reflection on the van for having extended itself so far. But it should be asked, what was the meaning of the signal ‘ for every ship to steer down for and engage her opponent,’ unless it was for the van ship to engage the van ship of the enemy, and so of the rest ? *both fleets being a-breast of each other, and nearly ship for ship when that signal was made.*

“ That such was Sir George's intention plainly appeared from his continuing to carry sail after the van of the enemy, for a whole hour, each British ship endeavouring to bring to action her corresponding one of the enemy ; nor did he countermand that signal, or show his disapprobation of the manner it had been acted on by the van division. He did not get into action until after the van

were engaged, when the Sandwich got alongside of the Couronne, which was the *centre ship*.

“ Under the impression of that signal, the van felt bound to keep up, if possible, with the van of the enemy ; a portion of their fleet, equal, if not superior to itself. It is, therefore, difficult to understand what Sir George had to complain of, or how the extension of his van, *having that of the enemy along with it*, could have prevented the pursuit of the rest.”

SIR GEORGE RODNEY WITH THE FRENCH FLEET.

May 15 and 19, 1780.

Extract of a Letter from Sir George Rodney, May 31, 1780. Barbadoes.

“ HAVING landed the wounded and sick men, watered and refitted the fleet, on the 6th of May, upon receiving intelligence of the enemy's approach to windward of Martinico, I put to sea with nineteen sail of the line, two fifty gun ships, and several frigates.

“ From the 6th to the 10th of May, the fleet continued turning to windward between Martinico and St. Lucia, when we got sight of the French fleet, about three leagues to windward of us ; Point Salines then bearing N. N. E. five leagues, Captain Affleck in the *Triumph* joining me the same day.

“ The enemy's fleet consisted of twenty-three sail of the line, seven frigates, &c. Nothing could induce them to risk a general action, though it was in their power daily.

“ As they were sensible of their advantage in sailing, it emboldened them to approach nearer to his Majesty's ships than they would otherwise have done ; and for several days, about two in the afternoon, they bore down in a line a-breast, and brought to the wind a little beyond random-shot distance.”

After changes of wind and different operations of the hostile fleets, the Admiral proceeds thus :

“ However, it did not enable them to weather his Majesty's fleet so much, but the van, led by that good and gallant officer, Captain Bowyer, about seven in the evening, reached their centre ; and was followed by Rear Admiral Rowley's



Fig. 1.





Fig. 2.



squadron, who then led the van, the centre and rear of his Majesty's fleet following in order."

(Here see Fig. 2, Plate X.)

"As the enemy were under a press of sail, none but the van of his Majesty's fleet could come in for any part of the action, without wasting powder and shot; the enemy wantonly expended a great deal of theirs at such a distance as to have no effect," &c.

"The enemy kept an awful distance till the 19th instant, when I was in hopes that I should have weathered them, but had the mortification to be disappointed; however, their rear could not escape being closely attacked by the ships of the van, then led by Commodore Hotham," &c.

Plate X, Fig. 2, exhibits Clerk's fourth position (Plate XI) with a shift of wind. Here it is evident, that the British fleet, by tacking in succession when the wind shifted, might have brought the enemy to close action to the leeward; leaving the van unoccupied.

A, the original direction of the wind.

D, the wind when it had shifted.

The following extracts from the journal so frequently quoted, distinctly show the aversion of the French to close fighting.

"May 10th, 1780. The British fleet formed line and chased to windward; the next day, about two o'clock, Mons. de Guichen suddenly bore down in line a-breast, as if with a determination to attack; but on coming within random shot, hauled up, and made all sail he could to windward. He was encouraged to take this liberty by finding that he sailed so much better as a fleet than the British. This was regularly repeated every day at the same hour.

"On the fifteenth, in the afternoon, when the French van ship was nearly a-breast of the British centre, and rather nearer than usual, the wind shifted so much as to afford a prospect of forcing the enemy to battle; and the signal was instantly made for the commander of the rear division, who led on the larboard tack, to tack and gain the wind. The French immediately wore, and crowded sail away, endeavouring to regain the advantage.

“ At six, p. m. they tacked and stood across the British van, when the wind shifted six points in their favour, which obliged Rear Admiral Rowley and his division to pass to leeward of their line, exposed to a severe fire. The enemy keeping his wind, the centre and rear were not engaged. From this day they kept at a greater distance; but on the 19th an opportunity again offered, and the British again tacked, with the hope of being able to weather them; when finding their rear must be brought to action, the rest of the fleet, after crossing the British van, and *getting sufficiently far to windward*, edged away, keeping up a heavy cannonade as they passed parallel to the British line, though hardly within gun-shot.

“ Rear Admiral Rowley’s division again led upon this as on the former occasion, and sustained about the same loss; but the French rear ships must have suffered severely, *being exposed to a raking fire after passing the British van*, as they were obliged to *hug their wind* as close as possible in order to fetch into the wake of their leading ships, who were in no hurry to bear away.

“ After this Mons. de Guichen stood away under a press of sail, and approached the British fleet no more. It was afterwards understood that the French fleet, unable to keep the sea any longer, and not daring to run the risk of forcing a passage through the British fleet, received orders the same night to make the best of their way to Fort Royal, *each ship as she could*, which they effected, while Sir G. Rodney stood away for Barbadoes. Had he continued off Fort Royal, this could not have happened. The French had been at sea from the 15th of April; had sustained three actions; nor had they landed their wounded: the British had been nine days in port, had landed their wounded, and had been refreshed and refitted. No doubt Sir George had good reasons for his conduct.

“ While at Barbadoes information was received of the sailing and near approach of a Spanish squadron and large convoy, from Cadiz to the West Indies. Sir George was in hopes of intercepting it, but was too late; the whole got safe into Fort Royal, where the combined fleet amounted to *thirty-six sail of the line*. Sir George proceeded to St. Lucia, where he thought it provident to anchor in line of battle. One of the coppered line-of-battle ships looked into Fort Royal every morning without being molested. The whole combined force soon after sailed for Cape Francois.

“ The Princess Royal immediately afterwards sailed for Jamaica with the flag of Admiral Rowley, and thence a private ship for England, with a convoy, the 20th August, 1781. She reached Spithead after a passage of thirteen weeks,

with but one day's provisions on board at half allowance, and was making five feet water per hour. During this long passage the weather was so fine that the smallest boat might have lived the whole way."

REMARK.

"The plan proposed in this mode of attack is very desirable, and would probably have been followed if the lateness of the hour (seven, p. m.) had not prevented the use of signals. Or, had the van to the centre, or flag-ship, *tacked together*, they might soon have brought to close action the van of the enemy F, and engaged him ship to ship; the rear C, of the fleet B, standing on to engage the rear of the fleet F."

OBSERVATIONS.

In describing this battle, it is not necessary to follow the Admiral, in all his previous endeavours to weather upon the enemy, and bring him to close action; but to examine it when the fleets had arrived at the fourth position. (Fig. 2, Plate X.) By their appearance in this figure, it would seem, that had the British fleet then tacked in succession from the van, it would have been closely engaged with the enemy from centre to rear, leaving the van unoccupied.

It is true, that by attacking them in this manner, ships, while *in stays*, would be exposed to a heavy raking fire from the enemy's line; but in situations of this nature, where an opportunity offers of seizing an advantage, too nice a calculation should not be made as to present consequences; intent only upon defeating the enemy by every possible means.

On the 19th, it appears, that although the British Admiral was disappointed in his hopes of gaining the wind, he might have passed through the enemy's line, at the fourth or fifth ship from the van. See Fig. 1, Plate XI.

Should the leading ship of the fleet B, succeed in laying the enemy "*athwart hawse*," the second should in like manner proceed to another; thus, in different places, the centre and rear of the enemy's line will be attacked to great advantage.

By breaking the line, he would have thrown one ship upon another, and the rear into confusion; by which, no doubt, great advantage might have arisen. Where a superior can be brought to act with effect upon an inferior force, there can be little doubt of success.

"Nothing can be more clear and plain than this, and a glorious opportunity, was lost, by not passing through the French line."

REMARKS.

The following remarks, by a former able commentator, are entitled to the closest attention :

“ When chasing from the leeward, if he had advanced his fast sailing ships, I should think he would have stopped, or at all events would have much impeded, the enemy's progress. Under most circumstances, I think a fleet has less chance of escaping when to windward (at a moderate distance) of the chasing fleet, than if it were to leeward ; because a certain number of the chasing must certainly sail better than the worst of the flying ships, and will be able to harass and annoy them. A disabled ship is not so easily carried off *on* a wind, as *off* the wind ; therefore, if one of the attacked fleet is disabled, she must be supported (which would probably bring on a general action), or she must fall into the hands of the chasing fleet ; while if one of the detached ships of the latter be disabled, she will in like manner be better able to rejoin, and receive assistance from her friends to leeward.

“ All fleets in order of sailing, or of battle, should have a squadron of reserve composed of the best sailing ships, for the purpose of strengthening any particular part of the line, or bringing a flying enemy to action ; for general purposes of chasing, or for covering a retreat. But should a fleet to leeward be losing time by unnecessary manœuvres, it never can get up with an enemy to windward.”

OBSERVATION.

Admitting that Lord Rodney considered the system of Mr. Clerk entirely new, it only proves that he had not looked farther back for examples, not being a man of particular research. The same may be said of Lord Howe and Lord Nelson : but had they only cast their eye over the Preface of Paul Hoste's work, they would have read, “ Sans l'art des Evolutions un Général ne peut disposer que tres imparfaitement de son armée, soit pour s'opposer à propos aux ennemis, soit pour *les enfoncer, les couper, les doubler*, les eviter, les forcer au combat, et les poursuivre ;” and probably they would have been encouraged to go on ; but in those days the French language was seldom studied by sea officers, and French works were held in little esteem.

Admiral Kempenfelt, who was a man of acknowledged talents and acquirements, is thought to have practised the “ order of retreat ” to protect his convoy from a superior force. This order of retreat is fully described and explained in the “ *Traité des Evolutions Navales*,” by Paul Hoste. From this circumstance

it may be presumed that he had consulted, and profited by that useful treatise ; and to him it is more than probable the system of Mr. Clerk would not have appeared new. The talents and services of Admiral Kempenfelt were lost to his profession and to his country somewhat before the publication of the " Essay on Naval Tactics," by Clerk, of Eldin.

REMARKS.

" Have you ever said any thing respecting the propriety of an officer running his ship on board of one of the enemy, in order to detain her by disabling her ; and by that means to bring on a general action ? To do it in a masterly manner, would be, if possible, by carrying away the enemy's bowsprit without disabling your own ships.

" It struck me, on reading an account of one of Rodney's partial actions to windward of St. Lucie ; when the van of his fleet fetched up with the rear of the enemy, I think the seventh or eighth ship ; and bore up along the line of the enemy, exchanging fires as they passed under their lee upon opposite tacks.

" I should in this case conceive that the leading ship should have *actually run on board* of the ship she fetched, or of her second a-stern ; this, by throwing those a-stern of her into confusion, might have been attended with good effect ; the ship abandoned, or a general action brought on.

" A signal to such an effect would be of service ; namely, for a particular ship to run on board of the enemy and endeavour to detain her by disabling her." The object of the gallant officer is answered in the following

MODES OF ATTACK FROM THE WINDWARD, &c.

By Admiral the Hon. Sir A. J. Cochrane, Bart. G. C. B.

" WHEN an attack is intended to be made upon the enemy's *rear*, so as to endeavour to cut off a certain number of ships from that part of their fleet, the same will be made known by signal No. 27 ; and the numeral signal which accompanies it will point out the headmost of the enemy's ships that is to be attacked, counting always from the van, as stated in Page 160, Art. 31 (Instructions). The signal will afterwards be made for the division intended to make the attack, or the same will be signified by the ships' pendants, and the pendants of the ship in that division which is to begin the attack, with the No. of the ship to be first attacked in the enemy's line. Should it be intended that the leading

ship in the division is to attack the rear ship of the enemy, she must bear up, so as to get upon the weather quarter of that ship; the ships following her in the line will pass in succession on her weather quarter, giving their fire to the ship she is engaged with; and so on in succession, until they have closed with the headmost ship intended to be attacked.

“ The ships in reserve, who have no opponents, will break through the enemy's line a-head of this ship, so as to cut off the ships engaged from the rest of the enemy's fleet.

“ When it is intended that the rear ship of the division shall attack the rear ship of the enemy's line, that ship's pendants will be shown; the rest of the ships in the division will invert their order, shortening sail until they can in succession follow the rear ship, giving their fire to the enemy's ships in like manner as above stated; and the reserve ships will cut through the enemy's line as already mentioned.

“ When this mode of attack is intended to be put in force, the other divisions of the fleet, whether in order of sailing or battle, will keep to windward just out of gun-shot, so as to be ready to support the rear, and prevent the van and centre of the enemy from doubling upon them. This manœuvre, if properly executed, may force the enemy either to abandon the ships in his rear, or submit to be brought to action on equal terms, which is difficult to be obtained when the attack is made from to windward. When the fleet is to leeward, and the Commanding Officer intends to cut through the enemy's line, the number of the ship in their line, where the attempt is to be made, will be shown as already stated.

“ If the ships after passing the enemy's line are to tack, and double upon the enemy's ships a-head, the same will be made known by a blue pendant over the signal twenty-seven; if not, they are to bear up and run to the enemy's line to windward, engaging the ship they first meet with; each succeeding ship giving her fire, and passing on to the next in the rear. The ships destined to attack the enemy's rear will be pointed out by the number of the last ship in the line that is to make this movement, or the pendants of that ship will be shown; but, should no signal be made, it is to be understood that the number of ships to bear up is equal in number to the enemy's ships that have been cut off; the succeeding ships will attack and pursue the van of the enemy, or form, should it be necessary to prevent the enemy's van from passing round the rear of the fleet to relieve or join their cut-off ships.

“ If it is intended that the ships following those destined to engage the enemy's rear to windward shall bear up and prevent that part of their rear

which has been cut off from escaping to leeward, the same will be made known by a red pendant being hoisted over the signal twenty-one, and the number of ships so ordered will be shown by numeral signals or pendants. If from the centre division, a white pendant will be hoisted over the signal.

“ If the rear ships are to perform this service by bearing up, the same will be made known by a red pendant under the numeral signal, or pendants; counting always from the van will show the headmost ship to proceed on this service. The ships not directed by those signals are to form in close order, to cover the ships engaged from the rest of the enemy's fleet.

“ When the enemy's ships are to be engaged by both van and centre, the rear will keep their wind, to cover the ships engaged from the enemy to windward, as circumstances may require.

“ When the signal shall be made to cut through the enemy's van from to leeward, the same will be made known by signal twenty-seven, &c. In this case, if the headmost ships are to tack and double upon the enemy's van, engaging their ships in succession as they get up, the blue pendant will be shown as already stated, and the numeral signal pointing out the last ship from the van which is to tack, which in general will be equal in number to the enemy's ships cut through; the rest of the ships will be prepared to act as the occasion may require, either by bearing up and attacking the enemy's centre and rear, or tacking or waring to cut off the van of the enemy from passing round the rear of the fleet to re-join their centre. And on this service, it is probable, should the enemy's ships bear up, that some of the rear ships will be employed—the signal No. 21 will be made, accompanied with the number of pendants of the headmost ship—upon which she, with the ships in her rear, will proceed to the attack of the enemy.

“ When an attack is likely to be made by an enemy's squadron, by forcing the fleet from to leeward, signal 109 will be made with a blue pendant where best seen; upon which each ship will luff up upon the weather quarter of her second a-head, so as to leave no opening for the leading ship of the enemy to pass through: this movement will expose them to the collected fire of all that part of the fleet they intended to force.”

In the same book is also a signal (No. 785) under the head “ Enemy,” to “ lay on board,” with the adjoining *N. B.* “ This signal is not meant that your people should board the enemy, unless you should find advantage in it; but that you should *run your ship on board the enemy*, to disable him from getting away.”

ADMIRAL ARBUTHNOT'S ACTION.

March 16th, 1781.

Extract of a Letter from the Admiral, March 20th, 1781. Linnehaven Bay.

“ I immediately concluded it must be the enemy I was in search of, and accordingly prepared the squadron for battle, by forming the line a-head, a cable's length asunder, on a wind which was then fresh; and proceeded towards them with a press of sail; wind at West: the French bearing from us N. N. E. the weather very hazy,” &c.

“ Soon after eight, a. m. the wind veered to N. by W. which gave the enemy the weather-gage. About this time several of the enemy's ships were discovered to windward, manœuvring to form their line,” &c.

“ The British line was by this time completely formed, and close hauled on the larboard tack,” &c.

“ At twelve o'clock, there being a prospect of the van of my line reaching the enemy, tacked by signal, in succession; the van ship continuing to lead on the other tack,” &c.

“ At one o'clock, the French squadron having completed their line, consisting of eight two deckers, bore E. by S., the British line steering E. S. E., wind at N. E.” &c.

“ At half an hour after one o'clock, the enemy, being very apprehensive of the danger and inconvenience of engaging to windward; from the high sea that was running, and squally weather, wore, and formed their line to leeward of the British line,” &c.

“ At two o'clock, the van of my squadron wore in the line,” &c.

“ The ships in the van and centre were all engaged by half past two; and by three the French line was broke. They began to wear and form again with their heads to the South East. At twenty minutes after three I wore and stood after them. I was sorry to observe the Robust, Prudent, and Europe, the headmost ships, and having received the whole of the enemy's fire at their rigging as they bore down, so entirely disabled,” &c.

Passing over the different evolutions of the two fleets upon the first discovery of each other, we shall proceed to Mr. Clerk's second position of them.

Plate XI, Fig. 2. It is proposed here, that the British fleet should have carried a press of sail along the dotted line, to have intercepted the enemy; who evidently seems to prefer the leeward position; by which, he is afterwards enabled greatly to annoy the British fleet in its attack.

REMARKS.

“ There can be no reasonable doubt, but that essential advantages would have attended the adoption of the measures proposed by this plan.”

It is further proposed, that the British fleet should, when it approaches the enemy, invert the line; No. 1 stopping at No. 1 of the enemy; No. 2 passing close to leeward, and fixing upon No. 2 of the enemy's line; and so of the rest. By this mode, some of them must have been taken or destroyed.

“ I certainly think he should have attacked the French fleet while running down, as in the proposed plan; but as he did not, he should have cut off their rear and centre after they were formed in line to leeward, instead of trying to stop their van.”

OBSERVATIONS.

This engagement is one of the many proofs of the advantages of a leeward, to the weather-gage; and here it is seen that the French relinquished the one for the other; by which they very considerably disabled the British fleet.

It is somewhat strange, that the British Admiral, aware too of its “ dangers and inconvenience from the high sea that was running,” should have been so anxious “ to gain the wind of the enemy,” when he appears to have had so good an opportunity of attacking him to great advantage, and of frustrating his intentions. See Plate XI, Fig. II.

It is unnecessary to carry the inquiry further: suffice it to observe, that if it was an advantage to the enemy to attain the *leeward* situation, it was no less so to the British Admiral to have *kept it*, when he *had it*; and by standing immediately across him, with a press of sail, and attacking him when bearing up to change his position, he most probably would have entirely defeated him.

The following remarks are taken from a “ Short Account of the Naval Actions of the last War, by an officer,” London, 1788.

It will appear, they are strongly in favour of tactical acquirements in the forming of a perfect sea officer; and are therefore justly entitled to attention in a work like this. Extracts from this little book are therefore given in different places.

“ We have failed more than once by confiding merely in our bravery, and permitting our ships to attack at random. This happened on the 27th of July; and in the battle off the Grenades in the West Indies; and I may add, Admiral Arbuthnot's battle off the Capes of Virginia. If the latter was not at random, I am sure it will be admitted that, if there had been as much skill in the management of the whole fleet, as there was bravery shown in those ships that engaged, the French squadron would have been captured.”

OBSERVATIONS.

In describing this engagement, Mr. Clerk has been guilty of a great mistake; for when he tells us the French fleet had *quitted its windward position and formed to leeward*, he at the same time says, the *British* fleet is “*in chase, keeping their wind.*” (Clerk's Part I, Page 76, Third Edit., Plate VIII, Fig. 2.)

In the “Political Magazine and Parliamentary Journal,” for May 1781, are several letters upon this subject; all tending to show how little the result of it satisfied the public expectation. A few extracts shall be given, by which it will no doubt appear that, as more *might* have been done, it is fair to offer such suggestions on the mode of attack, as may seem better calculated for defeating the enemy; at the same time affording sufficient authority for the criticism already attempted.

“ The French fleet sailed from Rhode Island, having on board 2000 land forces: fortunately our fleet fell in with them on the 16th instant, off the Delaware; an action ensued, which lasted an hour and ten minutes, *though nothing decisive followed*; as the French fleet ran away, leaving some of our ships much disabled,” &c. “ Every body allows more might have been done. As for the two *Admirals*, they had little share of the action; and the ships a-stern never came in, *owing to the blunder of ordering the signal for the line at two cables length asunder, and keeping it up the whole time*; whereas, had he hauled it down, our ships would have each taken one of the enemy's, and have stuck by her; when, no doubt, almost the whole of the French fleet would have been *taken, sunk, or destroyed*; as they were in the greatest confusion when they saw our fleet,” &c.

In another letter, from an officer present, it is said,—

“ In my line of service I have learnt, having now seen three general actions; that of July 1788, under Mr. Keppel; that with Mons. D'Estaing in July 1779,

under Mr. Byron ; and the one I am now speaking of : and the result of my observations, is, *that two fleets of equal force can never be all brought into action, unless the two commanding officers are equally disposed to it,*" &c.

" We have to do with an enemy, who, by keeping on the defensive, obliges us to bear down and attack in a mode that must always expose our ships to be crippled in their rigging : our late experience is a melancholy proof of it," &c.

In another, from an officer also present in the fleet, it is asserted ; that

" The whole cause of our failure was the Admiral not hauling down the signal for the line, and making the signal for a close action," &c. This officer ends by saying, " I am tired of telling our misfortunes ; I wish I could obliterate such a day out of my memory."

In some " Remarks" on our " Engagements at Sea," and the different modes of fighting of the French and English, it is well observed in the same work, " *that every captain of a gun* in the French service is equal in ordnance abilities to the most experienced gunners in our navy." On this account they have always preferred the lee to the weather-gage ; and by this superiority of gunnery, and the preference they have shown to that position, we have so frequently and materially suffered, when they have received little comparative injury ; leaving us at their option and often not in a condition to follow them. " The letters of Admiral Barrington, Byron, Rodney, and Arbuthnot," (says the writer) " prove this," &c.

He goes on to observe, " many of our brave commanders will say, that by taking the weather-gage, they have the option of bearing down on the enemy when they please ; or, should he be too strong for them, by hauling their wind, they may more easily escape ; and that by firing at the hull they destroy many of the enemy, and drive the remainder from their quarters.

" A ship whose rigging is much damaged cannot with safety look to windward, and is little adapted to pursuit : and of what service is it to us to destroy half the enemy's men, when the remainder can leave us at pleasure ?

" Would it- not therefore be better to imitate in part the French method ? Our upper guns might be directed against the rigging ; the heavy metal of the lower decks against the hull ; and the quarter-deck and forecastle guns for clearing all above their decks either abaft or forward. In our three-deckers both the lower and middle deck guns might be directed against the hull," &c.

" In this mode of fighting the lee-gage is certainly preferable ; as in that situation the guns to be directed against the rigging can be elevated with greater facility, and more certain aim : besides, the officers on board the windward ships

are more exposed to the small arms of those to leeward ; and when within pistol shot, the whole can be directed at the hull. The battle would then be brought to a crisis, from which the enemy could with difficulty escape."

These observations are entitled to serious consideration ; particularly the manifest advantage arising from allotting the guns of every particular deck to its appropriate object ; by which, undoubtedly, greater effect is to be produced. This is by no means new in *practice* ; many officers having brought even to still greater precision the rules and practice of gunnery in His Majesty's ships.*

A gallant baronet, greatly distinguished in the late American war, amongst many other meritorious officers, by diligent application to the subject, and constant exercise, brought the system of naval gunnery to a state of perfection never before known ; for which the service at large is greatly indebted to him : he could point his guns with such precision, as to concentrate the fire of the whole broadside to any given object ; and, from a description of the system, it appears to merit a more general introduction.

The naval service acknowledges with gratitude what it owes to Sir Charles Douglas for the application of the lock to the great gun ; and the present Admiral Sir Charles M. Pole, when he commanded the *Success*, in the first American war, was so delighted with the improvement, that, fearing the failure of *one*, he even caused two to be placed (one on each side of the touch-hole), which were both pulled together by one lanyard. He also caused *sights*, made of copper, to be fixed upon the second reinforce-ring of every gun, with a graduated point rising in the centre of it, to guide the elevation. In this manner he fought and captured in the night the *Santa Catalina* ; and by means of these sights the seamen could at any time shoot away the flag placed upon a cask.

Abundant proofs were also given of the efficiency of naval gunnery on the 1st of June. When the *Brunswick* was engaging the *Vengeur*, with her starboard guns, *l'Achille* came to her assistance, by bringing the *Brunswick* to close action on the larboard side : in the course of a very few broadsides, all the masts of the French ship were seen tumbling over the side. The fate of the *Vengeur* is well known, and is related in another part of this work.

Since the foregoing was written, there has appeared an able little "Treatise upon Naval Gunnery," by Colonel Sir Howard Douglas, Bart., well meriting the

* See Sir William Congreve's Description of Sights for the Use of the Navy, with an Account of them after continued Trials, by the Hon. Captain Henry Duncan, R.N. C.B. (Second edition, 1819.)

See also Captain Pechel's Tract.

attention of Naval officers; and although much of it applies to the higher departments in the state, yet the observations it contains upon pointing and firing, whether upon the lee-lurch or weather-roll, with other considerations attached to the service of naval ordnance, are highly useful; and so is the reasoning, and his plate, upon the "*tactics of single actions*." Much information is also conveyed upon the "windage" of shot, the quality of gunpowder, and the preference to be given to a long gun; with a display of scientific knowledge, showing the author to be perfect master of the subject.

Having acknowledged this, it is hoped that the writer will be forgiven for an observation he is about to make upon another part of it; the tendency of which, since it could not have been intentional, was most likely overlooked by the gallant officer in its progress.

Of the "Established Form of Exercise for the Great Guns of the Year 1817,"* the writer knows nothing; but this he knows, that the practice of *quartering* by *watches* and *divisions*, with *appellations expressive* of their *duties* (by which terms the men *answered at muster*), has existed in the service ever since (and probably before) the peace preceding the revolutionary war.

To readers not better acquainted with the state and discipline of the navy generally, it may appear from Sir Howard Douglas's work that the "*Shannon*" was the *only ship* in it wherein the crew were quartered in that way: this is to pay a compliment to Sir P. Brooke at the expense of others, not very acceptable to a liberal mind, and therefore not gratifying to *him*. To lessen the merit of the skilful and gallant Baronet's achievement is impossible; and he may have carried his arrangements and experiments further than most men; yet the system of quartering the crew, as described by Sir Howard Douglas, was well known and practised long before. As to the "*French manual*," it is entitled to little consideration, since it consists of more that will perplex than direct.

It is too minute in the detail. This should be taught, and taught in turns, to all the crew at the gun, by the officers at the different quarters, that their men may become all equally expert. Losses from casualties will then not be so severely felt. The *numbering* has been a more recent practice in our navy, and in leaving that off we have only returned to the old custom.

The French manual teaches to stop the vent by the *thumb*; a man thus occupied is useless in other respects; vents, two at each gun, made of the carpenter's "*back leather*," and affixed by lanyards to the breech of the piece,

* See the "Treatise on Naval Gunnery," Part III, pages 143, &c.

have been found to answer better than any thing. When one of these is applied, the captain of the gun can assist at the train (or port) tackle fall, should not the gun have recoiled sufficiently for reloading; which, if a lee-gun, may probably be the case. The general system for supply of powder is nearly the same in both services. On this part of the subject the writer will venture a remark.

Upon an attentive inquiry into the history of most general actions at sea, it will be found that explosions from cartridges have taken place to a fatal extent, in one or the other, if not in both the fleets engaged; and have become known, notwithstanding every attempt to conceal them.

Upon this subject Ramatuelle is particularly eloquent, and gives a chapter upon the method of loading the guns when fighting with the lee-gage, and recommends the use of a *canvas bag* (made after a very particular manner, which he takes two or three pages to describe), instead of the wooden boxes, and this bag is to be kept *wet*.

If men are cautious to shut the box *close* upon the delivery of the cartridge, no fire can enter. Ramatuelle declares he has known explosions to take place from sparks left in the boxes; and more frequently when firing the weather guns, the wadding flying back into the ship. This is well known, and always to be guarded against; the great danger arises from having too large a quantity of powder collected in one place, and from carelessness and inattention.

To avoid the necessity of keeping too much powder upon deck, an ingenious officer recommends that a second load be kept *within* the *muzzle* of every gun, affixed to the lanyard of the *tompson*, so as to be *drawn out with it*; then cut loose and put into the cartridge or *salt-box*, kept for that purpose.

To prevent as much as possible the calamitous effects arising from such a cause (an accumulation of powder in one place), the following method was adopted in one of the seventy-four's employed against the walls of Algiers. Her two principal gun-decks, (of fifteen each) were divided into three equal divisions, each division having *three* "powder-men" attached to it. These men were *not* to consider themselves as belonging to *one gun* only, but were to carry their cartridge, first to the foremost gun of their division; and if it was not wanted there, to proceed in succession to the rest; upon the cartridge being demanded, he returned by the opposite side of the deck with the empty box; and, on going to the supplying hatchway, exchanged it for a full one. In this manner the powder-men were making a perpetual circuit throughout their division; every gun had a cartridge when it wanted one, and *no more*.

The fire thus kept up was uniform and general, and more animated at the close than at the commencement; the only orders given from the quarter-deck were, to take deliberate aim, and not to fire too fast.

In some ships it has been the custom to station a man or boy, with a "salt-box" belonging to his gun, on the side of the deck not engaged; a powder-man of that gun keeps the salt-box in supply, making a merit of collecting all he possibly can for his gun; when, if the powder-man of the next has not been so active, or, from the struggle of so many applicants at the hatchway, *that* gun should *be without*; the provident boy, tenacious of his charge, will not give a cartridge for any gun but his own. The consequence *may* be an explosion; at all events, neither the rapidity nor the regularity of fire is preserved. Boys may, with more benefit and propriety, be quartered to pass along the boxes below.

Of instrumental sights, the writer has seen frequent trial, and strongly recommends their use; particularly at small and distant objects: gun-boats in a calm, for instance; and, for close action, they must prove very efficacious. The trial made of different ones, on board the *Liffey*, by the Honourable Captain Duneau, has entirely established their character for the utmost precision in striking the object, and a perfect aptness to the naval service. Great merit is due to Sir William Congreve for the invention, and his introduction of them into the British navy.

Yet, if we look to the effect of the fire from some of the ships in our most important actions, we shall find that for *close* fighting our naval gunners have little to learn. The ships of the late Sir Samuel Hood, and of the present Sir Thomas Foley, at the battle of the Nile, completely dismasted their opponents in 15 minutes; while that of Sir James Saumarez dismasted and sunk a frigate in about a couple of broadsides, as it was *in passing* her to take up her anchorage in the attack. The *Zealous* dismasted the *Guerrier* in five minutes.

When practising with instrumental sights at a target for some time on board the *Tonnant*, at sea, in 1818, and without having once struck it, an old seaman requested he might be permitted to fire at it *without* the sights: at the third trial he shot away the flag-staff!

The following observations are strongly in point; and, as they proceed from an officer of acknowledged ability and enterprise, who greatly distinguished himself in the late wars, the writer is happy to avail himself of them. Opinions of a professional nature from such sources must at all times be highly valuable.

"Sufficient attention to the manner in which ships were manned was never

paid by any Admiral; and very few of them ever took the trouble of mustering the crews of the ships under their orders. A ship should be frequently *reviewed* by an Admiral or Commanding Officer:* she should be worked while he is on board in all ways, and by *every* Lieutenant in her; and, above all, her *guns* should be exercised under his inspection. If you have a spare corner in your book, impress on *us* the necessity of attending to the *real* exercise of guns, and of the manœuvre of the ship in action: at the same time contradict the false notion, that because a ship is well painted, smart looking, and particularly clean, she cannot fight: never was an idea so absurd. If a ship removes any of her *rigging*, *annoys her men*, by *polishing bolts*, &c., *does not exercise her guns* for fear of *spoiling the paint*, *does not* keep the *essentials* necessary for action upon her *decks* because *it would lumber them*; and sacrifice every thing *needful* to *external show*; then, *that ship* is in *bad order*, and *will disgrace herself in fight*; and such ships, to a seaman's eye at least, generally seem in the worst condition. Our navy was certainly bad at the breaking out of the (last) American war; we had had no enemy to fight with for some time," &c.

In another letter he observes,—“ To show how much may be made of any set of men; a crew consisting of 145, made up principally of foreigners; seven pressed men, three of whom were Americans, being the only good men in the ship; were in six months rendered every thing that could be wished for in a gallant ship's company. The same men who, six weeks after the ship was commissioned, declined to volunteer the cutting out of a gun-boat, in six months behaved in the most gallant manner; and those who had before refused to come forward, were seen to insist upon returning, under a heavy fire, to a vessel they had left burning, because they had forgotten to haul down the French flag; and they *did* go back, and *hoisted a blue jacket* over the *enemy's colours*!

“ Upon leaving England we had only two men in the ship who had ever steered with a wheel; and I am satisfied that a brig well manned would have taken us. In the Archipelago we fell in with an American ship (before the war with that Power) one night; and in going alongside of her a gun went off by accident: the broadside followed: we were so close, I concluded we must have cut her to pieces: what was my surprise when I found not a rope-yarn had been touched! We had been manned at this time about a

* Admirals were in the habit of mustering the ships of their division in our large fleets.

Upon the Expedition to Algiers Lord Exmouth mustered in a particular manner every one of his squadron soon after leaving Plymouth.

month. and this affair was the first thing that opened my eyes to the necessity of paying the greatest attention to the guns; and I hope I have never lost sight of it since."

Such had been the education and experience of this strange mixture of people, that by the constant exertions and example of their Captain and Officers, at the end of fourteen months, upon the appointment of another Captain, he declared "he had never seen anything like them at the guns."

SIR SAMUEL (AFTERWARDS LORD) HOOD'S ENGAGEMENT
WITH THE FRENCH FLEET,

OFF FORT ROYAL, MARTINICO, APRIL 29, 1781.

Extracts of a Letter from Sir Samuel Hood, May 4th, 1781.

"A little before nine, the Amazon joined me, the enemy then in sight coming down between Point Salines and the Diamond Rock. I made the signal for a close line, and to prepare for action," &c.

"At thirty-five minutes past ten, tacked the squadron together; the van of the enemy being almost a-breast of our centre: at eleven they began to fire, which I took no notice of. At this time the ships in Fort Royal Bay slipped their cables, and got under sail. I tacked the squadron together, and repeated the signal for a close order of battle. At twenty-five minutes past eleven, finding the enemy's shot to go over us, made the signal for engaging; and, in passing, our van and the enemy's rear exchanged some broadsides. At forty minutes after eleven the enemy tacked. At fifty minutes past eleven, finding it impossible to get up to the enemy's fleet, I invited it to come to me, by bringing the squadron to, under the top-sails.

"At half past twelve the French Admiral began to fire at the Barfleur, which was immediately returned; and the action became general, but at too great a distance; and, I believe, never was more powder and shot thrown away in one day before; but it was with Monsieur de Grasse the option of distance lay; it was not possible for me to go nearer," &c.

" At forty-five minutes past four sent Captain Finch to the Shrewsbury, to order Captain Robertson to keep as near the wind, and carry all the sail he could to preserve the line of battle, and to return back along the line, to acquaint every captain of the same," &c.

" Rear Admiral Drake sent to inform me that the Russell was in great distress, having received several shot between wind and water; that the water was over the platform of the magazine, and gaining upon the pumps; and that three of their guns were dismounted. Ordered the Russell to come within hail, &c. The enemy's fleet consisted of twenty-four sail of the line, at this time about four miles to windward," &c.

" The Russell, Captain Sutherland, parted company, for St. Eustatius, or any other port he could make; and to acquaint Sir George Rodney of all that had passed.

" On Monday, April 30th, at day-light, found the van and centre of the squadron separated at some distance from the Barfleur and rear, owing to fluttering winds and calms in the night; and, finding the enemy's advanced ships steering for our van, made all possible sail towards them, and made signal for a close line of battle. At seven, the squadron under my command being well formed, the enemy's advanced ships hauled off," &c.

" At twenty-five minutes past twelve, the wind blowing steady at S. E. made the signal for a general chase to windward, with a design to weather the enemy; in which, had the breeze continued, I should certainly have succeeded; but the wind dying away at four, I found it impracticable," &c.

" Having been informed that the Intrepid made so much water, they could scarce keep her free; and that the Centaur was in the same state, and that her lower masts were very badly wounded; I judged it improper to dare the enemy to battle any longer," &c.

OBSERVATIONS.

The gallant Admiral's letter is more in the nature of a log of his proceedings for several days; but is unnecessary to be further detailed in this place. These extracts, it is hoped, are sufficient to prove to the naval reader the skill and great anxiety shown by the British Admiral to bring the enemy to close action; and, from the excessive caution and disinclination manifested by the French Commander, the perfect impossibility of effecting it; the enemy having throughout, by the weather-gage, the option of fighting, and the choice of distance. The more important object with him appears to have been the secure arrival of his

convoy ; for which he manœuvred with equal dexterity and success. Sir Samuel Hood did all that it was in the power of man to do ; but the winds and currents were against his utmost efforts ; and the object and obvious intention of De Grasse was merely to amuse him until he had effected his purpose.

In this affair, the defective state of our signals, from the frequent necessity of sending orders by ships, is very apparent. But our improvement in the use of signals has advanced much more rapidly than our knowledge of tactics, or the art of managing and manœuvring squadrons or fleets ; having constantly in view the power of attacking an enemy to the greatest advantage, with the least risk of loss or injury to our own ships. This familiarity with naval evolutions should not be confined to the flag-officers. It is absolutely essential to the safety of all, and to success in battle, that every captain should possess a competent knowledge of this subject, by which he may properly direct and instruct those under his command.

An attempt to describe this encounter by a figure would be to point out the unfortunate and helpless situation of the British fleet, without any means of displaying in an adequate manner the efforts and extreme anxiety of the British Admiral to grapple with the enemy ; and therefore, as it could not render him justice, would only be productive of disappointment.

Extract of a Letter from Captain Sutherland, of the Russell, to a naval friend in England, Sept. 12th, 1781.

“ Inclosed is the narrative I promised you ; to men unacquainted with our service, it may appear simple and inadequate ; but to you, who are able to judge of our situation and views, it will not seem strange that I have not been more diffuse.

“ Sea-fights are infinitely grand and interesting, but they can afford no great field for description, there is such a sameness in the events. At the moment no officer ought to be sufficiently at leisure to exercise his imagination ; after it is over, it would be ridiculous affectation. I am interrupted. *Remember that I am not ambitious of being thought an author.* Yours, &c.,

“ A. SUTHERLAND.

“ Fort Royal Bay, Martinique, April 28th.

“ Having early in the morning left the fleet with an intention of going into St. Lucia for the recovery of our people, who were becoming very sickly, at nine

we discovered a frigate coming from the windward, making the signal for an enemy's fleet, which we repeated to the Admiral. At eleven rejoined him, and had his directions to take our station in the line, then forming to the southward.

"At four the Amazon made the signal that the fleet seen was of superior force. We soon after could perceive them from our mast-heads, lying-to off Point Salines.

"At six our fleet tacked to the north, and kept moving across the bay for the right, in line-of-battle, without seeing any more of the enemy.

"At seven, a. m., on the 29th, still in line, standing to the southward, perceived a French frigate open with the Diamond Rock, when Admiral Sir Samuel Hood made signal for the van to make more sail.

"At nine we discovered the fleet, changing from line a-breast to line-of-battle a-head, and in that order they stood towards us; and the wind having favoured them, they were enabled to weather us: about ten their van was nearly a-breast of ours, and within random shot, when they began to fire on our rear, which was returned by some of our ships. At ten our fleet tacked together per signal, and received some shots while *in stays*.

"When *about*, their van was nearly a-breast of our centre. In this position we continued about a quarter of an hour, exchanging random shot; when our van being well in with the shore to the northward of the bay, we tacked again to the southward, at which time we perceived the four ships that had been lying in Fort Royal Bay, under sail, standing out; and as their own fleet was then waring to the southward, took their stations in the rear.

"When the French wore, the two fleets were in lines nearly parallel, about a mile asunder; theirs, as more numerous, extending more to the southward than ours, which enabled them the better to cover their convoy, at that time passing into port, between them and the land.

"This appears to have been their principal object; and in order to prevent the possibility of interruption, they bore down at this time something nearer, and I believe the action became pretty general, at least it was so in the van, and continued for about three quarters of an hour. The French then hauled their wind, increasing their distance, and the firing ceased for the present.

"At half past one, the leading ship's signal (the Shrewsbury) was made to make more sail, and shortly after for a closer line, which until then had been at two cables asunder. Upon opening the land, the leading ships having a fresher breeze, increased their distance a little, and four of them were attacked by eight of the enemy very smartly. Until half past three these ships were warmly engaged, the enemy directing their fire principally at the rigging: the

masts were more particularly their aim, most were wounded, though none rendered unserviceable.

“ Besides our killed and wounded, we found we had received nine shot between wind and water ; four of them very dangerous, the ship making so much water, that with pumping and bailing we could scarcely prevent its gaining on us. In this condition we quitted the line per signal, and as soon as it was dark, the fleet,” &c.

“ When it is considered that the French had twenty-five sail of the line to our eighteen, and that the whole of the first day they had it at their option to have made the battle as general and close as they pleased ; I flatter myself we shall not be found to have conducted ourselves unworthily ; though no doubt the French will gasconade enough on the occasion ; but with so very decided a superiority, I do not see that they have much to boast of.”

ADMIRAL PARKER'S BATTLE ON THE DOGGER BANK, August 5th, 1781.

Extract of Admiral Parker's Letter.

“ YESTERDAY morning we fell in with the Dutch squadron, with a large convoy, on the Dogger Bank. I was happy to find I had the wind of them, as the great numbers of their large frigates might otherwise have endangered my convoy. Having separated the men of war from the merchant ships, and made a signal for the latter to keep their wind, I bore away with a general signal to chase.

“ The enemy formed their line, consisting of eight two-decked ships, on the *larboard tack*. Ours, including the Dolphin of forty-four guns, consisted of seven. Not a gun was fired on either side until within the distance of half-musket shot. The Fortitude being then a-breast of the Dutch Admiral, the action began, and continued with an unceasing fire for three hours and forty minutes : by this time our ships were unmanageable. I made an effort to form the line to renew the action, and found it impracticable.

"The *Bienfaisant* had lost her main-top-mast, and the *Buffalo* her fore yard; the rest of the ships were not less shattered in their masts, rigging, and sails; the enemy appeared to be in as bad a condition. Both squadrons lay-to a considerable time near each other, when the Dutch, with their convoy, bore away for the Texel. We were not in a condition to follow them."

OBSERVATIONS.

This action is introduced by Mr. Clerk (page 136, 3d edition), as another proof of the disastrous effects of an attack from a windward position; although it appears, the Dutch Admiral did not think proper to take all the advantage of his own leeward position that was in his power. It displays at the same time the gallantry of the British Admiral, who, with a very inferior force, did not hesitate to bear down upon him and bring him to close action (very properly) to windward: for had he gone to leeward, he would thereby have exposed his convoy.

The battle ended in favour of the British; as a Dutch ship of the line (the *Hollandia*) foundered before they reached the Texel; her pendant having been brought to the Admiral by Captain Patton, of the *Belle Poule*.

The *Hollandia* having sunk in shallow water, her mast heads were left considerably above its surface; and a neutral vessel falling in with them, took away her pendant, still flying, and, justly considering it the property of the British Admiral, presented it to the Captain of the frigate.

Postscript of Admiral H. Parker's Letter.

"The frigate this morning discovered one of the Dutch men of war sunk in twenty-two fathoms of water; her top-gallant-masts were above the surface, and her pendant still flying, which Captain Patton struck, and brought to me on board. I believe she was the second ship in the line, of seventy-four guns."*

Of Admiral Parker it is related, that upon being informed of the force of the Dutch squadron in the morning, he replied (pulling up his breeches), "It matters little what their force is; we must fight them if they are double the number."

* By Admiral Zoutman's report it appears to have been the *Hollande*, Captain Dedel, of sixty-four guns. See the "Remembrancer" for 1781; also, excellent accounts, English and Dutch, of this engagement, in the "Political Magazine and Parliamentary Journal," for September, 1781.

Engagement between the English and Dutch Squadrons on the Dogger Bank, August 5th, 1781.

The following "Notes" were taken during the action, by a Lieutenant of a frigate; he is now a distinguished Vice Admiral.


"I send the minutes of the Dogger Bank, which you must make allowance for, as written by a young Lieutenant; but I believe them to be quite correct, as I remember they were kept with great care during the action.

"Before I speak of the battle, I think it proper to give some particulars of the state of our squadron; which was chiefly composed of ships totally unfit for the line of battle, and had been but a short time together, and during that time but little attention was paid to make them expert in the forming of lines; the signal for that purpose having been made but two or three times. The Berwick was a fine ship, well appointed; and, in addition to her proper metal, had several carronades, two of which were sixty-eight-pounders. The Dolphin (who was next her in action) was a good forty-four, but a kind of ship very unfit for lines of battle; for, having only twenty or twenty-two eighteen-pounders on her lower deck, what impression could she make on a seventy-four gun ship? besides, the small size of her masts rendered them very easy to be shot away: yet this little ship, with the assistance of some carronades, on her quarter-deck, did wonders. The Buffalo was formerly the Captain, of seventy guns; but in the beginning of the war, not being thought fit for service as a ship of force, she was fitted up as a mast ship, and her name changed; but either from a change of opinion, or from a great want of ships, she was again fitted out for war, with sixty guns; but I believe with only eighteen-pounders below. She had only a fifty gun ship's masts and yards. The Fortitude was well manned; and, as the weather was remarkably fine, no inconvenience was found from her being rather a small ship for a seventy-four. The Princess Amelia, an old eighty gun ship with reduced metal, and I also believe masts. The Preston was a good fifty gun ship. The Bienfaisant had either her guns on the lower or main deck reduced, or both. The Artois was then the finest frigate known; twenty-eight eighteen-pounders on her main deck; and, in addition to her proper complement of guns, had several heavy carronades on her quarter-deck, and two sixty-eight-pounders on her forecastle: her masts and yards were the size of a fifty gun ship, and she had nearly 300 men on board. The Latona, a fine thirty-eight gun frigate with eighteen-pounders. The Cleopatra, a fine thirty-two gun

frigate. The *Belle Poule*, a fine ship of thirty-six guns. The *Tartar* went away with the convoy.

“As we knew the Dutch convoy was at sea, we expected to meet them; accordingly, on the 5th of August, about four o'clock in the morning, we saw the enemy about six leagues directly to leeward, the weather finely calculated for the business before us, there being a fine commanding breeze and smooth water; and the clear weather, by giving us a distinct view of the enemy's fleet, *put it in our power* to make all the proper dispositions to annoy them effectually. At thirty-five minutes past four the signal was made for a general chase to the S. E. and of course the attention of the officers and men was taken from the necessary preparations to engage, to the making sail. The signal for chasing may be thought to give an idea of superiority; but it could not persuade any person, that an enemy which was seen coolly preparing to receive us, was running away. It was here no doubt very improper, as it lumbered the ships with the great quantity of gear necessary for the setting of studding-sails, royals, &c., some of which would be wanting for preventer braces. The sails also should have been placed so as to be in no danger of falling in the way of the guns, or of taking fire. The presence of the officers and men was requisite to see their quarters in every respect clear and provided. I am of opinion that at this time the signal should have been made for the line of battle a-breast, or on the point of the compass parallel to the general range of the enemy's fleet; and the Admiral should have carried such sail as would just have obliged the worst sailing ship to have set all her plain sails. And even if the Admiral's hurry for fighting was very great, this manœuvre would not have kept him many minutes out of action. At five, the Dutch hoisted their colours, and the men of war drew out from among the merchant ships. At half past five, the Admiral made the *Tartar's* signal to stay by the convoy; and the *Latona*, who had charge of the convoy, made a signal to the merchant ships to make the best of their way into port. Upon this, the *Tartar*, the brig, and the convoy, hauled their wind to the westward, and were soon out of sight and danger, even had our fleet been worsted. The Admiral then is rid of all fear on their account, and before him sees a glorious harvest of honour and wealth; and on his skill depends the success of the reapers. At eleven minutes past six the signal was made for a line of battle a-breast, two cables' length distance. The headmost ships were by this means enabled to take in their flying-sails; but the heavy sailers were still obliged to crowd, as it was some time before the Admiral took in his fore-sail and top-gallant-sails; and, if I recollect right, when the signal for battle was made, the *Princess Amelia* had a fore-top-mast studding-sail boom unsecured. At twelve minutes past six the signal was made

for the Dolphin and Preston to change stations; a signal of bad tendency, for it placed the Dolphin in the hottest part of the enemy's line; but, however, it appears that quite the contrary was intended, and this signal was made owing to a mistake of the Admiral's, in looking at an old line of battle instead of the present one. *Why the D——l did he not look at the ships themselves?* At forty-six minutes past six the signal was made for the line to close to one cable's length. At seven the Bienfaisant's signal was made to make more sail (this was the oldest Captain going into action). At thirty-five minutes past seven the Berwick's, Buffalo's, and Dolphin's signals were made, that they were out of their stations; but I believe that they were all three erring on the right side, and were a little too far a-head. At fifty-six minutes past seven the signal for battle was made. Let me now turn to the Dutch, and see the situation they were in when we made our approach. Their line of battle, consisting of seven sail, were drawn up in a regular line of battle a-head, on the larboard tack, at a little more than a cable's length distance from each other. They kept about a point from the wind, and seemed to have their sail well proportioned to each other's going. In general, they had top-sails, mizen and fore-sails and fore-top-mast stay-sails; some had their jibs hoisted. They appeared to be in great order; and their hammocks, quarter-cloths, &c., were spread in as nice order, as if for show in harbour. Their marines also were well drawn up, and stood with their muskets shouldered, with all the regularity and exactness of a review. Their politeness ought to be remembered by every man in our line; for, as if certain of what happened, we came down almost end on upon their broadsides; yet did not the Dutch Admiral fire a gun, or make the signal to engage, till the red flag was at the Fortitude's mast-head, and her shot were finding their way into his ship. This was a manœuvre which Admiral Zutman should not be warmly thanked for by their High Mightinesses; as he had it in his power to have done infinite mischief to our fleet, coming down in that un-officer-like manner. Having suffered Admiral Parker to place himself as he pleased, he calmly waited till the signal was hoisting on board the Fortitude; and at the same instant we saw the signal going up on board Admiral Zutman's ship. At this time the Dutch frigates and convoy were close under the lee of their line, and some large ships were observed working to windward amongst the convoy, which we thought to be Indiamen; and probably fired some shot at our ships through the intervals of their line. Our frigates kept about a mile to windward of our line; all the advantages given us by the Dutch Admiral one should conceive were eagerly seized; but as ill luck would have it, that was far from the case!



“ For our Admiral, A, without considering that the Dutch Admiral, D, was not in the centre of his line, bore down alongside of him ; from which reason, as may be seen by the rough sketch above, the Bienfaisant, C, had not at first a ship opposed to her ; the Dutch rear, G, being opposite to the Preston, H. The consequences of this mistake were, that the Buffalo, I, and Dolphin, K, which were our weakest ships, had for some time three ships opposed to them ; and unfortunately the van of the Dutch was the strongest part of their line, while our van was the weakest of ours. At eight the signal for the line was hauled down, and the signal for closer action was made. At six minutes past eight the signal was made for the Buffalo to make more sail ; but this she was disabled from doing, not having a brace remaining ; and she could not get her jib and main-top-mast stay-sail set. At about a quarter before ten the Berwick, B, having forced the Dutch van ship, E, to edge off, she soon found herself (by following her up a little) so far to leeward, that she received several shot into her larboard side, from the Dutch ship, F, commanded by Commodore Kingsbergen.

“ This was a sad blow upon us, as the Berwick was our best ship, and now obliged to make sail a-head to regain her station again by tacking ; and it was eleven o'clock before she got again within shot. Here was surely some error on board the Berwick ; * as she only set her fore-sail and jib. If she had not set her main-sail, she ought surely to have set top-gallant-sails ; and this was the more necessary, as her mizen-top-mast was shot away. As soon as she could fetch to windward of the Dutch line, she ranged along the line on the starboard tack, till a-breast of Admiral Parker. She then tacked, and was standing into her station ; but did not get there before the end of the action : but although the Berwick was so long kept out of action, yet did she fully get her share of the danger of the day ; for no ship was so warmly engaged for some time after the beginning of the action ; and her list of killed and wounded was as great as that of the Fortitude, or nearly so. Before the Berwick had returned again to action, the

* If the Berwick did not set her main-sail and top-gallant-sails, it must have been from inability, as all her lower masts were badly wounded. Never was greater exertion used, nor anxiety shown, to enable a ship to recover her station in the battle.

The writer (who was on board the Berwick) distinctly recollects, that when the ship succeeded in getting upon the starboard tack, standing for the van ship of the enemy's line, the Captain directed the Master (John Forbes) in case he could not weather, to run on board of her ; and that she bore up a little, to let us pass, when the broadside was given, mentioned in the narrative.

Dolphin had also been obliged to stand a-head, and make a tack, having got to leeward of some of the Dutch line. And all this was owing to the Admiral's error in going to engage Admiral Zutman, instead of the ship a-head of him ; or, if he thought proper to engage the Dutch Admiral, he should have changed stations with the Princess Amelia, L, and then the ships of each squadron would have been arranged ship against ship from the beginning. At eleven the Admiral passed to leeward of the Buffalo, the ships a-stern of the Admiral following him up (the signal for a line a-head having been again hoisted at forty-three minutes past ten) and engaging the Dutch line as they passed. At this time the Dutch fire was very slack, except from the Admiral and Commodore Kingsbergen's ships. The latter in particular kept up a glorious fire to the last moment, and a very severe cannonading took place between the Fortitude and her, as the latter passed her. And she continued to engage with the same vigour, as the ships a-stern of the Admiral passed her in succession. At thirty-five minutes passed eleven the action ceased, and at forty minutes past twelve the signal was made to wear ; and ten minutes after to form a line a-head. This being the last signal that was made of consequence, I now take a view of our situation. About the middle of the action, the Dutch convoy bore away for the Texel ; an acknowledgement on their sides, that they no longer hoped for victory, or that they would be able to continue their voyage. That they kept their convoy by them at all, was, I think, most likely owing to their having been misinformed of our force ; the Berwick having, by great good fortune, joined us on the coast of Norway a few days before. Not but I conceive the Dutch were superior to us in force, even with this great addition to our strength. Several of their ships had very heavy metal on board ; shot being found on board some of our ships of forty pounds weight ; and, so far from having a ship in their line so small as the Dolphin, I am almost sure they had none of inferior size to the Preston. Being to leeward, they brought all their frigates into action ; and even a cutter came up and fired a broadside or two at the Fortitude. When the signal was made to wear at forty minutes past twelve, the damage our fleet had received was not such as to prevent their going again into action, especially against an enemy much more disabled than ourselves ; our damage, besides the killed and wounded, (who could have been replaced from the frigates) being only of a main-top-mast on board the Bienfaisant, which went after the action ; a mizen-top-mast on board the Berwick ; a fore-top-gallant-mast on board the Princess Amelia ; and the Buffalo had a fore-yard lowered down : the mere reeving of new ropes would not have prevented her from setting sail enough to have gone into action. Now let us see the state of the Dutch fleet

at the same time. One of their line of battle ships was lying several miles to windward of the body of their ships, totally disabled; and two frigates, which were working up to her assistance, bore away as soon as we wore. Their squadron in general seemed perfectly unmanageable, and either did not, or else they in vain endeavoured to fall at all into a line; although it was in our power to have renewed the action instantly, and I am sure every soul in both squadrons expected it. When the signal for our line was made, their disabled ship was still unable to move, and, to my knowledge, our Admiral was then intending, and eager to renew the engagement; which must inevitably have been crowned with complete success: but neither now, nor the next day, when one of their large ships was found sunk, nor afterwards, when we knew they had all lost one or more of their top-masts, did we follow them—a mystery this indeed. * * * * Thus was lost a glorious opportunity of destroying the flower of the Dutch navy; and the action, as no attempt was made to reap any advantage from it, was but a sacrifice of a great number of brave men's lives."

The author of the above narrative proceeds thus: "I do not much admire some of the Lieutenant's observations as to the manner of hastening into action, but you see it was a motley squadron.

"Old Parker was full of life and spirits. Sir James Saumarez* was the officer on deck actively employed refitting the rigging, &c. The Captain had the gout, and Waghorn, the first Lieutenant, was wounded.

"I kept a sharp look-out on the Berwick: the whole party of Dutch marines seemed to be knocked down by your poop-carronades; your pilot, Hutchinson, was an old shipmate of mine; and when Keith Stewart told him to assist in conning the ship close to the enemy, he asked, 'If by close, he meant about a ship's *breadth*.' This brave man was killed early in the action.

"We ought to have taken every ship of war, and many of the convoy."

By the foregoing minutes it is seen, that the British Admiral inadvertently rendered his van too weak for that of the enemy; and through the same mistake one of his ships was for a time useless, by being extended beyond the rear. This teaches us the necessity of care in forming lines of battle, that force may be as equally applied to force as circumstances will admit.

The Dutch Admiral is more to be admired for his cool intrepidity than for his

* See an interesting "Memoir" of this distinguished officer and amiable man, with some account of his gallant ancestors, in "Public Characters" for 1805, also in the more recent work of Mr. Ralfe, the "Royal Naval Biography."

prudence, in forbearing to avail himself of the advantage of attacking the approaching fleet: at the same time a proof is given of the evil effects arising from the silly custom of drawing up the marines in battle array upon the poop. Were they riflemen, and distributed where they could do most execution at the least risk, they would certainly contribute more effectually to success.

The conduct of Commodore Johnstone, and the discomfiture of his squadron, in Port Praya Bay, St. Jago, in 1781, as they contribute nothing to tactical information, are omitted.

A full account of this unfortunate affair by his own, and by different hands, may be seen in vol. xii. of the "Remembrancer."

Much may be gleaned from the work of Audibert Ramatuelle; but great allowances are necessary from the glaring partiality of his statements. British seamen will not be found to yield their assent to at least one erroneous assertion with which he has attempted to impose upon the credulity of his countrymen. Such an unblushing disregard to truth cannot be overlooked. In striving to prove the superiority of the French "*à l'abordage*," he has the following passage:—

"J'ai choisi quelques-uns des exemples les plus récents, qui prouvent notre supériorité à l'abordage, et qui attestent jusqu'à quel point *nos ennemis naturels* REDOUDENT ce genre d'attaque!!"

Of the four *proofs*, one is of the *Scipion* falling on board of the *London* in the first American war, and unaccountably suffered to escape; the next by L'Artisien driving on board the *Isis* in Port Praya Bay; the third, the capture of the *Sprightly* (Lougre Anglaise, de quatorze canons); and the last, the Ambuscade by the *Bayonaise*, overpowered by numerous troops!! (Cours Elémentaire, p. 349.) To reflect the greater credit on "Le Bailly de Souffrien," he has described the British squadron as *anchored with springs* in a line of defence, or "*embossée*." It is perfectly well known that it was *neglecting* to do this which led to the Commodore's misfortunes.

As a considerable *set-off* against the foregoing unfounded attack upon the character of British seamen, the *French* reader (for it must be sufficiently known to others) is invited to look into the account of the third expedition to Louisbourg, under Admiral Boscawen, Generals Amherst and Wolfe, 1758. In the twenty-fifth volume of the "Naval Chronicle" (p. 178) is, in the "Memoirs" of the services of the late Admiral Sir J. Laforey, a circumstantial detail of the operations there by land and sea; by which it will be seen that a resolution to capture or destroy the two remaining ships, and arrangements necessary for that

purpose were made by the Admiral upon the destruction by fire of the other three.*

Commanders Laforey and Balfour, with 600 subordinate officers and men, were selected for this service, who, with their usual unanimity and undaunted bravery, boarded from boats, with sword in hand, the *bows*, gangways, and quarters of the *Prudente*, of seventy-four, and the *Bienfaisant*, of sixty-four guns, making the forts and harbour re-echo with their cheers. From the difficulties of situation the *Prudente* grounded, and could not be brought away, but the *Bienfaisant* (called afterwards by the British sailors the *Bonny Pheasant*) was borne off in proud triumph, in spite of every effort of the enemy. She was long a favourite ship of her class in the British navy.

For examples "*plus récents*." "To whatever extent boarding and cutting out the enemy's vessels from under the forts, &c., may have been carried, Captain Nicholas Tomlinson believes he had the honour to set the example in the late war (in Europe at least), by cutting out a lugger in a *single boat in open daylight*, while lying within pistol shot of a battery, with the adjoining sand-hills covered with soldiers." (Naval Chronicle, vol. xxv. p. 93.)

The Naval Chronicle, and "James's Naval History," abound in proofs of daring enterprises of this, and of a still more extraordinary character; officers and men upon such occasions trying to outdo all former examples, however brilliant.

The most early of these feats of bravery which present themselves to the memory of the writer, are the boarding of the *Bien-venue* frigate, by Lieutenant Bowen, in the *guard-boat* of the *Boyne*, in Fort Royal, Bay of Martinique; the desperate recovery of the *Hermione* by the boats of the *Surprise*, under the present Sir Edward Hamilton; and the no less determined attack upon and capture of the *Chevrette*.

In the naval history of the war from 1793, by Mr. James, is a circumstantial account of no less than *one hundred and sixty-six proofs* of the falsehood of the Frenchman's assertion; all distinguished by the greatest bravery and entire devotion; plans deliberately formed, and carried into execution with the utmost heroism. Many of the instances related by Mr. James are not merely attacks by

* The late Vice Admiral Sir R. Onslow, who so nobly forced the Dutch line in the battle of Camperdown, distinguished himself upon this occasion.

Owing to the rather singular part of the ship by which it was his lot to scramble on board the enemy, some rather *unpleasant consequences attached* themselves to his person; this caused an *epithet* of an *unsavory* nature to be familiarly applied to him; which, as it originally *stuck*, adhered to him for the rest of his life!

boats on armed vessels afloat, but where it has not unfrequently happened that formidable forts or batteries were to be carried to secure their success, and under circumstances of peculiar difficulty and danger. Within the same period in which these memorable details are given, tending to show how truly the sons of Britain "*redoutent ce genre d'attaque*," are to be found not *more* than half-a-dozen instances of attempts to board, or of absolute success in boarding, by the enemy, and one of them, that of the Ambuscade by the Bayonnaise mentioned by Ramatuelle; in others their attacks have been powerfully resisted and overcome, the boarders having become the boarded and subdued.*

It is not for a work of this nature to enter into a description of exploits already told with so much spirit by the naval historian, for in every one of his six octavo volumes will be found most interesting details upon this subject; where the well-known names of Pellew, Sydney Smith, Richard Bowen, T. M. Hardy, P. Campbell, Cochrane, Coghlan, P. Carteret Sylvester, P. D. Broke, and a multitude of others may be found; and many who no longer live to enjoy the honourable fame attendant upon their deeds in arms, who fought, *hand to hand*, and gloriously fell, in that very mode of warfare they have been basely accused of holding in dread.

To readers who are not satisfied of the falsehood of this pretended claim to superiority, let them call to their recollection the attack upon *Teneriffe*, where the names of Nelson, Trowbridge, Hood, Thompson, Bowen, Fremantle, and Miller appear, all well known to and dreaded by the enemy; what was this but a deliberate and most desperate "*abordage*;" and marked too with circumstances of the deepest interest, to admire and to deplore!

Many other instances may be advanced, differing only in the degree of importance attached to them; while the same spirit and intrepidity distinguished their progress and success; such are the capture of Curaçoa by Sir Charles Brisbane, and of Banda, by Sir Christopher Cole. Nay, what was the *landing in Egypt*, but a descent, *en masse*, in defiance of a large French army drawn up with fifteen pieces of cannon to oppose it? The British army and navy steadily advanced in their boats eight miles, determined to rescue the country from their grasp; and made good their purpose, driving the enemy before them. Numbers were killed and drowned before a shot could be returned, and some, in jumping from the boats, leaped as it were upon their bayonets.† What was this but a

* The writer having seen a *boarding jacket*, which from its lightness, convenience, and apparent efficiency, seems very capable of adoption for services of this description, has given the inventor's account of it, in Appendix No. 2.

† See Walsh's "Campaign in Egypt."

most splendid display of that system of attack so frequently manifested by British troops and seamen, and which this boasting Frenchman would deny them even the courage to attempt !*.

Ramatuelle makes this charge even subsequent to this great event ; for his work is dated in 1802, and dedicated to the man who had deserted his army of Egypt for laurels more easily to be gained ; for nothing less than absolute power and universal dominion could glut his ambition.

THE HON. WILLIAM CORNWALLIS.

WHEN the Honourable William Cornwallis commanded the *Lion* of sixty-four guns ; having the *Bristol* of fifty, and the *Janus* of forty-four guns, under his orders, upon meeting with the squadron, under the celebrated *La Motte Piquet*, consisting of the *Hannibal*, *Diadem*, and another ship of seventy-

* “ The practice of detaching boats on a distant service, *out of the protection of the ship* (Lord Collingwood observes), are enterprises highly injurious to the public service, because they disable the ship from performing her real duty,” &c. &c.

“ The *Hydra* performed lately a very gallant thing against a great force. Three privateers, well armed, and a battery of four twenty-four-pounders, were taken, with the loss of one man ; but the ship and boats acted in concert, and in every part the skill and conduct of Captain Mundy was as conspicuous as the gallantry of his officers and men.” (Lord Collingwood’s Letter to Admiral Thornborough, p. 276.)

“ All our frigate Captains are great generals, and some in the brigs are good brigadiers. They have taken seven forts, garrisons, or castles, within the last two months ; and scaling towers at midnight, and storming redoubts at mid-day, are becoming familiar occurrences. The enemy cannot stand a galling fire from the launch’s carronade, or a sharp fire of grape and musketry from the jolly-boat. It is really astonishing.” (Lord Collingwood, p. 467.)

“ The *Spartan*, *Amphion*, and others, have taken and blown up three fortified places. *Stewart*, in the *Seahorse*, and the *Halcyon* brig, took two small islands, in which were fortified forts and towns ; *Alceste* and *Cyané* three towers by escalade at midnight ; and the *Scout*, not to be behind hand, divided his force, and making a brisk attack with his boats in front, stormed a French work in the rear, and brought down seven vessels out of the port.” (Correspondence, p. 468.)

The names of the Captains of the ships mentioned are, Sir *Jahleel Brenton*, Sir *Wm. Hoste*, Sir *Murray Maxwell*, Sir *Thomas Staines*, Captain *H. W. Pearse*, and Captain *Raitt*.

“ The morning of the 1st of November (1809) we burnt the convoy, which had escaped into *Rosas Bay*. The attack was highly spirited ; there were five armed ships and vessels amongst them, moored under the protection of the castle and strong batteries. They were boarded by the boats, carried in a short time sword in hand, and all on fire. We lost sixteen men, and had between fifty and sixty wounded. The loss of the enemy was great,” &c. (Correspondence, p. 488.)

four guns,* the *Reflechi* of sixty-four, and the *Amphion* of fifty; and one of Commodore Cornwallis's ships being in danger to leeward, he bore down to her support; and, uniting his force, resisted the attack of the heavy ships of the enemy: the *Ruby* of sixty-four guns, and the *Pomona* and *Niger* frigates afterwards appearing in sight (that is, on the following morning) the enemy made off.

When officers have thus considered it their duty to risk all for the protection of one, how can it be presumed that any will ever think of leaving three of their ships to the mercy of the enemy, without risking something; particularly when they may be, at last, compelled to fight, with their force thus diminished, or so far separated, as to be beyond the reach of mutual assistance?

Upon the manner of rendering support to the rear, when exposed to the attack of a superior force from the windward, reference may again be made to Sir Edward Hughes. In retiring before the enemy, he skilfully collected his little force, so as effectually to prevent his rear from being cut off; even the sternmost ship, that was so considerably separated from the rest. With intelligent British seamen, alive to their own reputation, and to the honour and interest of their country, there can be no question as to the conduct to be pursued. Under this persuasion it is confidently left to their decision.

In this affair, Sir Manley Dixon was first Lieutenant of the *Bristol*, commanded by the Honourable (now Sir) Thomas Pakenham,

The *Janus*, with her Captain (Glover) lying dead in the cabin, was, on the second morning of this contest, considerably to leeward; and sustained the heavy fire of the French ships in a most gallant manner, supported by the *Lion* and *Bristol*. The *Bristol* had fired away all her powder, and was supplied with more from the *Lion*; and, when every moment it was expected that the *Janus* must fall, or sink under the overpowering fire of the enemy, a grape-shot from that ship struck M. La Motte Piquet on the breast; when his ship made all sail away, followed by the rest of the French squadron. The late Admiral G. H. Stephens was first Lieutenant of the *Janus*, and fought the ship.

During the time Lieutenant Dixon remained on board the *Lion* to receive the supply of powder, he was charged with the thanks of Captain Cornwallis to Captain Pakenham, for the gallant and able support he had given him against

* "The *Amphion* was seen to enter Cape Francois with the convoy which La Motte Piquet had in charge, and did not rejoin the French Admiral."

In Sir Peter Parker's account of this affair (to be found in the *Political Magazine* for 1780), it is stated, that Captain Cornwallis, upon being reinforced on the morning of the 22d, chased the French Admiral for five hours.

such a superior force; at the same time, a hasty "Memorandum" was issued to the squadron, expressive of his approbation of their conduct, and of his firm persuasion that none of his Majesty's ships, under his orders, would "be *given away*!"

A trait of professional skill and undaunted resolution was shown by the present Rear Admiral Tollemache, when he commanded a seventy-four gun ship, watching the motions of the enemy's fleet at Toulon in the last war.

The French fleet had that day ventured out of port to exercise; and, favoured by the wind, the van had so considerably advanced upon the in-shore squadron of British ships, as to bring into danger of being cut-off a frigate and a sloop of war. This was immediately seen by Admiral Tollemache (then Captain Halliday), who instantly ran his ship between the line-of-battle ships of the enemy and his two little friends, and rescued them from destruction: his conduct excited the admiration of the whole British fleet, in sight, but at too great a distance to support him.

A similar act and in the same place occurred a second time, when the present Sir Waller Otway interposed in the Ajax, seventy-four, and rescued the Sheerwater from destruction. (See the very interesting memoir of that able and enterprising officer in "Ralfe's Royal Naval Biography.")

HONOURABLE W. CORNWALLIS WITH A SMALL SQUADRON.

Extracts from the letter of Captain Cornwallis, taken from the 10th volume of the "Remembrancer."

It appears to have been written to Sir Peter Parker, then Commander-in-Chief at Jamaica: and the force to which he was opposed, a squadron under the orders of Mons. Terney.

" H. M. ship *Lion*, off Cape Francois, July 14th, 1780.

" Sir,

" On the 9th of June, the convoy having past through the Gulph of Florida, and got as far to the northward as twenty-nine degrees thirty minutes, Captain Inglis made the signal to separate. We parted company accordingly, and proceeded on, pursuant to your orders, with the *Lion*, *Sultan*, *Hector*,

Fig. 1.




Fig. 2.




Fig.3.





Fig. 4.



Bristol, Ruby, and Niger. On the 20th, at one p. m., the wind S.S.E., standing to the eastward, the Niger, a-head, made the signal for a general chase. We soon perceived they were a convoy standing across us to the N. N. W.; but upon seeing us, they hauled up towards us; some large ships stretching a-head of the rest, particularly two that were much advanced; who, as soon as the Hector and Niger came near them, wore, and edged down to join the others. About half-past four, being pretty near, and perceiving seven two-decked ships (Plate XII, Fig. 1) drawing into a line; besides some others that were with the convoy, and some frigates; I made the signal for the line on the starboard tack; the enemy being upon the larboard tack (Fig. 1); their convoy being about two or three miles upon their starboard quarter; and some two-decked ships and frigates carrying a press of sail to join the other seven.

“The Ruby was so far to leeward, that the enemy would have weathered her. She was therefore obliged to tack. (Fig. 2.) I then made the signal to ware, and form the line upon the larboard tack; the same the enemy were upon; and edged down to support the Ruby, and prevent their weathermost ships getting between her and us. The enemy kept edging off, and forming their line; but did not fire, although within gun-shot.” (See Plates XII. and XIII.)

“About half-past five, perceiving we had pushed the French ships sufficiently to leeward, to enable the Ruby, who was upon our lee bow, to join us, I made her signal to tack. The enemy then hoisted their colours, and began to fire: their leading ship had a broad pendant; and their third ship, which commanded, and was a-breast of the Lion, a flag at the mizen-top-mast head; all the others common white pendants.” (Plate XIII, Fig. 3.)

“As soon as the Ruby had fetched into the rear of our line and tacked, the enemy tacked, headmost first, and the rest in succession, keeping their line; and those leading upon the starboard, that led before upon the larboard tack; they fired as they passed our ships, but at a great distance. When they got the length of our rear, about seven in the evening, they bore up, and joined their convoy.”

(In Plate XIII, Fig. 4,—A, is the Ruby; B, the British squadron; F, seven French line-of-battle ships, hauled out from the rest; G, the convoy, attended by two or three ships of the line, and some frigates.)

“This fleet I believe consisted of fourteen men of war, ten or eleven of which were two-decked ships, and three or four frigates; the rest were merchant ships or transports, a cutter, &c.; the whole from forty-four to forty-seven sail,” &c.

“A random shot killed the coxswain, and wounded a marine on board the

Lion; one man was wounded on board the Bristol: the Ruby, by passing between the two lines, was more exposed to the enemy's fire than the other ships, and had one killed and three wounded, and her jib-boom shot away.

"The whole is a matter of small importance; but I thought it my duty to inform you of every particular, for fear of misrepresentations, as the enemy are sometimes not very correct in their accounts," &c.

"I am to lament my ill fortune, that, after having been entrusted by you with the command of five such ships, and a frigate, I should again* meet the enemy so strong, as to prevent our being able to attempt any thing against them."

ADMIRAL GRAVES'S BATTLE OFF THE CHESAPEAK,

September 5th, 1781.

Extract of a Letter from Admiral Graves.

"THE moment the wind served to carry the ships over the bar, which was buoyed for the purpose, the squadron came out. Sir Samuel Hood getting under way at the same time, the fleet proceeded together to the southward.

"The wind being rather favourable, we approached the Chesapeak the morning of the 5th of September; when the advanced ship made the signal of a fleet. We soon discovered a number of great ships at anchor, extended across the entrance of the Chesapeak, from Cape Henry to the middle ground. As we approached, the whole got under sail and stretched out to sea, with the wind at N. N. E.

"As we drew nearer I formed the line, first a-head, and then in such a manner as to bring his Majesty's fleet nearly parallel to the line of approach of the enemy; and when I found that our van was advanced as far as the shoal of the middle ground would admit of, I wore the fleet, and brought it upon the same tack with the enemy.

* This refers to his meeting with a superior force under La Motte Piquet on a former cruise.

Fig. 1.





Fig. 2.



" So soon as I judged that our van would be able to operate, I made the signal to bear away and approach, and soon after to engage the enemy close.

" Somewhat after four, the action began amongst the headmost ships, pretty close, and soon became general as far as the second ship from the centre towards the rear. The van of the enemy bore away, to enable the centre to support them, or they would have been cut up.

" The centre of the enemy continued to *bear up as it advanced*,* and at that moment seemed to have little more in view than to shelter their own van, as it went away before the wind," &c.

Here at sun-set the engagement ended. His Majesty's fleet consisted of nineteen sail of the line ; that of the French twenty-four. Many of the British fleet suffered very severely upon this occasion ; justifying all that has been said upon such a mode of attack from the windward position.

OBSERVATIONS.

If the British Admiral could not have attacked the French fleet before it could be formed into line, he would have had a much greater prospect of success had he done so when in position Fig. 2, and with his van and centre made an attack on their rear.

By this mode, a superior would have been brought to act against an inferior force ; calling as many ships to his assistance as he thought necessary ; while the van of the enemy would have been left unoccupied.

By the plan adopted, the fleet was *certain* to suffer very materially, without any probable chance of a compensation ; while, at the same time, the British Admiral might have flattered himself that he had *broken* the enemy's line, and compelled him to fly before the wind ! Mr. Clerk has described this action in four Figures.

Plate XIV, Fig. 1, A, the French fleet at anchor.

F, the French fleet drawn out into line.

B, the British fleet bearing down.

Figs. 1 and 2, show the modes proposed ; Fig. 2, the van and part of the centre bear down to attack the centre and rear of the enemy. The rest stand

* The centre of the enemy is described as having "*bore up as it advanced*;" meaning, that the centre having advanced to the support of its van, engaged with the van of the British fleet, then *kept away* from the wind, increasing its distance from the British fleet ; having given its fire in passing, and not wishing to expose itself to closer action. (See Clerk's Plate IX, Fig. 4.)

on under a press of sail to support the attack, and to keep the van of the enemy in check.

It clearly appears that had a proper attention been paid to signals, and that the *east and west line* had been occupied by the fleet (Fig. 1), the battle must have been more general.

To make sail after, and follow in the *wake* of your *leader*, was then considered to be forming the *line of battle*! Where you chase in line, with *the enemy a-head of you*, it may carry you up with him; but that is *not* to form the *line of battle* against a fleet drawn up *in line to leeward*; as in Fig. 1, Plate XIV.

It was the prevailing custom in those days, to consider that any considerable fleet of an enemy could only be approached in a *regular line of battle* equally extended with that of their opponent: had a less formal and deliberate mode of proceeding been adopted upon this occasion, a much better effect might probably have been produced. Unfortunately, the fate of Mathews and of Byng was still fresh in the recollection of our naval Commanders; and as in those cases, disgrace or punishment alike awaited both the daring and the cautious, the conducting of a fleet in the presence of an enemy became a duty at once perilous and perplexing.

By a log of the proceedings of the fleet, taken on board the London (the flagship of Admiral Graves), it appears that the French were discovered at half-past nine a. m. in the S. W.—wind at N. N. E.; and at ten, Cape Henry was seen at the distance of six leagues. At eleven, the enemy's large ships hove in sight at an anchor; when the signal was made for the line of battle a-head, at two cables' length asunder.

It is here with deference submitted, that the signal at this time should have been for a *general chase*; then to clear for action, and to engage the enemy on arriving up with him. By these measures, the headmost of the British fleet would most likely have brought to close action the most advanced of the enemy, and have thrown the rest, not yet under way, into disorder. The British ships, as they drew near to the leading ships of the enemy, should ware and close with them (either to windward or to leeward) on the same tack; and the remainder following in close succession, a desperate attack might have been made upon their van, at that time beyond the reach of assistance from their rear, unable to

clear the anchorage, and not in a situation to form in line for a regular defence (See Plate XV.) The success of such an attack depends entirely upon the promptitude and vigour of the execution.*

FROM THE LONDON'S LOG.

At one, signal for an east and west line, at one cable.

At two, the van distant three miles. The enemy twenty-four sail.

At fifteen min. past two, the fleet veered together, and brought to, to let the centre of the enemy come a-breast of the British centre.

At forty-six min. past three, signal for a line a-head, at one cable, and for the fleet to bear down, and engage their opponents.

At forty-nine min. past three, repeated the signal to engage.

At eleven min. past four, hauled down the signal for the line a-head, that it might not interfere with the signal to engage close.

At twenty-two min. past four, hoisted again the signal for line a-head, the ships not being sufficiently extended.

At twenty min. past five, repeated signal for close action.

At half-past five, Rear Admiral Sir Samuel Hood bore down towards the enemy.

At half-past six, the firing ceased on both sides.

In a note it is said, the rear bore down at half-past five, but not near enough to engage before dusk. In the van and centre 336 men were killed and wounded, and sixteen guns dismounted; in the rear none, and no damage received.

Soon after two p. m., when the van of the French bore *south* of the London, three miles, the British fleet wore together, and placed themselves on the same tack with the enemy: but it was not until a quarter past four p. m. that the engagement commenced in the van and centre, and half-past five when the rear division (Sir Samuel Hood's) bore down into action; and it appears that much difficulty was experienced by the Admiral in getting some of his ships to keep their stations, and great dilatoriness on the part of the rear division in

* The mode suggested in a note upon Rodney's rencontre with the French fleet, to windward of Martinique, might also be applied to an attack of this nature:—namely, by laying the enemy on board, to disable him.

obeying his signals and closing with the enemy. At half-past six the firing ceased on both sides; the rear division having been very little, if at all, engaged; not one of the ships under Sir Samuel Hood having suffered by the loss of a single man in killed or wounded.

In the "Political Magazine" for 1782, it is said of this affair, that the "*Souverain*," the flag-ship of de Grasse, was entangled with the shore in four fathoms water in getting under way at ten in the morning.

"If Admiral Graves, upon first seeing the enemy, had pushed into the bay, as the wind was perfectly fair for him, he would have found the French fleet in the utmost confusion," &c.

"He also might have taken up the anchorage there at the mouth of York River in a strong position. He would also have found some ships of war of the enemy there, and been at hand to support Lord Cornwallis.

"Even after the action he might have attempted to gain the Chesapeak; but this, after five days, de Grasse prevented by going back there himself.

"De Grasse, with his fleet, had to *turn* out of the bay, and were in great irregularity, struggling with the shore and shoals of Lynhaven Bay."


In the "Political Magazine" for 1782, is much naval information, with anecdotes, &c.


Plate XV. shows the British fleet B, supposed under a press of sail, bearing down to attack the van of the enemy.

SIR SAMUEL (LORD) HOOD, AT ST. CHRISTOPHER'S,
February, 1782.

Extract of Sir Samuel Hood's Letter.

"AT day-light of the 25th, we plainly discovered thirty-three sail of the enemy's ships; twenty-nine of which, of two decks, formed in a line a-head. I made every appearance of an attack, which threw Count de Grasse a little from





the shore ; and as I thought I had a fair prospect of gaining the anchorage he left, and well knowing it was the only chance I had of saving the island, if it was to be saved, I pushed for it, and succeeded, by having my rear and part of my centre engaged.

“ The enemy gave a preference to Commodore Affleck ; but he kept up so noble a fire, and was so supported by his seconds, Captain Cornwallis and Lord Robert Manners, that the loss and damages sustained in those ships were but trifling, and they very much preserved the other ships in the rear,” &c.

“ Would the event of a battle have determined the fate of the Island, I would without hesitation have attacked the enemy,” &c.

“ I anchored His Majesty’s squadron in a close line a-head. Next morning, about eight o’clock, I was attacked from van to rear with the whole force of the enemy (twenty-nine sail) for nearly two hours, without having the least visible impression made upon my line. The French ships then wore and stood off again ; and in the afternoon began a second attack upon my centre and rear, with no better success than before ; since which the Count de Grasse has kept a safe distance.”

See the Plates XVI. and XVII.

OBSERVATIONS.

This was, no doubt, a most skilful and gallant attempt to recover the Island of St. Christopher’s ; but had the Count de Grasse possessed the talents and enterprise of his opponent, he would have made him pay dearly, for having, with a force so inferior, taken up the anchorage so lately occupied by the French fleet ; and which, “ feeling the situation disadvantageous,” they had quitted.

The French Admiral, to have struck a decisive blow, should have made his attack upon the van (being the windward end of the line), by anchoring against it in double force, and on the *outside* of his enemy : having succeeded in the van, he would then have turned his attention to the centre and rear ; and left, as his superiority allowed, a sufficient number of ships under way, to watch their motions and prevent their escape.

To anchor on the outside of the British line was expedient (rather than to *double* upon it, as in the battle of the Nile), the better to prevent any escape to sea ; the land side being at that time equally hostile to the British fleet.

If, with the island in possession of the French, the Count de Grasse, so superior in force (twenty-nine to twenty-two sail of the line), considered his position in Basseterre Road “ untenable,” what might it have been deemed to a hostile fleet

of so unequal a number? This enterprise displayed in an eminent degree the skill and intrepidity of the British Admiral; whose conduct far surpassed that of any of his predecessors, and formed a brilliant contrast to the ostentatious manœuvring of the Count de Grasse.

In "A Short Account of the Naval Actions of last War, by an Officer," published in 1788, are the following remarks.

"The placing of our fleet at anchor was most judicious; the ships occupying the whole space from the salt-pans, at the head of the Bay, to the outer part of Basseterre Road; the van ship being anchored so near the shore, that it would be impossible for the enemy to weather her; and so nearly upon the edge of the bank, that the enemy's fleet could not anchor without it; and beyond the range of a shell from the batteries at Basseterre, at this time in the enemy's possession.

"This brilliant manœuvre was at once so mortifying and distressing to the enemy, that Monsieur de Grasse seemed determined the following morning to try the weight of his fleet against the advantage of position, and came on accordingly, his van ship leading with the greatest gallantry."

If such were the case, as to the nature of the ground occupied by the British fleet, it was not in the power of the French fleet to have attacked it by anchoring; and the skill and ability of the British Admiral are strikingly displayed.

Plate XVI. shows Sir Samuel Hood's action at St. Christopher's, February 1782. British, twenty-two sail of the line and five frigates. French, thirty-three.

A, the British fleet standing for the anchorage.

B, the van of the British fleet having come to anchor with springs, prepared to act on the defensive.


C, the rear of the British fleet under Commodore Affleck, with part of the centre, sustaining, while coming to an anchor, an attack from the enemy.

Plate XVII., the ships having anchored with springs, presents their starboard broadsides to the French fleet.

F, the first attack from van to rear.

F, G, the second attack, upon the centre and rear.

C, the Alfred, Canada, and Resolution; having before anchored too far to leeward, and near the edge of the bank, outside of which there is no anchorage. By the judicious position of these ships the British line was flanked, and the rear greatly protected.



Ramatuelle says of this affair, that the British fleet being but very *feebly defended by batteries on shore*, at the extremities of its line, might have been attacked with ease by ships in perpetual succession, on the rear ; and recommends a line of approach, by which they would avoid exposure to the fire of the line in general, and direct their whole force successively upon the three or four sternmost ships. The island being *in possession of the enemy*, the British fleet could receive *no support or defence whatever* from the land side. (See *Cours Élémentaire*, p. 475.)

THE account of these memorable transactions may here be closed by an Extract from a

JOURNAL OF THE CAPTURE AND RECOVERY OF NEVIS.

The surrender took place on the 20th of January, 1782. It was taken possession of by the Viscount d'Escars, Captain of the *Glorieux*.

Note.—The “*Narrows*,” so frequently mentioned in this narrative, is the long, rocky, and intricate channel which separates Nevis from St. Christopher's.

January 23d, 1782 —Sir Samuel Hood at anchor under Antigua ; look-out vessels continually sent out by the French Admiral to reconnoitre to windward, and returning with different signals. The *Iris* in particular goes out of our road every morning, stretches far to windward, and returns every evening about sunset. Towards evening the English fleet was plainly seen getting under way. The *Iris*, in returning this evening (rather in a hurry I presume), ran plump on shore on the reef above our fort. After sticking about an hour, she fired signals of distress, which were answered by the *Glorieux*, who sent boats to her assistance ; and, by throwing her guns overboard, she got off about day-light, and made the best of her way to St. Kitt's.

January 24th.—Just before day-light the *Glorieux* slipped her cable and stood for St. Kitt's, leaving the English flag flying at one fort, and taking every Frenchman off the island. The dawn discovered the English fleet nearly in to windward of the island ; about thirty sail, large and small. About seven o'clock a. m. two English frigates were so far a-head of the fleet as to be a-breast of our

fort. A large French cutter standing from the southward, stood close to them, taking them for French; but a broadside from one of them soon undeceived her, and she immediately struck; which we considered as a favourable omen of what might follow. This happened in the face of the French fleet in Basseterre; and four heavy frigates were immediately dispatched, on whose approach our scouts retired towards our fleet with their prize. When this happened I had got up to a fine look-out, which commanded all Basseterre Bay to leeward, and a great range to windward: and here was soon collected a large company both of men and women.

About one p. m. the van of Hood's fleet hove in sight, advancing very slowly, and sometimes lying-to. The French having yet formed no regular line, we conclude they mean to come out; they have always lain in great confusion in Basseterre road, three or four deep. About three p. m. the French began to move, and were all under way before sun-set, standing towards Hood with an easy sail. Towards evening Hood tacked and stood up to the southward, seemingly retiring, and the French following boldly: a mortifying sight this to us all, and the occasion of many uneasy conjectures during an anxious night.

January 25th, Friday.—Both fleets to leeward of the island, but the English much better in with the land, about three leagues off. The frigates of the two fleets pretty near each other, at least some of them. The English seemingly endeavouring to get still more to windward, and the French appearing to work with uncertainty and irregularity. About ten a. m., on a signal from the Admiral, five or six sail of the English van made sail a-head in a regular line; but another signal called them back again, the French working up to get nearer. About one p. m. the English Admiral again made his signal for a line a-head, which was formed with the greatest expedition and regularity. As they got to their stations they made sail a-head towards St. Kitts, keeping as close to Nevis' shore as the water would permit; the frigates within them. Our whole line was formed in less than an hour, each ship in her exact distance. The French immediately formed their line also a-head, but in a very irregular manner; and *bore down** diagonally towards our centre, with a view probably to cut off our rear. About half-past two the Ville de Paris, being the seventh ship from the French van, fired about three single shots, probably to try the range of his guns; which were taken no notice of. At about three o'clock the French Admiral began in earnest, seeming to direct his fire at the sixth ship from our rear. He was imme-

* This must be intended for "*hauled up*," the French fleet being to leeward. As the observer was not a seaman, he might not know the distinction.

diately followed by about thirteen or fourteen of his ships nearest to him a-head and a-stern. This being returned by the six or seven of our rear, a most dreadful cannonade ensued, which spread by degrees to about the twelfth ship from our rear. But the heaviest of the French fire fell on our three last ships; for whose fate we trembled, as they had the fire of twelve or fourteen of the enemy on them at once: yet they never moved an inch out of the line, but kept their stations and distances as steadily as if they had been at anchor; at the same time we could distinctly perceive they shot a-head of the enemy. Some of our centre seemed at this time to edge down a little to take off part of the French fire, while our van made more sail to reach St. Kitt's, which our whole fleet happily effected before sun-set. The heat of this action lasted about an hour and a half; after which the fire subsided by degrees. During this action there were about seven sail of the French line which kept a-stern of the rest the whole time; they were probably some of their worst ships, and ordered to keep that station till wanted. The steadiness of our whole line was truly admirable; not one of our ships seemed to deviate a single foot from her station. One small armed ship of ours was frequently between the two fleets on all tacks, and seemed to court unnecessary danger. She was once a-ground, and had frequently the fire of three or four of the line on her, and their shot we could see fall round her like showers of hail; yet she had not a sail or yard hurt. During the engagement the Solebay frigate ran on shore. Several French ships kept firing on her in this distress, and the Captain returned it; but, finding she must inevitably fall into the enemy's hands, Captain Everett set fire to her and quitted her. She burnt for an hour or more, and blew up about eight o'clock with a most tremendous report; having 160 barrels of powder on board. The reverberation from the mountain was like distant thunder. This awful explosion seemed a characteristic conclusion to this memorable day. The action happened so near our shore, that the shot from the French fleet (which was the outer line) came in some places above half a mile on shore; but fortunately did no damage. I have two in my possession which weigh forty pounds each. The whole was minutely seen from all the lee-side of the island; and had it been a representation calculated for the entertainment of the company where I was, it would have begun on the very spot it did. After the crew quitted the Solebay, they came to town; and, their road lying through this fort, they lowered our flag, and hoisted it again, to retake the island as they called it. Hearing the captain and crew were in town, I went thither. When it was proposed by some unthinking people that he might with his crew easily take possession of the island, he or one of his officers (the latter I think) said "it was of more consequence to His Majesty's service to join

the English fleet with his men, than to take such a *paltry island*." He took possession therefore of two vessels in the road, and carried with him as many of his people as he could collect; but before he went off it seems he was prevailed on to leave a letter for the President, demanding a surrender of the island to His Britannic Majesty; which was to be delivered by his lieutenant next morning.

The small ship which behaved so gallantly, or rather rashly, was (it seems) the Amazon privateer, of London, Captain Hughes, who came down with the English fleet.

January 26th, Saturday.—We observed the French fleet (which had lain-to near the land during the night, making many signals with rockets and false fires), forming in a regular line a-head, and standing with a leading breeze towards the English, who were at anchor in a line, or rather crescent, under Green Point at St. Kitt's; extending to sea so as to cut off the communication with Basseterre road; their frigates lying nearer in. As the French bore down, the wind headed them a little, so as to prevent their reaching our van. The leading ship of the French stood on with amazing steadiness and resolution, and advanced considerably farther than the rest. She kept on advancing till the fire of our line opened upon her, which seemed visibly to stagger her: the fire of the whole line opening in a manner at once, was truly awful: it resembled loud rolling thunder, and was incessant for nearly two hours. The whole French line followed their leader, but none came so near to the English line: the difference among them was very distinguishable in this respect; some luffing up and endeavouring to get as close as possible, while others apparently edged out of the heat of our fire. The *Ville de Paris* on this occasion set a fair example to the rest of the fleet. The action lasted near two hours, during most part of which the cannonade was dreadful. The heat of it fell again on the fifth or sixth ships composing our rear. As the French got out of action, they wore and stood again to the southward, and afterwards tacked and formed the line a-head and stood again towards our line. During this interval Sir Samuel Hood had strengthened the rear of his line considerably, by moving some of his heaviest ships, and placing them in the intervals of the others; so that the line was in a manner double in the rear, where he had reason to expect the weight of the enemy's attack, as they could not weather his van.

About two p. m. the French made a second attempt, when six or seven of the French van attacked our rear; two of them seemed to us to luff up very gallantly, almost so as to double round it; but the fire from our rear was now so terrible,

and particularly the *Barfleur's*, that they soon bore away and stood up to the southward; when they lay-to for the night.

This third action seemed but a feeble attempt of the French, who were much further to leeward, and did not appear very anxious to get nearer; probably some of them were a good deal hurt in the two former.

Lieutenant Hare, of the *Solebay*, went down to the English fleet this morning, with as many of the remainder of his crew as he could find; the President having refused any *voluntary* surrender of the island to Captain Everett's letter; and informing Mr. Hare that he was to act as he thought proper, but that our oath of neutrality put it out of our power to take any *active* part in such a business, however desirous we must of course be to return under the British government.

January 27th, Sunday.—The French fleet at day-light two or three leagues to leeward of this island. As the day advanced they made sail, in a line a-head towards the English line; but when the leading ship was nearly within shot, they all on signal lay-to, and so continued to do the whole day, with boats passing between them. We could perceive that several of them had suffered much in their hulls. The *Ville de Paris* in particular had many plugs and patches near or below her coppering. There were men on stages over her bows, and others in boats alongside at work the whole day: other ships had also stages over, and many holes patched. In the afternoon two of their frigates came pretty near our line and lay-to; but two or three of ours being dispatched through the line to speak with them, they brushed off with much haste. The whole French fleet swagged away so far to leeward to-day, that we imagined they were going to anchor at St. Eustatia. A large ship of the line joined them from the southward in the afternoon, full of signals; which appeared to be a fresh ship. Some bombs were this day thrown from the French batteries against Brimstone Hill, and some guns fired from the Hill. From Tysons we could distinguish the large encampment of the French, and see every mortar fired.

This day was very squally; the French fleet in much disorder; and had the English thought proper to attack them, many of their ships would have found it difficult to keep the line.

It was learnt from pretty good authority that a Council of War was this day held by Count de Grasse, in order to consult on again attacking Hood; when he proposed to bring his fleet to an anchor alongside the English, and make one desperate effort; but he had only ten captains who approved his

scheme. This accounts in some manner for the apparent confusion in their fleet this day.

January 28th, Monday.—The French fleet at day-light about four leagues to leeward, lying-to; during the forenoon sometimes working up to windward; at other times lying-to. About noon the body of the fleet, something near thirty-one sail, in sight; one of their frigates much to windward of the rest. Under easy sail the whole day, and falling again to leeward towards the evening.

This day 700 regulars, being all the effectives General Prescott brought down with him, were landed under cover of the frigates at Frigate and Potatoe Bays. The French had a body of men posted on the hills above them, 400 or 500.

About one p. m., the General detached 400 to dislodge them; who performed this service with gallantry, though their march was all up hill, and through thick shrubs and prickly pears. This action was very smart while it lasted; but the French gave way and retired in great disorder to Basseterre. We lost about seventeen killed, forty-seven wounded, and seven missing. Among the killed, two Captains (Ross and Elliott); and Captain Smith desperately wounded, with four or five others. General Prescott made an attempt to march towards Basseterre; but a large detachment from the French camp being on their way towards him (about 3000, headed by the Marquis de Bouilli and Count Dillon), he retreated and retired across Frigate Bay to St. Timothy's Hill. The French detachment arrived at Frigate Bay towards evening, and made Dupuis Estate their head-quarters.

The loss of the French not exactly known; but it is supposed that they had between 200 and 300 killed and wounded.

January 29th, Tuesday.—At day-light, thirty-four sail, including frigates, about two leagues and a half from our island, standing towards St. Kitt's (they must have worked toward windward all night). About seven a. m. they tacked and stood to the southward under their topsails; manœuvring the whole day to keep their ground. Towards evening four large sail were seen towards the south. They have probably been joined in the night by some fresh ships, as the four seem standing towards Martinico, and are likely to be disabled ships going to refit.

The French troops, though so numerous, did not think proper to attack ours on the hill, who were glad to retire quietly down the other side, and re-embarked in the evening from Friers Bay.

January 30th, Wednesday.—The French fleet in the morning (thirty-three sail), tolerably well in with the land, and standing towards our line pretty

regularly. About ten a. m. they all hoisted their colours, when we expected another attack. The headmost ships stood on, and the two or three leaders being within shot of the rear of our line, the *Barfleur* and some of the rest fired a few shot at them; which the French did not return, but wore and stood up to the southward again, as was their constant practice. We could perceive the English shot fall considerably over them.

January 31st, Thursday.—The French fleet manœuvring as usual, but it having blown hard all last night, they were further to leeward than usual. Only twenty-eight sail in sight, including frigates.

The French had generally two sail of the line watering at Old Road all the while Sir Samuel Hood staid at St. Kitt's; and it was to protect these that they kept hovering so near him. They frequently also detached ships and frigates to windward; probably for repairs, or supplies; or to look out; and were joined by others in their room, which occasioned an almost daily difference of their number in sight.

Sir Samuel Hood used to send his boats up in the night for water to Nevis unperceived I suppose by the French, who might easily have prevented it. Thus the French were supplied with water at an English Island, and the English at a French island, in spite of, and in fact in view of, each other. Sir Samuel Hood had also an armed schooner generally lying in the narrows, sounding, and looking out to windward occasionally.

February 1st, Friday.—The French fleet well in with the land this morning: twenty-seven sail employed as yesterday.

About an hour before sun-set we were much surprised to see two English frigates standing up from Sir Samuel Hood's line. They passed by our road and kept close to the land, under a press of sail, standing to windward in sight of the whole French fleet. About eleven p. m., several guns were heard to the southward and windward of the island; which we fear was owing to some pursuit of those ships by the French. This day an armed ship came through the narrows with signals, and safely joined Sir Samuel Hood.

The two frigates which went to windward were the *Fortunée* and *Convert*, with the English troops for Antigua. They were chased the whole night and part of the next day, by two frigates and two of the line: they exchanged some broadsides with the headmost frigate; and the *Convert* would have been taken by an eighty-four, which was close up with her, had not the *Fortunée* lain-to, and received the ship's fire while the *Convert* got away. The people of Antigua say that both frigates must inevitably have been taken by the French eighty-four, if he had had good pilots on board; as they escaped by keeping so near

the reefs, that the Frenchman was afraid to follow, though there was no real danger.

General Prescott was not in these ships, but went through the narrows in an armed brig, and was chased into Montserrat, and did not arrive at Antigua till some days after.

The ship which went through the narrows was the *Tisiphone* fire-ship, express from Admiral Kempenfelt, with an account of the dispersion of Vaudreuil's fleet.

February 2d, Saturday.—The French fleet well in with the land; twenty-seven sail. About noon a very fast-sailing armed brig left the Admiral, and stood close into the opening of the narrows. She then tacked and stood along our road with a boat out; and, being close in, she sent her boat and cut out a schooner belonging to Mr. Ross, and carried her off to the French Admiral. Two English frigates from Sir Samuel Hood's line made sail after her, but too late.

It appears since, that Count de Grasse ordered this, as Mr. Ross's schooner was one of the vessels in which Captain Everett joined the English fleet the day after the engagement.

February 3d, Sunday.—The French fleet standing off and on, as yesterday; but the number increased to thirty-three sail, including frigates. In the afternoon they were joined by about twelve sail of small craft from windward, probably with supplies.

February 4th, 5th, 6th.—The French fleet constantly working and tacking as usual, sometimes near in, and sometimes farther off, as the wind favoured them, or not.

February 7th, Thursday.—The French fleet working as usual, but as near our shore as the water would permit. A schooner being dispatched this morning from the English fleet to go through the narrows, the French sent two fast-sailing brigs quite into the passage after her, and took her: their whole fleet standing near our line to cover in case of need. The schooner might easily have put back, or run on shore.

It seems to have been a Spanish prize, which had fallen into Sir Samuel Hood's hands as he lay at anchor; mistaking his fleet for the French.

February 8th, Friday, and Saturday, 9th.—The French fleet working as usual.

February 10th, Sunday.—The French fleet as near shore as possible; about ten a. m. a seventy-four lay-to close off our fort. In the forenoon they were joined from leeward by two sail of the line, clean ships, with many signals flying.

They proved to be the *Triomphant*, of eighty-four, and the *Brave*, of seventy-

four; the only ships which kept their course after Kempenfelt's affair. Mons. Vaudreuil was on board the Triomphant.

February 11th, Monday.—The French fleet well to the southward, with a detachment of five or six still more to windward, nearly as far as Redondo.

February 12th, Tuesday.—They kept lower down, but several still to windward, seemingly on the look out.

February 13th, Wednesday.—The French fleet were joined by another ship of the line, and about ten store-ships from windward. About nine this morning we first discovered a white flag on Brimstone Hill, by some thought to have a red cross on it. Under this state of suspense and agitation we continued the whole day and night. This was truly a period of the utmost anxiety. In the evening two boats from Hood's fleet came up for water, which knew nothing of the surrender; this gave us hopes, though we knew that the flag on the hill could not be seen from Hood's line.

February 14th, Thursday.—At day-light perceived plainly the French fleet were standing for our road with a view to anchor. By noon the whole were anchored, though some of them came to almost as far up as Long Point, in very foul ground. They consisted of one three-decker, thirty two-deckers, six or eight frigates; in all about fifty sail; though two of their ships seemed only armed en flute. We sent off a deputation to wait on Count de Grasse, who returned with a demand for 50 cattle and 300 sheep, and as much poultry, greens, &c. as possible, to be ready by to-morrow morning.

We now first learned for certain that Brimstone Hill capitulated on Tuesday night, after a breach being made in the walls, and two additional batteries being ready to open against it. The Council dispatched orders for the stock to be brought in to-morrow.

February 15th, Friday.—Count de Grasse invited the President and Council to dine on board the Ville de Paris. The Ville de Paris had been very roughly handled in the different rencontres; her stern and galleries much shattered, and many shot-holes about her quarters. It seems, in the first affair off Nevis, she had ninety men blown up on her middle-deck by loose cartridges taking fire; many of whom died, and, among others, the Danish officer who translated our capitulation.

Count de Grasse, &c. were on shore again this day. M. de Vaudreuil never landed.

This morning we perceived that Sir Samuel Hood had quitted his station in the night, and his whole fleet was out of sight.

February 16th, Saturday.—This morning the whole French fleet got under weigh and went to St. Kitt's.

February 17th, Sunday.—The whole French fleet at anchor in Basseterre road.

February 18th, Monday.—Two gentlemen went this afternoon down to St. Kitt's, in a boat belonging to the *Auguste*, at the desire of the Council, to compliment the Marquis de Bouilli on his departure.

They got alongside the *Auguste* about half-past seven, and were invited by M. de Bougainville to go on board and sup, which they declined: he then ordered a small boat to carry them on shore. They landed about eight o'clock; when they first heard that the island of Nevis was included with St. Kitt's in their capitulation, and were much surprised at it: finding the Marquis de Bouilli was preparing to quit the island, determined to see him directly: found him surrounded by French officers on the point of embarking. They first made the compliments of our island to him, and then brought on the subject of our being included in the St. Kitt's capitulation.

He seemed to attend to them with impatience; told them it was all settled; that it was no time for alterations; that he was sure we should be contented; that he would do all in his power to make us so; that the second capitulation was in some respects more favourable than our own; made many professions of his desire to make us all happy, &c. They endeavoured to argue with him, but found it in vain: and he, beginning to be displeased with their importunity, left them, and soon after embarked in a frigate for Martinico.

February 20th, Wednesday.—This day Count de Grasse left St. Kitt's with the whole fleet, and took Monserrat in his way up. It surrendered on capitulation to a detachment of the fleet under M. Barras and the army under Count Flechin.

February 24th.—The Deputies returned to Nevis.

February 28th.—This day is the date of our Memorial to Count Dillon.

March 5th.—Count Dillon came up and produced his own commission as Governor of St. Kitt's and Nevis; also the commission of Marquis de Fresne as joint Governor ("adjoint au gouvernement"); the commissions were read; Mr. Dillon was then addressed, and afterwards took his seat. He had not been seated many minutes before a fellow in a white jacket enters the room with a bundle tied up in a handkerchief, and placing himself in one corner, untied the handkerchief, and took out a case resembling a barber's apparatus; which the President perceiving, mistook the man for the Count's valet; and, being a great friend to decorum, began to apprehend our new Governor was going to dress himself in the Council Chamber: to stop, therefore, so indecent a proceeding, he addressed Count Dillon in these words, looking, at the same time, at his

attendant in the corner. "If your Excellency means to *shave*, you had better stay till you get to my house" (where he was to dine): Count Dillon stared; "Shave! Shave, sir! what do you mean? that gentleman is my secretary!" It was difficult to stifle our laughter at this ridiculous mistake; as M. le Secretaire looked much more like a brother of the razor, than of the quill. He was afterwards found to be a corporal in the brigade, and generally attended the Count's person with a sheet or two of paper, and three or four pens in a tin case. After Council Count Dillon went out, accompanied by his aides-de-camp and three other officers of the brigade, to dine with the President; M. le Secretaire following on foot, which the Count said he was used to.

March 6th.—Count Dillon again met the Council, when he presented Mr. *** with a *special* commission as president and commander of the island; which, with the advice of Council and Assembly, he accepted. This commission he accompanied with a curious set of instructions for his conduct.

He dined with the Council and Assembly, and all was harmony and conviviality.

* * * *

He then signed a pass for a vessel going to windward, "By virtue of the 16th article of the *Capitulation of Nevis*," &c. He went to St. Kitt's in the afternoon, and left us flushed with the hopes that we should now carry our point.

April 12th.—Count Dillon left St. Kitt's, and the government devolved on the Chevalier de Fresne.

April 13th.—It being reported that the Marquis de Bouilli was at St. Kitt's, the two Deputies were desired to go down and know the fate of our Memorial.

April 14th.—They found the Marquis de Bouilli was not at St. Kitt's, but concluded by waiting on M. de Fresne at Sandy Point; who paid great attention to what they had to offer, and promised to forward some additional papers they left with him to the French Governor-general. They there heard of an engagement between the two fleets (the affair of the 9th) which the French called a victory, and had actually fired a general feu de joie on the strength of their intelligence.

They then returned to dinner, and on their way perceived two men of war of the line, the largest seemingly of eighty guns, dreadfully mauled, and in a shattered condition, standing along under the lee of St. Kitt's, pretty near in. The ships made many signals, which were answered from Brimstone Hill; but they hoisted no colours. It was, however, clear, from their build as well as their signals, that they were French; though when the Deputies got to

Basseterre, the French and Irish officers were determined to call them English, and that they were runaways from our beaten fleet. Next day appeared off Basseterre a large frigate under English colours, which worked for some hours as if she wanted to communicate with the shore ; but bore away in the afternoon.

The two French ships were the *Auguste*, and the *Brave*, which got into Curassoa.

The *Auguste* was Bougainville's ship.

April 16th.—The Deputies returned to Nevis. Just before getting on board the packet, one of them was taken aside by a particular friend, who told him in the utmost confidence, that he had spoken to a white man who had been the day before on board the English frigate in the offing ; which was the *Endymion*, Captain Smith ; where he learnt there had been two actions, the last, on the 12th, decisive—that we had taken the *Ville de Paris*, and three other ships of the line, and burnt another—that Count de Grasse was then prisoner on board the *Formidable*—and that he had brought two letters on shore for gentlemen of the island.

LORD RODNEY.

On the 9th and 12th of April, 1782.

*Extracts of Letters from Lord Rodney, dated Formidable, at Sea,
April 14th, 1782.*

“ ON the 5th of April I received intelligence that the enemy were embarking their troops on board the ships of war ; and concluded they intended to sail in a few days. Captain Byron, of the *Andromache*, an active and diligent officer, watched their motions with such attention, that on the 8th instant at day-light he made the signal of the enemy's coming out, and standing to the N. W. I instantly made the signal to weigh ; and having looked into the bays of Fort Royal and St. Pierre, I made the signal for a general chase ; and, before day-light, came up with the enemy under Dominique, where both fleets were becalmed,

and continued so for some time. The enemy first got the wind, and stood towards Guadaloupe.

“ My van division, under that gallant officer Sir Samuel Hood, received it next, and stood after them. At nine the enemy began to cannonade my van, which was returned with the greatest briskness. The baffling winds did not permit part of the centre division to get into action with the enemy's rear till half-past eleven; and then only the ship next to me in the line of battle,” &c.

“ The enemy's cannonade ceased upon my rear's approach, but not before they had done considerable damage to the ships in the van, and disabled the Royal Oak and the Montague,” &c.

“ The night of the 9th instant the fleet lay-to, to repair their damages. The 10th, they continued to turn to windward under an easy sail, the enemy's fleet continuing to do the same; and always had it in their power to come to action, which they cautiously avoided, and rendered it impossible for me to force them in the situation they were in, between the Saints and the Island of Dominique.

“ On the 11th, the enemy having gained considerably to windward, and the wind blowing a fresh steady gale, I made the signal for a general chase to windward; which continued the whole day; and towards sun-set, one of the enemy's ships damaged in the late action falling to leeward, the Count de Grasse bore down with his whole fleet to her protection, which brought him so near, that I flattered myself he would give me an opportunity of engaging him next day. With that view I threw out the signal for the form of sailing, and stood with the whole fleet to the southward, till two in the morning; then tacked, and had the happiness, at day-light, to find my most sanguine desire was near being accomplished, by my having it in my power to force the enemy to battle,” &c.

Note, from Lord Rodney's Narrative, contained in a private Letter. (See Clerk.)

“ The 10th and 11th of April were employed in endeavouring to bring the enemy to battle; and on the 11th, late in the afternoon, the enemy bore down to protect two of their own ships, who were in danger of being cut off.” This brought them to the position the Admiral wished: he “ instantly issued orders to sail during the night in the order of sailing; to put all lights out; to stand to the southward till two in the morning, and then the whole fleet to tack without

signal. This deceived the enemy, who had no conception that the British fleet should be so near them at day-light: we instantly formed the line of battle upon the starboard tack; the enemy formed theirs upon the larboard tack, and had made the signal to ware; but the nearness of the British squadron prevented its being put in execution; and the British fleet taking the lee-gage, the Admiral made the signal to engage and close."

" This important victory was obtained the 12th instant, after a battle which lasted with unremitting fury from seven in the morning till half-past six in the evening, when the setting sun put an end to the contest," &c.

" The enemy's whole army, consisting of 5500 men, were on board their ships of war: the destruction among them must have been prodigious; as, for the greatest part of the action, every gun told, and the Formidable fired near eighty broadsides," &c.

" The Monarch fired away all her powder, and was supplied from the frigates during the action."

OBSERVATIONS.

Plate XVIII, Fig. 1, describes the situation of the two fleets on the 9th; wherein it would seem some advantage might have been taken by the rear of the British fleet, had it hauled closer to the wind. (See Fig. 1.)

Upon this supposition they would probably have driven the ships, F, upon their own line to leeward; then engaged; and must have occasioned much confusion; this *alone* is to gain an advantage.

In Lord Rodney's narrative is related an admirable manœuvre, by which the gallant Admiral surprised the enemy on the morning of the 12th, and gained the victory. On this day, nothing could be better conducted, whether by accident or design, than the *cutting* the line in twain,* by the centre of the

* By the story of Lord Rodney and the cherry-stones related by Mr. Cumberland, it would appear that he considered the project of breaking the line to originate in his Lordship, for he observes, " the thought seemed first to occur to him of breaking the French line by passing through it in the heat of the action." Lord Rodney, in describing his intention, makes no mention whatever of Mr. Clerk's Essay, nor did it appear to the company that the idea was taken from any other person, or any previous consideration on the subject. The conversation took place after dinner at Stoneland, the seat of Lord George Germain.

In attributing originality to Lord Rodney, Mr. Cumberland fell into a scrape with the Edinburgh

Fig. 1.





Fig. 2.



British fleet, as shown in Plate XVIII, Fig. 2; but let it be observed, that the enemy, by proceeding as recommended in the figure, had it in his power to retaliate with great effect; fortunately for the British Admiral, this was not attempted.

A copy of the log of H. M. ship Anson, on the 12th of April, is inserted below. A veteran officer, distinguished in this and in several other engagements, declared to the writer, that upon this occasion it was as easy to have taken fifteen as five sail of the line.

*Extract of the Log of His Majesty's ship Anson, Captain Blair,
April 12th, 1782.*

Fresh breezes and clear weather. P. M., April 11th, all the fleet still in chase of the French fleet. At five p. m. all the French fleet that were to windward of the islands called the Saints, bore down to succour two of their bad sailing line of battle ships, that the weathermost of our ships was gaining on very fast; and in all probability would have soon brought them to action: we then bore up for our fleet, as per signal from the Admiral. All the French fleet bore up in a body after us; at seven p. m. we made sail, and stood to the S. E. The enemy having hauled their wind to the S. E. at eight p. m., moderate and cloudy weather; saw the lights of the enemy's fleet bearing E. by N. At midnight the Admiral made the signal to tack; do. tacked to the northward. At five a. m. squally with rain, saw the French fleet, consisting of thirty-eight sail, bearing N. E. two or three leagues; at half-past five the Admiral made the signal for two ships to chase two French ships in the N. W. quarter. At three-quarters past five the Admiral made the signal to call in all cruizers; at fifty minutes past five the signal to form the line a-head at two cables' length asunder; at

Reviewers, who informed him that it was to the Essay of Mr. Clerk he was indebted. This is related in the Supplement.

See the interesting "Memoirs of Richard Cumberland," vol. i. p. 407.

In the 25th volume of the "Naval Chronicle," p. 406, a writer, styling himself a physician, and under the signature of "Scrutator," declares that he had "often been assured by that brave officer himself, that it first occurred to him a considerable time before in France, during a conversation at the table of a Marechal de Biron." This is part of a letter copied by this person out of the 5th vol. of the "Athenæum," denying Mr. Clerk's claim to any originality whatever; or that Rodney had been in the least degree actuated by Mr. Clerk's presumed recommendations.

It is supposed to be from the pen of a "Doctor G. B****, M. D." For further particulars readers are referred to the 5th vol. of the Athenæum, or the 25th of the Naval Chronicle.

six, the French fleet being formed in the same line, standing to the southward, we beat to quarters, and got all clear for action. The Admiral then made the signal for the van (Drake's) division to lead on, and engage the enemy as they closed with them. At half-past seven the enemy began to fire on our van ships; which was returned. At forty minutes past seven we began to fire at the enemy; the first ship that we engaged was the twenty-fourth ship from the enemy's rear: we kept our wind, and passed close alongside to leeward of their line. At eight we received the whole broadside from the *Ville de Paris*: at half-past eight Captain Blair was killed: at nine, having passed all the French line, we ceased firing. Our centre and rear still engaging the enemy, the Admiral made the signal for a closer action. We began to repair our rigging (it being much cut), so as to enable us to keep our station in the line. Admiral Rodney in the *Formidable*, followed by the *Duke*,* *broke the French line, which occasioned great confusion amongst them: three or four of their ships got foul of each other, one of which ships sunk*,† supposed to be the *Diademe*, of seventy-four guns. At half-past nine the Admiral made the signal to tack; do. hauled down; and the signal was made to ware. We wore ship, but were so much disabled, that we could not keep up with Admiral Drake; our damages received were, the main-top-sail-yard, cross-jack-yard, fore and main-top-gallant-masts shot away; the fore, main, and mizen yards much wounded; the fore and main-masts and bowsprit slightly wounded; all our stays and rigging shot away; two shot betwixt wind and water; and our sails shot all to ribbons. Captain and one man killed, and thirteen wounded. At noon, when the smoke cleared away, we saw the *Glorieux* dismasted, with her colours flying on the stump of her main-mast. She was taken in tow by one of their frigates, who was soon obliged to cast her off; she then struck to the *Royal Oak*, whose signal was made to take her in tow, which she did. The rear and part of the centre still in action with the enemy. Twelve sail of their line bore up and made all the sail they could, in great confusion; one of which was steering with sweeps: we were employed in getting down our main-top-sail-yard and cross-jack-yard, and fitted the mizen-top-gallant-sail for a mizen-top-sail; knotting and splicing our rigging; still following Admiral Drake with all the sail we could make. At half-past twelve the Admiral made the signal for the van to close with the centre. At one p. m. the signal for close action was repeated; at twenty-five minutes past one our fleet closed with the enemy, every ship engaging as they could come up with them; they still carrying all the sail they could. At fifty minutes past one the signal

* This is a mistake. Lord Rodney was followed by the *Namur*.

† The report of one *sunk* was unfounded.

for a closer action was again repeated; several of our weathermost ships renewed the action with the enemy's rear. At five minutes past four the Admiral made the signal to ware; do. wore ship, and bore up for the enemy. At twenty-five minutes past four the Hector struck to the Canada; but was taken possession of by the Alcide; whose signal was made to take her in tow, which she did. At thirty-five minutes past four the Admiral made the signal for the fleet to close. At five minutes past five the Ville de Paris was hard pressed by several of our headmost ships, which caused her to keep up a heavy fire on both sides together. At half-past five the Ardent struck to the Belliqueux. At half-past six the Ville de Paris struck her flag; (on board of which ship was the Count de Grasse, Commander-in-chief of the enemy's fleet,) and the Cæsar struck to the Centaur; at which time the action ceased. At eight the Cæsar blew up. At five a. m. we hauled our wind to the S. E., having lost sight of the enemy's fleet; and only the Bedford, Marlborough, Torbay, Russell, and Fame in company. At six a. m. saw our fleet from the mast-head, bearing E. N. E., but no sight of the French fleet."

From this plain narrative, taken by the master of the Anson, and copied by one of the young midshipmen,* it is seen that *breaking the enemy's line* occasioned *confusion*; and *confusion* led to *defeat*.

REMARK.

It is curious to observe, that notwithstanding this brilliant manœuvre, so well performed, the French rear escaped to leeward; while their van, separating in two parts, made off in different directions. It was surely for the British van to have closely pursued the separated rear; this could not have interfered with the capture of De Grasse. When he surrendered he had *three* British Admirals very near him.

It is related of Lord Rodney, and by one who was a party upon the occasion, that in the middle of the battle, being very thirsty, he directed one of his little attendants to mix him some lemonade; the boy observing a lime and a knife, black from former use, upon a table in the after-cabin, immediately proceeded to comply, and having made it, but being without a spoon, stirred it with the knife. "Child," said Lord Rodney, "that may do very well for a midshipman's berth; but not for an admiral; drink it yourself, and go and call my steward to me."

* Now a captain in the service, and who kindly favoured the writer with permission to insert it.

Of the character and talents of Sir Charles Douglas, then Captain of the fleet, the service at large cannot be ignorant; yet it may not generally be known, that to him, by passing through the enemy's line, are we indebted for the fortunate result of that day. Lord Rodney had at first opposed it, by directing the helm to be put to *starboard*, when Sir C. Douglas had ordered it to be put "*a-port*;" and the master, seeing the inconvenience likely to arise from this difference of opinion, caused the helm to be kept *a-mid-ships*; and soon after, Sir C. Douglas urging it a second time, the Chief said, "Then do it as you please." The fault was in not doing more afterwards.

Sir Charles Douglas was the first man who proposed and fitted *locks* to the cannon of His Majesty's ships.

OBSERVATIONS.

The advocates for the originality of Mr. Clerk, having triumphantly exhibited the battle of the 12th of April, as the glorious result, arising from a knowledge of the great *secret*; let us see if in any of the battles of preceding times nothing can be found to compare with it; for this purpose may be given the "Combat du Texel, 1665," as related by Paul Hoste, page 42. Speaking of the order of battle, he begins by telling us, "Cet ordre fut exactement gardé pour la première fois, dans le fameux combat du Texel, où le Duc d'York, à présent Roy d'Angleterre, défit les Hollandois, le 13 Juin, 1665, et c'est à sa Majesté Britannique que nous en devons toute la perfection. L'armée d'Angleterre étoit de cent vaisseaux de guerre; l'armée de Hollande en avoit plus, quoiqu'elle n'eût pas tant de vaisseaux à trois pons. Les deux armées se trouvèrent en présence au point du jour, et le vent étant au Sud-Ouest, elles se rangèrent sur deux lignes parallèles au Sud-Sud-Est; et elles occupoient chacune près de cinq lieues en longueur; celle des Anglois avoit le vent. Le Duc d'York, qui commandoit l'armée d'Angleterre, s'étoit mis au corps de bataille, et il avoit donné son avant-garde au Prince Robert (Rupert), et au Comte de Sandwich son arrière-garde. Le Sieur Opdam, Amiral de Hollande, s'étoit aussi mis au milieu de son armée par le travers du Duc d'York, et il avoit opposé le Vice Amiral Tromp au Prince Robert." After a cannonading from three o'clock in the morning to eleven, and the capture of one ship by the Dutch, "A onze heures le Duc d'York fit *arriver* (to bear down) toute sa ligne sur l'ennemi, arrivant lui-même sur Opdam. Cette action renouvela l'ardeur des combattans. Le bruit effroyable des canons, les débris des vaisseaux, la chute des mâts, une fumée épaisse, et mêlée de l'éclat du feu que les vaisseaux vomissoient en

sautant ; tout cela donnoit à ce combat toute l'horreur qu'on peut imaginer," &c. " Sur les deux heures après-midi le Duc d'York fit le signal pour *arriver tout-à-fait sur l'ennemi* ; et les Hollandois commencèrent à ne pas tant *pincer le vent*. Opdam seul, et l'Orange, vaisseaux à trois ponts, ne changèrent point leur route ; mais un moment après, Opdam aiant reçu de fort près toute la bordée du Duc d'York, son vaisseau sauta en l'air ; les Hollandois, qui avoient déjà perdu plusieurs navires, voyant sauter leur Amiral, *furent vent arrière* pour se retirer au Texel. Le Duc d'York les poursuivit avec une ardeur incroyable jusques à l'entrée de leur port : il leur prît ou brûla vingt-deux vaisseaux de guerre, dont vingt étoient de cinquante à quatre-vingt pièces de canon ; et il remporta sur eux la plus glorieuse victoire, et la plus complete, qu'on eût encore gagné sur la mer. Elle ne coûta qu'un vaisseau au Anglois, avec la perte de trois à quatre cents hommes."

To those not acquainted with French sea-phrases,* it is expedient to state, that the term *arriver* signifies, " to bear away, to bear up," or " bear down ;" and that *pincer le vent* means, " to hug," or " to keep close to the wind." *Arriver tout-à-fait* may therefore be understood to mean to *bear right down* upon the enemy ; when the Dutch, no longer liking such close quarters, bore away right before the wind for the Texel. In this manner they avoided, not only having their line cut in twain, but being cut to pieces ; it appeared to be *saute qui peut*, and fortunate were those who escaped.

Compared with this, the battle of the 12th of April was but children's play ; and nothing in later times can be thought to resemble it in its effects, but the battles of Camperdown, of the Nile, of St. Domingo, and of Trafalgar.

Let it be remembered that the man who has given us this description, lived in, or soon after, the time in which the events he relates took place ; and, having himself been twelve years at sea, in all the expeditions under some of the most celebrated French Admirals, may be considered to have known something of the subject of which he treats.

It has been observed by an officer, one of the supporters of Mr. Clerk, that Paul Hoste treats only of drawing up two hostile fleets in parallel lines, upon a wind, or nearly so, and not of a regular plan of breaking a line of battle to leeward ; or of any form of attack upon a particular part. On this latter subject Paul Hoste shall speak for himself. See his fifth part, page 382.

* See a " Vocabulary of Sea Terms, &c. French and English, and English and French, by a Captain in the British Navy, 1799. London." Also, at the end of the work of Paul Hoste, " Explication des Termes de Marine dont on se sert dans cet ouvrage."

“ Tout le monde n'a pas desaprouvé la manière dont l'Amiral Herber rangea son armée, quand il *arriva* sur les François dans le combat de Bevisier l'an 1690. Il avoit quelques vaisseaux moins que nous : et il étoit résolu de faire ses plus grands efforts contre notre *arrière-garde*. C'est pourquoi il ordonna à la premiere division Hollandoise de tomber sur notre seconde division ; ensuite il ouvrit son armée au milieu, laissant un grand vuide par le travers de notre corps de bataille : Après quoi aiant extrêmement *serré* ses Anglois, il *les opposa à notre arrière-garde*, et il se tint avec sa division un peu au large, afin d'empêcher que les François ne profitassent du vuide qu'il laissoit dans son armée, pour doubler les Hollandois. Cet ordre rendit en effet notre premiere division presque inutile, parcequ'il lui fallut faire une fort longue bordée, pour revirer sur la tête des ennemis ; et le vent aiant calmé, elle eut peine de se trouver assez à tems pour partager la gloire de l'action. D'autre part, les Anglois, qui étoient extrêmement serrez, eurent d'abord quelque avantage sur notre queue, qu'un accident fit plier ; mais les vaisseaux suivans, animez par l'exemple du Comte d'Estrées, Vice Amiral de France, qui commandoit l'arrière-garde, soutinrent avec tant de valeur le grand nombre d'Anglois qui tomboient sur eux, que ceux-ci, ne pouvant plus souffrir le feu des François, pincèrent le vent, et se firent remorquer par leur chaloupes, pour se tirer au large des victorieux.”

The same officer also says, that had Paul Hoste ever thought of breaking the enemy's line from the windward, he never would recommend an opening to be left in any part of it, as in his Plate CXXIV : and quotes the following from page 387.

“ Si l'armée moins nombreuse est *sous-le-vent*, on pourra laisser plus de vuide *au milieu*, et moins de l'avant :” but what is the rest of the sentence ? “ mais il faudra avoir un petit *détachement de vaisseaux* de guerre et de *brûlots*, afin d'empêcher que les ennemis ne *profitent* des *vuides de l'armée* pour la *diviser*.” A clear proof that such a manœuvre was to be guarded against ; and the Plate represents two vessels placed immediately opposite the openings in the lee line.

A gallant officer, now an Admiral, who was present on the 12th of April, has assured the writer, and shown him, clearly described in an old engraving of that battle, that the “ Duke,” Lord Rodney's second a-head, had it in her power to have passed through the French line ; but that Captain (afterwards Lord) Gardner, not knowing it to be the intention of Lord Rodney so to do, and considering it his duty to follow the van, *put his helm up*, that he might preserve his station in the wake of his leader. The plate in question shows the Duke coming close round to leeward of the French ship ; when, by the change of the

wind, and the space left in the enemy's line, he might with more ease, by keeping his wind, have been the first, but without signal or previous design, to cut through the French line. In bearing up to follow the British van, so close was he to a French ship a-breast of him, that he nearly ran on board of her in the operation. The opening then becoming wide, Lord Rodney in the *Formidable*, followed by the *Namur*, kept his wind and separated the French line of battle. Another distinguished officer, who commanded a ship of the line in this battle, has assured the writer that no previous intention of cutting the enemy's line was made known by Lord Rodney to his fleet, nor appeared on the day of battle.

The *Namur* was afterwards directed to take the Duke's place, a-head of the *Formidable*; and upon the capture of *De Grasse*, took the *Ville de Paris* in tow.

Besides the engraving before mentioned, the writer has seen drawings by Pocock, in the possession of an officer who was on board the *Namur*, illustrative of what he advances.

Of this battle it is observed by "*Ramatuelle*," that Lord Rodney attached considerable importance to the mode of attack—that of engaging upon *opposite tacks*; to this, to the favourable change of the wind, and to his superiority of force, he ascribes his success; which indeed he declares would have been followed by consequences the most disastrous, had he been skilful enough to have made the most of his victory; instead of which he says he shut himself up at Jamaica with all his fleet, permitting the French Admiral (*Vaudreuil*) to send two considerable convoys from *St. Domingo*, which arrived safe in France, under the protection of two ships of war, no longer able to keep the sea.

The object of the French Admiral was to unite with the Spaniards at *St. Domingo*, for the attack of Jamaica; for this purpose they had embarked troops to the amount 5,500 men: the loss of a few ships they considered nothing when compared with an important enterprise in view; and not without reason claim merit to themselves for accomplishing objects of a secondary nature, after a defeat which, had it been properly followed up, would have annihilated their force in those seas. (*Cours Elémentaire*, P. 371.)

Plate XVIII, Fig. 1. It appears by the direction of the wind in this figure, and the position of the two fleets, that it was in the power of the rear, D, by hauling closer to the wind, to have weathered upon the enemy, and thus to have attacked to greater advantage.

Fig. 2. Here it was evidently in the power of the enemy to have made a violent attack upon the rear of the British fleet, by waring round the sternmost ship in succession, and bringing it to close action ; No. 2 passing No. 1, and so on in the manner denoted by their numbers ; by which movement it would have rejoined the other part of the fleet to leeward, or by bearing immediately down, and breaking through the line in every accessible part.

Plate XIX. Fig. 1, where is exhibited the situation of the two fleets after Lord Rodney had passed through the enemy's line.

The dotted lines denote the course of pursuit recommended to the British fleet ; the division D bearing up, the sternmost ship first, and the rest in succession, following in each other's wake, to renew the action with the van, G. The division E doing the same, beginning with the fifth ship ; by which G would be between two fires, and consequently overpowered.

Fig. 2 is intended to show the probable effect of the above movement.

The van of the enemy, G, would be surrounded, and entirely separated from the rest of his fleet.

SIR EDWARD HUGHES'S BATTLE IN THE EAST INDIES.

February 17, 1782.

Extract of a Letter from Sir Edward Hughes.

" Superbe, at sea, April 4, 1782.


" ON the 8th of February I anchored in Madras Road ; in the afternoon of the 9th, Captain Alms, of the Monmouth, with the Hero, Isis, and the armed transport Manilla, joined me. On the 15th the enemy's squadron, consisting of twelve sail of the line, six frigates, with transports and captured vessels, came in sight to the northward, standing for Madras Road ; and about noon anchored about four miles without the road. In the mean time, I placed his Majesty's ships in the most advantageous manner to defend themselves ; and the other



Fig. 1.



Fig. 2.



ships in the road with springs on their cables, that they might bring their broadsides to bear more effectually on the enemy, should they attempt an attack.

“ At four in the afternoon the enemy weighed and stood to the southward ; when I immediately made the signal to weigh, and stood after them, with the squadron as per margin,* the worst manned of them having part of 300 officers and men of the 98th regiment distributed amongst them.

“ At day-light on the morning of the 17th, the body of the enemy's squadron bore N. by E. of ours, distant about three leagues ; the weather very hazy, with light winds and frequent squalls, of short duration, from the N. N. E. the enemy crowding all the sail they could towards our squadron.

“ At six in the morning I made the signal to form the line of battle a-head : at twenty-five minutes past eight, our line being formed with great difficulty, from the want of wind, and frequent intervals of calms ; I made the signal for the leading ship to make the same sail as the Admiral, and made sail : formed in line a-head, intending to weather the enemy, that I might engage them closely.

“ At ten, the enemy having the advantage of the squalls from the N. N. E., which always reached them first, and in consequence continued longest with them, neared us very fast ; and I made the signal for our line to alter course two points to leeward ; the enemy then steering down on the rear of our line, in an irregular or double line a-breast.

“ At half-past noon I made the signal to form the line of battle a-breast in order to draw the rear of our line closer to the centre, and prevent the enemy from breaking in on it, and attacking it when separated.

“ At three in the afternoon, the enemy still pushing on our rear in a double line a-breast, I again altered my course in the line, in order to draw our rear ships still closer to the centre ; and at forty minutes after three, finding it impossible to avoid the enemy's attack, under all the disadvantages of little or no wind to work our ships, and of being to leeward of them, I made the signal to form at once into the line of battle a-head.

“ At four, the Exeter (the sternmost ship when formed on the larboard tack) not being quite closed with her second a-head, three of the enemy bore right down upon her ; while four of their second line, headed by the ship bearing M. Suffrein's flag, hauled towards our centre.

* Superbe, Exeter, Monarch, Hero, Worcester, Burford, Monmouth, Eagle, Isis, Sea-horse, and Combustion.

“ At five minutes past four the enemy began to fire upon the Exeter, which was returned by her and her second a-head. At ten minutes past four I made the signal for battle, and the action became general from the rear to the centre. The French Admiral never advanced beyond the centre of the British squadron, with little or no wind, and heavy rain during the engagement.

“ Under these circumstances, the enemy brought eight of their best ships to attack five of ours. As the van of our line could not be brought into action without tacking on the enemy; and although the signal for that purpose was at the mast-head ready for showing; there was neither wind sufficient to enable them to tack, nor for the five hard-pressed ships of our centre and rear, so much disabled, to follow them.

“ At six in the afternoon a squall of wind from the S. E. took our ships, and paid them round, head on the enemy to the N. E.; when the engagement was renewed by our five ships, with great spirit, from the starboard guns; and at twenty-five minutes past six, just before dark, the enemy's ships engaged with ours having visibly suffered severely, the whole of them hauled their wind, and stood to the northward.

“ At this time the Superbe had lost her mainyard, had five feet water in the hold, and several large shot-holes under water, and neither brace nor bow-line left entire; and the Exeter, reduced almost to a wreck, had made the signal of distress,” &c.

OBSERVATIONS.

Mr. Clerk, in his “ Attack upon the three Sternmost Ships,” has invariably made the fleet attacked, to *abandon them*. Now it has been proved by himself, in the account he has given of the foregoing battle, that such a measure not only was unnecessary, but would have been extremely disgraceful.

Sir Edward Hughes managed his little force with great skill and bravery, and was so well seconded in his object by all the Captains of his squadron, that wind alone was wanting, to give him an opportunity of displaying his courage and ability with better effect.

Could the van have tacked, it should have been by the sternmost ship first; and in failure of getting round by any other means, they should have towed round. A boat or two, with men in them, should be in the water from every ship, before going into action; particularly in light winds; and in going to make an attack at an anchor, every boat in the fleet should be previously hoisted out; and if circumstances should render it necessary, prepared with arms,

hawsters, or small anchors, or such aids as would naturally occur to the mind of a zealous and experienced officer.

In "A Complete History of Europe," for the year 1704, is a letter from Sir Cloudesley Shovel upon the action off Malaga; conducted in chief by Sir G. Rooke, assisted by a Dutch squadron, against a powerful fleet of France, consisting of forty-nine sail of the line; the British and Dutch of fifty-three; but the gallant Admiral says, "Their ships did far exceed in bigness; I judge they had seventeen three-deck ships, and we but seven."

"The ships that suffered most in my division were the Lenox, Warspight, Tilbury, and Swiftsure; the rest escaped pretty well, and I the best of all; though I never took greater pains in all my life to have been soundly beaten; for I set all my sails, and rowed with three boats a-head to get alongside with the Admiral of the White and Blue; but he, outsailing me, shunned fighting, and lay alongside of the little ships.

"Notwithstanding, the engagement was very sharp, and I think the like between two fleets never has been in any time."

Ships of fifty guns were in the line in those days. The French had twenty-four gallies.

It has been suggested by a gallant young officer, that in cases of close action, a boat provided with proper materials and a few resolute fellows, might, by means of *wedges, jam up* the rudder of the ship you engage, and render it useless.

It is possible, that in the thickness of the smoke and the ardour of the fight, such an attempt might not be discovered until the mischief was done; but musquetry from the stern-ports would probably take off some of the persons employed.

Iron wedges, ragged (or jagged), should be used, and stout carpenters sent with an officer for this service; such an attempt could only be made in moderate weather and smooth water, when, by the state of the atmosphere, and smoke, concealment might favour the design.

Perhaps two guns allotted to that object alone, well worked and served, might answer the purpose better; and where the rudder is much exposed, it might in little time be rendered unserviceable.

REMARK.

"This battle affords a remarkable instance of a well-combined attack of a superior squadron, under unfavourable circumstances, upon the rear of an inferior, and failing, from the resolute manner in which a part only of the British force defended itself, against the united efforts of the enemy.

“ Sir Edward Hughes might have counteracted the attack, by *waring* his squadron when it was about to commence. If there was wind enough to bring the enemy's ships into their stations, there was sufficient to enable the British to *ware*, though not to tack, and thus to have met the attack.—The vicinity of the land, in all probability, prevented the British Admiral from performing this manœuvre.”

In *waring together*, the van would have soon been in a situation to give support to the rear.

Plate XX. Fig. 1, exhibits Sir Edward Hughes's battle, Feb. 17, 1782.

F, the French fleet in pursuit.

B, the British fleet retiring; the dotted lines showing the method adopted by the British Admiral to collect his force, and to succour his rear, the object of attack.

D, the Exeter. On board this ship, Commodore (afterwards Sir Richard) King carried his broad pendant, and Captain Reynolds was killed: the ship being greatly pressed by a superior force and reduced to great distress, the *master* came to the Commodore to ask him, “ *what was to be done?*” upon which he coolly replied, “ *There is nothing to be done but to fight her till she sinks!*”

Fig. 2 shows the attack commencing upon the rear of the British fleet, and the French Admiral having advanced to the centre of it, the engagement took place from centre to rear. From the lightness of the wind, the British Admiral had not been able entirely to accomplish his purpose before the enemy came up with him. He therefore formed the best line of battle that circumstances admitted of; his rear and van being still somewhat separated from the centre. The signal was not shown for the van to tack, as it could not be obeyed for want of wind; the van should have towed round, and thus must have approximated the enemy. The enemy should have passed through a-head of the British Admiral if possible, and thus have separated his van and centre; the fifth ship from the rear cutting off the two sternmost British ships.



Fig. 1.





Fig. 2.



SIR EDWARD HUGHES'S SECOND BATTLE IN THE
EAST INDIES.

April 12th, 1782.

*Extract of a Letter from Sir Edward Hughes, Trincomalee Bay,
May 10th, 1782.*

“ON the 8th, about noon, I came in sight of the enemy's squadron, consisting of eighteen sail, in the N. E. quarter; and continued my course for this place on the 9th, 10th, and 11th; the enemy still in sight. On the 11th, having made the coast of Ceylon, about fifteen leagues to windward of Trincomalee, I bore away for that place. On the 12th, at day-light, the position of the enemy's squadron being altered by my bearing away, so as to give them the wind of ours, I discovered them crowding all the sail they could set after us; and their copper-bottomed ships coming fast up with the ships in our rear; I therefore determined to engage them.

“At nine in the forenoon I made the signal for the line of battle a-head on the starboard tack, at two cables' length distance; the enemy then bearing N. by E. distant six miles, and the wind at N. by E. They continued manœuvring their ships, and changing their positions in the line, till a quarter past noon; when they bore away to engage us. Five ships of their van stretched along to engage the van of the British squadron, and the other seven steered directly on our centre ships, the *Superbe*, the *Monmouth*, and the *Monarca*.

“At half-past one the engagement began in the van, and I made the signal for battle. The French Admiral and his second bore down within pistol-shot of the *Superbe*; the *Hero* then stood on to attack the *Monmouth*, at that time engaged with another ship; making room for the ships in his rear to come up to the attack of our centre, where the engagement was hottest.

“At three the *Monmouth* had her mizen-mast shot away, and soon after her main-mast; and bore away out of the line to leeward. At forty minutes past three, the wind continuing far northerly, and careful not to entangle our ships with the shore, I made the signal to wear and form the line of battle on the larboard tack, still engaging the enemy.

“At forty minutes past five, being in fifteen fathoms water, and apprehensive that the *Monmouth*, in her disabled state, might drift too near the shore, I made the

signal to prepare to anchor. At forty minutes past six the enemy drew off in great disorder to the eastward, and the engagement ceased; and soon after I anchored with the squadron, the *Superbe* close to the *Monmouth*, to repair our damages, which were very great; and all the ships had suffered considerably in their masts, sails, and rigging," &c.

"The enemy anchored about five miles without us."

"In these situations both squadrons continued at anchor till the 19th in the morning, when the enemy's got under sail with the land wind, and stood out to sea close hauled; and at noon tacked with the sea breeze and stood in, as with an intent to attack us; but after coming within two miles, and finding us prepared to receive them, they tacked again and stood away to the eastward; nor have I been able to learn certainly where they are gone."

OBSERVATIONS.

Equal bravery and good conduct were displayed by all upon this, as on the former occasion; nor should the merit of skill and resolution be denied to the French Admiral; yet, let it be remembered, he had the superiority of force; nor does it appear that he derived any material advantage from it. The British Admiral's firmness and good management saved the *Monmouth*, whose Captain fought her until she was a wreck.

Plate XXI, Figs. 1, 2, and 3, will make it clear to the naval reader.




"*Ramatuelle*," in a note page 481, gives the character of the Bailly de Souffrien in the highest strain of eulogy; he observes that he united in himself every thing that constitutes a superior man.

Plate XXI, Fig. 1, shows Sir Edward Hughes's action off Ceylon, April 12th, 1782.

The French squadron bearing down to attack the British, formed in line at two cables' distance, on the starboard tack.

Fig. 2. The enemy having brought the van and centre of the British fleet to action: C, the *Monmouth*, having lost her main and mizen-masts, falling out of the line. With such openings in the British line, the enemy should have passed through it.

Fig. 3. The British fleet wore and formed in line on the larboard tack, (still in action) to avoid the shore.



SIR EDWARD HUGHES'S THIRD BATTLE WITH
M. SOUFFRIEN.

Extracts of Letters from Vice Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, K. B. &c. to Mr. Stephens, brought home by the Honourable Captain Carpenter.

“ Superb, off Negapatnam, July 15, 1782.

“ I continued with the squadron at anchor in Negapatnam road till the 5th of this month ; when, at one p. m. the French squadron, consisting of eighteen sail, twelve of which, of the line, came in sight. At three p. m. I weighed with his Majesty's squadron, and stood to the southward all that evening and night, in order to gain the wind of the enemy.

“ On the 6th, at day-light, the enemy's squadron at anchor, bearing N. N. E., distant about seven or eight miles, wind at S. W. At fifty minutes past five a. m. I made the signal for the line of battle a-breast, and bore away towards the enemy.

“ At six, observing the enemy getting under sail, and standing to the eastward, hauled down the signal for the line of battle a-breast, and made the signal for the line a-head at two cables' length distance. At ten minutes past seven, our line being well formed, made the signal to bear down on the enemy ; each ship in our line against the ship opposed to her in the enemy's line. At forty minutes past ten, the enemy's line began to fire on ours. At forty-five minutes past ten, I made the signal for battle ; and, at the same time, the signal for a close engagement.

“ From ten minutes after eleven, till thirty-five past noon, the engagement was general from van to rear in both lines, and mostly very close ; the enemy's ships appeared to have suffered severely both in hulls and masts. The van ship had bore away out of the line ; and the Brilliant, the French Admiral's second a-head, had lost her main-mast.

“ At this time the sea-breeze set in at S. S. E. very fresh, and several of the ships in our van and centre were taken a-back, and paid round with their heads to the westward ; while others of our ships, those in the rear in particular, which had suffered much less in their rigging, paid off, and continued on their former tack. Some of the enemy's ships were also paid round by the sea breeze, with their heads to the westward : the Admiral's second a-head in particular, which I supposed to be the Ajax, but it proved afterwards to be the Sévère, fell

alongside the Sultan, and struck to her; but, whilst the Sultan was waring to join me, made what sail he could, fired on and raked the Sultan, without showing any colours, and then got in amongst his own ships. At fifty minutes past noon, finding the Worcester, Eagle, and Burford still continuing on their former tack, and nearing the body of the enemy's squadron very fast, I made the signal to ware, and hauled down the signal for the line, purposing to make the signal for a general chase; but the Captain of the Monarca having hailed, and informed me that all his standing rigging was shot away, and the ship otherwise so much disabled as to be ungovernable; and the Hero, on the contrary tack, hauling in with the land with the signal of distress out; and the enemy's ships having wore and come-to on the larboard tack; those least disabled forming to the windward to cover their disabled ships, and endeavouring to cut off the Eagle; I made the signal, at twenty minutes past one, to ware, and stood to the westward; the engagement still continuing partially, wherever our ships were near the enemy's, and the Eagle hard pressed by two of the enemy's ships. At half-past one, I made the signal for the line of battle a-head on the larboard tack, and made the Exeter's signal to come within hail, and directed her to take her station a-stern of the Sultan. At two p. m. the enemy's squadron were standing in shore, and collecting their ships; which I was also endeavouring to do, as our squadron was very much dispersed, and continued on different tacks; the ships being greatly disabled, and in general ungovernable.

“ At half-past four I hauled down the signal for the line of battle a-head, and made the signal to prepare to anchor; and at half-past five I anchored with the Superb, in six fathoms of water, between Negapatnam and Nagore; the other ships of the squadron anchoring as they came in with the land, and the Worcester next day.

“ On the 7th, in the morning, the damages sustained by the several ships of the squadron appeared to me so great, that I gave up all thoughts of pursuing the enemy; and at nine a. m. the French squadron got under sail, and returned to Cuddalore Road, their disabled ships a-head, and those less so covering their retreat in the rear.

“ I am extremely happy to inform their Lordships, that, in this engagement, his Majesty's squadron under my command gained a decided superiority over that of the enemy; and, had not the wind shifted, and thrown his Majesty's squadron out of action, at the very time when some of the enemy's ships had broken their line, and were running away, and others of them greatly disabled, I have good reason to believe it would have ended in the capture of several of the line of battle ships.”

OBSERVATIONS.

From the circumstances attending all the battles of Sir Edward Hughes, it is recommended, as indispensably necessary, never to come to action with the fleets of our enemy without a positive determination to take or destroy as many as possible.

Commanding officers would find a convenience in forming or selecting such plans of attack or defence as, from position, &c. they may most likely be called upon to execute, distributing them, numbered, to their fleets, having a signal attached to each. Upon meeting with an enemy, it will probably be under some case of resemblance to *one* of the plans, with a mode of attack adapted to it; one signal would then express the Admiral's intention; and those at a loss have only to bear in mind the memorable *remedy* of Nelson.

The British Admiral, it appears, having, by diligence and exertion during the night, obtained the object of his wishes, found himself in the morning to windward of the enemy about seven or eight miles, and stood towards him in line a-breast; but soon after, observing the enemy's fleet getting under way, and drawing out to the *eastward*,* he changed to the order of battle; and when formed, bore gallantly down, in a lasking direction, to bring him to action, ship with ship.

For two hours and three quarters the engagement was general; and, as the Admiral tells us, "mostly very close," and, of course, the ships on both sides must have suffered considerably; the van ship of the enemy had (as customary) bore away out of the line, and the French Admiral's second a-head had lost his main-mast, when an important change of wind took place, which payed the ships' heads round in different directions.

Here the truth of Mr. Clerk's observations upon this mode of attack is very apparent; for the rear ships of the British squadron had "suffered much less in their rigging," than the van and centre, and were, consequently, better able to second the gallant Admiral's intentions; but the latter were so seriously disabled, as to oblige him to relinquish his design; and at about half-past one, he wore from the enemy, and, excepting a little partial cannonading, the battle ceased.

If it be admitted that the sudden shift of wind to S. S. E. threw the British

* In the Annual Register, it is printed *westward*, which must evidently be a mistake, clearly demonstrated by looking at a chart of the coast, and by what follows in the Admiral's letter.

squadron out of action, it can only be meant for a short time; as, had it been in a condition to follow the enemy, the wind was then full as favourable for it as before; and unless circumstances, such as those mentioned, the ungovernable state of many of the ships of both fleets, &c. prevented a renewal of the action, they were not, by the shift of wind to S. S. E. (as may be seen by the plate), necessarily compelled to separate.

It would seem, indeed, that both squadrons had had enough of it, and were glad to avail themselves of a change of wind to withdraw; but whether the wind was from S. S. E. or the opposite quarter, it most certainly admitted of the closest mode of fighting; and nothing but the damages sustained in the contest prevented a complete victory, or the defeat of M. Suffrien.



Plate XIV, Fig. 1, shows the enemy's fleet in the N. N. E. weighing and standing to the eastward; the British squadron, from line a-breast, drawing into line a-head.

Fig. 2. The position of the hostile fleets upon the sudden change of the wind from S. W. to S. S. E. when several of the ships in both fleets are thrown upon different tacks.

G G, the French fleet when it had wore and hove-to on the larboard tack.

REMARK.

“ Here is an instance where the enemy's masts and rigging suffered much more than ours; the French Admiral's ship lost his main and mizen-mast; our Commander-in-chief had not, therefore, the old excuse of being unable to follow; but unfortunately the French upon that occasion fired low, and the British fleet suffered severely from shot in their hulls.”



1000

FOURTH BATTLE OF SIR EDWARD HUGHES.

Extract of a Letter from Vice Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, K. B. &c.

“ Superb, in Madras Road, September 30th, 1782.

“ IN my letter of the 12th of last month, I mentioned my intention to proceed to sea, when the squadron was refitted, for the purpose of covering the arrival of the expected reinforcements under the command of Sir Richard Bickerton, and to oppose the enemy's squadron; and accordingly, on the 20th, the squadron having completed its provisions, and being in a tolerable condition for service, I left the road with the squadron under my command, and used all diligence possible to get to the southward, to Trincomalé; being apprehensive the enemy would endeavour to make themselves masters of that harbour in the absence of the squadron. But, the wind blowing strong from the southward, I did not arrive with the squadron off Trincomalé till the night of the second of this month; and, in the morning following, I discovered French colours on the forts, and their squadron reinforced by the *Illustre* of seventy-four guns, the *St. Michael* of sixty-four, and the *Elizabeth*, formerly a company's ship, of fifty guns, with several transports, in all thirty sail, at anchor in the several bays there. On the appearance of his Majesty's squadron on the morning of the 3d, the French squadron, consisting of fourteen line-of-battle ships, the *Elizabeth*, three frigates, and a fire-ship, got under sail, and about six a. m. stood out of Back Bay to the S. eastward, the wind blowing strong at S. W. off the shore, which placed them to windward of his Majesty's squadron. At ten minutes past six a. m. I made the signal for the line of battle a-head at two cables' length distance; shortened sail, and edged away from the wind, that the ships to form the van of our line might the more speedily get into their stations. At twenty minutes past eight, the enemy's squadron began to edge down to our line, then formed in good order. From that time till half-past eleven a. m. I steered under top-sails in the line E. S. E.* with the wind blowing strong at S. W. in order to draw the enemy's squadron as far as possible from the port of Trincomalé; they

* It thus appears that the British line, formed in good order, was steering *four points from the wind*: had the British fleet hauled up, upon the line C. D. in the plate, it must have met, or broken the line of the enemy in its advance (Fig. I, Plate XXIII.); at all events it would have mixed sooner with him.

sometimes edging down, sometimes bringing-to, and in no regular order, as if undetermined what to do.

“ At noon, the enemy’s squadron appeared to have an intention to engage. At half-past two p. m. the French line began to fire on ours, and I made the signal for battle : at five minutes after, the engagement was general, from our van to our rear : the two additional ships of the enemy’s line falling furiously on our rearmost ship, the Worcester, were bravely resisted by that ship, and the Monmouth, her second a-head, which backed all her sails to assist her. About the same time, the van of the enemy’s line, to which five of their ships had crowded, bore down to the Exeter and Isis, the two headmost ships of our line ; and, by an exerted fire on them, forced the Exeter, much disabled, out of the line ; then tacked, keeping their wind, and firing on the Isis, and other ships of our van, as they passed. In the mean time, the centres of the two lines were warmly engaged, ship to ship. At twenty-eight minutes past three, the mizen-mast of the French Admiral’s second a-stern was shot or cut away ; and, at the same time, his second a-head lost her fore and mizen-top-masts.

“ At thirty-five minutes past five, the wind shifting suddenly from S. W. to E. S. E. I made the signal for the squadron to ware, which was instantly obeyed in good order, the ships of the enemy’s squadron either waring or staying at the same time ; and the engagement was renewed, on the other tack, close and vigorously on our part. At twenty minutes past six, the French Admiral’s main-mast was shot away by the board, and soon after his mizen-mast ; and about the same time, the Worcester, one of our line-of-battle ships, lost her main-top-mast. At about seven p. m. the body of the French squadron hauled their wind to the southward ; the ships in our rear continuing a severe fire on them till twenty minutes past seven, when the engagement ceased ; and the ships of our squadron had apparently suffered so much as to be in no condition to pursue them. At about eight p. m. made the night signal for the line of battle a head on the larboard tack ; but the night being dark, and several of the ships not to be seen, at twelve p. m. I made the signal for the squadron to bring-to, and lie by on the larboard tack. At day-light no part of the enemy’s squadron was in sight ; and the Eagle, Monmouth, Burford, Superb, and several other ships, making much water from shot-holes so very low down in the bottom as not to be come at to be effectually stopped ; and the whole having suffered severely in their masts and rigging ; under these circumstances, and Trincomalé being in the enemy’s possession, and the other parts of the west coast of Ceylon unsafe to anchor on at this late season of the year, when the N. E. winds often blow strong there, I was under the necessity of steering with the

squadron for this coast to get anchoring ground, in order to stop the shot-holes under water; and, from the disabled state of the ships, I fell in with the land a very few leagues only to windward of this port, on the 8th inst. and anchored in this road on the 9th, and am now closely employed in repairing the damages the several ships have received."

OBSERVATIONS.

It appears the British Admiral could not arrive in time to save the harbour of Trincomalé; and, upon making Ceylon, he found himself to leeward of the French fleet, and very judiciously stood away to the E. S. E. in order to draw the enemy as much as possible from his own port; yet not declining the attack of his old competitor. Keeping a steady course under top-sails only, he received the enemy as he bore down upon them, with the same determined resolution he had always manifested; and, at about half-past two, the action became general. The superiority of the enemy enabled him to direct his principal attention to the van and rear; five ships of the van bearing furiously upon the two leading ships of the British line, while two more made a desperate attack upon the Worcester, supported very properly and gallantly by the Monmouth.

The two centres having quite sufficient to occupy their attention, the British van and rear were exposed to a severe and very unequal contest; the force opposed to them being not unskilfully applied on the part of the French; yet it is somewhat surprising that the five van ships of the enemy did not succeed in entirely separating, and afterwards capturing the two hard-pressed ships, Exeter and Isis.

In this manner it seems the fleets were situated, when, about half-past five, the wind shifted from S. W. to E. S. E.; that is, right-a-head, and consequently must have taken them a-back. The British Admiral lost no time in attempting to reap every advantage that was offered him by this change, and the action was renewed on the other tack, close and vigorously; the squadron waring in good order, in obedience to the signal; the ships of the enemy doing the same. At half-past seven, both fleets having suffered very severely, they separated by tacit consent, and the battle ceased. The French Admiral, having lost his main and mizen-masts, was certainly in no condition to continue the fight; while it must be allowed that his capture might seem an object of no great difficulty. Two other ships of the enemy also suffered the loss of masts; the Admiral's second a-stern, her mizen-mast; and his second a-head, her fore and mizen-top-masts;

and it does not appear that any of the British squadron, excepting the Worcester, had lost any thing, and she lost her main-top-mast.

But "the Eagle, Monmouth, Burford, Superb, and several other ships, were making so much water from shot-holes low down, and were otherwise so severely handled, that the Admiral retired in the best way he could, to the nearest safe anchorage, to repair his shattered fleet." In this manner concluded the naval warfare of 1782 in the east; and, from the evident advantages gained over the enemy, it is much to be regretted it was not in the power of the British squadron to have captured his dismantled ships, concealed and protected from further molestation by the darkness of the night; for every thing seems to have been attempted by the skill and bravery of the British fleet, which, it must also be remembered, was much inferior in force.

Plate XXIII, Fig. 1, is described by the following extract from Sir Edward's letter:—

"On the morning of the 3d, the French squadron, consisting of fourteen line-of-battle ships, the Elizabeth, three frigates, and a fire-ship; and at six a. m. stood out of Back Bay to the south-eastward, wind blowing strong at S. W. which placed them to windward of his Majesty's squadron."

The British line, until half-past eleven, steering under top-sails, E. S. E. to draw the enemy from Trincomalé.

In Fig. 2. "The engagement general from van to rear, the two additional ships of the enemy's line falling furiously on our rearmost ship, the Worcester."

Plate XXIV, Fig. 3. "The van of the enemy's line, to which five ships had crowded, bore down to the Exeter and Isis, the two headmost ships of our line, and forced the Exeter, much disabled, out of the line; then tacked, keeping their wind, and firing on the Isis, and other ships of our van."

Fig. 4. "The wind shifting suddenly from S. W. to E. S. E. I made the signal for the squadron to ware, which was instantly obeyed in good order; the ships of the enemy staying or waring at the same time; and the engagement was renewed, on the other tack, close and vigorously on our part."

Fig. 1.




Fig. 2






Fig. 3.




Fig. 4.



SIR EDWARD HUGHES'S FIFTH BATTLE WITH
M. SUFFRIEN.

*Extract of a Letter from Vice Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, K. B. &c,
in the East Indies.*

" Superb, in Madras Road, July 25, 1783.

" FROM the day of the squadron's arrival in this road, all possible diligence has been used to complete the ships' water; in doing which, great delay, and frequent disappointments, arose from the want of a sufficient number of shore boats, and the high surf on the beach. However, I put to sea on the 2d of May, with his Majesty's ships, to seek the enemy's squadron.

" On the 15th of May, when off Cuddalore, I spoke two Portuguese ships from Trincomalee, who informed me Mons. Souffrien, with his whole force, was there fitting for sea, with all possible expedition, to come to the relief of Cuddalore. From that time, I continued working to windward with the squadron along shore, lest the enemy's squadron should pass in shore of me, and fall on the store-ships, and their covering party, then at anchor near to Cuddalore.

" On the 25th of May, I came off Trincomalé, and reconnoitred the position of the enemy's squadron, which I did not think by any means eligible to attack at anchor under cover of their gun and mortar batteries; and therefore stood to the southward, to intercept any reinforcement or supplies that might be coming to them; at the same time watching their motions by the frigates of the squadron, and keeping within a proper distance of the place, lest they should put to sea in the night, and fall down on the covering ships and store-ships off Cuddalore.

" On the 1st of June, two English seamen in a boat escaped from the French squadron, and brought certain intelligence, that the Fendant of 74 guns, with two frigates, and two storeships, had slipped out of Trincomalé bay; the store-ships I concluded carried stores for the French garrison of Cuddalore, and the Fendant and two frigates destined to cover and protect them; and being apprehensive they might attack our covering ships and store-ships off Cuddalore, I bore away on the 2d of June for the coast, and on the 3d, had sight of the Fendant and two frigates, whom I chased till night, when I lost sight of them.

“ I continued cruising, with the squadron, to the southward of Cuddalore till the 9th of June, when I anchored in Porto Novo Road, about seven leagues to the southward of that place, partly to cover our own ships in Cuddalore Road, and engage the enemy's squadron before they could anchor there ; and partly to endeavour to get a supply of water, of which many ships began to be in want. But, after exerting ourselves to the utmost, no water could be obtained, either at Porto Novo, or Tranquebar ; at the first place the enemy's troops were in possession of both banks of the river ; at the other, the wells were dried up.

“ On the 13th of June, the enemy's squadron, under the command of Mons. Suffrien, came in sight to the southward, consisting of fifteen ships of the line, three frigates, and a fire-ship ; and the same day, I weighed with his Majesty's squadron, and dropped down to about five miles distance off Cuddalore and there anchored ; the French squadron anchored off the Coleroon river, about seven or eight leagues to the southward of ours.

“ On the 17th, the French squadron being under sail, and bearing down, I made the signal, and weighed with his Majesty's squadron, and formed the line of battle a-head to receive the enemy. In the evening, they hauled the wind, and stood to the southward, and I followed them with his Majesty's squadron. From this time to the 20th, I was continually employed in endeavouring to get the wind of the enemy ; which, however, I was never able to effect, from the extraordinary variableness of the winds, that often brought part of the two squadrons within a random shot of each other. On the 20th the enemy, still having the wind, showed a disposition to engage, when I immediately formed the line of battle a-head, and brought-to to receive them. At four minutes past four p. m. the van ship of the enemy having first tried her distance by a single shot, when scarce within point-blank-shot distance, the enemy's squadron began their fire on his Majesty's ; which, at twenty minutes after, was returned, and a heavy cannonade ensued on both sides ; the enemy still keeping up their distance. The cannonade continued till seven p. m. when the enemy hauled off. At day-light, I made the signal, and wore with the squadron, and brought-to to repair the damages, with the ships' heads towards the land : several of the ships much disabled in their hulls, masts, and rigging, the Gibraltar and Isis in particular ; the enemy's squadron not in sight.

“ In the morning of the 22d, I saw the French squadron at anchor in Pondicherry Road, bearing S. S. W. directly to windward of his Majesty's squadron, and some of them getting under weigh ; and I made what sail I could towards them, and anchored the same night off the ruins of Alemparvo, the more effectually to stop shot-holes, and repair the damages sustained. I beg you will

be pleased to inform their Lordships that, so early as the 8th of June, the scurvy began to make a rapid progress among the crews of all the ships of the squadron; but particularly on board the ships last arrived from England, under the orders of Commodore Sir Richard Bickerton, Bart.

“ The number of sick on board the line-of-battle ships amounted on that day to 1,121 men; 605 of whom, being in the last stage of the scurvy, I was under the necessity of sending, on the day following, to the naval hospital of this place, in his Majesty's ships Bristol and San Carlos.

“ From that time to the 22d, the disease increased the numbers of the sick daily, so as most of the ships of the line had from seventy to ninety men, and the ships last from England double that number, very many in the last stage of the disease, and unable to come to quarters, dying daily. Under these circumstances, and the water of most of the ships being expended, except a few casks in their ground tiers, and none to be obtained to the southward, I determined to return to this road, there to land the sick and wounded, and complete the water of the squadron for further service. On the 23d of June, I weighed with the squadron, and arrived in this road on the afternoon of the 25th.”

OBSERVATIONS.

The zeal and perseverance of Sir Edward Hughes were never more conspicuous than in this last endeavour to recover Trincomalé, and bring the French fleet to close action; but the winds, and the inclination of Mons. Suffrien, upon this occasion, seem to have been against him; for, having the weather-gage, he cautiously avoided too near an approach, lest he should thereby afford the British Admiral an opportunity of closing with, or weathering upon him, which would have given him the option of distance.

This battle furnishes us with another proof of the dislike the French have always shown to the windward position; and, by their extreme caution in coming down, it is evident they consider that a fleet posted to leeward has the advantage.

It appears that Sir Edward Hughes made every effort to avail himself of the variableness of the wind to effect his purpose; but, in all its variations, it never did more than bring “ part of the two squadrons within random shot of each other:” yet, on the 20th, “ the enemy, still having the wind, showed a disposition to engage; when he formed the line, and brought-to to receive them.” A cannonade, scarcely within point-blank-range, was commenced by the enemy soon after four, which continued until seven p. m. when he hauled off, and the battle ceased. The British fleet had before suffered very materially by the

scurvy; and on this day, although not distinguished by any event of a decisive nature, it shed its blood profusely; as, by the returns, ninety-nine were killed, and 431 wounded, many of whom were officers. The battles of Sir Edward Hughes were all of them bloody, though never characterized either by a loss of ship, or a capture. He had to contend with the best sea officer that France had ever known; and, excepting in this last action, was always inferior in force. On this occasion, it is probable that the difference of three ships in the line contributed to increase the disinclination of the French Admiral to a nearer connexion with them. The numbers being, on the part of the British, eighteen ships in the line, eight frigates, and a fire-ship; when that of Mons. Suffrien was but fifteen sail in the line of battle, and three frigates.

A distinction is made between ships *in* and *of* the line; for, in those days, ships of fifty guns, on both sides, were placed in the line of battle; but they were never considered line of battle ships. A seventy-four gun ship is now the smallest in the line of battle.

The late Admiral Sir Andrew Mitchell went out in the Rippon to the East Indies with Sir Edward Vernon; and was made a Lieutenant by him, and at once a Post Captain into the Coventry, of twenty-eight guns. In the Coventry he fought a severe battle with the Bellona, of forty guns, and suffered so much as to be unable to follow her, and she escaped to the French fleet. (See "Memoirs" of this officer in "Public Characters" for 1806.) He then arrived at the command of the Sultan in the last engagement; and ultimately succeeded to the rank of Commodore in those seas, and realized a considerable fortune.

The battles of Sir Edward Hughes were peculiarly marked by the loss of officers. Many brave captains fell in the faithful discharge of their duty; and of those who remained, the names of King, Alms, Raynier, and Gell, should never be forgotten.

The late Sir Thomas Troubridge entered the navy, and went to India with Sir Edward Hughes; by whom he was taken great notice of, and brought forward; the merit and talents of the youngster showed the discernment of the patron, as the naval service, perhaps, never produced a more extraordinary character. For resources in time of need and distress he was scarcely equalled, never surpassed.

REMARK.

"If this Admiral, with eighteen ships, chased, in line of battle, fifteen sail of French ships, I do not think he could expect to get up with them; and when they edged away to engage him, he should have kept working up under a press of sail, and should not have brought-to."

LORD HOWE'S AFFAIR WITH THE COMBINED FLEETS
AFTER THE RELIEF OF GIBRALTAR.

October 20th, 1782.

LORD HOWE, after having with equal judgment and address thrown succours into the garrison of Gibraltar, was followed out of the Streights by the combined fleets of France and Spain, amounting to forty-five or forty-six ships of the line ; the British force consisting of but thirty-four.

*Extract of a letter from Lord Howe to Mr. Stephens, dated on board
H. M. Ship Victory, October 21st, 1782. Cape Spartel E. N. E.
forty leagues.*

“ The wind changing next morning (the 20th) to the northward, the combined fleets (forty-five or forty-six ships of the line) still retained the advantage of the wind.

“ The British fleet being formed to leeward to receive them, they were left uninterruptedly to take the distance at which they should think fit to engage.

“ They began their cannonade at sun-set on the van and rear ; seeming to point their chief attack on the latter ; and continued their fire along their whole line at a considerable distance, and with little effect until ten at night. It was returned occasionally from different ships of the fleet, as their nearer approach at times afforded a more favourable opportunity for making any impression upon them.

“ The enemy hauling their wind, and the British fleet keeping on all night with the full sail directed before the commencement of their fire, the fleets are now much separated.”

OBSERVATIONS.

The British fleet was formed in a most exact line of battle on the starboard tack, wind from the northward, in very close order (the weather being extremely favourable,) and the enemy was on the weather-beam.

This encounter (for it can scarcely be called an action) affords an additional proof of the truth of Mr. Clerk's observation ; namely, the evident dislike the

French have always shown to the weather-gage; and of the disadvantages to which a fleet is exposed in the situation before us (Plate XXII, Fig. 1), in bearing down upon an enemy's fleet drawn up in close line of battle to leeward.

The van and centre of the enemy were formed of French ships; the rear of Spaniards, under Don Cordova. The firing commenced by the van of the enemy, and ships in succession, edging down upon the van of the British fleet.

In this manner, but at an increased distance, the action was continued to the centre; Lord Howe declaring that "not a gun should be fired from the Victory until he could see the buttons upon the Frenchmen's jackets;" and but one gun was fired from that ship, by accident, from the lower deck; the centre never approaching to the fighting distance of the British Admiral.

Don Cordova bore down about nine, p. m., followed by some others in succession, to cut asunder the British rear at the sixth or seventh ship; in this, however, by a steady and well-directed fire, he was completely foiled; and suddenly luffing up to the wind, caused considerable confusion in the ships a-stern of him: the attempt was then entirely abandoned.

Had it been day-light, the British fleet, by tacking in succession from the centre, might probably have gained an advantage over the Spaniards by separating them from the van. See the figure; the British rear, by making sail, would thus have eluded the attack.

Another mode also presents itself in this case; and recommended in the "Cours Élémentaire," when the windward fleet shall have left any open spaces in their line, opposite to the heavy ships of the enemy.

The centre ware in quick succession from the ship of the Commander-in-Chief, and, followed by the van, haul the wind on the other tack in line, through the opening in that of the enemy.

The rear do the same, beginning with the rear ship, as shown by the dotted lines in the Figure 1, Plate XXIV; in this manner the leeward fleet would elude the attack, leave the van of the enemy to themselves, and have the power to make a formidable impression upon the rear.

Figure 2 describes the fleet B, on the line of battle perpendicular to, or at right angles with the wind; and having *tacked together*, form what the French call *l'échiquier sur la perpendiculaire du vent*, C D, E G, and are in pursuit of the enemy to windward.

The ships are close hauled preserving their line, and forming *l'échiquier*.

The relation of this action is of no further importance, than as it affords an additional illustration of Mr. Clerk's argument; the powerful effects of a fire

from the leeward, on ships coming down to the attack ; attested by one who was then on the quarter-deck of one of the rear ships.

Of their objection to the weather-gage, we can want no better proof than the case before us ; where our enemy, with a fleet so greatly superior, profited nothing by its position, evidently considering it to be disadvantageous.

Audibert Ramatuelle observes (Page 240), upon the “ Usage de la ligne de bataille au plus près du vent :”

“ Une armée déterminée à combattre doit se former en bataille au plus près du vent dans deux circonstances ; 1^o lorsqu'étant *sous le vent* elle veut *forcer* l'ennemi au combat ; 2^o lorsqu'étant *au vent* elle veut l'éviter, ou au moins différer le plus possible l'instant de l'engagement. Dans le premier cas, il est d'une nécessité rigoureuse qu'elle se forme strictement au plus près, puisque, sans cela, l'ennemi lui échapperait indubitablement en tenant rigoureusement le vent.

“ Dans le second cas, il y a même nécessité de tenir strictement le vent, car, sans cela, l'ennemi se formant strictement au plus près, on accélérerait l'instant de l'engagement.” (Cours Élémentaire, p. 240.)

“ La ligne de bataille *sur la perpendiculaire du vent* est la formation la plus avantageuse pour une armée *sous le vent*, plus faible ou égale en force, qui voit l'armée du vent décidé à l'attaquer. Cette formation réunit la plus grande partie des avantages de la ligne de bataille au plus près du vent.”

Again, Ramatuelle observes, that, “ une armée doit naviguer sur l'ordre qui réunit le mieux ses bâtimens sans les trop exposer aux abordages ; sur l'ordre qui coûte le moins de temps à former et à conserver ; enfin sur celui qui facilite la formation de tous les autres.

“ Jusqu'à présent nos armées ont navigué sur trois colonnes. On trouve, dans la formation de cet ordre, le grand avantage d'être moins exposé aux abordages.” (Cours Élémentaires, p. 128.)

This Frenchman begins by “ Des ordres primitifs,” of which he mentions *eight* : these again are divided and subdivided into *forty-six* different forms and modes of arranging fleets under the various circumstances of the wind, and the intentions of the Commander-in-chief. The magnitude of number is truly appalling, and at once would induce a British seaman to shut the book ; nor is it necessary to spin the subject to such an extent. His first order of sailing is “ sur trois pelotons, ou sur trois colonnes.” Then comes eighteen different ways of forming a line of battle ; with twelve modes of arranging fleets on échiquier, or the bow and quarter line. There is a *ligne de force*, and a *ligne*

de contre force, a prompte ligne de bataille, ligne de force, de contre force, échiquier, &c. &c.

This author also recommends the order of sailing on the line perpendicular to that of the wind, for the convenience it offers to a fleet of assuming the line of battle, wind a-beam.

Suppose any given number of ships *upon the east and west line, close hauled*, with the wind at north; it will be seen that, by bearing up two points, the whole will be in line of battle, wind a-beam, on either tack. (See Plate XXIV.) Suppose also a fleet formed upon the same line, to be sailing one or more points free, taking care to preserve the same relative bearing (line perpendicular to the wind), they have but to haul up *together* the number of points between their course and the perpendicular line to effect the same purpose. On this account, and in the presence of an enemy of superior force, this order is not without its advantages. A fleet to leeward so formed, making sail upon a wind (on either tack), may attack with success the rear of an enemy's fleet, formed in closed hauled line to windward. (See Plate. Admiral Byng.)

Fig. 2 shows the situation of the fleets on the following morning.

Carronades with shot of sixty-eight pounds' weight, it is thought, were first used on board H. M. ships in this action. The Cambridge, of eighty guns, commanded by the Hon. Keith Steward, had one mounted in each entering port, and fired carcass shots from the side engaged. Locks were also more generally used at this time; musket locks, upon wooden stocks shaped for the gun, and secured by lashings. The advantages of these over the common match became so apparent, that in due time they gave place to locks of a better sort, made and supplied for general use.

This action, and the partial cannonade of the 28th and 29th of May, 1794, are the only instances wherein the enemy have had the advantage of the wind; unless it is in that of Sir Robert Calder; where, however, it appears the British fleet might have passed through that of the enemy, had it not been for the thick fog which prevailed in almost every direction.

Plate XXIV, Fig. 1, is Lord Howe's engagement with the combined fleets of France and Spain, after the relief of Gibraltar, October, 1782.

"They began their cannonade at sun-set on the van and rear, seeming to point their chief attack on the latter."

The combined fleets (forty-five or forty-six sail of the line) to windward,

Fig. 1.





Fig. 2.



edging down to engage the British van; and the rear under Don Cordova bearing down, about nine p. m., to break through the rear of the British fleet; but from the steady fire kept up upon them, they were stopped and thrown into confusion at the distance of point-blank range, and obliged to relinquish it.

The British fleet (thirty-four ships of the line) was formed in the most exact line, and in very close order.

Fig. 2. "The enemy hauling their wind, and the British fleet keeping on all night, with the full sail directed before the commencement of their fire; the fleets are now much separated."

Lord Howe and Lord Hood were as much indebted to their skill in the management of fleets for the glory they acquired, as to their intrepidity. With this knowledge, they often braved and foiled a superior force; profiting with dexterity by every occasion that offered to distress the enemy.

Lord Howe, Lord Gardner, and Lord St. Vincent, were of the few British Admirals who in former days took any particular pleasure in exercising a fleet in different evolutions; but in this, from want of practice, they were little understood, and indifferently seconded.

The necessity of a general understanding of the movements of ships in concert must therefore be apparent to all, and may form a proper subject for future consideration.

NAVAL BATTLES.

PART II.

“ Esteeming the naval superiority of this country as the principle on which its power, interest, safety, and general prosperity, in the highest degree, depend.”—(Sixth Report of the Finance Committee of the House of Commons.)—From the “ Globe ” of Monday, March 16, 1818.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE SECOND PART.

IF there be truth in that opinion of a committee of our Legislators which introduces this portion of the present work—if, as that extract declares, not only the “power” but also the “safety” of this country depend on its “naval superiority,” then it will be readily granted that the subject before us is of the most positive vital importance.

Under the impression that our very existence as a powerful and independent state rests *solely* on our naval superiority, and even at the risk of incurring the unmerited imputation of aiming to magnify the necessity of preserving our maritime weight in the scale of nations, the writer considers that no efforts should be spared, no opportunity neglected, by the government or by the people, of cherishing and supporting its naval force; whether by stimulating the zeal of its officers, encouraging and rewarding the services of its warriors, or by improving the powers and the qualities of our ships.

The overthrow of the monarchy of France involved in its fall (more or less) the remaining established governments of Europe, and by its convulsive effects created a system of inveterate hostility, only finally extinguished on the glorious and memorable field of Waterloo!

All who are acquainted with the history of events so indelibly marked, so deeply engraven, yet here so summarily noticed, cannot overlook the connexion between them and the foregoing observations, or fail to perceive that the dominion of the seas led directly to the imposing character assumed by Great Britain in the vast continental struggle which followed.

But should this view of it by some be considered erroneous, let it be supposed, for the sake of illustration, that, owing to neglect or imbecility on the one part, or a want of capacity and inclination on the other, our fleets, instead of being *successful*, had been *defeated* in our principal combats upon the ocean. It is *possible* that we might have *lost* the battle with revolutionary France, and even that of the Nile, or of Trafalgar, although commanded by a Howe or a Nelson: it would therefore become us to reflect upon the probable consequences of a reverse of fortune so serious; of the condition to which this country would be reduced, and the altered position she must be compelled to take, by such a calamity.

Without great superiority at sea, it is entirely vain to suppose that we can be either safe at home, or secure abroad.

What, let us ask, (under the avenging hand of the Almighty) annihilated the views, and preserved us from the bigot gripe of Spain, in her gigantic Armada? How did we become possessed of what is now our justly boasted Gibraltar? By what means did we put a stop to the aggressions of Spain in the reign of George the First? And how did we render abortive the attempts of France upon Ireland in the reign of George the Third? Unless we had first destroyed the French fleet, * there could have been no landing of troops in Egypt! What saved the remains of our retreating army at Corunna? How are we to form expeditions, whether to Sicily,† to Walcheren, the Baltic, the East or West Indies, or to America? What is to protect our trade, and be the bulwark of our shores? How are we to chastise an Algerine, or to punish a Turk?

When Great Britain can no longer maintain the character of the most powerful maritime state on earth, she will then form an object of contention for the most aspiring; and, at length fall a prey to the strongest: she will, as

* " Sicily, I hope, is well secured against any sudden attack. There is great reason for believing that the fleet which was beaten off Trafalgar was destined for that island. A considerable field equipage was embarked; 4,000 troops were in the ships; a like number was expected to embark at Carthagen, and 12,000 were on the march to Toulon for the same purpose, but were remanded on the action taking place." (Lord Collingwood's Correspondence, page 157.)

† See Corbett's " Expedition to Sicily " in 1718.

heretofore, be exposed to insult and depredation, or become the property of another people.

The victories detailed in the foregoing, as in the following pages, were not so much the result of physical as of moral power.* Bravery, enterprise, experience, and discipline, are the sources whence the navy derives its most essential support; compensating for the physical deficiencies under which it so frequently laboured, and which they so happily contributed to veil.

The commencement of the year 1827 brought with it a memorable and fortunate change in the administration of our naval affairs: when such is the zeal, interest, and ability so strongly manifested by the illustrious head of this important arm of the national body, the country may look with pride and exultation at the firm and dignified stand she will ever make to assert or to defend her rights, to protect her crown, her liberty, and her religion.

February, 1828.

* See "Hume's History of England," octavo edition, vol. v. page 334.

EARL HOWE'S ENGAGEMENTS WITH THE FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY FLEET.

May 28th, 29th, and June 1, 1794.

Extracts from the Letters of Lord Howe, dated (1st) Queen Charlotte at Sea, June 2d, 1794. Ushant E. $\frac{1}{2}$ N. 140 Leagues.

" On the morning of the 28th, the enemy were discovered far to windward, and partial actions were engaged with them that evening and the next day.

" The weather-gage having been obtained in the progress of the last-mentioned day, and the fleet being in a situation for bringing the enemy to close action the 1st instant, the ships bore up together for that purpose between seven and eight o'clock in the morning.

" The French, their force consisting of twenty-six ships of the line, opposed to his Majesty's fleet of twenty-five (the Audacious having parted company with a captured ship of the line on the night of the 28th), waited for the action, and sustained the attack with their customary resolution.

" In less than an hour after the close action commenced in the centre, the French Admiral, engaged by the Queen Charlotte, crowded off, and was followed by most of the ships of his van in a condition to carry sail after him, leaving with us about ten or twelve of the crippled ships, exclusive of one sunk in the action. The Queen Charlotte had then lost her fore and main-top-masts. See Plate XXX.*

" The greater number of the other ships of the British fleet were, at this time, so much disabled, or widely separated, and under such circumstances, with respect to those ships of the enemy, in a state for action, and with which the firing was still continued, that two or three even of their dismasted ships attempting to get away under a spritsail singly, or smaller sail raised on the top stump of the foremast, could not be detained; seven remained in our possession."

" The material injury to his Majesty's ships, I understand, is confined principally to their masts and yards," &c.

* Lord Howe kept an advanced squadron to windward, as chasing ships; it was by means of this squadron that the rear of the enemy was first brought to action, and that the three-decker mentioned was separated, or cut off, by the Audacious, of seventy-four guns.

Extracts from another Letter, dated June 21st (referring to the Figures).

Plate XXVI, Fig. 1. "Early in the morning of the 28th, the enemy were discovered by the advanced frigates far distant on the weather bow; the wind then fresh from the S. by W. with a very rough sea."

Fig. 2. "They came down for some time in a loose order, hauling their wind; when they came nearer, and, after some hours, formed the order of battle on the starboard tack—the British fleet continuing as before in the order of sailing."—"This facilitated the nearer approach of his Majesty's fleet to them, and for the detached part of it, under Rear Admiral Pasley, to be placed more advantageously for making an impression on their rear."

Plate XXVII, Fig. 3. "The Rear Admiral, upon the close of the day, led his division with peculiar firmness, and attacked a three-decked ship, the sternmost in the enemy's line. He was followed by the *Leviathan*, Lord H. Seymour; and by Captain Parker of the *Audacious*. The three-decked ship struck, and separated with the *Audacious*." (C. in the Fig.)



Fig. 4. "The two opponent fleets continued on the starboard tack in a parallel direction, the enemy still to windward the remainder of the night. The British fleet appearing in the morning of the 29th,* when in order of battle, to be far enough advanced for the ships in the van to make some further impression on the enemy's rear, was tacked in succession with that intent."

Plate XXVIII, Fig. 5. "The enemy hereupon wore from van to rear, and continued edging down in line a-head to engage the van of the British fleet. When arrived at such a distance as to be just able to reach our most advanced ships, their headmost ships, as they came successively into the wake of their respective seconds a-head, opened with that distant fire upon the headmost ships of the British van. The signal for passing through their line, made when the fleet tacked before, was then renewed."



Fig. 6. "As the smoke at intervals dispersed, it was observed that the *Cæsar*, the leading ship of the British van, after being about on the starboard tack, and come a-breast of the *Queen Charlotte*, had *not kept to the wind*,—and that the appointed movement would, consequently, be liable to fail of the proposed effect.

"The *Queen Charlotte* was, therefore, immediately tacked; and, followed

* In the morning (between three and four o'clock), the signal was made to form the line as most convenient. The *Cæsar* led, then *Queen*, *Russell*, *Royal George*, *Invincible*, *Orion*, &c.














Fig. 8.




Fig. 9.





Fig. 10



by the *Bellerophon*, her second a-stern, and soon after by the *Leviathan*, passed through in action between the fifth and sixth ships in the rear of the enemy's line: she was put about again on the larboard tack forthwith after the enemy, in preparation for renewing the action with the advantage of that weathermost situation.*

Fig. 7. "The rest of the British fleet being, at this time, passing to leeward, and without the sternmost ships, mostly of the French line; the enemy wore again to the eastward in succession for succouring the disabled ships of their rear; which intention, by reason of the then disunited state of the fleet, and having no more than the two crippled ships, the *Bellerophon* and *Leviathan*, at that time near me, I was unable to obstruct."

Plate XXIX, Fig. 8. "The enemy, having succeeded in that operation, wore round again after some distant cannonading with the nearest British ships, and stood away in order of battle on the larboard tack, followed by the British fleet in the same order (but with the weather-gage retained), as soon as the ships, coming forward to close with the *Queen Charlotte*, were suitably arranged.

"The fleets remained separated some few miles, in view, at times, on the intermission of a thick fog, which lasted most part of the two next days," &c.

It will here be useful, the better to describe the situation of the two fleets on the 28th and 29th of May, to give extracts from the letters of Captain W. Parker of the *Audacious*.

"Every thing was done by his Majesty's fleet, per signals from the Earl Howe (preserving them in order), to get up with the enemy, who appeared to be formed in order of battle. But, as I apprehend, his Lordship considered their conduct began rather to indicate an intention of avoiding a general action; at fifty-five minutes after one o'clock, he directed a general chase. It was just becoming dark when his Majesty's ship, under my command, arrived up with the rear ship of the enemy's line."

"The rear of the French line had been engaged at a distance by Rear Admiral Pasley's division, and some other ships that did not fetch so far to windward, a considerable time before I arrived up with them; and this very ship was engaged by one of his Majesty's ships at some distance to leeward at the time I did."

"The night being very dark, I could form but little judgment of the situation of our fleet with respect to the French, in point of distance, other than, not

* However "unintelligible" this figure may have been to a late naval historian, it cannot be altered. The work is addressed to practical *sea officers*.

hearing any firing after our own ceased, I concluded they were scarcely far enough to windward.

“ Soon after day-light next morning, we discovered nine sail of the enemy's ships about three miles to the windward.”

The rest of Captain Parker's letter is a description of his own action with the sternmost ship, and consequent separation from the fleet,—unnecessary here; at the same time, it is impossible to withhold the tribute of admiration and applause to which his conduct, upon that occasion, so justly entitled him, together with his gallant officers and ship's company.

OBSERVATIONS.

Nothing could be more favourable for an attack, had the day-light continued, than the position of the two fleets in Figure 3; for, while the rear (or weather) division was closely engaged with the rear of the enemy, the centre and leeward divisions of the British fleet, by carrying a press of sail, and keeping their wind, must, in a short time, have reached, and the centre have brought to action, the centre of the enemy.

A long line of battle cannot be preserved if it be kept close to the wind,—and seven points from it is usually considered necessary for that purpose; while smaller divisions of ships, and in general chase, can be kept closer. Under these circumstances, the centre would have closed with the centre of the enemy; and the leeward division standing on would, on one tack or the other, be able to bring to action the van of the enemy; acting then as occasion might offer; fighting him either to windward or to leeward; the whole of their line being then engaged by the British fleet.

It does not appear that any better movement could have been made by the British fleet, than that adopted by the Admiral (in Figure 4), for making “ further impression upon the enemys rear.” This was, however, frustrated by an important movement on their part, which led to the failure of the British Admiral's design.

Fig. 5. This movement of the French Admiral was certainly well adapted to prevent the meditated attack upon his rear; exposed to be separated by the advance of the British van; and, by veering (or waring) and edging down in line a-head, to engage the leading ships of the British fleet, offered battle upon equal terms; the latter continuing its course in line to receive him.

Fig. 6. We now come to the only unpleasant part of the detail; to show, in the conduct of one man, that the greatest designs of a Commander-in-chief may be rendered ineffectual by negligence, stupidity, or cowardice; and to point out how much it is the duty of captains, and juniors in command, to become masters of their chief's intentions, by clearly understanding his signals, and devoting themselves to a rigid execution of them; for on this, not only their own character may depend, but the glory and success of a great national enterprise.

Had the *Cæsar*, and the rest of the British van, followed the direction of the Commander-in-chief, the struggle might, on that day, have been decided; but "the appointed movement failed of the proposed effect."

Fig. 5. Under the pressure of vexation and disappointment, the gallant Admiral did the only thing that was left him, to show his intention to the rest of the British fleet; and to accomplish, though but in part, the object of his wishes—to penetrate the line of the enemy, by which to separate and overpower part of his force.

The *Cæsar* having, by inability or mistake, not "*kept to the wind*"* when "about on the starboard tack, and having come a-breast of the *Queen Charlotte*, the *Queen Charlotte* was immediately tacked; and, having passed through the line was put about again on the larboard tack forthwith," &c. supported only by the *Bellerophon* and *Leviathan*.

The enemy veering again to protect his rear, while the British fleet was hastening to windward to enable the Admiral to re-form his line and renew the attack.

Figs. 7 and 8, show the altered position of the hostile fleets; and it appears that nothing more could be done by the British Admiral, from the then "disunited state of the fleet; having no more than the two crippled ships, the *Bellerophon* and the *Leviathan*, at that time near him."

Fig. 9. Here, "as soon as the ships coming forward to close with the *Queen Charlotte* were suitably arranged," the two fleets are again drawing out into order of battle, the British Admiral having gained the weather-gage.

"The enemy stood away in order of battle on the larboard tack, followed by

* It has been said, and by an officer then on the quarter-deck of the *Queen Charlotte*, that the *Cæsar* passed to *windward* of that ship: this is, however, unlikely, as it is stated by Lord Howe that she had "*not kept to the wind*." The writer has also been assured by the signal lieutenant, and from the authority of the master of the fleet, that it was not so. By a plan of the movements of both fleets by an officer present, since obtained, the *Cæsar* is nearly as placed in the figure.

the British fleet in the same order, but with the weather-gage retained. The fleets remained, separated some few miles, in view, at times, on the intermission of a thick fog, which lasted most part of the two next days."

Fig. 10. June 1: as both fleets on the 29th May (Fig. 9) are left on the larboard tack, the British fleet having the weather-gage, and Lord Howe making no mention of a change, either of the wind, or the position of the hostile fleets on the 1st June, we suppose them arranged in parallel lines; the French being drawn up in line of battle to leeward; "and the British fleet being in a situation for bringing the enemy to close action the 1st instant, the ships bore up together for that purpose, between seven and eight o'clock in the morning."

The position of the British fleet, if divided into two parts, offered a fine opportunity for a vigorous attack upon the van and rear, leaving the centre untouched: the van and rear might thus have been overpowered by numbers, and the whole thrown into confusion. All the ships, from the Commander-in-chief to the rear, if not then within long range of shot, should shape a course *as if* to attack the centre; and upon getting within shot range, *alter course together*, and dart upon the rear. This would at least place the centre in what *Ramatuelle* calls "*un embarras*." If the fleet be formed in two lines a-breast, as supposed in Fig. 10, an attack upon the rear would be irresistible.

In both these cases, the lines should be in rather open order, and the change of course be made by all, with the utmost regularity and precision, according to signal.

By the preparatory movements and exertion of the British Admiral, seconded by the zeal and gallantry of his fleet, we now behold the great event drawing to a crisis; and the anxious wishes of the leader on the point of receiving their fullest completion. The power of choosing his fighting distance, so ardently desired, is at length attained; and "the enemy's force, consisting of twenty-six ships of the line, waited for the action, and sustained the attack with their accustomed resolution."

The figure describes the British fleet having "bore up together, to break through the line, and bring the enemy to close action." The British fleet one less in number.

All that professional skill, perseverance, and judgment could effect, was now accomplished. What was still necessary to its final, glorious issue depended much on the conduct of the subordinate characters. Had all striven to imitate the many bright examples, conspicuous on that day, a greater triumph would have crowned its success; and although the enemy was most unequivocally beaten, and

entirely routed ; yet " seven ships (only) remained in our possession, exclusive of one sunk ; while many got away under little or no sail, and could not be detained."

In this, as in the victory of the 12th of April, we may lament that the blow was not followed up ; as in that case, a much greater number of ships might have been added to the train of the valiant chief.

The mode of attack is what Mr. Clerk terms the " perpendicular," or " attack at right angles," and is exposed to the objections he has urged against it : they appear to be corroborated in this instance ; as the material injury to his Majesty's ships " was confined principally to their masts and yards."

The British Admiral, on the morning of the 1st of June, finding his fleet to occupy a line parallel to that of the enemy, determined on a vigorous attack upon his whole line, rather than lose a moment by making a different arrangement ; though it will be admitted, that an attack upon a particular part of it, by a superior force, might have been attended with greater success : upon this occasion, allowance should be made for the anxious impatience of the British chief, somewhat mortified and disappointed by the preceding events : he may, therefore, well be forgiven for having rushed forward with impetuosity to the combat, relying on the zeal and bravery of those under his command.*

An extract from the log of a ship, particularly distinguished, cannot fail to be interesting to naval men ; the more so, as it never yet has appeared in print.

Log of His Majesty's Ship Queen, 29th and 30th May, 1794.

" At fifty-three minutes past *noon* (which, by log, *at that time, ended* the 29th and *began* the 30th day of the month),† wore ship per signal, and renewed the action ; passing along the enemy's line within ours ; made four different attempts to break the enemy's line, but could not effect it ; their rear being so compact rendered it impossible, particularly from the shattered state of our ship, which barely steered. At half past two discontinued firing ; having passed the enemy's rear ship ; most of our fleet in action. Wore ship and laid our head towards the enemy. Employed repairing damages. Masts all wounded. Got the fore-top-gallant-mast down : cleared the wreck of the fore-yard. Sent the main-

* The writer has been informed, that the British fleet was (to use a military term) *dressed*, two or three times, when bearing down to the enemy ; and that the latter, upon its near approach, instantly made sail, " large," to elude as much as possible the severity of the onset. In a letter from Lord Collingwood to Mr. Blackett, he says, " Drew up and dressed our ranks."

† A ship's log now commences from midnight.

top-gallant-mast up for a mizen-top-mast; main-top-sail-yard for a fore-yard, and bent a complete new set of square sails. At 4^h 10' made the Venus's signal to stay by us; 6^h 10' enemy's fleet wore and stood for us with an intent to cut us off, but some of our ships bore down and prevented it, when they hauled off, and wore in a good line. At eight p. m. body of the fleet west, inclinable to fog; fresh breezes and cloudy; lost sight of the fleet; when it became clearer, saw, at daylight, the body of the French fleet N. W. three or four leagues; 8^h 45' made the signal of being ready to renew the action. Fleet forming in order of sailing."

OBSERVATIONS.—1st of June, 1794.

Plate XXX exhibits the situation of the two fleets about one o'clock p. m. when the enemy was completely beaten, and several of the British fleet so much disabled, that it was not without apprehensions some might have been overpowered by the enemy; the Queen and some others being out of the reach of immediate protection.


If in this plate be shown the result of a combined vigorous assault, the object of the *tactician* is answered. The writer declared in his former Preface, that it was not his purpose to enter into a detail of the cases of particular ships. The plan is by an officer in the battle, and was presented by the Captain of one of the most distinguished ships. The *casualties* of war are for the naval historian.

Here it is seen, that ten or twelve ships are making their escape in the best manner they can, when the second in command makes the signal for a general chase.*

Lord Howe, in countermanding this signal, probably judged of the state of his fleet by the condition of the Queen Charlotte, Queen, Defence, and some others, more severely handled than the rest; for it is well known, there were still a sufficient number left to have stopped the fugitives; but the responsibility was entirely his own, and it appeared to him, "the greater number of the British fleet were at this time so disabled or widely separated, that they could not be detached after them."

With another extract from the log of that distinguished ship which bore the

* That Admiral Graves made this signal has been forgotten by some, and disbelieved by others. The writer's authority for stating it is that of the master of the Bellerophon, (Urquhart) who has made a note of it in one corner of his plan of the battle, from which Plate V. is taken.

[illegible]

These Ships formed a Line or' Battle to Leeward w' the British Fleet & fired upon the Queen in passing & having lost her Main mast to join it.

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100

flag of Rear Admiral Gardner, the account of this important victory may be closed.

“ June 1st, 1794.—Wind southerly; at half-past eight bore down on the enemy, each ship for her opponent; three-quarters past eight the two vans began to engage. At nine received the fire of several ships in the rear, going down to engage our opponent; which she easily declined by making sail from us; our ship being then very much disabled in her masts, sails, and rigging. At a quarter past nine brought the next ship to close action, passed through their line, and engaged within a cable's length to leeward; sometimes the ships barely clear of each other. Soon found we had the superiority at close fighting; the fire of our opponent being nearly silenced by half-past ten. She suffered us to rake her twice, and soon after her three masts went by the board, as did our main-mast nearly at the same time. At eleven the French ship called for quarter; boats not in a condition to take possession; people employed clearing the wreck, and getting up a jury main-mast; the van and part of the centre still in action.

“ Counted twelve ships dismasted a-stern of our van, the generality of them having struck to our ships.”

June 2d, p. m.—“ Employed refitting and repairing our damages. Three-quarters past one wore ship. In standing between the French and English lines the ship being unmanageable, eleven of the enemy's line of battle, with several frigates, fired upon us on passing; which we returned. At two discontinued firing, the enemy having passed us. Proceeded again to repair our losses. Rigged a fore-top-mast for a main-mast, and other spars and sails, in proportion to what the masts would bear. At two the Pegasus took us in tow. At six wore ship; observed one of the prizes, a two-decker, sink. At half-past six the Pegasus cast us off. At twelve Admiral's lights E. by S. one mile. At five a. m. thirty-one sail of masted ships and a cutter in sight, with eight sail of dismasted ships.”

In this severe conflict of two days, it appears that the Queen lost her captain, master, and thirty-six seamen and marines killed, and thirty-two officers, seamen, and marines wounded. The loss of Captain Hutt was ably supplied by the First Lieutenant (the late Vice Admiral Bedford), who was immediately appointed Captain of the ship.

In the “ Naval Chronicle,” is to be found the log of Sir J. Duckworth, then Captain of the Orion, one of the van ships on the 29th of May: by this it appears, that although the leading ship (the Cæsar,) did not make any attempt

to break the enemy's line, in conformity with the signal ; the Orion and many others did ; and were only prevented by their own disabled state, and the compactness of the French line of battle.*

A brave and distinguished officer, who commanded a frigate in this action, has observed, that if ships going down into battle " large " or before the wind, would previously brace their yards in the direction they wish them, when hauled up to attack the enemy, they would probably preserve their masts and yards longer than in general they do ; the act of bracing them up, and hauling to the wind, exposing them at once both to the effects of the wind and of the shot at the same time ; the men also must be more exposed to the fire of the enemy. The same officer informed the writer that the Bellerophon, on the 28th of May, having received so much injury in her main-cap, as to prevent her continuing the action with the rear of the French line, necessarily fell a-stern, and was occupied in securing the heel of the main-top-mast to the head of the main-mast. The example was followed even by the frigates ; and the heels of the top-masts, by means of *filling-pieces* and stout lashings and frappings, passed and hove taught, from the heel of one to the head of the other, rendered the top-mast as firm in its place, and as independent of the cap, as the nature of the case would admit.

NOTE.

Lord Howe caused to be abandoned and destroyed all the captures that were made by the ships under his orders from the time he left Spithead, to his battle of the 1st of June ; that the effective strength of his fleet might in no way be diminished.

REMARK.

" I have always been of opinion that this action should have been more decided. When the Queen Charlotte tacked, how came she separated from all the ships a-stern of her wake, except two ? Surely, if they had all tacked successively in *her* wake, and again in the same position when on the larboard tack, at least two of the enemy's rear ships must have been taken. And had the van of *our* fleet tacked (or wore, if unable to tack) when the mistake was discovered, they

* A seaman of the Brunswick, in a letter to his wife at Newton Abbot, makes the following remark :—

" This dreadful battle happened on a *Sunday* ; and if the French have rejected that day out of *their* calendar, God Almighty has shown them that he has not left it out of *his*."

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would have kept a position close a-breast of the enemy's rear, and prevented the manœuvre of the French van waring to support it.

"On the 1st of June, had Lord Howe attacked the centre and rear of the French line with his whole force, he would have gained a complete and easy victory; not to follow up his success, I hold to have been a great error."

A French Account of the Proceedings of their Fleet.

Jean bon Saint André, a Deputy from the then ruling power of France, has given a journal of the proceedings of their fleet, from its sailing to its defeat on the 1st of June; but from this little information is to be collected. Much anxiety is expressed throughout, and great hopes of success are entertained from the apparent zeal and spirit of the officers and seamen; at the same time the Deputy complains much of the want of attention and experience in many of the captains in performing the different evolutions, previous to their meeting with the British fleet: nor does it appear that the "Citizen Captains" (of the frigates particularly) considered strict obedience to orders or signals as a necessary part of their duty; for, when sent in chase, they returned at discretion. *Le Jacobin*, from missing stays twice, threw the rear of the centre column into disorder; and the *Brutus* frigate, having lost a main-top-mast at seven p. m. had only removed the stump of it by ten o'clock on the following morning; and at eight of the morning of the day *after*, she had got up the main-top-sail-yard! * and the Deputy very properly considers, that, as the same ship had lost a top-mast upon a former cruize, it should have proved a "*lesson*" to the captain; not understanding how such an accident ought to be suffered to take place a second time! His letters to his "Citizen Colleagues" of the Committee of Public Safety are not interesting. He says, "some officers are deficient in instruction, but none wanting good will," and that a fleet like theirs requires fifteen or twenty frigates to attend it.

He goes on to say, that "signals were not sufficient to prevail on the captains keeping in close order," and a frigate is sent to perform this service; which is termed *rallying* the fleet: in another part it is said *Le Scipion's* fore-yard had been carried away three days; her main-top-sail-yard yesterday; and this afternoon she made the signal for springing her fore-top-mast!

He magnifies the force of the British fleet. On the 29th of May they discover the separation of the Revolutionaire; and that *Le Terrible* had by a violent pitch, in a head sea, carried away her fore-top-mast.

* See notes at the end.

In speaking of the conduct of the ships, he observes, "they all manifested a courage, from which, had it been joined by practical knowledge, the day would have been glorious to them; but, slowness of manœuvres, continual mistakes, small means when large ones should have been conceived and daringly executed, was what snatched from us the brilliant success we had a right to expect." He complains greatly of the conduct and disobedience of the frigates, particularly of *La Seine* and *Le Brutus*.

The disasters of the 1st of June he attributes much to the unskilfulness of manœuvre in some of their ships, particularly of *Le Jacobin*, the second a-stern of the *Montaigne*; which, by first running up too near the Admiral, and then backing to regain her place, left an opening in the line for the British Admiral. Thence they date their defeat. These indeed *are* "*lessons*," from which it is hoped British seamen will never fail to profit: this *last* was taught by the example of one of the greatest *masters* this nation has ever known;—long may his name be cherished and revered by an admiring and grateful country!

OBSERVATIONS.

Amongst an abundance of proofs that might be advanced, of the superior skill and activity displayed on board British ships of war in cases similar to that of the *Brutus* mentioned in the foregoing journal, may be given the following; as it contrasts in a striking manner with the extremely dilatory conduct of the French ship, and under circumstances of great resemblance.

When the *St. Albans*, of sixty-four guns was a look-out ship from the channel fleet in the year 1797 or 1798, it was discovered one evening, just before sun-set, that both her fore and main top-masts were sprung. Every necessary arrangement being immediately made for shifting them, they set to work as soon as they were no longer perceptible by the fleet; and preserving her station on the look-out, she shifted both top-masts before day-light, and appeared to the fleet as if nothing whatever had taken place.

REMARKS.

"I once in 1808 kept company with a French fleet twenty-one days. A corvette lost her fore-top-mast, was taken in tow by a line-of-battle ship, and never attempted to get up another until she got into Corfu, *five days after*; though fine weather.

"A British frigate in the Mediterranean shifted a main-top-mast in four

hours, when under *storm stay-sails* in a *gale of wind* on an enemy's coast, and blockading an enemy's force!"

It has been said that, "in *45 minutes*, the *Bittern* sloop of war shifted her main-top-mast without previous preparation!"

OBSERVATIONS CONTINUED.

To point out the precise spot or situation of any particular ship, at different periods of an action like that which has just been related, would be a very difficult, if not an impossible task. To give a general idea of the whole, at the most eventful crisis of the day, is therefore all that can be attempted; and in the last Plate, many ships, from the very nature of the scene, which is perpetually shifting, may not be accurately placed. This, it is hoped, will be pardoned by those who from actual knowledge are better acquainted with the subject. What is presented is from the best information that the writer could obtain; the same must be said of individual cases, or of particular incidents which occurred in the battle. If more are not related, it is only because more have not reached the knowledge of the writer; who would be still most happy to record every particular that would render justice to the brave, and illustrate their professional character.

The following is from an intelligent and distinguished officer, then belonging to the *Ramillies* :—

"In the battle of the 1st of June, a circumstance occurred, not generally known.—In the dreadful contest between the *Brunswick* (commanded by Captain John Harvey) and *Le Vengeur*, one of the bower-anchors of the former ship was shot away; and the cable, not being stoppered within board, ran out its whole length. This naturally brought the ship round-to, and prevented her from veering or waring; at the same time, throwing her close on board of the *Vengeur*: each ship preparing to board. In this situation, they were seen by the *Ramillies*, Captain Henry Harvey, brother of the *Brunswick's* gallant chief, who fell upon that day. He immediately stood to her relief, and placing himself in the most judicious and effectual position, and firing several tremendous broadsides into the stern and quarters of the *Vengeur*, sent her shortly after to the bottom."

The value of sprit-sails, and sprit-sail-top-sails, was seen in this action; the *Ramillies* wore by means of these two sails only, having nothing else in a condition to set upon the ship.

To show, in a striking manner, what it is in the power of particular

circumstances, apparently trifling, to effect in the most critical situations, may be related a remarkable occurrence which took place in the battle of the 1st of June on board the Marlborough. When that ship was entirely dismasted, and otherwise disabled by the extreme severity of the conflict; the Captain (the Hon. G. Berkley) severely wounded; the ship so roughly treated that the officers were considering of the necessity of surrendering;—a *cock*, having escaped from his coop, suddenly perched himself upon the stump of the main-mast, clapped his wings, and crowed with extreme vociferation. In an instant three hearty exhilarating cheers rang throughout the ship's company.

All classes immediately renewed their efforts to defend the ship; victory at the same time appearing to be inclined towards the British fleet, and succour being rendered to the Marlborough,* she was happily rescued from her perilous situation.

On that important day, when Great Britain, single-handed upon the ocean, first opposed herself to the infuriated spirit of revolutionary France; Lord Howe, deeply impressed with the magnitude of the charge entrusted to him, zealous for his country's honour, and perhaps inwardly *exulting* in the prospect before him, could not conceal from the master (the skilful Palinurus of the fleet) his great anxiety to penetrate the enemy's line in the very spot and manner previously determined on. Fearing that the ship of the French Commander-in-chief and his second a-stern would not give him *room* to enter, he called the attention of the master, Mr. (now Commissioner) Bowen, to that object. The undaunted seaman replied, "conning" the ship from the poop-ladder into battle, "Never fear, my Lord, we'll *make* room enough for ourselves presently!"

It is unnecessary to point out how effectually the Admiral was assisted in his great duties by this brave man; while the conduct of the Captain, the late much lamented Sir Andrew Douglas, throughout the whole of this eventful crisis, was greatly conspicuous, by an entire devotion to his country's service.

His Majesty's ship the Brunswick was distinguished by a large figure-head of the Duke of that august house; proudly riding the waves, with his hand upon his sword, and a laced hat upon his head. This figure was in the heat of the battle (1st of June) deprived of his hat by a cannon-ball. The crew of the Brunswick, not feeling satisfied that their great leader should continue uncovered in the face of his enemies, sent a deputation, in form, to the quarter-deck, to request that their Captain (John Harvey) would be pleased to order his servant

* At this moment the *Aquilon*, Captain (the Hon. Sir Robert) Stopford, came to her assistance, and towed her out of the battle.

to give them his *laced cocked hat* to supply the loss. The Captain of course immediately complied; and the hat, *nailed* upon the head of the figure, remained there the rest of the action!*

Of Admiral, the first Lord Gardner (who so greatly distinguished himself in this battle) it may be truly said, that he was one of the most zealous and independent officers that ever the country produced. His thoughts were at all times entirely and solely bent upon rendering service to his country, unmixed with the smallest particle of self-interest. Of this feeling he was so extremely tenacious, that he would not suffer even his secretary to be in any manner connected with prizes and prize concerns. He was also a severe and strict economist of the public stores.

During the time he commanded the Channel fleet, and was blockading that of the enemy in Brest, it was his invariable rule, when standing in for the land, to lead the line himself; then, to tack the fleet together, and lie off under easy sail. By this means he became the sternmost, and the nearest ship to hold communication with the in-shore squadron; and upon tacking again, *together*, the fleet were in line of battle, with their heads for the shore. Such a practice merits imitation; as the Commander-in-chief not only placed himself in the most convenient position for receiving intelligence, but at the same time kept the fleet in the best posture for battle.

When tacked together with their heads off for the night, they formed the *line of bearing* of the tack just left; and upon again tacking together, the line of *battle*. Ships in the former situation (in what is called the bow-and-quarter-line) should be particularly attentive to preserve the bearing.

ADMIRAL HOTHAM'S BATTLE WITH THE FRENCH FLEET OFF GENOA.

* His Majesty's ship *Britannia*, at sea, March 16th, 1795.

"I SHALL not enter into a detail of our proceedings until the two squadrons got sight of each other, and the prospect opened of forcing the enemy to action;

* In this battle Admiral Pasley suffered the amputation of a leg: in reply to an observation respecting it, he said, "never mind the leg; take care of my flag!"

every movement which was made being directed to that object, and that alone.

" Yet the two squadrons did not get sight of each other until the 12th; when that of the enemy was discovered to windward.

" The signal was made for a general chase; the weather being squally, and blowing very fresh, we discovered one of their line-of-battle ships to be without her top-masts, which afforded to Captain Freemantle, in the *Inconstant* frigate, an opportunity to distinguish himself. He was most ably seconded by Captain Nelson of the *Agamemnon*; but they were at this time so far detached from our own fleet, that they were obliged to quit her, as other ships of the enemy were coming up, by one of which she was soon after taken in tow.

" Finding that our heavy ships did not gain on the enemy during the chase, I made the signal for the squadron to form upon the *larboard line of bearing*,* in which order we continued for the night. At day-light next morning (the 14th) we observed the enemy's disabled ship, with the one that had her in tow, to be so far to leeward, and separated from their own squadron, as to afford a probable chance of our cutting them off. The opportunity was not lost; which reduced the enemy to the alternative of abandoning those ships, or coming to battle.

" Although the latter did not appear to be their choice, they yet came down (on the contrary tack to which we were) with the view of supporting them; but the Captain and Bedford were so far advanced, and so closely supported by the other ships of our van, as to cut them off effectually from any assistance that could be given them.

" The conflict ended in the enemy's abandoning them, and firing upon our line as they passed with a light air of wind.

" Our van ships suffered so much by this attack, particularly the *Illustrious* and *Courageux* (having each lost their main and mizen-masts) that it became impossible for any thing further to be done."

Plate XXXI. Fig. 1, shows the position of the two fleets when the French were "first discovered, to windward;" but the tack on which they were standing, or the course steered, is not mentioned: they are placed on the starboard tack; the British fleet on the same tack to leeward.†

Fig. 2. After the signal for a general chase, when the *Agamemnon* and *Inconstant* attacked the disabled ship, and were obliged to quit her.

* On the lines of bearing, see what Paul Hoste says further on.

† *British*, fourteen sail of the line and three or four frigates;—*French*, fifteen sail of the line and four frigates.

North





Fig. 1.

B



South




Fig. 2.

B





Fig. 3.

B






Fig. 3. Not gaining on the enemy, the signal was made to form upon the "*larboard line of bearing* ;"* both fleets still supposed upon the starboard tack ; the Admiral not having denoted his tack, nor that he had put about. The British fleet in this Fig. therefore is placed upon the *larboard* line of bearing, but continuing on the *starboard* tack.

OBSERVATIONS.

It appears, however, not very likely that this should actually have been the position of the British fleet ; but for the sake of inquiry, it may remain so, in order to show the nature of a line of bearing such as that before us ; which by being *tacked together* at once becomes a line of battle on the *larboard* tack.

From a consideration of the circumstances related in the Admiral's letter, it seems probable that the enemy was first encountered upon the *larboard* tack ; and that the British fleet was formed upon the *larboard* line of bearing when chasing upon the *larboard* tack ; and upon the chase being discontinued, the fleet resumed its position, upon the *larboard* line of bearing ; in other words, the line of battle on the *larboard* tack, as in Plate XXXII, Fig. 4, when the leading ships, supported by the van, succeeded in cutting off the two disabled ships of the enemy.

" The French bearing down on the opposite tack with a view to protect them, the conflict ended by the enemy's abandoning them and firing upon our line as they passed."

Here it is to be regretted that the British Admiral should have been satisfied with the capture of two only of the enemy's ships ; for although two of his own were much disabled, and rendered incapable of keeping their stations, yet the same comparative force still remained ; and the British Admiral, by tacking in succession, when in position represented by Figure 4, might have passed through the enemy's line, and brought him to close action, in whatever manner he thought proper ; leaving the frigates, and such others as might be deemed necessary, to take care of the prizes and disabled ships.

Paul Hoste speaks thus upon the lines of bearing in presence of an enemy :

" Quand on prévoit la ligne du plus-près sur laquelle on sera obligé de se battre, on n'attend pas d'être en présence des ennemis pour s'y ranger : mais après avoir mis l'armée sur cette ligne, on fait la route qui convient ; ainsi

* See note further on.

quand le poste des ennemis, ou le lieu du combat, ou quelques autres circonstances, auront fait juger au Général de l'armée, A, B, qu'il faudra se battre sur la ligne du plus-près *stribord*, il rangera son armée sur cette ligne, et ensuite il fera la route qui conviendra, courant vent-arrière, et largue de même bord, comme A, B, I, L, ou vent-arrière, et largue de l'autre bord, comme G, H, C, D, ou au plus-près bas-bord, comme E, F." *P. Hoste, p. 66, pl. 21.*

REMARQUE.

" On ne doit guères ranger l'armée en cet ordre que quand on est à la vûe, et fort près de l'ennemi : car cet ordre est défectueux pour plusieurs raisons : 1. L'armée en cet ordre est trop étendue ; ce qui rend la communication des commandemens fort mal-aisée ; outre que l'armée peut aisément se diviser par la diversité des vents, des courants, des parages, &c. sur tout quand on est peu éloigné des terres.

" 2. L'armée ne courant pas sur la ligne sur quoi elle est rangée, se maintiendra difficilement en ligne, et se trouvera bientôt en desordre. Aussi voions-nous dans la pratique, qu'on ne se sert guères de cet ordre, lors même qu'on n'est pas fort éloigné de l'ennemi."

The following opinions of Paul Hoste may serve as some reply to those who consider that he has not advanced any thing in support of an attack upon a particular part of an enemy's line of battle. The work itself gives many instances of the contrary :—

UPON DOUBLING. PAUL HOSTE.

" L'armée qui est *plus nombreuse* tâchera d'élonger les ennemis, de telle manière qu'elle laisse une *queuë de l'arrière, qui se repliera ensuite sur l'ennemi pour le doubler, et le mettre entre deux feux.*"

" REMARQUE I.

" Si l'armée qui est plus nombreuse est au-vent, elle pourra plus aisément replier sa queuë sur celle de l'ennemi, et le mettre entre deux feux : mais si l'armée qui est plus nombreuse est sous le vent, elle ne doit pas moins laisser une queuë de l'arrière, parceque le vent peut changer durant le combat ;

d'ailleurs, l'armée qui est sous le vent, peut larguer insensiblement en combattant, pour donner lieu à sa queue de se replier sur l'ennemi en pinçant le vent."

" REMARQUE II.

" Je sçai que plusieurs habiles gens sont persuadez qu'il faut *doubler* les ennemis par la tête : parceque si la tête des ennemis est une fois en desordre, elle tombe sur le reste de l'armée ; et elle y met infailliblement la confusion : car si *la tête A, de l'armée A, B, se trouve demâtée, elle tombe sur les vaisseaux qui viennent après, ceux-ci sur les suivans, et bientôt tout les vaisseaux ne pouvant plus avancer, se mêlent, se doublent, s'abordent.* La chose paroîtra vraisemblable, si on ne fait pas réflexion, que les vaisseaux dans l'armée A, B, sont rangez sur une ligne, avec des distances qui donnent lieu au vaisseau A de passer au-vent du vaisseau E, qui pour lui faciliter la chose, peut un peu arriver, sans craindre nulle confusion. La tête A, se tireroit encore plus aisément d'intrigues, si l'armée A, B, étoit sous le vent ; d'où je conclus que ce n'est pas un grand avantage pour l'armée C, D, d'avoir double l'armée A, B, par la tête ; parceque les vaisseaux de l'armée A, B, qui sont desemparez, peuvent se retirer, sans que les vaisseaux G, F, puissent les poursuivre, à moins qu'ils ne veüillent essuier tout le feu de l'armée ennemie, et se mettre en un danger évident de périr. Au contraire, si les vaisseaux L, M, de l'armée C, D, ont doublé la queue B, et que le vaisseau B vienne à être desemparé, il ne peut pas s'empêcher d'être la proie des vaisseaux L, M, qui fondront sur lui, ou qui le feront tomber sur la queue D." *Paul Hoste, p. 376, plate 121.*

The naval square described in all the more modern works on naval tactics is taken from this of Paul Hoste. See his Plate 130, page 409.

ADMIRAL HOTHAM'S BATTLE WITH THE FRENCH FLEET
OFF THE HIERES ISLANDS.

1795.

Extract. Britannia, at Sea, July 19, 1795.

" YESTERDAY, at *day-break*, we discovered them to leeward of us, on the larboard tack, consisting of twenty-three sail, seventeen of which proved to be of the line. The wind at this time blew very hard from the W. N. W. attended with a heavy swell; and six of our ships had to bend main-top-sails in the room of those split in the night."

Plate XXXII, Fig. 1. " I caused the fleet, however, to be formed with all possible expedition on the *larboard line of bearing*, carrying all sail possible to preserve that order, and to keep the wind of the enemy, in hopes of cutting them off from the land; from which we were only five leagues distant.

" At *eight o'clock*, finding *they had no other view but to get from us*, I made the signal for a general chase, and for the ships to take suitable stations for their mutual support; and to engage the enemy as arriving up with them in succession (see Fig. 2, Pl. XXXII); but the baffling winds and vexatious calms, which render every naval operation in this country doubtful, soon afterwards took place, and allowed a few only of our ships to get up with the enemy's rear about noon; which they attacked so warmly, that, in the course of an hour after, we had the satisfaction to find one of the sternmost ships, viz. the Alcide of seventy-four guns, had struck. The rest of their fleet, favoured by a shift of wind to the eastward (that placed them now to windward of us), had got so far into Frejus bay, whilst the major part of ours was becalmed in the offing, that it became impossible for any thing further to be done." (See Fig. 3.)

The British fleet consisted of twenty-three ships of the line, and were to *windward*; that of the enemy of but seventeen. It cannot therefore appear surprising that seventeen should have had but one object in view, namely, to escape if they could.

Plate XXXII,* Fig. 1, shows the supposed position of the two fleets in the

* It appears, from an officer who was in the British fleet, that it was formed in two lines on the *starboard* tack, as in the figure c. c.




Fig. 4.




Fig. 1.




Fig. 2.




Fig. 3.

morning when first discovered ; the British fleet forming the "*larboard line of bearing*." As the Admiral has not said that he was steering a particular course, we are left to conclude they must have been nearly upon a wind, or in a line of battle on the larboard tack.

Fig. 2, represents the British fleet bearing down in general chase, preserving their order ; namely, the larboard line of bearing, or that point of the compass which is six points from the wind on the larboard tack.

As this is frequently confounded with, and misunderstood for, the relative, or reciprocal bearing, and will continue to mislead if not more closely examined, it is necessary here to enter more fully into an explanation of it, since it is a point or part of our tactics highly important to be clearly understood.

The relative bearing of ships is the reciprocal bearing they have to each other in their different orders and evolutions ; but very distinct from the "*lines of bearing*," starboard and larboard, as described and intended by the general instructions, contained in the signal book now issued.

For instance, with the wind at *north* (as the "*line of bearing*" must always have relation to the wind), the larboard line of bearing will be E. N. E. or six points from the wind on the larboard tack : the starboard line of bearing W. N. W. or six points from the wind on the starboard tack.

The wind upon this occasion being W. N. W. the larboard line of bearing was, consequently, north and south, or six points from the wind ; when ships were formed in line of battle upon that tack. Arranged upon that line, or preserving that order, a fleet may be sailing any course, large, or before the wind, that the Admiral may think proper ; the intention and utility of such order or disposition being the ease with which, from that order, it can become a line of battle ; which is performed by *hauling the wind together* upon the larboard tack.

With the wind at W. N. W. the "*starboard line of bearing*" is S. W. and N. E. or six points from the wind on the starboard tack ; and had the Admiral fallen in with the enemy upon that tack, he might have chased him upon the starboard line of bearing (or S. W. and N. E. line), with a view to the facility of forming a line of battle, by bringing his fleet *together to the wind* on the starboard tack, whenever he had approached the enemy's line sufficiently near to have brought him to action. But to close the account of this engagement, Plate XXXII, Fig. 3, describes the van of the British fleet having brought the rear of the enemy to action : when one ship of the line was captured, and the wind shifting, nothing more could be effected.

OBSERVATIONS.

In considering the proceedings of the British fleet on the morning of the 18th July, it cannot escape the attention of a careful observer, that much time appears to have elapsed from day-break in the morning, when the enemy was first seen to leeward, to the period of the general chase: since we are at the same time told, it was evidently their intention to get away; and that the land, from which it was the wish of the British Admiral to cut them off, was distant only five leagues.

Six ships having to shift their main-top-sails, ought not to have prevented the British fleet from immediately bearing down to the attack; as the most effectual mode of cutting them off from the land; the prospect of which never occurred again. These are lessons which should never be forgotten by a sea officer, and such opportunities once lost may never return.

We see that, "by the baffling winds and vexatious calms" which followed, few only of the van could get up with the enemy about noon; and but one ship was captured. The wind then shifted, giving the enemy the weather-gage; and all was over.

LORD BRIDPORT'S CAPTURE OF THREE SHIPS
OFF L'ORIENT.

1795.

THIS capture was effected by a chase of great zeal and perseverance on the part of the British fleet; which was considerably superior to that of the enemy. It does not appear that any thing more could have been done; and it was by great exertion that any part of the British fleet succeeded in cutting off the three line of battle ships of the enemy close to the port of L'Orient, to which place the rest of them made their escape.

In all long pursuits, like this, with light and variable wind, ships are much separated; many, by superiority of sailing, are far advanced before their com-

panions. These had the advantage, and to them belonged the danger and honour of the day, as all that could be done was effected before the body of the fleet could reach the scene of action.

It has since been considered, that justice will not be rendered to the parties who had the good fortune to distinguish themselves upon this occasion, if the conduct of the fleet be not more fully entered into; and this cannot be done so well as by giving extracts of Lord Bridport's letter; with some information relative to the situation of the two fleets at the close of the battle, from an officer who was present.

“ Royal George, at sea, June 24th, 1795.

“ His Majesty's squadron under my command attacked the enemy's fleet, consisting of twelve ships of the line, attended with eleven frigates, and some smaller cruizers, on the 23d instant, close in with the port of L'Orient.

“ The ships which struck are *Le Formidable*, *L'Alexandre*, and *Le Tigre*; which were with difficulty retained. If the enemy had not been sheltered by the land, I have every reason to believe that a much greater number would have been taken or destroyed.”

“ Early in the morning of the 23d instant, the headmost ships, the *Irresistible*, *Orion*, *Queen Charlotte*, *Russell*, *Colossus*, and *Sans-Pareil*, were pretty well up with the enemy; and a little before six o'clock the action began, and continued till near nine. When the ships struck, the British squadron was near to some batteries, and in the face of a strong naval port; which will manifest to the public, the zeal, intrepidity, and skill, shown by all employed upon this service.”

OBSERVATIONS.

The wind, although not mentioned by the Admiral, was from the southward, and the chase was from the dawn of day of the 22d, and continued with very little of it, until the following morning.

The French squadron, upon approaching the S. E. end of Groix, found they could not weather it, and were obliged in consequence to keep away under easy sail, to round the N. W. point of it, before they could haul in for L'Orient.

The British fleet, not aware of the dilemma into which they had fallen, after the capture of the three ships, unfortunately retired with their prizes; whereas, had a few ships of the line, *well in* with Groix, and not able to fetch the weathermost ships of the enemy, posted themselves for mutual support, off, and *close in* with the N. W. point, many more of the enemy's fleet must have been intercepted and brought to action, and most likely would have shared the

fate of their companions. At this time there was no signal by which the wishes of the Commander-in-chief to this effect could be signified; and the opportunity was lost before it was possible to convey instructions by other means.

A better acquaintance with this coast at a subsequent period enabled a distinguished officer, in a ship of seventy-four guns, by running in between the Isle of Groix (or Groa) and L'Orient, and anchoring his ship, to destroy a squadron of two frigates and a corvette, returning with the plunder of a long cruize. If the detail of single exploits came within the scope of the present work, this would make a conspicuous figure. It was effected in the face of several strong batteries, under imminent risk of either running upon the rocks, or suffering the enemy to escape.

The gallant and much-esteemed Admiral, under whose orders this service was performed, observed, that "it was the only thing ever done at sea, which, was it to do again, could not be done better."

It happened in the month of May, 1812.

THE RETREAT OF ADMIRAL THE HON. W. CORNWALLIS.

June, 1795.

ALTHOUGH this cannot strictly be considered in the light of a general action, yet it is an event of so peculiar a nature, a display of conduct so highly honourable to the British naval character, that it would be an unpardonable injustice to the memory of the great Admiral to whom the glory is due, and to the merit of his brave associates, if some account of it was not attempted. A description of this celebrated retreat, therefore, the pride and boast of the British navy, claims place, as a sacred duty, at the hands, however humble, of a professional man.

We must begin by extracts from the Admiral's account of it.

"On the 16th in the morning, I sent the Phaeton a-head, to look for any of the enemy's ships upon the coast; and stood after her with the rest of the ships (Royal Sovereign, Mars, Triumph, Brunswick, Bellerophon, and Pallas). At

Fig. 1.




Fig. 2.




Fig. 1.





Fig. 2.



ten she made the signal for a fleet a-head. I made the signal to haul the wind upon the starboard tack ; thirty sail were then counted upon a wind directly to leeward of us.

“ Upon asking their force, Captain Stopford answered, thirteen ships of the line, fourteen frigates, two brigs, and a cutter ; in all thirty sail ; near half of them tacked in shore ; in the afternoon the wind fell and came to the northward off the land, and of course brought those ships of the enemy which had tacked to windward, and the other ships laid up for us. They were seen in the morning before day-light upon both quarters of the squadron.

“ At nine in the morning, one of the front line-of-battle ships began to fire upon the Mars. Their frigates were ranged up a-breast of us to windward, except one, which kept to leeward and ran up upon the larboard quarter of the Mars ; then yawed and fired ; which was frequently repeated. This was the only frigate that attempted any thing.

“ The line-of-battle ships came up in succession ; and a teasing fire, with intervals, was kept up during the whole day. In the evening they made a show of a more serious attack on the Mars, and obliged me to bear up for her support. This was their last effort, if any thing they did can deserve that appellation.

“ Several shot were fired for two hours after ; but they appeared to be drawing off ; and before sun-set their whole fleet had tacked, and were standing from us. The Mars and Triumph, being the sternmost ships, were of course more exposed to the enemy's fire,” &c.

DESCRIPTION.

Plate XXXIII, Fig. 1, shows the relative position of the British squadron (consisting of five sail of the line and two frigates) and the French fleet when first seen and reported by Captain Stopford ; thirteen sail of the line, fourteen frigates, two brigs, and a cutter ; and when the British Admiral “ hauled upon the starboard tack, with all our sail, keeping the ships collected.” They are therefore placed in line of battle on the starboard tack.

Fig. 2, represents their situation when nearly half of the French fleet had tacked in shore, with a view of taking advantage of the land wind : which they probably expected during the night ; by which they might reach the British squadron.

Plate XXXIV, Fig. 1, describes a more advanced state of the attack.

Fig. 2.—In the evening, when they made a show of a more serious attack upon the Mars, the Admiral wore round, as in this figure, to her protection.

Thus ended this memorable defence, which can never be sufficiently admired or extolled : it will ever hold up to British seamen a brilliant example of what can be effected by skill, unanimity, and courage. In the language of the dauntless Chief, " Could common prudence have allowed me to let loose their valour, I hardly know what might not have been accomplished by such men."

French officers, present in this action, have declared, that the determined resolution shown by this little band of heroes, the management of their ships, and their steady and destructive fire, perfectly appalled them ; and they left them, satisfied with having done all that was in their power. The modest Admiral says nothing of his own fire, but the enemy have done justice to its powerful effect upon them.

REMARK.

" I never have been able to view this retreat in so high a light as it has been so often placed. Admiral Cornwallis deserves every credit for doing all he could, and no brave man would have done less. Had the French attacked this squadron seriously, it would have sold itself dearly ; but it must have been overpowered. As in Barrington's affair at St. Lucie, I take more credit from the French, than I am disposed to give to the English."

In a contest like this, it cannot be doubted that if our ships' *sterns* were formed into *circular batteries* they would prove of the greatest advantage ; giving to the British ships the power of defending themselves with ease and security, and much more effectually than with the square sterns.

OF ADMIRAL CORNWALLIS.

When Admiral Cornwallis commanded the Channel fleet, and was occupied in watching the motions of the enemy on the coast of France, it once happened that he was so sanguine in his hopes of an opportunity to bring him to close action, that, compelled to anchor for the night in sight of the enemy's fleet, outside of the harbour of Brest, he during the night dispatched a cutter round the fleet, with the following memorandum.

" The Commander-in-chief intends to attack the enemy to-morrow morning ; when every ship is to take, sink, burn, and destroy as many of their fleet as possible ; he will himself lead in the *Ville de Paris*."

The fleet was all under weigh at dawn of day standing for the French fleet ; which had also lost no time in weighing their anchors to escape into Brest. Every exertion was made on the part of the British fleet to come up with them,

after sustaining a heavy cannonade from the batteries around the entrance of Brest harbour. Upon this occasion the gallant Admiral led the body of the fleet, stating as his reason, that no person could so well judge as himself, of the proper time and expediency of tacking, to relinquish the attempt. He was struck on the breast by a part of a shell fired from one of the batteries.

To adhere strictly to truth, and give what is due to Sir Richard Strachan, it must be stated, that the *Cæsar*, being a look-out ship in the direction of the enemy, was, in reality, the headmost ship upon this occasion; nor would he yield his advantage to the Commander-in-chief, who, nevertheless, was foremost of the main body; observing that a junior officer might be exposed to blame without deserving it, by tacking, when the Commander-in-chief, at a greater distance, could not judge of his situation.

The plan of flag-officers taking the lead, upon all important occasions, has before been recommended. "Billy Blue," as Admiral Cornwallis was nicknamed by the seamen, was a man of very reserved habits and manners; of few signals, and fewer words; but no one could have done the business more effectually than he would.

The *Cæsar*, upon being broken up very lately in the dock-yard at Plymouth, was found to be more full of *shot* than any ship that had before been examined in that yard. In obedience to the signal to "harass the enemy's rear," the *Cæsar*, Sir Richard Strachan; the *Montague*, Captain R. W. Otway; and the *Indefatigable*, Captain Rodd, had an opportunity to distinguish themselves.

The unusual manner of waring the fleet practised by this officer should not be overlooked; for, although it may not have been adopted by others, experience and consideration may, at a future time, render it less objectionable than by many it is thought at present. The following description of it, therefore, is given by the same officer to whom the writer was first indebted for his able assistance and valuable remarks:—

"I happened to be but a very short time in company with the Channel fleet during the practice of Admiral Cornwallis's novel manœuvre of waring. The manner of execution was this:—On the signal being made for waring (and he established a particular one for this operation) his second a-stern shortened all sail, and manœuvred so as to admit the Admiral to pass a-head of him; all sail was then made by the second a-stern, until he had wore and gained his station a-stern of the Admiral. The same operation was continued in succession through the line; and, I think, the advantage of it consisted in the fleet preserving its ground to windward better than by the former mode of waring and passing to leeward of the whole line.

"I never witnessed this evolution at night, but was told that it was occasionally practised; and, in clear and moderate weather, it might be done with safety.

"For myself, I should always prefer waring sternmost and leewardmost first, keeping the line of bearing on one tack, and the line a-head on the other. It affords more practice, and renders the order of sailing (otherwise dull and monotonous) a perpetual school of observation and nautical practice.

Upon this subject another experienced flag officer observes: "For my part, I cannot but think that all general evolutions by a fleet should be performed *together*, whether in moderate or in blowing weather. This would insensibly lead to the exercise of all other manœuvres; for officers, being accustomed to keep their stations in the bow-and-quarter line, would very soon comprehend, without much trouble, the other movements. This, I understand, was Lord St. Vincent's mode of conducting his fleet. I think, also, that the Commander-in-chief's position should be to windward, a-breast of the Admiral's ship of the van division. Here he would be visible to the whole fleet, a circumstance that rarely occurs, in the mode at present adopted, when the fleet is numerous, and in three divisions. Moreover I am of opinion that the movements would be simplified, if the van was always the weather division instead of the centre; which, with Lord Howe, was always stationed the most to windward."

Of Admiral Cornwallis's singular manœuvre, one more opinion will be given. It was kindly transmitted in compliance with a request, and from the hand of an able and experienced seaman.

QUESTION.

"When a fleet is formed in the order of sailing in three divisions upon a wind, and the weather will not admit of tacking, what is your opinion upon ships waring in succession, the headmost first, and coming to the wind upon the other tack *a-head* of their *seconds* a-stern?"

ANSWER.

"In considering this question, so materially varying from the usual mode, it becomes necessary well to examine the several circumstances that may arise in practice to defeat the accomplishment of it; together with a consideration of the utility, and the degree of risk attending the performance of it; but more especially as it may affect the efficient state of a fleet for service.

“ Experience has fully proved, that when the weather is boisterous, or there is too much wind and sea for a fleet to tack, the ships will occupy more time and space in waring, than when the sea is smooth, or the wind sufficiently moderate to manage the sails with facility; likewise, that ships varying in their construction are extremely different in their movements. These and such like uncertainties would render it indispensably necessary to form a fleet in a very extended order of sailing, previous to the execution of this evolution; for which I do not consider it an exaggeration to state, that the distance of each ship from her second a-stern should not be less than three times what the established regulation at two cables prescribes. But it is evident that such an extension of the ships would militate against the first principle upon which an order of sailing was established; namely, for the forming in line-of-battle, either by day or night, in the shortest possible time, with the least degree of risk, combined with such a safe disposition of the ships as should best favour this object. It would not be consistent with the naval service to contemplate the ships of a fleet otherwise than as one combined body, arranged in such an efficient state of constant preparation, as should best enable them to meet all the exigencies that might arise.

“ In the event of a fleet being formed in such a sufficient open order of sailing as would favour the evolution in question; and should an enemy's fleet be discovered at a short distance, either at day-break, or during the night; and a consequent necessity arise for immediately forming in line-of-battle;—it is obvious, from the increased distance between all the ships, that the sternmost ship of the weather, or van division of the fleet, would, at that moment, be separated from the headmost ship of the centre division, at three times the distance that would be required in the same state of weather, when in the usual prescribed order of sailing. Consequently there would be a loss of time, in forming in line-of-battle, equal to the increased distance the sternmost ship would have to run, in order to take her station a-head of the leading ship of the centre division.

“ The leeward, or rear division of the fleet, would experience an equal delay in forming in line-of-battle. The commander of this division would, probably, deem it expedient to allow the same time for the ships of the rear division to close, as the ships of the centre would require, before he made the signal to ware together in furtherance of the object in contemplation; as, by a contrary proceeding, in the open order in which the fleet would be sailing, the headmost ships of the rear division, after waring, would meet the centre ships of the centre division; and be obliged either to shorten sail before approaching too near, or else to bear up and pass to leeward and a-stern of the remaining ships; whilst

many of the rear column, then in a line of bearing, would be unable to close with their leader until again formed in a line a-head, a-stern of the centre division; and thus occasion a still further loss of time. Should the columns be previously separated to a distance proportionate to the extension of the ships in each column in order to guard against their meeting on opposite tacks; then the loss of time in completing a line-of-battle would be considerably augmented, as a separation of two cables' length to leeward would require a distance of something more than five cables to be run, in order to recover the original position to windward.

"The great difference that is observable in the rate of ships sailing, in proportion as the sea may be more or less on their broadsides or bows, presents an additional obstacle to the safe execution of this evolution. It is likely often to occur, that the ships of each division, after running the distance to leeward that is unavoidable in waring, and then coming to the wind, and *bowing** the sea with little way through the water; whilst their seconds a-stern were more rapidly advancing, would find it very hazardous to pass a-head of their seconds a-stern. But, should the direction of the sea be reversed, and the rate of sailing increased in the same proportion, when on the opposite tack, whilst the rear ships were slowly advancing; then it might be practicable to ware and pass with safety a-head of their seconds a-stern: but the certain consequence would be, with such extended columns, that the headmost ships of the centre and rear divisions would meet on opposite tacks the centre ships of the columns next to windward of each other; and thus occasion an ultimate increased separation of the columns, proportionate to their length; as the leading ships would necessarily have to bear up, and pass to leeward and a-stern of the rear ships. Should the ships of the columns, as they successively ware, close again with their corresponding ships in the columns next to leeward, by running parallel with them to windward of their respective columns; and preserving, at the same time, their relative bearings; it is evident that each time the fleet was directed to ware, there would be a loss of distance to leeward, equal to three times what would be lost, were the fleet, from a compact order of sailing, to ware the headmost first, and to pass to leeward and a-stern of their respective columns; admitting that the distance I have suggested, as being necessary between each ship should not be greater than the several detailed circumstances that may occur in practice would render prudent to allow. Those

* *Bowing* the sea is when a turbulent sea presents itself more a-head, or on the bows of a ship and obstructs her course: it also occasions a very heavy *pitching* or plunging motion, frequently springing a mast or yard.

officers who have witnessed the performance of this evolution, as being frequently practised, well know that, at day-break, the rear-ships of the columns have been *hull down** a-stern from their leaders: so great has been the apprehension of danger from not allowing space sufficient between the ships.

“ It may, on a cursory consideration of this question, be imagined that, when the leading ships of each division, and others in succession, have wore, and come to the wind, on the opposite tack, a-head of their seconds a-stern, the fleet by this evolution will have gained an advantage by preserving its position to windward.

“ Although I think enough has been already advanced, to refute such a misconception; yet I will consider this view of the subject separately; and, more generally, as it appears to furnish some pretext for its adoption. I have to observe, that what the leading ships of each column would gain to windward, by thus waring a-head of their seconds a-stern, the rear ships, and particularly the lee columns, would lose in a greater proportion, by necessarily keeping so far a-stern and to leeward. As a fleet, for all efficient purposes, must be considered to act and move as a whole; consequently, as the leading ships of each division, after waring, would be obliged to shorten all possible sail, and to continue in that state for a much longer period than would otherwise be necessary to enable the ships to close, before an effectual line-of-battle could be formed; it follows, that as time, and distance to be run, are as one to the other, the ships composing a fleet thus separated, would not, considered as a body, gain any advantage to windward; but, on the contrary, the loss of time from the increased distances would be very considerable: nor would it in any way affect this question, whether the columns were previously formed in open order, commensurate to the length of the columns, or not: for such a separation would be produced, whenever the fleet was directed to ware in the manner under consideration; and the loss of time, as I have before shown, would be proportionate to the distance to be recovered.

“ It may not be out of place here to remark, as connected with the foregoing observations, that the prescribed distances of the columns, in the established order of sailing, has always a reference to an assumed number of ships in each column; and a consequent arrangement is made, sufficient for general purposes, to guard the leading ships from to leeward, against the risk of meeting the rear ships to windward, when tacking in succession; preserving, at the same time,

* “ *Hull down*” is when the hull of a ship, from her distance, is not to be seen from the deck of another—her masts and sails only appearing above the horizon.

the ships of the fleet in as compact a state as possible for immediate service. Thus when a fleet is formed in order of sailing in two columns, or grand divisions, it is assumed, that the length of each is greater than when formed in three columns; and, in consequence, their distance is fixed at one mile and a half. When the fleet is formed in three columns, it is presumed there are a greater number of ships; but, being thus divided, the columns are less in length than in the former instance, and the distances between each are reduced to one mile. When the number of ships is still augmented, the fleet is divided into three squadrons of two columns each; the distances between the squadrons being fixed at one mile; assuming that the length of each, when the fleet is so divided, would be comparatively short. But if, from this disposition in six columns, the Commander-in-Chief should deem it advisable to form the fleet in three columns; which would have the effect of doubling the length of each; no change would be requisite in the general arrangement of distances, as by the established regulations, the weather columns of each squadron would be already at the prescribed distance from each other, of one mile and a half. The same degree of general precaution is observed, to guard the leading ships as far as seems necessary, from meeting those to windward, when tacking in succession; as when the fleet is composed of fewer ships divided in two grand divisions; thus manifesting throughout an attention to the security of the whole, whilst the most compact order of sailing is preserved.

“ With respect to the general safety of the ships, I think great danger would attend the practice of this mode of waring, particularly during the night, from the uncertainty of the precise distances of the seconds a-stern, as well as of the rate of approximation of ships when crossing on opposite tacks. The experience of almost every officer will furnish him with proof sufficient to verify this latter observation; and bring to his recollection instances of ships, by daylight, which, when attempting to cross, have both been obliged to heave in stays, to prevent the otherwise unavoidable result of running on board of each other.

“ Should the general arrangements now in force for the safe conduct of the fleet be departed from; as they necessarily must be, to enable the ships to ware a-head of their seconds a-stern; and this mode of waring be adopted; I am of opinion that the general security and order of the fleet, as well as its efficiency, would be materially impaired, without obtaining any one desirable object.”

Fig. 1.




Fig. 2.




Fig. 3.





Fig. 4.



THE ENGAGEMENT OF SIR JOHN JERVIS

(AFTERWARDS EARL ST. VINCENT)

WITH THE SPANISH FLEET OFF CAPE ST. VINCENT,

February 14, 1797.

WE come now to the bold attack of the British fleet, under Sir John Jervis, on a very superior force of Spaniards; and the capture of four ships of the line.

Extract from the Public Dispatch.

"I anxiously awaited the dawn of day; when, being on the starboard tack, Cape St. Vincent bearing E. N. E. eight leagues, I had the satisfaction of seeing a number of ships extended from S. W. to S., the wind then W. by S.; at forty-nine minutes past ten, the weather being extremely hazy, La Bonne Citoyenne made the signal that the ships seen were of the line, twenty-five in number.

"His Majesty's squadron under my command, consisting of fifteen ships of the line, named in the margin, happily formed in the most compact order of sailing in two lines. By carrying a press of sail, I was fortunate in getting in with the enemy's fleet, at half-past eleven, before it had time to collect, and form a regular order of battle. Such a moment was not to be lost; and confident in the skill, valour, and discipline of the officers and men I had the happiness to command;—and judging that the honour of his Majesty's arms, and the circumstances of the war in these seas, required a considerable degree of enterprise, I felt myself justified in departing from the regular system; and passing through their fleet, in a line formed with the utmost celerity, tacked, and thereby separated one-third from the main body; after a partial cannonade, which prevented their rejunction till the evening;—and by the very great exertions of the ships which had the good fortune to arrive up with the enemy on the larboard tack, the ships named in the margin were captured, and the action ceased about five in the evening."

DESCRIPTION DEDUCIBLE FROM THE ADMIRAL'S LETTER.

Plate XXXV, Fig. 1, represents the relative position of the hostile fleets, when first discovered to each other in the morning, extended from S. W. to S.

Both fleets were, at first, on the same tack. The Spaniards *afterwards* tacked, and continued on the larboard tack.

Fig. 2. By the prompt, skilful, and spirited decision of the British Admiral, the fleets are supposed to be now in the situation described by Figure 2; where the British squadron, in "a line formed with the utmost celerity," had passed through and separated one-third of the enemy's fleet from the main body. The Admiral's letter says nothing of the Spanish fleet tacking.

OBSERVATIONS.

The judgment which directed this movement, and the alacrity and precision with which it was carried into effect, cannot be sufficiently admired, and were productive of the advantage and success it deserved. Yet as, from this position, a different mode of attack presents itself to a seaman's eye, he may be permitted to indulge himself by submitting it to the consideration of others. Let it be observed that the Figures from 1 to 4 consider the Spaniards to have remained on the *starboard* tack, and that the larger proportion was to *leeward*: this was *not* the case.

The Admiral tells us, he "then tacked, whereby he separated," &c.: while the van was, by signal, tacking in succession, the action had become very close and severe in the rear; the enemy to windward having borne up, with a view to pass round the rear of the British fleet, to join their main body to leeward.

Commodore Nelson, in the Captain, one of the rear ships, seeing the intention, immediately bore up out of the line to prevent it; in this he was followed by two or three others; and the contest in this part of the line became very severe—the Captain having two of the enemy's ships alongside of her at the same time; but they effectually frustrated the enemy's design, and ultimately captured four of them.

In this situation, then, it is presumed, was the rear of the British squadron, when, "by the great exertions of the ships which had the good fortune to arrive up with the enemy on the larboard tack," the victory was secured.

Plate XXXV, Fig. 3, shows the supposed situation of the fleets, when, according to signal, the van of the British fleet had tacked in succession. About this time the events before mentioned were taking place in the rear; and it will be seen by the distance of the van, that considerable time must elapse, and "great exertions" were necessary to enable them to render any support to the ships engaged; but their arrival put a decisive period to the battle.

Fig. 4. Instead of the British squadron tacking in succession, it is here proposed that they should tack together.

By this movement, it is conceived that the Spanish division to windward might have been attacked to greater advantage: the action, by being more general, would have been less severe upon the few, and the success still greater than it proved: it is difficult to see how, under such circumstances, any of the separated ships could have escaped; while the British squadron, should it be necessary, by *tacking again together*, would be in a line of *battle*, ready to act on the defensive against the designs of the main body of the fleet.

Remark.—"Another mode equally eligible is waring the fleet, sternmost ships first, and the rest in succession."

What may occasionally be presented, differing from established practice, and from modes adopted by brave and experienced officers, is submitted as questions for their consideration, and an appeal to their judgment, rather than, by any means, to imply censure.

"I agree with the proposed suggestion of tacking together; and, had not Lord St. Vincent commanded the fleet, I should consider that an oversight had been committed, in taking the van so far beyond the enemy that it did not tack until his rear was a-breast of that of the Spaniards.

"Forming the *line* appears to have been unnecessary: had the weather division of our fleet kept its wind, it would have closed with, and intermingled with, the enemy's weather ships; while the lee division, closing up to leeward, would have doubled on them, and at the same time prevented a junction. Plate XXXVI, Fig. 1.

"I am ready to allow it was more prudent to attack as Lord St. Vincent did; but, having done so, he should have tacked sooner and together, or sternmost first."

In this plan of attack, the lee division of the British fleet is exposed to the attack of a much superior force, by the *tacking together* of the enemy's line to leeward of it. It is daring in the extreme—and, should the lee division of the enemy be otherwise than in a close line of battle, much advantage might be reaped from it.

Notes on the battle of the 14th of February, 1797, collected from Officers who were then on board the ship of the Commander-in-Chief.

When the Spanish fleet was first seen, it was standing on the starboard tack, scattered and divided. As the British fleet advanced, the Spaniards *tacked*, and

part was to windward, and part to leeward of the British fleet; the *weather*-part being the most numerous. In an irregular line it was steering away from the wind to go round the rear of the British fleet, to join the other division of their own.

The leeward part of the Spanish fleet was keeping its wind on the *larboard* tack, trying to weather the British van; but in the attempt received the heavy fire of the leading ships, and more particularly of the Victory, the ship of the British Admiral; who only just weathered the ship of the Spanish Admiral, which hove in stays under the Victory's fire, and suffered very severely.

The British van then tacked; and, followed by the Victory, carried all the sail they could to assist the rear of the British line, warmly engaged with the windward division of the Spaniards. Plate XXXVI, Fig. 2, is intended to represent the battle about this period, and before the "Captain," the ship of Commodore Nelson, had wore to stop their leading ships.

Upon his ship being disabled, Commodore Nelson went on board the Minerva, Captain G. Cockburn, whom he directed to take him to the first ship he could reach that was closely engaged with the enemy; but the signal being then made to discontinue the action, he went on board the Victory; where he was received with open arms by the great Chief, and greeted with the warmest cordiality.

The Commodore afterwards hoisted his broad pendant on board the Irresistible, Captain George Martin.

The fleets separated, by the British fleet continuing on the starboard tack, and the Spaniards on the larboard tack, leaving four large ships in our possession.

" His Majesty's ship Prince George, Lagos Bay, Feb. 18th, 1797.

" *Extract of a Letter from Sir W. Parker.*

"About a quarter before eleven the signal for the line-of-battle without regard to the order prescribed; the enemy now being open to our view, in a disordered line upon the larboard tack: the King's fleet upon the starboard tack. At forty-two minutes past eleven the signal to cut through the enemy's line, I being the only flag officer in the van, this was effected by the Culloden, Blenheim, myself in the Prince George, Orion, and Colossus. The Culloden passed through, leaving some ships of the enemy between the Prince George and herself; the other four of us were close after each other, which occasioned the enemy's ships left in the rear, though the two headmost were three-deckers, to tack, and make a great deal of sail. At forty-eight minutes past eleven the signal to engage,

which continued during our passing through a number of the enemy's ships, upon the contrary tack in no regular order, close on board of some, and others more distant, and until eighteen minutes past twelve, when we tacked per signal, in which time the Colossus lost her fore and fore-topsail yards.

"At twenty minutes past one o'clock, the signal to cut back through the enemy's line and engage them to leeward. When we tacked, the two three-deckers tacked after us, and which the rest of the enemy's rear were about to do, but the Commander-in-Chief, with the centre and rear followed close, and covered us from their attack, and obliged them to re-tack, engaging that part of the enemy's fleet, and effectually dividing it.

"Commodore Nelson, in the Captain, being in the rear of our line upon the starboard tack, tacked, and joined the ships with me in the van. We got up with the enemy's van, now considerably the larger number, and in great disorder, at a quarter-past one o'clock, upon the larboard tack, and began to engage, close on board of them.

"At forty-three minutes past one the signal by my order for the ships a-head to fill and stand on, which I found necessary to repeat at three o'clock. The Commander-in-Chief arriving up in the rear of the Orion, my second a-stern repeated it also. This part of the action was supported until this time by the Culloden, Captain, Blenheim, Prince George, and Orion: during which time the enemy never formed; therefore, though we had the fire of two or three of them together, yet, from their disordered state, our fire had a great effect upon them, for it could not be lost, even if it had not the full effect upon the ships we were more particularly opposed to. They were so huddled together, I've no doubt but that they did each other a great deal of injury; by this time five of them became very much disabled, and the Excellent, at twenty-three minutes past three, closed with one to windward and she struck her colours, and one of the three-deckers we had engaged and left in our rear much disabled, struck, I believe to the Victory.

"Soon after, from the disabled state of the "Captain," (fore-top mast gone) she fell on board one of the ships she had been opposed to, but whether from exact intention of Commodore Nelson I am to learn, however he boarded her and made her strike, and a three-decker bearing a Rear Admiral's flag, struck to the fire of the Prince George, and from her disabled state fell on board the same ship Commodore Nelson was on board of, upon the quarter, on the other side. By this time the Namure passed between the Prince George, Culloden, and the Saint Trinidad of 130 guns, Don Cordova, Commander-in-Chief; the ship was apparently in a sinking state, but receiving timely support, was saved the necessity of surrendering, though it was asserted that she did strike her colours. At sun-

set the signal to ware and come to the wind on the other tack; to form in close order of battle and cover the prizes.

" I feel it incumbent on me to say, that the Captain, Culloden, and Blenheim, but more particularly the two former, bore more of the brunt of the action than the Prince George and Orion, from their being more in the van. The Commander-in-Chief certainly displayed great naval abilities in conducting the attack, and in the management throughout, and I do not believe the King has a more competent officer.

" I fully believe that more acts of gallantry were shown than could possibly have come within my observation," &c. &c.

By the unwearied diligence of a naval friend, the writer is enabled to lay before the reader some further accounts of this celebrated battle. They are extracts from " A Journal of the Proceedings of H. M. Fleet on the 14th of February, 1797, by an officer on board one of the ships that bore a distinguished share in the action : " with a plan, a copy of which is given in Plate XXXVI, Fig. 3.

" After passing over the mention of several signals by different ships, denoting the appearance of a strange fleet, we shall proceed at once to those made when it was at length clearly discovered through the fog, and at fifty-five minutes past ten, by the Bonne Citoyenne, declared by signal to be twenty-five sail of the line. The enemy a-head endeavouring to form on the larboard tack. Observed one of their line-of-battle ships with her fore-top-mast gone. At eleven the Admiral made the signal to form the line of battle a-head and a-stern of the Admiral as most convenient, steering S. S. W. At sixteen minutes past eleven the signal to alter course one point to port in succession. At twenty-five minutes past eleven, that the Victory would take her station a-stern of the Colossus. At twenty-seven minutes past eleven, to alter course one point to starboard in succession. Observed a Vice Admiral in a three-decked ship, four two-deckers and some frigates of the enemy separate from the body of the fleet, and bear up with the wind on the starboard quarter, steering about S. E.

" At twenty-nine minutes past eleven the signal was made, that the Admiral intends to pass through between the ships of their line for engaging them to leeward, when having the weather-gage of the enemy; or, being to leeward, to pass between them, for obtaining the weather-gage. The enemy's five ships in the S. E. hauled their wind, and endeavoured to form on the starboard tack.

" At thirty-four minutes past eleven the signal to come to the wind on the starboard tack in succession, our rear and centre forming as they arrived up.

" The Culloden took her station a-head in the line of battle; the Blenheim

second; the Prince George on her lee-bow, the Orion on her lee-quarter. At thirty-five minutes past eleven the signal was made to engage. The Culloden began a warm and well-directed fire, which was immediately returned by the enemy's van and centre; and the action soon became general, as the fleets passed on opposite tacks. At twelve, having passed the rear of the enemy, the Culloden tacked by signal. Observed five sail of the line and some frigates of the enemy to leeward to tack to the northward. At six minutes past twelve the Blenheim tacked, and closed with the Culloden: the Prince George and Orion also tacked and formed in her rear. At 12^h 19' the Colossus carried away her fore and fore-top-sail-yard, in stays, but wore immediately, and came to the wind on the larboard tack: the enemy's fleet bearing N. by E., distant about two or three miles, going large, with the wind abaft their beam.

" At 12^h 22' the Admiral made the signal that he intended to pass between the enemy, for obtaining the weather-gage. At 12^h 30' the Spanish Admiral with five sail in the S. E. opened their fire on the Victory and centre of our fleet in passing them. At 33 minutes past twelve, the Spanish Admiral all a-back, and the Victory in stays. The five Spanish ships wore and stood to the southward. At 12^h 35' observed *H. M. ship Captain steer and make sail to the northward, on the larboard tack*. At 12^h 42' the Captain took her station in the van, a-head of the Culloden, and both engaged the centre of the enemy, seemingly in great confusion. At one, signal for ships to take suitable stations for mutual support, and engage as arriving up with the enemy. At 1^h 13' the signal for the Minerva to take the Colossus in tow. At 1^h 25' the signal to come to the wind in succession on the larboard tack. The Culloden and Captain with their mizen-top-sails a-back, their sails and rigging much cut. At two, one of the enemy's ships had her main-top-mast shot away. At 2^h 30' the Blenheim warmly engaged, having a four-decked ship on her larboard beam, two two-deckers nearly a-stern of her, and another to windward, keeping up a constant fire. The smoke clearing away a little, saw an enemy with his mizen-mast gone. At 3^h 37' the Captain lost her fore-top-mast. Observed the Excellent to pass the Captain, and take a station to support her. At 3^h 40' the Captain, the ship she was engaging, and the ship with her mizen-mast gone, were on board of each other.

" At four the smoke had cleared away a-stern:—observed a three and a two-decked ship had struck, besides the two on board of the Captain.

" The signal for the fleet to bring-to. At 4^h 11' the enemy's four-decker lost her main-top-mast:—the headmost of our ships in close action. Observed the

five sail before to leeward standing in to the fleet under a press of sail to windward, and firing upon our ships in passing. At 4^h 27' the signal to come to the wind on the starboard tack. At 4^h 49' wore. At 4^h 50' the firing ceased on both sides."




Plate XXXVI, Fig. 3, describes the position of the two fleets with reference to this journal, and is noted as follows :—

- A, Five sail of the Spanish line and some frigates.
- B, British fleet in close line on the starboard tack.
- C, The body of the Spanish fleet in an irregular line to windward, engaging as they pass.
- D, The Santissima Trinidad, with some others, bearing down to leeward.
- E, Several Spanish ships that had kept their wind.
- F, The Captain, of seventy-four guns, on board of the San Nicolas and San Josef at the same time.
- G, San Nicolas, taken.
- H, San Josef, 112 guns, taken.
- I, Salvador del Mundo, taken.
- K, San Isidro, taken.
- L, Santissima Trinidad, struck, but got away.
- M, Irresistible engaging the Salvador.
- N, The Diadem of sixty-four guns, engaged until other ships came up.

The ships as numbered and named in the plan, and given in the figure, are as follow :—

- | | |
|-------------------|-------------------|
| 1, Culloden. | 9, Goliah. |
| 2, Blenheim. | 10, Captain. |
| 3, Prince George. | 11, Excellent. |
| 4, Orion. | 12, Namur. |
| 5, Barfleur. | 13, Britannia. |
| 6, Colossus. | 14, Diadem. |
| 7, Victory. | 15, Irresistible. |
| 8, Egmont | |

The dotted lines show the movements of some of the ships during the action.



OBSERVATIONS.

Here, in the conduct of the heroic Nelson, followed by several others, is seen a bold departure from established order and strict discipline : which, had it not met with the success that attended it, might probably have drawn upon the leader a heavy responsibility ; but in this case it was wisely overlooked by the Commander-in-Chief ; who was said to have made a noble reply, when urged by an officer near him to visit such a breach of order by a public investigation. The writer not having been able to trace this circumstance to an authentic source, as such was not *heard* to pass by other officers close to the side, and much in the confidence of the Chief on the day of battle, he does not give it ; the reply was worthy of the Noble Earl, but it is hoped no feeling of hostility to the Commodore could have given rise to it.

When we compare the position of the fleets as shown in Fig. 3, (Plate XXXVI.) with the signals of the Commander-in-Chief, we are led to imagine that the *rear* of the enemy to *windward* was the object it was his intention to attack, by keeping the wind, and causing the van to tack in succession ; having before effectually prevented any junction of the ships at A. In this, he might very probably have succeeded to his wishes, by cutting off many of the sternmost ships from the body of their fleet. The new and important events that were taking place in the rear of his own line, however, obliged him to change his intention, and hasten to support the gallant band that with so much address had arrested the course of the wary Spaniards, in their attempts to join others to leeward. By this judicious measure he supported and covered the attack, and secured the captures made. It may yet appear, that by *waring* the whole line in quick succession, beginning with the *sternmost* ship, still more *might* have been accomplished.

*Some particulars relative to the proceedings of H. M. ship Captain,
bearing the broad pendant of Commodore Nelson.*

“ At one p. m. the Captain having passed the sternmost of the enemy's ships which formed their van and part of their centre, consisting of seventeen sail of the line ; they on the larboard and we on the starboard tack ; the Admiral made the signal to tack in succession ; but Commodore Nelson perceiving the Spanish ships all to bear up before the wind, or nearly so, evidently with an intention of forming their line, going large, and joining their separated division, at that time engaged with some of our centre ; ordered the ship to be wore, and passing

between the Diadem and Excellent, at a quarter past one, was engaged with the headmost and leewardmost of the Spanish ships; namely—the Santissima Trinidad, of 130 guns, San Josef, of 112 do., Salvador del Mundo, of 112, San Nicolas, of 80, another first-rate, and a 74, names not known. We were immediately joined, and most ably supported by the Culloden, Captain Trowbridge. The Spanish fleet trying to avoid such close fighting, hauled to the wind on the larboard tack. For near an hour did the Culloden and Captain support this apparently unequal contest; when the Blenheim, passing between us and the enemy, gave us a respite and sickened the Dons.

“ At this time the Salvador and San Isidro dropped a-stern, and were engaged in a masterly style by the Excellent, Captain Collingwood, who compelled the San Isidro to hoist English colours; and it is thought the Salvador then struck: but Captain Collingwood, disdaining the parade of taking possession, gallantly pushed on under all sail, to save his old friend and messmate, who was, to appearance, in a critical state; the Blenheim being a-head, and the Culloden crippled and a-stern. The Excellent ranged up within *ten feet* of the San Nicolas, giving her a tremendous fire. The San Nicolas luffing up, the San Josef fell on board her, and the Excellent passing on for the Santissima Trinidad, the Captain resumed her station a-breast of the San Nicolas and San Josef and close alongside. At this time the Captain having lost her fore-top-mast, not a sail, rope, or shroud left; her wheel shot away, and incapable of further service in the line or chase; the Commodore directed Captain Miller to put the helm a-starboard, and calling for the boarders, ordered them to board.”

By another officer in the fleet it is stated that, “ the Spaniards were not in line, but in a confused cluster of *at least* a mile long. The wind was very light and partial (I should not think the fleet were at any time going above four miles an hour, though under all sail). The ‘ Journal ’ makes the Victory *tack before* the Captain *wore*, which certainly was not the case. My own idea is, that the *Captain* wore immediately after the *Culloden* tacked, and that the Excellent tacked out of the line to support the Captain just before the Victory tacked (the Culloden and Blenheim having already passed the Excellent). The Culloden was the first ship that came to the Captain’s assistance, then the Excellent and Blenheim but which first I do not remember.

“ Had our fleet *tacked together* when the Culloden did, our sternmost ships would have fetched them, and in their state of confusion more would certainly have been done. Indeed, *as it was*, it is difficult to give a good reason why the Santissima Trinidad was allowed to escape.

“ The Spanish fleet were in fact in a state of actual flight. It must, however,

be remembered, that we had three ships, the Captain, Culloden, and Colossus, disabled, and that to the remaining twelve the Spaniards could oppose twenty-three.

“ It is easy to find out what might have been done after a battle is over, and here our forming a line of battle *at all* seems to have been a misfortune; for it prevented our fetching into the body of the Spanish fleet, which our *weather line* in the order of sailing could have done, had they not run down to the lee line to form the line of battle.

“ The Journal allows the Captain but seven minutes from the time of her *waring* to her being in ‘close action.’ The thing is impossible. I suspect the *time* of the various occurrences to be *incorrect throughout* the Journal, and was probably stated from memory of the events, and not from observation at the moment.”

A Spanish account of the battle of the 14th of February, 1797.

“ On the 13th of February at night, the corvette that preceded the squadron made signal that several English ships were in sight, which were taken for a convoy, of which some had been captured the evening before. After much deliberation, orders were given to keep as near the land as possible. In the morning of the 14th, at half-past seven, the belief still prevailed that the ships were but a convoy: a thick fog prevented any accurate knowledge. At ten the frigate Santa Catalina, being a-head, made signal for ships of the line in the N. E. The signal was repeated by the Preciosa. Every one was then convinced it was the English fleet. The Spaniards, relying too much on their superiority, began a general chase, as if the English had evinced a disposition to retreat. Upon the fog clearing away, they saw the British fleet in two lines making all the sail they could to cut off the squadron.

“ Eleven o'clock came; it was no longer possible to form the line. After many efforts and much disorder, a *square* was formed. In the mean time the English came within reach. After the first broadsides, the advanced guard broke through, and cut out of the line several ships, amongst which were the San Isidro and San Nicolas. Upon this, the Admiral's ship, seconded by seven or eight others, commanded by French emigrants, advanced in a line to take the enemy on the starboard side, and to give time to the ships to form the line of battle.

“ *Admiral Cordova* was himself on board a frigate, and left the command to *Captain Essano*.

"The former movement disengaged several ships, and it was hoped both sides might be put on a par, but these hopes and efforts were vain.

"More than twelve ships having hung out signals of distress, *for want of good will*, could not even form a van-guard. It was now six p. m., when a land-breeze favoured the English, who by skilful manœuvre surrounded four of our ships, and carried them off. The remainder of our squadron dared not follow them."

ADMIRAL DUNCAN OFF CAMPERDOWN.

1797.

"Venerable, off the coast of Holland, 12th October, three p. m.
Camperdown, E. by S. eight miles, wind N. by E.*

"SIR,

"I have the pleasure to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that, at nine o'clock this morning, I got sight of the Dutch fleet; at half-past twelve, I passed through their line, and the action commenced, which has been very severe. The Admiral's ship is dismasted and has struck, as have several others, and one is on fire."

"Venerable, October 13, 1797.

"At nine o'clock in the morning of the 11th, I got sight of Captain Trollope's squadron, with signals flying for an enemy to leeward; I immediately bore up and made signal for a general chase, and soon got sight of them, forming in a line on the larboard tack to receive us; the wind at N. W. As we approached, I made the signal to shorten sail, to connect the squadron: soon after I saw the land between Camperdown and Egmont, about nine miles to leeward of the enemy, and finding there was no time to be lost in making the attack, I made the signal to bear up, break the enemy's line, and engage them to leeward, each ship her opponent; by which I got between them and the land,

* This precision of time, place, the wind, &c. is important and well-judged. The letter itself brings to our recollection the style of Captain Walton off Syracuse, and is by no means inferior to it.

whither they were fast approaching. My signals were obeyed with great promptitude; and Vice Admiral Onslow, in the *Monarch*, bore down on the enemy's rear in the most gallant manner,—his division following his example; and the action commenced about forty minutes past twelve o'clock.

“The Venerable soon got through the enemy's line, and I began a close action, with my division on their van, which lasted near two hours and a half; when I observed all the masts of the Dutch Admiral's ship to go by the board. She was, however, defended for some time in a most gallant manner; but, being overpressed by numbers, her colours were struck, and Admiral de Winter was soon brought on board the Venerable.

“On looking round me, I observed the ship bearing the Vice Admiral's flag was also dismasted, and had surrendered to Vice Admiral Onslow; and that many others had struck.

“Finding we were in nine fathoms water, and not further than four miles from the land, my attention was so much taken up in getting the heads of the disabled ships off shore, that I was not able to distinguish the number of ships captured; and the wind having been constantly on the land since, we have unavoidably been much dispersed, so that I have not been able to gain an exact account of them; but we have taken possession of eight or nine,—more of them had struck,” &c.

OBSERVATIONS.

The gallant Admiral having informed us both of his own force and of that of the enemy, we are under some degree of surprise* to find that, in the list of killed and wounded, an account of ten ships only is given; one of them the *Isis* of fifty guns.

Admiral de Winter, in his account of the battle, considers the British fleet to have consisted of sixteen sail of the line, including the fifty-gun ship; but he has mis-stated the tack on which he stood when attacked by the British Admiral.

Admiral Duncan's squadron consisted of sixteen ships of two decks; as the *Russell*, commanded by Captain Trollope, who first gave notice of the enemy, with others under his orders, joined in the chase, and was present in the battle.

* In Schomberg's *Naval Chronology*, the force stated is sixteen British of two decks, and two frigates, and a sloop of war; Dutch, fifteen of two decks, four frigates, and six sloops of war; superior in number of guns by about 150. (See his App. vol. iv.)

*Extract of a Letter from Captain W. O'Brien Drury, of H. M. Ship
Powerful, seventy-four guns.*

" October 16th, 1797.

" Our late action off the Texel was so curious a scramble, that it would be impossible to mention all the circumstances without creating as much confusion in your mind as there was in our fleet. What has immediately fallen under my knowledge I will recount. * * *

" At nine we discovered the Dutch fleet formed in a line a-head on the larboard tack, lying-to—we kept steering down upon them with a press of sail; the signal for a general chase having been made. Admiral Duncan made the signal to shorten sail, and for the line to be formed N. W. and S. E. It was not clearly understood, and the fleet continued in great disorder, still closing the enemy; it was then blowing strong, and he made the signal to bring to, and take two reefs in the topsails; that being done, he made the signal to attack your opponent in the line on coming up, and immediately after Vice Admiral Onslow's signal was made to attack the rear of the enemy, and No. 34 soon after, to cut their line. * * *

" Upon the lee quarters of the line of battle ships were placed their frigates and brigs, to fire I imagine *red shot shells*, and *grenades*; I judge so from being *set on fire by a shot on the starboard gangway by the frigate* which supported my opponent in the line, and from *combustibles bursting between decks, which have done infinite mischief, and set me on fire in the fore-cockpit; which by God's providence was extinguished, or in five minutes we must have been blown up!*

" No sooner did Admiral Duncan make signal 34, but the Vice Admiral Onslow, in the Monarch, with the most decided gallantry, marked to the fleet their duty, by steering directly down on the Dutch Vice Admiral. I was so fortunate as to be the gallant Admiral's second a-stern, therefore closed the Monarch a-breast, and we cut the enemy's line at the same moment, and at the same time luffed within pistol shot—the Monarch of the Dutch Vice Admiral, the Powerful of his second a-stern, and not ten yards from my jib-boom to the Monarch's stern. In twenty minutes my opponent struck her colours, and in ten or twelve more the Dutch Vice Admiral also struck. At this time very few of our ships had got into action, and what is extraordinary to say, the Monarch and Powerful were I think twenty minutes engaged to leeward of the enemy's line before a single gun was fired from any ship in the British line. The brig which fired into the Monarch was sunk, and my frigate made off.

“Admiral Duncan was now in close action in the van, and the ships in the rear were pretty well defeated.—I was soon able to make sail, and joined action in the van, but not in a condition to place myself properly, my fore and fore-top-sail-yard being shot away; I pushed forward to support Admiral Duncan, who appeared to be surrounded by Dutchmen. The *Triumph* I first met, appearing much beaten, and next the *Venerable*, followed by the *Ardent*. * * *

“At the time Admiral Duncan was coming out of a very heavy fire to leeward of the enemy’s ships, three of our men of war were firing at the Dutch ships from to windward, at so ridiculous a distance that even my little son desired to make the signal for closer action, which he did, and it was kept flying until I joined our gallant Admiral. I wore upon his quarter; and the unfortunate Dutch Admiral which I had passed on different tacks, half an hour before, and who had shot away my fore-yard, was now astern, standing towards his van, which were flying, but fighting: he was to pass the *Venerable* and me; being much beaten at this time, he was very soon dismasted, and being surrounded by our ships he struck. * * *

“Had Admiral Duncan’s instructions, and No. 34, been carried into effect, I do not believe a single ship would have escaped; for however well this fleet was manned and obstinately defended, they were by no means upon a footing with us; for I give you my word, that after the first quarter of an hour the sixty-four or sixty-eight which we took, and a large *Razée* frigate, were comparatively silenced; and I am sure from the time Vice Admiral Onslow commenced the action until our two ships were taken could not have been forty minutes.

“Admiral De Winter informed me that this fleet was the completest that ever sailed from Holland, and that expectation was on the tip-toe, from the full persuasion that we must have been defeated. I am satisfied they built their hopes of success on the certainty of *setting us on fire*. The French forced them to sea, and all the *mobility* of Holland insisted upon their making another ‘*Dogger Bank*’ of it. * * *

“I am sure you will be pleased to hear that my son behaved like a hero. I had my pocket shot off, and received a very severe bruise on the fleshy part of my thigh from the wind of a shot; as it twisted me round, and confused me a good deal, the people thought I was wounded, and told William so; he came to see, and when I recovered, he told me he was afraid if he said any thing of his father being wounded, that the people might be alarmed!”

Plate XXXVII, Fig. 1, shows the state of the British fleet when the signal

was given for a general chase ; and then to bear up, break through the enemy's line, and engage them to leeward.

Too much credit cannot be given to the British Admiral for his promptitude and decision upon seeing the Dutch fleet, as he took immediately the most effectual mode of capturing or destroying it. To the plan of attack, and the example set by the Commander-in-Chief and the Vice Admiral, the highest commendation is due ; and " eight or nine were taken, more had struck," but unfortunately succeeded in making their escape.



Fig. 2, shows the position *intended* by the British Admiral to have been taken by his fleet, which is supposed to have passed through the enemy's line, to engage them to leeward, and cut them off from the land, distance to leeward five miles.

" The squadron suffered much (the Admiral observes) in their masts, yards, and rigging ; and many of them have lost a number of men, however, in no proportion to that of the enemy. The carnage on board the two ships that bore the Admiral's flags has been beyond all description."

However much this mode of attack exposes a fleet to severe cannonade, by which it may suffer considerably before it can grapple with the enemy,—yet this action is another decisive proof of the final advantage of it, when, by getting close to leeward, the contest can be decided only by the party which displays most resolution and perseverance, which can best maintain his position, and whose fire is seen to produce the most destructive effects. This should teach us to be particularly attentive at all times to acquire a perfect knowledge and management of the great guns, to husband our resources, and to be prompt and skilful in the application of them : to dispose of the marines in such manner as, with the least exposure of themselves, to produce the greatest effect upon the decks of the enemy : and while braces, bowlines, sails, sweeps,* and rudder, are left you, to endeavour to preserve an advantageous position.

The British Admiral soon perceived that if he waited to form his line (the enemy drawing fast in with the land) " there would be no action." He, therefore, made the signal to make all sail, break the line, and engage the enemy to leeward, and for "*close action* ;" which, " last signal flew until it was shot away." This signal could not be mistaken ; and, coupled with the gallant chief's

* *Sweeps* are immense *oars* worked by several men. In large ships they may be applied out of the stern ports and used as a rudder in a calm, or when the ship is entirely disabled. The *Belleisle* (Captain Hargood), totally dismasted in the battle of Trafalgar, is said to have benefited very much by a timely use of them. Small vessels are pulled a-head by them.



example, superseded all former ones; and every ship had then nothing to call her attention from using every exertion to close speedily with the enemy.

If further proof of the superior efficacy of such a mode of attack be wanting, it is to be found, not only in the manly declaration of the gallant Dutchman, but also in the honourable testimony of the great Nelson, who, although not acquainted with Lord Duncan, after the battle of the Nile, wrote to him to tell him how "*he had profitted by his example!*" De Winter said, "Your not waiting to form a line ruined me; if I had got nearer to the shore, and you had attacked, I should have probably drawn both fleets on it, and it would have been a victory to me, being on my own coast."

The British squadron was formed of very indifferent and inadequate ships, many of them having been intended for Indiamen; it was otherwise ill conditioned and deficient: but a trait of professional character in a seaman must not be overlooked. When the main-top-gallant-mast of the Venerable was shot away, a man of the name of Crawford *nailed the flag* to the top-mast head.

REMARK.

"Had his fleet been composed of the same materials as Lord St. Vincent's, every Dutch ship would have been taken. Had all the ships followed the example of their Chief, such must have been the result.

"When the action ceased, the British ships were in nine fathoms water, five miles from a lee shore, with every appearance of the gale which followed. Few people are aware of the merits of the Chief on that day; and it should be recollected he had been only two days in port, after a blockade of nineteen weeks, when the Dutch fleet put to sea.*

"It was the opinion of Lord Duncan that, upon such occasions, the Commander-in-Chief should hoist his flag on board of a frigate; and he said, should he ever fight another battle, he would certainly do so. I often heard him declare, that had his flag been flying on board of a frigate in this action, not one of the Dutch fleet would have escaped. However, the man who first does this should have his character well established for personal courage."

The author of these remarks has kindly favoured the writer with a plan of the situation of the two fleets, five minutes before the action commenced. The original is taken from the best authority.

* "For a piece of artless and affecting oratory," see the speech which he made to the crew of his own ship on the 3d of June, 1797, when left alone off the Texel, by the mutinous conduct of the rest of his squadron. (Public Characters for 1798.)

Plate XXXVIII represents the British fleet bearing down towards the Dutch line of battle, formed on the larboard tack, five minutes before the action commenced. Nine ships of the line, two frigates, and three Admirals, were taken, though one of the latter escaped.

The seventh ship in the Dutch line, bearing the flag of the Rear-Admiral Story, closed up to the ship of his Commander-in-Chief, and obliged the Venerable to go a-stern of her;—she, notwithstanding, struck to the British Admiral, and afterwards made off. Those distinguished by *dots under them* were taken. Thus it appears that eleven ships of war were captured by ten ships of the British squadron, as not more than that number were seriously engaged. What is remarkable in this action is, that more was accomplished, in proportion to the *means*, than in any naval engagement of modern times,—a circumstance in the highest degree honourable to the character and conduct of the great departed Chief, and to those who so bravely supported him.


NOTES.

Of Sir Henry Trollope it is related from authority not to be questioned that, on the morning when he discovered the Dutch fleet, he assembled all the officers of his ship, and pointed out to them in a becoming and impressive manner, as necessary to his, and to their own honour, that the enemy should by no means be lost sight of; he declared, that unless from excessive thick weather, this should take place, he would bring the officer of the watch to a Court Martial; and directed that notice, every ten minutes, should be taken, and marked, of the enemy's position.

The officers required no threat of that kind to stimulate them to a strict discharge of their duty.

Sir H. Trollope, when a lieutenant, commanding the Kite cutter, and coming into Plymouth after a long cruize, was informed that two ships deeply laden with ship timber had been seen a few days before, bound for Brest; and from the prevailing light and contrary winds since, it was conjectured that they could not have made much progress. Lieutenant Trollope immediately altered his course, and by an animated address incited his crew to a diligent exertion of their duties; to which a fidler, and constant good cheer upon deck, very mainly contributed.

The prospect of making so rich a capture, kept alive by the zeal, perseverance, and liberality of the commander, lightened their labour at the sweeps, occasionally suspended by light breezes, which, in a few days, carried them to the



desired spot, and just in time to prevent the two ships from getting safe into Brest. They returned, as may be supposed, in the greatest exultation to Plymouth with their prizes; for which the Lieutenant's share amounted to 80,000*l*.

Captain Inglis of the *Belliqueux* of sixty-four guns, owing either to a long absence from active service, or an inaptitude to the subject, sometimes apparent in sea officers, had neglected to make himself a competent master of the signal book: and, on the morning of the day of battle, when it became necessary to act with promptitude in obedience to the signals, found himself more puzzled than enlightened by it; and throwing it with contempt upon the deck, exclaimed in broad Scotch, "D—n me, up wie the hellem an' gang into the middle o't."

In this manner he bravely anticipated the remedy in such cases provided by the gallant Nelson, who, in his celebrated "Memorandum," observes, "that when a captain should be *at a loss*, he cannot do *very wrong* if he lay his ship alongside of the enemy." In strict conformity with this doctrine, the *Belliqueux* got very roughly treated by the van of the enemy.

THE BATTLE OF THE NILE.

FROM SIR HORATIO NELSON TO EARL ST. VINCENT.

"Vanguard, off the mouth of the Nile, August 3d, 1798.

"MY LORD,

"Almighty God has blessed his Majesty's arms in the late battle by a great victory over the fleet of the enemy; whom I attacked at sunset on the 1st of August off the mouth of the Nile.

"The enemy were moored in a strong line of battle for defending the entrance of the Bay (of shoals) flanked by numerous gun-boats, four frigates, and a battery of guns and mortars on an island in their van.

"The ships of the enemy, all but their two rear ships, are nearly dismasted,

and those two, with two frigates, I am sorry to say, made their escape; nor was it in my power to prevent it."

"Captain Berry will present you with the flag of the second in command, that of the Commander-in-chief being burnt in L'Orient."

British force, fourteen sail of the line (with the *Leander* of fifty guns), and *La Mutine* brig. The French, thirteen sail of the line, and four frigates. Of this fleet, nine ships of the line were captured; two line of battle ships and two frigates burnt and sunk; two ships of the line and two frigates escaped.

We must here observe that the service of one ship of the line (the *Culloden*) was entirely lost to the British Admiral, by her unfortunately getting a-ground when advancing to the attack; and that he had no frigates.

The gallant chief has not detailed his plan of attack; it has, however, been accurately described by many competent eye-witnesses: the following are extracts:—

"He (Sir H. Nelson) instantly directed his course towards them, and found them at anchor in a line extending from N. W. to S. E. They were at single anchor with springs on their cables, and riding head to wind, which was from the N. W. To approach them it was necessary to sail round an island, and a reef projecting from it to the distance of several miles, from the point in which the small fort of Aboukir stands. The wind was perfectly fair, but unfortunately, in rounding the reef, the *Culloden* ran a-ground, and could not be got at all into action.

"After this accident, Nelson found himself with ten ships only (three having fallen very much a-stern) to fight thirteen of the enemy; and several of these of superior force to any of his.

"The island also, fortified with mortars and some heavy guns, was to be passed; yet he determined on an immediate attack, and made the signal to attack the van and centre of the enemy. It was near six in the evening when he closed with them. About half the ships got between the enemy and the shore, either by cutting through their line, or by sailing round the head of it; and the rest attacked on the outside. All dropped their anchors close in front of their opponents: by this disposition, some of the French line were doubled on, and all that were engaged on the land side were taken unprepared. The *Zealous* fired three broadsides before a gun was returned from that side.

"The enemy began firing as soon as our ships came within shot. The *Zealous* dismasted the *Guerrier* (French van ship) with three broadsides, and completely beat her in five minutes.

"Their six headmost ships were taken possession of the first night, and

L'Orient blew up. Next morning, at day-light, the action recommenced, and the other ships were taken or destroyed ; nor did the battle end till the forenoon of the third day, when the enemy's rear was compelled either to surrender or run : all the captured ships were dismasted. The Timoleon shared the fate of L'Orient," &c.

The writer of the above remarks, " that if the French Admiral could not have made such a disposition of his fleet *at anchor* as to command the Bay of Aboukir, he should have got it under sail, so that every ship might have had a chance of coming into action : as it was, his line was formed in the direction of the wind, exposed to be attacked to windward, leaving out all the leeward ships ; and consequently was beaten in succession ; and, on this matter, the decisive nature of the victory turned."

NOTE.

" The ships that had fallen a-stern, as they dropped in, took their stations a-stern of the other ships ; but the last did not arrive till two or three hours after the commencement of the action."

REMARKS ON THE BATTLE OF THE NILE.

With a Plate, by a gallant and intelligent officer, then on board the "*Goliah*."

" When the French fleet were discovered in Aboukir Bay, the body of the English fleet were pretty much together, but not in any order of sailing, for none was usually maintained. The Culloden was nearly hull down a-stern, and the Alexander and Swiftsure still more distant on the lee-beam, looking into Alexandria.

" The wind on the larboard quarter. The signal was made to '*form the line as most convenient*,' when the Zealous and Goliah immediately made for the post of honour ; but the Goliah having gained her own length, took the lead, and the line was soon formed, with every sail set. When well in with Aboukir Island, the Mutine obtained some men out of a coasting or fishing vessel, and sent them to the flag-ship as pilots ; the boat missed the Vanguard, who immediately *rounded to*, as did the whole line, except the Goliah and Zealous, till the boat got on board. As soon as the water deepened over the shoal, which extends from the island, it became necessary to haul nearly on a wind, on the starboard tack, to fetch the headmost ship in the French line. There was then

a space of at least two miles between the Zealous and the ship a-stern of her; every sail was however kept set, till within a cable's length of the Guerrier's bow, and that position was attained by the two leading ships without receiving any injury, though coming in nearly on the *beam* of the French van. The second or third ship of their line did indeed fire *one broadside*, but it was just too late, as the Goliath was nearly past her line of fire, as was the Zealous before she could fire a second. The batteries were too far off to do much execution to an object moving so fast (six or seven miles an hour). All sail was now taken in, except the mizen-top-sail, which was thrown a-back, and, when thus *very slowly* passing the bow of the Guerrier, within a ship's length, the action was commenced on our side by a most dreadfully destructive raking fire. The anchor was at the same time dropped from the bow, the cable being in at the stern port; but *having no after bitts*, when the ship swung stern to the wind, and the sails began to fly loose from the running rigging being cut, it became difficult to stopper the cable. It kept surging for some minutes, and at last carried all away, and ran out to the clinch, placing the Goliath on the quarter of the second, and bow of the third ship of the French line, so as to engage both. The Zealous exactly followed the Goliath's example; but the enemy being occupied, she furled her sails, and anchoring a little more to windward, veered into the place just left by the Goliath. From this moment the Guerrier *never fired a shot* except from her stern guns, so completely had she been destroyed (*in little more than five minutes*) by her two opponents. As the Goliath passed her quarter, the *Guerrier's* foremast fell by the deck, and five minutes afterwards her main and mizen-masts also fell, as well as the main-mast of the Conquerant. This was just as the Orion was passing inside of the Goliath, and the Audacious was coming to an anchor on the inner bow of the Conquerant. Such rapid execution must be partly attributed to the smoothness of the water, and partly to the unprepared state of the French ships on their larboard sides. The Guerrier's lower-deck guns on that side were not run out, and the other ports were full of bags and lumber!! As the Theseus passed the Goliath (soon after), she gave her three such cheers, as have been seldom heard. They were returned by the Goliath's crew, and an attempt was made to do the same by the French ships engaged, but it was so truly ridiculous, that it caused peals of laughter on board the English ships, loud enough to be heard by both parties. Such enthusiastic cheers were certainly very disheartening to the French, and they readily acknowledged it after the battle.

"The Vanguard was the first ship that anchored on the *outside* of the line, on the quarter of the Spartiate and bow of the Aquilon. The other ships followed

as described by the Rev. C. Willyams, and as represented in a plan I send with this, which I think will be found pretty correct. The sun was just touching the horizon as our fire commenced, and it must have been getting dark when the Culloden ran on shore. It was quite so when the Alexander and Swifsure came in, and when the Leander returned from the Culloden.

“ I must here say, that it has always appeared most extraordinary to me, that it should have been so long and generally believed that the *Culloden* ran on shore *leading the fleet in*. That honour was due to a most gallant officer and most estimable man, the present *Sir Thomas Foley*, to whom also was due the whole credit of passing *inside the headmost ship of the enemy's line, a manœuvre they were perfectly unprepared for*. The noble example which he set, and Captain Hood so readily followed, of running on under all sail when the rest of the English line brought-to for the Mutine's boat, proved also of the greatest consequence; *for the senior officer of the French van was rowing up to his own ship from L'Orient in a long boat, and they waited for his orders to commence firing*. He hailed his ship as soon as he was near enough, and they fired a broadside, but it was *just too late* for their guns to bear. Had *ten minutes been lost* (in bringing-to with the rest of the line for the Mutine's boat), *this officer would have been on board in time to have caused a destructive fire on the leading ships, and very likely to disable them sufficiently to prevent their getting into their proper positions*, when the day must have been much less glorious and complete; *such is often the value of time in closing with an enemy, a single minute ought certainly never to be lost*.

“ On the following morning, could the Audacious have gone to the assistance of the Zealous, the two ships which escaped would most likely have fallen into our hands; but as neither the Theseus nor Goliah had a boat that could be made to swim, the Audacious had taken possession of the second and third ship in the French line, and Captain Gould did not think he had men enough left to justify him in making the attempt. The rest of the ships were too much disabled to make sail; but the Theseus, Leander, and Goliah cut their cables, and drifted down before the wind to the enemy's ships that were disabled and had not surrendered; the Alexander was also there, and the French ships being disabled, and on shore, could make but little resistance.

“ I conceive it to be a mistake to say the *Seriense was sunk by a single broadside* from the Orion; she was too far off for such an accident, and was partially engaged by the Goliah from the very beginning of the action, and I believe by the Theseus also. She cut her cable, and her rudder being wedged by a shot when the helm was hard a-port, she ran on shore, and heeling to

starboard (on which side she was much battered), she filled. Her principal damage was most likely received from the Orion. Of course the English ships suffered a little from each other's fire, but the difficulty of stoppering the cables was the great evil, so much so, that it would have been perhaps better to have anchored by the bow. The Alexander's was a most masterly manoeuvre to be executed in so dark a night."


Plate XXXIX shows the position of the British squadron, at different periods of the combat; and whether in considering the mode of attack, or the manner in which it was carried into execution, the mind is entirely engrossed between gratitude, astonishment, and admiration.

The want of frigates or small vessels was greatly felt; they would have been useful in many ways, but particularly in buoying off the shoals, the better to guide the squadron to the attack; by which the services of the Culloden might have been preserved.

The following extract of a letter contains some further details of the battle:—

Extract of a Letter of the late Sir Samuel Hood to Lord Bridport.

"After completing our water at Syracuse in Sicily, we sailed from thence on the 24th of July, and arrived a second time off Alexandria on the 31st, where we found many more ships than were there before; amongst which were six with pendants, and appearing large, so that we were convinced the French fleet had been there. I immediately kept well to the eastward of the Admiral, to try if I could discover the enemy at Bequier. About one o'clock, the man at the mast-head called down, and said he saw a ship, and in a few minutes after announced a fleet at anchor. I sent a glass up, and eighteen large ships were clearly ascertained, thirteen or fourteen of which appeared to be of the line; which I made known by signal to the Admiral; who instantly pressed sail up, and made the signal to prepare for battle. The wind being to the N.N.W. and sometimes more northerly, we were obliged to haul to the wind. The Alexander and Swiftsure called in, which were to leeward; and the Culloden ordered to cast off the prize she had in tow, as she was somewhat a-stern. As we advanced towards the enemy, we plainly made out thirteen sail of the line, four frigates, with several small armed vessels, all at anchor in the road of Bequier or Aboukir, very *close in*, and in order of battle. The Admiral then made the signal to anchor, and for battle, and to attack the *van* and *centre* of



the enemy ; and soon after for the line a-head as most convenient. As we got pretty near a-breast of the shoal at the entrance, being within hail of the Admiral, he asked me if I thought we were far enough to the eastward to bear up clear of the shoal ; I told him I was in eleven fathoms ; that I had no chart of the bay ; but if he would allow me, I would bear up and sound with the lead, to which I would be very attentive, and carry him as close as I could with safety ; he said he would be obliged to me. I immediately bore away and rounded the shoal, the Goliah keeping upon my lee bow, until I found we were advancing too far from the Admiral ; and then shortened sail ; and soon found the Admiral was waiting to speak to a boat. Soon after he made the signal to proceed on, the Goliah leading ; and as we approached the enemy, shortened sail gradually ; the Admiral allowing the Orion, &c. to pass a-head of the Vanguard. The van ship of the enemy being in five fathoms, I expected the Goliah and Zealous to stick fast on the shoal every moment, and did not imagine we should attempt to pass within her, as the van with the mortars, &c. from the island fired regularly at us. Captain Foley intended anchoring a-breast of the van ship ; but his sheet anchor, the cable being out of the stern port, not dropping the moment he wished it, he brought up a-breast of the second ship, having given the van one his fire. I saw immediately he had failed of his intention. Cut away the Zealous's sheet-anchor, and came-to, in the exact situation Captain Foley meant to have taken.

“ The enemy's van ship having her bow towards the Zealous (which had received very little damage, notwithstanding we received the fire of the whole van, island, &c. as we came in), I directed a heavy discharge into her bow within musket shot a little after six ; her fore-mast went by the board in a few minutes, just as the sun was closing with the horizon ; upon which the squadron gave three cheers, it happening before the next ship a-stern of me had fired a shot, and only the Goliah and Zealous had then engaged ; and in ten minutes more, her main and mizen-masts went (at this moment went also the main-mast of the second ship, closely engaged by the Goliah and Audacious) ; but I could not get her to strike for three hours after, although I hailed her several times, and seeing she was totally cut up, and only firing a stern-chase at intervals at the Goliah and Audacious. At last, being tired of killing men in that way, I sent a lieutenant on board, who was allowed, as I had instructed him, to hoist a light and haul it down as a sign of her submission. From the time her foremast went, the men had been driven from her upper decks by our canister shot and musketry ; and I assure your Lordship, that from her *bow to the gangway, the ports on her main-deck were entirely in one ;* and the *gunwale* in that part *totally cut away ;*

which caused two of her main-deck beams to fall upon her guns ; and she is so terribly mauled that we cannot move her without great detention and expense ; so that I imagine the Admiral will destroy her. In doing this execution, I am happy to say the Zealous had only seven men wounded, and not one killed. With respect to how the other ships anchored, I refer your Lordship to the enclosed sketch of the bay." (No sketch was found with this extract.)

" The Bellerophon, unfortunately, alongside L'Orient, was in two hours totally dismasted ; and, in consequence, cut her cable, and went off before the ship took fire : but she was most gallantly replaced by the Alexander and Swiftsure, our worthy friends. She soon after took fire and blew up. The Alexander and Swiftsure having been sent to look into Alexandria, was the cause of their being so late in the action. Poor Trowbridge, in trying to make the shortest way to the enemy, being too far a-stern, struck on a reef : his ship has since got off, with the loss of her rudder and some damage in her bottom ; so that he had no share in the glorious victory. I believe, had not the Culloden struck, the Alexander and Swiftsure in the dark would probably have got into her situation, so that the accident may be fortunate, as she was a buoy to them.

" On the blowing-up of L'Orient a part of the wreck fell on board of, and set fire to the jib and fore-top-mast-stay-sail of the Alexander ; but the great exertion of her officers and people soon got it under, with the loss of some men. Captain Westcott was killed by a musquet ball, early in the action ; but his loss was not felt, as the First Lieutenant, Cuthbert, fought the Majestic most gallantly during the remainder of the action. The Bellerophon and that ship have suffered much. In the morning, the Theseus, Goliah, Audacious, and Zealous, were ordered into the rear, having sustained but little damage ; but as I was going down, the Admiral made my signal to chase the Diane frigate, which was under sail, and attempting to escape. She, however, returned, and closed with the ships of the enemy that had not submitted ; and I was called in, and ordered to go to the assistance of the Bellerophon, who lay at anchor on the other side of the bay ; but in going to her I perceived the Guillaume Tell of eighty guns, and Genereux of seventy-four, the Diane and Justice of forty, pressing to make their escape ; being the only ships not disabled ; and immediately directed the Zealous to be kept close upon a wind, in the hope I should be able to bring them to action and disable them, so as to allow assistance to come to me ; or so far to cripple them as to prevent their working out of the bay. I weathered them within musquet shot, and obliged them to keep away to avoid being raked ; and although I did them a good deal of damage, they were so well prepared as to cut away every brace and bowling, with top-mast and standing rigging. I meant to have

boarded the rear frigate, but could not get the ship round for a short space of time; and whilst I was trying to do it, I was called in by signal, seeing I should get disabled, without having it in my power to stop so superior a force. The Admiral was very handsome in his acknowledgments for my zealous attempt, as well as for my general conduct; I told him I only did my duty, and although the ship was very much cut in her sails and rigging, having forty cannon shot through her main-sail, I had but one man killed, and none materially wounded. The Audacious was sent to the Bellerophon in my room, and I am now got quite to rights. Ben Hallowell has written to your Lordship; so has our brave Admiral, who, I am sorry to say, is again wounded, but is doing well; the wound is in his head, not dangerous but very troublesome: some of our ships have suffered much. Your Lordship, as well as the whole world, will believe and think this the most glorious victory that ever was gained, and it will certainly prove the ruin of the French army.

“A courier has been taken, charged with dispatches from Buonaparte and the other generals for France; and herewith your Lordship will receive some intercepted letters that are full of the distresses of the French army in their march to Cairo; and I am very confident, when Buonaparte hears of our victory, he will conclude all is *lost*.

“Lieutenant Duval, fourth of the Zealous, is gone to India by way of Alexandretta. I pointed him out to Sir Horatio as a proper person. Our frigates have not yet joined us. I fear your Lordship will think me troublesome in writing so long a letter, but flatter myself the greatness of our success will plead my excuse.

“Amongst the French letters we have got hold of, is one from young Beauharnois, Buonaparte's son-in-law, who is with him, to his mother; in which he says, ‘Buonaparte is very much distressed, owing to some disputes with Tallien and others, and particularly with Berthier, which he did not expect.’ These are favourable events, and will make our victory the more important.

“We have taken the island that covered the van of the enemy, and brought off two brass thirteen-inch mortars, two brass twelve-pounders, and two iron twelve-pounders,—the latter are destroyed.”

THE BATTLE OF THE NILE. (French Account.)

Having given an account of this memorable event from details furnished by British officers engaged, it cannot be uninteresting to observe in what manner

the same subject has been related and considered by our enemy. The following are extracts from an account written in French, on board the *Alexander*, on her passage to Naples, by the Adjutant General to Admiral Blanquet.

The *whole* is not necessary, as it describes too many individual cases occurring amongst the French ships: such parts therefore are selected as seem best suited to the purposes of the present undertaking; and first by showing the object and finesse of the French Admiral.

"The Alert then began to put the Admiral's orders into execution, namely, to stand towards the enemy until nearly within gun-shot, then to manœuvre and endeavour to draw them towards the outer shoal lying off the island; but the English Admiral no doubt had experienced pilots on board, as he did not pay any attention to the brig's track, but allowed her to go away, hauling well round all the danger.

"At five o'clock the enemy came to the wind in succession; the manœuvre convinced us that they intended attacking us that evening. The Admiral got the top-gallant-yards across, but soon after made the signal that he intended engaging the enemy at anchor: convinced no doubt, that he had not seamen enough to engage under sail."

"After this signal each ship ought to have sent a stream cable to the ship a-stern of her, and to have made a hawser fast to the cable, about twenty fathoms in the water, and passed to the bow on the opposite side to that expected to be engaged, as a spring. This was not generally executed; orders were then given to let go another bower anchor, and the broadsides of the ships were brought to bear upon the enemy; having the ships' heads S. E. from the island Bequir, forming a line of about 1800 fathoms N. W. and S. E. each with an anchor out S. S. E."

"All the van were attacked on both sides by the enemy, who ranged close along our line; they had each an anchor out a-stern, which facilitated their motions, and enabled them to place themselves in a most advantageous position." &c.

"At nine o'clock the ships in the van slackened their fire, and soon after it totally ceased; and with infinite sorrow we supposed they had surrendered. They were dismayed soon after the action began, and so damaged, it is to be presumed they could not hold out against an enemy so superior by an advantageous position, in placing several ships against one."

"At ten o'clock the main and mizen-masts (of the ship* on board which the officer is who gives this account) fell, and all the guns on the main-deck were dismounted: at half-past ten the Tonnant cut her cables to avoid the fire from

* The ship of Admiral Blanquet.

L'Orient. The English ship that was on L'Orient's larboard quarter, as soon as she had done firing at her, brought her broadside to bear upon the Tonnant's bow, and kept up a very heavy raking fire. The Hereux and Mercure conceived that they ought likewise to cut their cables; this manœuvre created so much confusion amongst the rear ships, that they fired into each other and did considerable damage; the Tonnant anchored a-head of the Guillaume Tell; Genereux, Timoleon, got on shore."

"The Adjutant General Montard, although badly wounded, swam to the ship nearest L'Orient, which proved to be English. Commodore Casabianca and his son, only ten years of age, who during the action gave proofs of bravery and intelligence far above his age, were not so fortunate; they were in the water upon the wreck of L'Orient's masts, not being able to swim, seeking each other until three quarters past ten, when the ship blew up, and put an end to their hopes and fears. The explosion was dreadful, and spread the fire to a considerable distance. The Franklin's decks were covered with red-hot *seam*,* pieces of timber, and rope; on fire the fourth time, but luckily got it under. Immediately after the tremendous explosion, the action ceased every where, and was succeeded by a most profound silence; the sky was darkened by thick clouds of black smoke, which seemed to threaten the destruction of both fleets.

"It was a quarter of an hour before the ships' crews recovered from the stupor they were thrown into: towards eleven o'clock, the Franklin, anxious to preserve the trust confided to her, recommenced the action with a few of the lower-deck guns; all the rest were dismounted: two-thirds of the ship's company were killed, and those who remained most fatigued. She was surrounded by the enemy's ships, who mowed down the men at every broadside. At half-past eleven, having only three lower-deck guns that could defend the honour of the flag, it became necessary to put an end to so disproportionate a struggle; and Citizen Martinel, Capitaine de Frégate, ordered the colours to be struck."

After detailing at considerable length the various disastrous events of the battle, dwelling with great feeling on the calamitous condition to which they were reduced by the judicious mode of attack chosen by the British Admiral; and the brave but unfortunate end of both of the French Admirals; the writer of the narrative draws it to a conclusion in the following manner:—

"Thus ends the journal of the 1st, 2d, and 3d of August; which will ever be remembered with the deepest sorrow by all those Frenchmen who possess good hearts, and by all those true Republicans who have survived this melancholy disaster."

* This must mean the composition of pitch and oakum with which the decks are caulked.

WATCHING AND FOLLOWING A SQUADRON OF THE ENEMY
BY CAPT. COUNTESS, OF THE ETHALION, WITH
THE ANSON AND SYLPH.

From the 17th of Sept. to the 11th of Oct. 1798.

BEFORE entering upon Admiral Sir John Warren's account of his proceedings on the coast of Ireland, it is due to the character of the late Admiral Countess to show in what manner the French squadron had been watched, and fairly conducted into the hands of the British Admiral, by himself and the officers under his orders.

Captain Countess, of the Ethalion, with the Anson and Sylph, had, "with great attention, continued to observe the French squadron since their sailing on the 17th ultimo;" and, on the morning of the 11th, had joined the Admiral.

The merit of such a service as that of the British Captain's in keeping sight of a superior force,* for so long a period at that season of the year, could not be sufficiently dwelt upon in a single dispatch; and to render justice where it is so evidently due is the object of introducing, in this place, the track of the Ethalion and ships in concert. By their skill, vigilance, and perseverance, every movement of the enemy was known; timely information of their approach was also given to Sir John Warren; and the enemy entirely defeated in his attempts upon Ireland.

The track of the Ethalion, from which the Plate is taken, was drawn and given by Captain Countess to Admiral Vashon; who, with a just sense of the importance of such service, and of the great abilities, but modest merits of the man, kindly contributed it for the present undertaking; anxious that so memorable a trait in the professional life of his old messmate should meet the commendation it deserves. The track is therefore given with the writer's thankful acknowledgments to Admiral Vashon.

* The force is shown in Capt. Countess's journal, and their object was Ireland.

References, accompanying the Track, by Captain Countess. See Plate XL.

“ Off the Passage du Raz, at day-light, in the morning of
the 17th September, 1798.

“ His Majesty's ships *Boadicea*, *Ethalion*, and *Sylph* brig, being in company, fell in with a French squadron, consisting of one line of battle ship, eight frigates, and a schooner; where Captain Keats, in the *Boadicea*, left the *Ethalion* and *Sylph* to watch their motions, and went himself to make known their having sailed, to the Admiral, Lord Bridport.

“ The 18th, at night, we were joined by the *Amelia*, the Honourable Captain Herbert, who passed through the enemy's squadron without being noticed. In the morning some of their frigates chased us, but we out-sailed them.

“ The 23d, in the evening, sent off the *Sylph*, Captain White, with despatches for Ireland.

“ The 25th, in the forenoon, saw a strange fleet to leeward of the enemy; observed several of them to be large ships, and that they formed in line of battle (they proved to be an English convoy, several of them East India ships); the *Anson* was ordered to go round the rear of the enemy to let them know our situation and the enemy's. At this time the French squadron seemed much confused, and the *Hoche* fell a-stern to protect their rear; and we were in hopes the fleet fallen in with was of force sufficient to enable us to attack the enemy to advantage: but, the weather being thick, we supposed they could not make out our signals; and, by the time the *Anson* had got round the enemy's rear, they had got a long way to leeward; so the *Anson* was recalled. It was the opinion that our signals and manœuvres prevented the enemy from attending to the convoy, and, of course, saved them.

“ The 26th, in the morning, the enemy chased us, but left off chase at noon, when we shortened sail, and followed them again.

“ The 29th, at day-light, the enemy's whole squadron chased us; three of them sailed very fast, and came up with us considerably; afterwards we held our own, and at nine they left off chase; one of them having carried away her main-top-mast, another a top-sail-yard, and a third a top-gallant-mast. The *Anson*, during the chase, sprung her main-top-mast.

“ The 4th October, a little after noon, a heavy gale came on, with thick weather, which occasioned our losing sight of the enemy, and gave them an opportunity of getting from us.

“ The 8th, in foggy bad weather, the *Amelia* parted company.

" The 11th, at day-light in the morning, saw the coast of Ireland ; and, in the forenoon, the Ethalion and Anson joined the squadron under Sir John B. Warren, and found the Amelia in company with them. Soon after noon, the enemy's squadron was discovered to windward coming down ; but, on seeing us, they hauled their wind, and we chased them : during the night, the Ethalion kept close to them, to prevent their attempting to escape.

" The 12th, the enemy was attacked and defeated, the Hoche and two frigates taken, and the rest attempted to escape ; after noon, the Ethalion chased, engaged, and took the Bellona. The Melampus (Captain G. Moore) afterwards took the Resolute ; the Anson (Captain P. C. Durham) the Loire ; and the Fishguard (Captain T. B. Martin) took the Immortalité off Brest ; so that only two frigates and a schooner escaped, viz. the Romaine, Semillante, and Biche. The frigates had each 300 soldiers on board, besides the crew."

SIR JOHN WARREN'S BATTLE WITH A FRENCH SQUADRON ON THE COAST OF IRELAND.

October, 1798.

TO VICE ADMIRAL KINGSMILL, AT CORK.

" Canada, Lough Swilly, Ireland, 16th October, 1798.

" SIR,

" In pursuance of the orders and instructions I received by the Kangaroo, I proceeded with the ships named in the margin (Canada, Robust, Foudroyant, Magnanime) off Achille head ; on the 10th I was joined by the Malampus and Doris ; the latter of whom I directed to look out for the enemy off Tory Island and the Rosses. In the evening the Amelia appeared in the offing. She had parted company with the Ethalion, Anson, and Sylph, who, with great attention, had continued to observe the French squadron since their sailing on the 17th ultimo. In the morning of the 11th, however, these two ships also fell in with us : and, at noon, the enemy were discovered in the N. W. quarter, consisting of one ship of eighty guns, eight frigates, a schooner,

and a brig. I immediately made the signal for a general chase, and to form in succession as each arrived up with the enemy, whom, from their great distance to windward, and a hollow sea, it was impossible to come up with before the twelfth.

" The chase was continued, in very bad and boisterous weather, all day of the 11th, and the following night; when, at half-past five a. m. they were seen at a little distance to windward, the line of battle ship having lost her main-top-mast.

" The enemy bore down, and formed their line in close order upon the starboard tack; and, from the length of the chase, and the ships being spread, it was impossible to close with them before seven a. m. when I made the Robust's signal to lead, which was obeyed with much alacrity, and the rest of the ships to form in succession in the rear of the van. The action commenced at twenty minutes past seven, the Rosses bearing S. S. W. five leagues; and, at eleven, the Hoche, after a gallant defence, struck; and the frigates made sail from us: the signal to pursue the enemy was immediately made, and, in five hours afterwards, three of the frigates hauled down their colours also; but they, as well as the Hoche, were obstinately defended, all of them being heavy frigates, entirely new, full of troops and stores, and every necessary for the establishment of their plans in Ireland.

" I am happy to say, that the efforts and conduct."

" I left Captain Thornborough with the Magnanime, Ethalion, and Amelia, with the prizes, and trust they will soon make their appearance."

" P. S. The ships with us in the action were the Canada, Robust, Foudroyant, Magnanime, Ethalion, Melampus, and Amelia. The Anson joined us late, having lost her mizen-mast in the chase the day before."

Thus, by the vigilance, perseverance, and spirit of this little detached squadron, a line of battle ship and three large frigates were taken from the enemy; and his views upon Ireland entirely frustrated. This was effected with little comparative loss, under very unpromising circumstances from the state of the weather.

EXTRACT.

" Canada, Plymouth Dock, November 18th, 1798.

" I have been waiting with great anxiety the arrival of the Robust and Le Hoche at this port, to enable me to make a return of the killed and wounded on the 12th of October last; but those ships may be still farther detained by repairs at Lough Swilly.

“ As the whole squadron was separated in chase of the flying enemy, and have successively arrived at this port, it was impracticable to communicate the particulars sooner, or to state the very gallant conduct of Captains Thornborough and De Courcy in the *Robust* and *Magnanime*; who, from their position in the van, were enabled to close with the enemy early in the action; and were zealously and bravely seconded by every other ship of the squadron, as well as by the intrepidity displayed by the *Anson* in the evening, in obeying my signal to harass the enemy, and in beating off their frigates.

“ For further particulars, I refer their Lordships to the letters they may have received from Captains Countess and Moore, of the *Ethalion* and *Melampus*.”

Plate XLI. Figs. 1, 2, 3, describe the relative position of the hostile squadrons, according to Sir J. Warren's account, when first discovered to each other in the morning of the 12th, and at the commencement of the action; the French squadron having borne down, and formed a close line of battle on the *starboard tack*.


The French fleet consisted of one ship of eighty guns, and eight frigates, a brig and schooner; the British, of three ships of the line and four frigates: the *Anson* joined late in the action.


Fig. 3. The British squadron having formed the line “ in succession in the rear of the van;” the *Robust* leading, followed by the *Magnanime*; who, “ from their position, were enabled to close with the enemy early in the action.”

From the information to be collected from the Admiral's letter, we are told, that the enemy bore down and formed a line on the *starboard tack*, &c.; but this is certainly incorrect. By a sketch from the hand of one of the best witnesses now living, Admiral Sir Edward Thornborough, (Nov. 1827) Plate XLII has been formed; by which it appears that, although the enemy's squadron was considerably to windward of the *flag-ship*, it was very little so of the *Robust*, *Magnanime*, and *Amelia*, who, on the morning of the 12th of October, discovered the enemy, as given in the figure, nearly right a-head, on the *larboard tack*. The *Robust* and frigates brought the *Hoche* and others to action on the *larboard side*, and to *windward* of them; and the action was nearly over before the *Canada* and *Foudroyant*, from being so far to leeward, could render any assistance.

When the *Hoche* struck, the French frigates endeavoured to escape by the opening made between the *Canada* and ships in shore of her; and, by the vigilant pursuit of the squadron, three of them, as we are informed in Sir J. Warren's letter, were taken.

7





Excepting a few guns at the enemy's frigates, the Robust fired her *starboard* guns only at the Hoche, which ship, without her main-top-mast, seems to have defended herself very well ; that is, from twenty minutes after seven until eleven o'clock.

The late naval historian, who places so much reliance upon *log-book authority*, is at last driven to confess that "*the entries in the different logs*" respecting this battle "*are confused, and in some instances contradictory.*" A French author ("*Victoires and Conquêtes*") is here considered "*respectable*," in another place he is accused of "*ignorance*," and of making "*sneering remarks*," and at last is declared guilty of making *false statements*.—(James, Vol. ii, p. 193, 439.) It is presumed the authority here shown can never be shaken.

SIR JAMES SAUMAREZ AT ALGEZIRAS.

1801.

Extracts of Letters from Sir James Saumarez dated Cæsar, Gibraltar Bay, July 6th.

"ON opening Cabrita point, I found the ships lay at a considerable distance from the enemy's batteries; and, having a leading wind up to them, afforded every reasonable hope of success in the attack.

"I had previously directed Captain Hood, in the Venerable, from his experience and knowledge of the anchorage, to lead the squadron; which he executed with his accustomed gallantry; and, although it was not intended he should anchor, he found himself under the necessity so to do, from the wind's failing; owing to which circumstance, I have to regret the want of success in this well-intended enterprise. Captain Stirling anchored opposite to the inner ship of the enemy, and brought the Pompée to action in the most gallant manner; which was also followed by the Captains of the ships in the squadron. Captains Darby and Ferris,* owing to light winds, were prevented, for a

* See Remark, page 277.

considerable time, from coming into action. At length, the Hannibal getting a breeze, Captain Ferris had the most favourable prospect of being alongside one of the enemy's ships, when the Hannibal unfortunately grounded; and I am extremely concerned to acquaint their Lordships that, after having made every possible effort, with this ship and the Audacious, to cover her from the enemy, I was under the necessity to make sail, being at the time only three cables' length from one of the enemy's batteries," &c.

Letter of Captain Ferris to Sir James Saumarez upon the Loss of his Ship, the Hannibal.

" Sir,

" Algeiras, July 7th.

" I have little more to tell you of the fate of his Majesty's ship Hannibal than yourself must have observed; only that, from the number of batteries and ships, gun-boats, &c. we had to encounter, our guns soon got knocked up; and I found it was impossible to do any thing, either for the preservation of the ship, or for the good of the service. Our boats, sails, rigging, and springs, being all shot away, and having so many killed and wounded, which will appear by the annexed list, I thought it prudent to strike, and thereby preserve the lives of the brave men that remained."

British force, six ships of the line, and one sloop of war; enemy, three ships of the line, protected by numerous batteries and gun-boats.

For a more particular account of this gallant but unfortunate attack shall be subjoined the clear, manly, and officer-like detail given by Captain Ferris at his Court Martial. It will be found to contain an excellent description of this severe and obstinate contest, which untoward circumstances alone, and the strong position of the enemy, rendered unsuccessful.

The Narrative of Captain Ferris.

" Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Court,

" In giving a detail of the circumstances which led to the loss of His Majesty's late ship, the Hannibal, then under my command, I am sorry that, owing to my clerk being killed, whose remarks were lost, I cannot be so particular as to the exact times of signals being made, as I otherwise should have been; but I shall state them to you to the best of my recollection.

" On the morning of the 6th July last, at about six o'clock, his Majesty's

ships, *Venerable*, *Pompée*, *Audacious*, *Cæsar*, *Spencer*, and *Hannibal*, under the command of Rear Admiral Sir J. Saumarez, being off *Cabrita* point, and standing in for *Algeziras* bay, upon the larboard tack, with the wind westerly; the Admiral made the signal to the *Venerable*, to know if she could fetch the enemy's ships then in sight in that bay; which being answered in the affirmative, the Admiral made the signal for close action.

"At about eight o'clock the *Venerable* began the action, at a considerable distance to leeward, as she could not fetch further into the bay; and soon after, the *Pompée* anchored nearer in shore, and the *Audacious* a-stern of her. The Admiral, in the *Cæsar*, next anchored a-head of the *Audacious*, and made the signal for the ships to anchor in the best possible manner for their mutual support. We then anchored a-head of the *Cæsar*, within hail of her, and, by a spring, got our broadside to bear on one of the enemy's line of battle ships at about ten minutes before nine o'clock, where we kept up a good fire for about an hour.

"At this time, about ten o'clock, not having understood some verbal directions attempted to be given from the *Cæsar*, I received an order from the Admiral by an officer to go and rake the French Admiral. I instantly turned the hands up to make sail, cut the cable, and cast the ship by the spring, and made sail to the northward; stood into a quarter less six, and then tacked for the French Admiral, for the purpose I had been ordered to effect. As I approached him, I began to take in sail in such manner as would have enabled me to have hauled in shore athwart his hawse; which I preferred to going to leeward under his stern, as that might have subjected me, from the variable flaws of the wind, to have drifted further to leeward, and, consequently, without fulfilling, in a manner the most effectual and decisive, the object of my orders. But just as I got the fore-cluegarnets manned, in order to take in the fore-sail, with an intent to put the helm a-lee, and to brace the head-yards a-box, the ship took the ground within hail of the French Admiral's ship, which accident alone could have prevented me from putting my orders into execution.

"In this situation, I opened my fire on the French Admiral, with as many of my fore-most guns as could be brought to bear on him; the rest being directed, with much effect, on the town, batteries, and gun-boats, with which I was surrounded; but, the ship appearing to swing a little, I let go the bower-anchor, and cut the cable; the stream-cable being clenched to the ring of the anchor, and in at the gun-room port, on which I intended to heave a strain to endeavour to force the ship round, so as to bring her broadside to bear on the

French Admiral (having, at this time, no hope of getting the ship entirely afloat, the master finding less water round the ship than where she lay); but the spring being shot away before it was well taut, the ship remained immovable. I had, by this time, after much endeavour, all my signal halliards being shot away, effected making the signal for striking and sticking fast on a shoal.

“ I observed some time afterwards all our ships driving out of the bay; the Admiral having previously made my signal of recal, and sent a boat from the *Cæsar*, and another from the *Venerable*, to my assistance; but, finding they could afford me none, I sent the *Venerable*'s boat back, and the crew of the *Cæsar*'s in one of my own cutters; their pinnace having been sunk by a shot alongside.

“ About twelve o'clock our ships were all out of gun-shot of the enemy;* and we had the fire of the whole French squadron, batteries, and gun-boats, to contend with alone; against which we continued to keep up as brisk fire as could be expected even of men in the most sanguine expectation of victory, until near two o'clock.

“ I had been before this time receiving repeated reports from several of my officers, of the numbers killed and wounded, and of many of the guns being rendered unserviceable; and seeing many of my brave crew every moment falling at their quarters, and the ship in all respects but little better than a wreck, I thought proper to call my officers together, and asked their opinion whether more could be done for the preservation of the ship; they replied, they thought it was impossible to do more, and that to strike the colours was the only means of preserving the lives of those that remained.

“ On these considerations, and from a conviction of having experienced every possible assistance that the persevering endeavours of zealous and brave officers and men could afford me; whose exertions, and those of Lieutenant Hill in particular (my First Lieutenant), I shall ever remember with the greatest gratitude; and seeing that our hitherto effective fire on the enemy's ships and batteries was now so slackened as to be nearly useless, I ordered the firing to cease, and the people to shelter themselves as much as possible; and in a little time afterwards I submitted to the painful necessity of ordering his Majesty's colours to be hauled down.”

* Here this gallant officer was led into a mistake, as the *Hannibal* was reduced to the necessity of surrendering before Sir James Saumarez had quitted his position: but he commences by stating that his clerk was killed, and the minutes of the battle were lost.

OBSERVATION.

Such was the honourable fate of this obstinate and brilliant contest. The attack reflects honour and credit upon all; and on no one more than the skilful, cool, and determined captain, officers, and crew of the Hannibal. To be at last compelled to surrender to a host of foes, and under such an accumulation of disasters, was perhaps more desirable than some victories would have been; and rendered them objects rather of envy and emulation, than of commiseration and regret.

To show the impression the conduct of this ship had made upon the members of the Court Martial, the following is extracted from the sentence:—

“The Court, on hearing the narrative of Captain Ferris, &c., was of opinion, that the loss of his Majesty’s ship Hannibal was caused by her grounding on a shoal in the bay of Algeziras a-head of the French Admiral; when Captain Ferris, her commander, agreeably to the orders he had received, was making the gallant and well-judged attempt to place her so as to rake the enemy; and after a considerable part of his ship’s company had been killed or wounded, being obliged to strike his Majesty’s colours: and that the conduct of Captain Ferris, in going into action, was that of an excellent and expert seaman; and that his conduct, after she was engaged, was that of a brave, cool, and determined officer; and that Captain Ferris, his officers, and ship’s company, throughout the action, more particularly in continuing it for a considerable time after she was on shore, and the rest of the British squadron had been obliged to quit her, did the utmost for the preservation of his Majesty’s ship, and the honour of the British flag; and doth adjudge them to be honourably acquitted.”

REMARK.

“A difference in the Admiral’s statement and Captain Ferris’s occasions some little obscurity; for by the latter it appears he was at an anchor, within hail of the *Cæsar* (the flag-ship), engaged for an hour; and ordered from that position to take another, in order to rake the French Admiral. The ships, not fetching in, should never have anchored.”

Ramatuelle, in his chapter “*De L’embossage*,” or the anchoring with springs for the defence of a port or road, alludes to this attack, to show how much its success depends upon the wind. He observes that an inferior force so placed, threatened with an attack, should take down all vanes, colours, or flags that

could in any way show the force or direction of the wind to a fleet in the offing, who may be affected by a very different one.

The wind in this instance first failed the British squadron, then shifted to the N. E. and E. N. E. which he observes threw the English upon a lee shore.

His account seems no otherwise incorrect than in stating that *two* of the British squadron ran aground; but that one of them was got off again. The change of wind, he says, obliged the French ships to cut their cables and run on shore. (Page 468.)

In such cases he recommends having some *fire ships* ready, outside and to windward, and provided with a few good *swimmers* or *divers*, to grapple with the enemy under cover of the smoke, when they shall have approached within half gun-shot!

SIR JAMES SAUMAREZ, IN THE STRAITS OF GIBRALTAR.

WE are now to relate another proof of extreme vigilance and activity displayed by Sir James Saumarez in equipping his disabled squadron, and pursuing in the shortest space of time a very superior force of the enemy; of his gallantly attacking it, and of the success which so honourably crowned his exertions.


The following are extracts from his letter, and that of Captain Keats of the *Superb* :—

“ *Cesar*, July 13th.

“ The three line of battle ships disabled in the battle of the 6th instant off Algeziras were on the 8th reinforced by a squadron of five Spanish line of battle ships, under the command of Don Juan Joaquin de Moreno; and a French ship of seventy-four guns, wearing a broad pendant; besides three frigates and an incredible number of gun-boats and other vessels; and got under sail yesterday morning.”

“ Confiding in the zeal and intrepidity of the officers and men I had the honour to command, I determined, if possible, to obstruct them in their passage to Cadiz. Late in the evening I observed the enemy's ships to have cleared

THE COAST OF SPAIN IN THE STREIGHTS OF GIBRALTAR *Fig. 1.*



LAND

Fig. 2.




Fig. 1.




Fig. 2.





Fig. 3.



Cabrita point, and at eight I bore up with the squadron to stand after them. His Majesty's ship *Superb* being stationed a-head of the *Cæsar*, I directed Captain Keats to make sail and attack the sternmost of the enemy's rear, using his endeavours to keep in-shore of them." See Plate XLIII, Fig. 1. French and Spanish, nine sail of the line; British, five sail of the line and one frigate.

Fig. 2. "At eleven the *Superb* opened her fire close to the enemy's ships; and on the *Cæsar's* coming up, and preparing to engage a three-decker that had hauled her wind, she was perceived to have taken fire, and the flames having communicated to a ship to leeward of her, both were soon in a blaze, and presented a most awful sight. No possibility existing of offering the least assistance in so distressing a situation, the *Cæsar* passed to close with the ship engaged by the *Superb*; but by the cool and determined fire kept upon her, the enemy's ship was completely silenced, and soon after hauled down her colours. The *Venerable* and *Spencer* having at this time come up, I bore up after the enemy, who were carrying a press of sail, standing out of the Straits; and lost sight of them during the night."

Plate XLIV, Fig. 4. "It blew excessively hard till day-light; and in the morning the only ships in company were the *Venerable* and *Thames*, a-head of the *Cæsar*; and one of the French ships at some distance from them, standing towards the shoals of Conil; besides the *Spencer* a-stern coming up.

"All the ships immediately made sail with a fresh breeze; but as we approached, the wind suddenly failing, the *Venerable* was alone able to bring her to action, which Captain Hood did in the most gallant manner, and had nearly silenced the French ship, when his main-mast (which had been before wounded) was unfortunately shot away; and it coming nearly calm, the enemy's ship was enabled to get off without any possibility of following her."

"This action was so near the shore, that the *Venerable* struck on a shoal, but was soon after got off and taken in tow by the *Thames*; but with the loss of all her masts. The enemy's ships are now in sight to the westward, standing in for Cadiz. The *Superb* and *Audacious*, with the captured ship, are also in sight."

Of this force, two ships of 112 guns took fire and blew up; and one of seventy-four guns was taken.

British force, five ships of the line, one frigate, and a sloop of war.

To do justice to those who had the good fortune to bear a more conspicuous part than others upon this occasion, we shall select parts of the following letter of Captain Keats, from which to draw no unimportant conclusion.

" Superb, off Cape Trafalgar, July 13th.

" I have the honour to inform you, that in consequence of your direction to make sail up to, and engage the sternmost of the enemy's ships, at half-past eleven I found myself a-breast of a Spanish three-decked ship (the Real Carlos), which having *brought-in-one* * with two other ships nearly line a-breast, I opened my fire upon her at a distance, not more than three cables. This evidently produced a good effect, as well in this ship, as the others a-breast of her ; which soon began firing on each other, and at times on the Superb. (See Fig. 2.) In about a quarter of an hour I perceived her to be on fire, and I proceeded on to the ship next at hand, which proved to be the San Antonio of 74 guns and 750 men, under French colours, and wearing a broad pendant ; which, after some action (the chief being wounded), struck her colours.

" I learnt that in the confusion of the action, the Hermenegildo (a first-rate) mistaking the Real Carlos for an enemy, ran on board her, and shared her melancholy fate. Services of this nature cannot well be expected to be performed without some loss," &c.

OBSERVATIONS.

From the result of this action is clearly shown the impropriety of retreating in a *line a-breast* ; or as Mr. Richard H. Gower, in his treatise, calls it, the order of retreat, having the *line of bearing across the wind*.

Nothing could have been more disadvantageous on the one hand, and (as it proved) of advantage to the pursuing squadron, than this mode of retreat ; for to a skilful and enterprising enemy, it afforded every prospect of success ; which from the form of approach recommended by the British Admiral, and the cool and determined manner in which it was executed by Sir Richard Keats, was so happily effected.

The French and Spanish Commanders well knew the vigilance and activity of their enemy, and fully expected to be closely pursued. Their force consisted of nine sail of the line, with numerous small vessels ; the British force, five sail of the line and a frigate. The following were Admiral Moreno's orders to his fleet upon this occasion. (See " Naval Chronicle," vol. vi. for a full account.)

" Order of sailing to be observed by the ships in my charge, on their passage through the Straits of Gibraltar :—

* This signifies, to bring in a direct line together ; exposed to suffer by the same broadside.

" The three French ships under the command of Rear Admiral Linois will form the van-guard, with the *line a-breast*. The six ships under my charge will follow a-stern of these, likewise formed in line a-breast; endeavouring as much as possible to keep opposite to the intervals of the French ships, so as not to impede their fire, according to the following disposition. (See Fig. 1, Plate XLIII.)

" In case the enemy should attempt to follow and attack the combined squadron in the rear, besides the continual fire which we ought to make from the stern chases, chiefly with a view to destroy the enemy's rigging, the squadron will form the line a-head, either with their heads to the Spanish coast, or to that of Africa, as will be determined by a signal from the Admiral; and in order that this may be the more simple, in that case, he will only show the signal for the course, at the entire lowering of which the movements must uniformly be made. As the operation, from their local situation, cannot naturally be of long duration, consequently, either by hailing (if near enough) or by a signal to 'pursue the course,' the squadron will proceed to form again the line a-breast as formerly.

" It is of the utmost importance that the fire from none of the ships should interfere, or be embarrassed with that of the others in this squadron, nor to leave the three French ships in the rear." Here are some further observations, not necessary; and the line of battle in the natural order; this is followed by

" A very essential Caution.

" A red pendant under any other signal, signifies that the signal above is directed only to the French ships under the command of Mons. de Linois.

" On board the Real Carlos, in the Bay
of Algeiras, July 11th, 1801.

(Signed)

" JUAN JOAQUIN DE MORENO."

Neither the disposition of his force, nor the precautionary orders with regard to the fire of his ships, were sufficient to protect the Spanish Admiral from the skill and intrepidity of British seamen.

His very mode of retreat was his ruin, and cannot be compared with that of Admiral Cornwallis; who, by a very different mode, defeated the attempt of an overwhelming superiority. Here, nine sail of the line (two of them first-rates, which took fire and blew up; and a seventy-four is taken) are attacked by three only of five ships of two decks, and are beaten and dispersed. In the former

case, five ships of the line, having but one three-decked ship, completely set at defiance a force of thirteen ships of two decks and fourteen frigates.—Let the reader consider this, and form his own conclusions.

REMARKS.

“With regard to this retreat, when nine ships make up their minds to run from five, it is of little consequence in what order they take their flight; and the confusion of the combined squadron, on being attacked by the *Superb*, shows they never would have preserved any regular order. Now the circular stern has been introduced, I think the line a-breast may be used with effect.”

“The disastrous consequence of a retreat in line a-breast, in this instance, I do not consider a fair trial; the line was never preserved; the enemy ran in disorder, and panic was the order of the day. If every ship had behaved like the French *Formidable* the next morning the British squadron could have done nothing. The fault was not in the line a-breast, but a want of skill and courage.”

The bombardment of Copenhagen by Lord Nelson, in 1801, although a naval achievement of the most brilliant description, does not come within the limits of the present inquiry, as not strictly connected with tactics. Lord Nelson remarked at a subsequent period, that he had there committed one great error, namely, by not having directed the ships to heave close to their anchors in going to the attack, instead of weighing them; as in the time taken to cat, fish, and stow their anchors, the navigation being so intricate and shallow, two of the ships grounded. (See the Biographical Memoir of Sir Waller Otway, by Mr. I. Ralfe.)

In this celebrated attack Captain Otway was a volunteer, and performed enterprising and distinguished service, to which it is shown he was particularly recommended and adapted.

Of the Peace of Amiens, concluded in that year, Lord Nelson's opinion is given in a MS. letter to the Right Hon. John Trevor, in which also he has drawn in few words the character of the then principal actor in the great continental drama. The letter was written soon after the destruction of the flotilla at Boulogne, and when he was suffering for the loss of his “dear gallant Parker;” yet continuing to interest himself in the future prospects of others, who were

known to him ; particularly in one recommended by Mr. Trevor. The following is an extract, and dated from the

“ Amazon, October 16th, 1801.

“ I am one that rejoices at the peace, and *rejoice* from my heart that we are not to keep Malta and the Cape of Good Hope, an enormous expense and no use to us ; this I will defend by proofs against all the dislikers of the terms in another place. If Europe had been true to itself our peace and their peace would have been very different ; *they never read the fable of the old man and the sticks*. I feel for the poor King of Sardinia ; I hate the French as much as ever ; and it is not because Buonaparte is a clever great scoundrel that I can ever like him ; *Corsican cunning grafted upon French insolence and infamy ; this is the god that Europe has made and they fall down and worship it*. But we have made peace with this animal—this nondescript—and I hope we and all Europe will keep it ; but the moment he outsteps his boundaries and again shows his cloven foot, *then I hope Europe will join heart and hand and beat this animal from the throne,*” &c.

(Signed) NELSON AND BRONTE.

In this letter it would seem that he had a strong suspicion this “*nondescript*” would outstep his boundary, and again show his cloven foot. The sequel proves Lord Nelson to have been no false prophet, and how with “heart and hand” he bravely contributed to “beat the animal from the throne.”

SIR ROBERT CALDER'S BATTLE.

1805.

EXTRACT.

“ Prince of Wales, July 23d.

“ YESTERDAY, at noon, I was favoured with a view of the combined squadrons of France and Spain, consisting of twenty sail of the line ; also three large ships armed en flûte of about fifty guns each, with five frigates, and three

brigs; the force under my direction at this time consisting of fifteen sail of the line, two frigates, a cutter, and lugger. I immediately stood towards the enemy, making the needful signals for battle in the closest order; and, on closing with them, I made the signal for attacking their centre.

"When I had reached their rear, I tacked the squadron in succession; this brought us close up under their lee; and, when our headmost ships reached their centre, the enemy were tacking in succession. This obliged me to make again the same manœuvre, by which I brought on an action, which lasted upward of four hours, when I found it necessary to bring to the squadron, to cover the two captured ships named in the margin.

"I have to observe, the enemy had every advantage of wind and weather during the whole day; the weather had been foggy at times a great part of the morning; and, very soon after we had brought them to action the fog was so very thick, at intervals, that we could, with great difficulty, see the ship a-head or a-stern of us. This rendered it impossible to take the advantages of the enemy, by signals, I wished to have done. Had the weather been more favourable, I am led to believe the victory would have been more complete," &c.

"If I may judge from the slaughter on board the captured ships, the enemy must have suffered greatly. They are now in sight to windward, and when I have secured, &c. I shall endeavour to avail myself," &c.

Plate XLV shows the positions of the two fleets, from the best information that can be collected.

Fig. 1. Wind about N. W. by N. forty leagues N. W. from Cape Finisterre. The British and combined fleets meeting, on opposite tacks, July 22d, 1805, "I made the signal for attacking their centre; when I reached their rear, I tacked the squadron in succession:" "this brought us close up under their lee."

Fig. 2. "When our headmost ships reached their centre, the enemy were tacking in succession:" "this obliged me again to make the same manœuvre."

The van having reached the centre of the enemy, and preparing to make the same manœuvre.


Fig. 3. The van of both fleets having tacked in succession, according to the British Admiral's statement.

By his manœuvre, the Admiral informs us, that he "brought on an action which lasted upwards of four hours, when he found it necessary to bring to the squadron, to cover the two captured ships."

By this position of the two fleets, it is difficult to understand how the British


LAND

Fig. 3.



LAND

Fig. 4.



fleet could avoid passing through the centre of the enemy, and thereby rendering the battle infinitely more decisive. After this manoeuvre the writer is unable further to trace the track of the British Admiral.

OBSERVATIONS.

It is singular that, in the foregoing letter, we are neither informed of the direction of the wind, the quarter in which the enemy is first seen, nor the tack or course upon which either fleet is standing. These are only to be discovered from its general contents, and from sources distinct from the Admiral's dispatches.

From the trial of the British Admiral by a Court Martial, as it relates exclusively to the transactions of the squadron from the 23d, in the morning, nothing is to be learned of the encounter of the 22d, excepting that the enemy was left upon the weather quarter of the British fleet at a very considerable distance. Upon this, his subsequent conduct, a Court Martial has pronounced judgment.

There is one part of the Admiral's letter that cannot escape observation ; it is this—that, notwithstanding the thickness of the fog at intervals, when he could with difficulty see the ships a-head and a-stern of him, it was also, at times, so clear, that he could discover the movements of the van ships of the enemy, by which he himself was guided. When they tacked in succession, he performed the same manoeuvre, which brought on an action of four hours, which he appears to have quitted without a sufficient reason ; for merely to cover the two captured ships will not be admitted to be so. By Figure 3, it would seem that it was in the power of the British Admiral, when he last tacked, to have passed through the enemy's line, and to have separated and captured many more.

FURTHER OBSERVATIONS UPON SIR ROBERT CALDER'S BATTLE.

As accuracy, so far as it can be attained, is essential to the credit of a record of this nature, no apology will be necessary for offering a few more observations upon the battle of Sir Robert Calder.

From an intelligent officer, Captain of one of the ships in that fleet, and another, a Lieutenant of one in the rear, whose account and description entirely correspond, the writer has been informed that mistakes have arisen in the statement given in the Admiral's letter.

The French Commander-in-chief (with the wonted address and politeness of

his country), yielding the post of *honour* to his faithful allies, had placed the Spaniards in the *van* to lead them into *battle*; but, the British fleet approaching his *rear*, lest they should be deprived of this opportunity of distinguishing themselves, he caused the van to *ware* (as along the dotted line in Figures 1 and 3), and thus to bring to action the van of the British fleet, upon the opposite tack, keeping to windward; while the French division continued standing away upon the larboard tack. The rear of the British fleet, at this time, had not got upon the larboard tack, but were still standing as in Figure 1, when the sternmost ships came in contact with the van of the enemy (the Spaniards) which had then nearly run the gauntlope of the British line. It was two of these that fell a prey to the British fleet: the rest were suffered to proceed, and the battle ended. Our sternmost ships were never engaged, but on the starboard side, with the enemy to windward; and must, therefore, have engaged on the starboard tack.

By a log of one of the ships, it appears that the enemy's fleet were seen at 11^h 15' a. m. bearing S. S. W. wind N. N. W.; and, at three p. m. they bore N. W. by W.; an evident proof of the advantage given them by the British Admiral, when, as the enemy were first seen on the lee-bow, he had it clearly in his power to have passed through their line in whatever part he thought proper; but he stood away, large, to be joined by the *Dragon* on the look-out in that quarter; and thus the opportunity was lost. He could then only tack, and, by carrying sail, range up under the enemy's lee, from the rear to the centre, as in Figure 2.

The two Spanish ships struck about sunset; and, at day-light on the following morning, the van of the British fleet was nearer to the enemy than to its own. The cause of this great separation between them does not appear to be accounted for.

All the information the writer can collect is, indeed, scanty and imperfect; but the accuracy of this may be entirely relied on, so far as relates to what could be seen from, or take place in, the rear of the British fleet. It led, however, to one, the greatest in our naval annals of modern times, now about to be described.

REMARKS.

"Some men have thought that doing a little is doing enough; Lord Nelson, like *Cæsar*, considered *nothing* done while any thing remained *undone*."

"This engagement is so ill-described (from want of proper information) that

it seems but fair to leave it out: it certainly appears by Figure 3 that Sir Robert might have taken (by cutting off) the enemy's rear."

The writer must observe in reply, that where he has applied for information, namely, to Captains who were present in the battle, no very clear or satisfactory account was given him; some of them knew little beyond the conduct of their own ships; and all agree in its having been a very ill-conducted attack, and quitted when the British fleet was only beginning to reap the advantage of it. The writer regrets that his numerous and earnest endeavours to acquire more satisfactory details of this battle have not met with better success.

BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR.

Extract from Lord Collingwood's Letter to the Admiralty.

"Euryalus, off Cape Trafalgar, October 22d, 1805.

"ON Monday, the 21st instant, at day-light, when Cape Trafalgar bore E. by S. about seven leagues, the enemy was discovered six or seven miles to the eastward, the wind about west, and very light; the Commander-in-chief immediately made the signal for the fleet to bear up in two columns, as they are formed in order of sailing; a mode of attack his Lordship had previously directed, to avoid the inconvenience and delay in forming a line of battle in the usual manner.

"The enemy's line consisted of thirty-three ships (of which eighteen were French and fifteen Spanish), commanded in chief by Admiral Villeneuve; the Spaniards, under Gravina, wore with their heads to the northward, and formed their line of battle with great closeness and correctness; but as the mode of attack was unusual, so the structure of their line was new; it formed a *crescent convexing to leeward*, so that, in leading down to their centre, I had both their van and rear a-baft the beam. Before the fire opened, every alternate ship was about a cable's length to windward of her second a-head and a-stern, forming a kind of double line; and appeared when on their beam, to leave a very little interval between them, and this without crowding their ships.

"The Commander-in-chief, in the Victory, led the weather column; and the Royal Sovereign, which bore my flag, the lee.*

"The action began at twelve o'clock by the leading ships of the columns breaking through the enemy's line; the Commander-in-chief about the tenth ship from the van; the second in command about the twelfth from the rear, leaving the van of the enemy unoccupied; the succeeding ships breaking through in all parts a-stern of their leaders, and engaging the enemy at the muzzles of their guns. The conflict was severe; the enemy's ships were fought with a gallantry highly honourable to their officers; but the attack on them was irresistible; and it pleased the Almighty Disposer of all events to grant his Majesty's arms a complete and glorious victory.

"About three p. m., many of the enemy's ships having struck their colours, their line gave way; Admiral Gravina, with ten sail, joining their frigates to leeward, stood towards Cadiz.

"The five headmost ships in their van tacked, and, standing to the southward, to windward of the British line, were engaged, and the sternmost of them taken. The others went off, leaving to his Majesty's squadron nineteen ships of the line (of which two are first rates), with three flag officers," &c.

In another letter he observes, "The ruin of the fleet is as complete as could be expected under the circumstances of fighting them close to their own shore. Had the battle been in the ocean, still fewer would have escaped."

OBSERVATIONS.

By a representation of the plan of attack, given in the 14th volume of the Naval Chronicle, and said to be copied from a drawing in the possession of the

* In an attack of this sort, a formidable battery in the bows of our ships would be desirable if it could be had; and, if not, that the bow should, if possible, be made *shot-proof*, yet not heavy. In the power, or means, of assailing an enemy from the bow, our ships in general are very deficient. The Endymion frigate, by a singular felicity, could at a long range make a cross fire with her two foremost guns on the main-deck. In her engagement with the President, for nearly three hours, she kept up a fire from one of these guns, and a traversing brass eighteen-pounder belonging to the Captain (Henry Hope) from the fore-castle; the only guns that, during that time, could be brought to bear; and, for the last half hour, having, with excellent management and attention, attained and preserved the "*point of impunity*," did some execution. Such was the look-out kept by the Endymion, and so closely in concert were all her movements with those of the enemy, that the American Captain declared both ships appeared to be *steered by the same wheel*! There can be no stronger proof of the discipline and conduct of the ship, nor could he have paid the Captain a higher compliment.

Line of the advanced Squadron Ships not present in the Action

Weather Division under Lord Nelson

Fig. 1.

Lee Division under Lord Collingwood





Fig. 2.



Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, it is shown that the British fleet bore down (as the letter expresses it) in *two columns* (lines A, B, C, D, Fig. 2, Plate XLVI), led by the flag-officers respectively. The advanced squadron (had there been one) was intended to have cut through more towards the van, but, at all events, to secure the capture or destruction of the Commander-in-chief; on whom, and the rear, their principal efforts were to be directed; and, supposing the enemy's force to have consisted of forty-six sail of the line, "twenty of them were to be left untouched;" that is, until those that were the first object had been properly accounted for.

While such must be considered as the actual mode of attack adopted, it is well known to all the Captains of that fleet, that an attack from the windward was, by previous concert, to have been of a different and still more formidable nature; for, as the order of sailing was the order of battle, and the enemy seen to leeward, the Commander-in-chief, in that case, would "bring the British fleet nearly within gun-shot of the enemy's centre, and the signal, most probably, then be made for the lee-division to *bear up together*, to set all sails, even steering sails," &c.

The secret memorandum at the end of these remarks, will best explain his Lordship's intention; but as an attempt to reconcile the approach in column with the plan before directed, we shall suppose the advance of the fleet as here given.* The lee division, *bearing up together*, followed soon after by the centre; the fleet originally formed in the order of sailing upon a wind on the larboard tack; the enemy formed in close line convexing to leeward, heads to the northward.

The preconcerted plan of attack differed essentially from the real one, inasmuch as that presumes the two lines to have borne up together. In the actual case, they *afterwards* fell into line a-head, the ships in the wake of each other, in obedience to the signal made in conformity with a change of intention on the part of Lord Nelson. This, it would seem, can only be accounted for by his great impatience to be the leader of his column, and the first in battle; for certain it is that such change *was made* in the form of attack, the writer having been assured of it from the best authority. Now, supposing a line, like that of Lord Collingwood's, of fifteen ships, all in their stations when the signal to bear up together should be made; and supposing the signal to be obeyed with equal alacrity by all; yet the different rates of sailing in them will soon be conspicuous; and the advantages of some over others neither to be reckoned upon nor

* British fleet twenty-seven sail of the line; French and Spanish thirty-three.

accounted for; yet it will be readily admitted that, from the design, no mode of attack could have been formed better calculated for effecting the purpose of the determined Chief; the capture or destruction of the centre and rear of the enemy. See the "*Memorandum*."

The great man, whose last brilliant achievement it is here feebly attempted to describe, had well calculated upon the probable result of this masterly manœuvre: justly confiding in the intrepidity of those under his command. The twelve rear ships of the enemy he had already assigned to the fifteen under Lord Collingwood; while, with his remaining twelve, he undertook the "management" of the rest; taking care that "the movements of the second in command should be as little interrupted as possible." Twenty-one ships therefore were to be managed by this matchless hero and his twelve sail of ships!

The dying Chief's wishes were accomplished before he resigned his breath; the fruit of his arrangements and example. He had "bargained for twenty,"* nineteen was the number taken or destroyed.

Sanguine in his expectations "as to the result," his great mind had nevertheless considered the subject well in all its bearings; for, towards the close of this celebrated memorandum, he says, "something must be left to chance; nothing is sure in a sea fight above all others; shot will carry away the masts and yards of friends as well as foes; but I look with confidence to a victory before the van of the enemy could succour their rear," &c.


Yet it may be permitted us to inquire, how far it might have been in the power of the enemy's van (ten or eleven sail) left unoccupied, to have succoured his rear; or in what manner to have stayed the dreadful havoc committed upon the rest of the fleet. For this purpose are offered for consideration, the movements described by Plate XLVII, Fig. 3; where the enemy's van has borne up to form a line of battle (on either tack) to leeward of the contending ships.

All sea officers will admit, that the crippled ships of both fleets must necessarily fall to leeward. This formidable line of fresh ships will therefore be ready to assist their friends, or to attack their disabled enemy; who, already having suffered severely in the contest, may be little able to contend with others, and most probably will fall an easy prey to them; while they present a safe shelter and protection to the shattered remains of their own fleet.

In the same Memorandum it is said, "If the van of the enemy tacks, the captured ships must run to leeward of the British fleet; if the enemy veers (or


* See "Dr. Beatty's Narrative and Death of Nelson."

Fig. 3.



THE COAST OF SPAIN ABOUT THE HARBOUR OF CADIZ

Fig. 4.



wares), the British must place themselves between the enemy and the captured ships; and should the enemy close, I have no fear as to the result."

In a conflict like this both fleets must suffer most severely; and the British fleet, having already fought its way through a double line of the enemy, cannot be equally capable of penetrating a third; and from their battered and dismantled condition must inevitably fall to leeward.

The Victory had suffered considerably before she could return a single shot. She had lost fifty men killed and wounded; her mizen-top-mast and all her studding-sails and their booms on both sides were shot away; the enemy's fire being chiefly directed at the masts and rigging; so certain is the effect of a cannonade from a line to leeward, and fully justifying Mr. Clerk's conclusions. The Victory was then laid on board of the Redoubtable; which ship had afterwards on her other side the Temeraire, with the Fougex also alongside of her; "so that the extraordinary and unprecedented circumstance occurred here, of four ships of the line being on board of each other in the heat of battle."*

Since such was the case with two, it was probably so with many of the ships; this will further appear by an extract from the log of the Bellerophon, with which this account shall be closed; all tending to favour the proposed movement of the enemy's van; who, in protecting their disabled companions, might still have disputed the fortune of the day.

From Lord Collingwood we learn, that five of the headmost ships tacked, were engaged by some of our ships, and the sternmost of them taken; the others went off; but, as it proved, only to fall into the hands of Sir Richard Strachan.

This was at least a most ignoble proceeding; offering nothing to the protection or defence of their comrades, and productive neither of honour nor of advantage.

In a letter dated October 24th, we are told, "On the 22d, in the morning, a strong southerly wind blew; with squally weather; which, however, did not prevent the officers and seamen of such ships as were manageable, to be actively employed in getting hold of many of the prizes (thirteen or fourteen) and towing them off to the westward, to rendezvous round the Royal Sovereign, in tow by the Neptune. But on the 23d the gale increased, and the sea ran so high that many of them broke the tow-rope, and some of them taking advantage of the dark and boisterous night, got before the wind, and have perhaps drifted upon the shore and sunk."

* See "Dr. Beatty's Narrative of the Battle and Death of Lord Nelson."

" On the afternoon of that day the remnant of the combined fleet, ten sail of ships, who had not been much engaged, stood up to leeward of my shattered and straggled charge, as if meaning to attack them; which obliged me to collect a force out of the least injured ships, and form to leeward for their defence. All this retarded the progress of the hulks; and the bad weather continuing, determined me to destroy all the leeward-most that could be cleared of the men," &c. See further details in Lord Collingwood's letter of the 24th of October.

In another letter from the same officer it is said that " a dreadful gale had dispersed the ships, and drove the captured hulls in all directions; I have since been employed in collecting and destroying them.

" In the gale the Royal Sovereign and the Mars lost their fore-masts, and are now rigging a-new, where the body of the squadron is at anchor to the N. W. of San Lucar.

" The Royal Sovereign having lost her masts, except the tottering foremast (which fell afterwards), I called the Euryalus to me, and shifted my flag to her, the more easily to communicate my orders, and to collect the ships; towing the Royal Sovereign out to seaward.

" The whole fleet was now in a most perilous situation; many dismasted, all shattered, in thirteen fathoms water, off the shoals of Trafalgar: and when I made the signal to prepare to anchor, few had an anchor to let go, their cables being shot; but the same good Providence which aided us throughout, preserved us in the night by the wind shifting a few points, and drifting the ships off the land, excepting four of the captured, dismasted ships, now at anchor off Trafalgar; and I hope they will ride in safety until the gales are over."

By all this it must be evident what might have been effected by a squadron of reserve posted as in Fig. 3, early in the battle, formed of those not made the immediate object of attack.

Having thus considered the mode of defence adopted by the enemy, in a double line (as we are informed by Lord Collingwood) convexing to leeward, as in Fig. 3, it may be useful to examine it in another manner, by supposing that he had so arranged his fleet as to have formed it into a half-moon convexing to *windward*. See Fig. 4.

Of these two modes, the latter appears the best, particularly while the attack, as in this case, is made upon the centre and rear.

Here the weathermost ships are in a situation to assail the approaching fleet before it is near enough to penetrate the line; and, should they have *circular*

sterns, by a flanking fire would considerably annoy any ships passing the line of their direction towards the rear.

Should the principal attack take place upon the van, the centre must *advance*, cut through the approaching column, separate, and inclose it. Unless they advance, they would be exposed to a severe raking fire; while the present construction of the bows of our ships admits of but a feeble fire in return.

A line thus formed might in an easy and simple manner become a line of battle in the regular way, by the van ships, and the rest in succession making sail; the centre edging gradually to leeward to receive the support of the whole line.

The Figure may represent the fleet upon either tack.

By a late naval historian, the author of the "Naval Battles" has been accused of having "*entirely misunderstood the principle upon which the Battle of Trafalgar was fought.*" (See "James," vol. iv, p. 144.)

In reply, the author must observe, that persons of experience in nautical affairs, with the facts before them, will clearly see by Lord Nelson's first plan of attack that he could not have intended to expose his ships, more particularly in light winds, to be *singly beaten in succession*. That this *was* the case, Mr. James himself affords ample proof. For example,—“It was not until full fifteen minutes after the “*Tonnant*” had cut through the line, that her second a-stern (the *Bellerophon*), owing to her distance from the former, and the lightness of the wind, was enabled to do the same.” (Page 73.)

Again, “The Royal Sovereign was in hot action, after having cut through the enemy's line, *for upwards of a quarter of an hour before any ship did, or could come to her assistance.*” (Page 136.)

“The Victory and Temeraire were also closely engaged for even a *longer period*, before the three or four ships a-stern of them could get to their support. The nature of the attack, combined with the *lightness of the breeze*, was such, indeed, that the *whole business* was done by *twelve or fourteen ships*, of the twenty-seven (page 136), and that, without the slightest disparagement to the conduct of the remainder!” So entirely was it occasioned by the mode of attack; and for what? Why, to oppose a smaller “*front* to the enemy.” If, indeed, British ships are built only to be fired AT, such a mode of reasoning might be tenable; but from a man who has so strenuously laboured to show throughout his whole work the effects of a superior and well-directed “*broadside weight of metal*,” it is somewhat extraordinary.

We are not now to learn what can be done in fifteen minutes, when exposed.

only to an *equal* force; but here we see that the "*Bellerophon*" at about fifty minutes past noon, ran foul of the "*Aigle*," and fired from both sides. In a short time *three other of the enemy's ships opened a cannonade upon her.*" (Page 73.)

"For upwards of fifteen minutes the *Royal Sovereign* was the only ship in close action." (Vol. iv. p. 51.)

"The *Royal Sovereign* we left just as, after fifteen minutes of close action with *three or four ships*, the *Belleisle* had come her relief." (Page 63.)

FURTHER PARTICULARS OF THE TRAFALGAR FIGHT.

As every authentic memorial of this great national event must be generally interesting, but more especially so to naval men, no apology is necessary for inserting in this place the following particulars.

The intelligent officer to whom the writer is indebted for this important manuscript, was an eye-witness of what he has so ably related; and upon which he has reasoned with so much judgment. Of six plans of the battle, delineated by the same hand; to the accuracy of which, many who were engaged have borne testimony, the present writer has selected three, still further to illustrate this great victory; and he will accompany them by such extracts from the remarks, as are calculated to explain them; and, also such as may show, in the narrator's own language, the opinion he had formed of the mode of attack, and the conduct of the enemy.

The sketch of the coast of Spain is taken from the first plan; the position of the fleets from the fourth, fifth, and sixth.

"The combined fleet, after veering from the starboard to the larboard tack, gradually fell into the form of an irregular crescent; in which they remained to the moment of attack. Many have considered that the French Admiral intended this formation of the line of battle; but from the information I obtained after the action, connected with some documents found on board the *Bucentaur*, I believe it was the intention to have formed a line a-head, consisting of twenty-one sail; the supposed force of the British fleet; and a squadron of observation composed of twelve sail of the line, under Admiral Gravina, intended to act according to circumstances after the British fleet were engaged. By wearing together, the enemy's line became inverted, and the light squadron which had been advanced in the van on the starboard tack, was left in the rear after wearing; and the ships were subsequently mingled with the rear of the main body. The wind being light, with a heavy swell, and the fleet lying with their main-top-sails to

the mast, it was impossible for the ships to preserve their exact stations in the line; consequently scarce any ship was immediately a-head or a-stern of her second. The fleet had then the appearance, generally, of having formed in two lines, thus (○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○), so that the ship to leeward seemed to be opposite the space left between two in the weather-line.

“In the rear, the line was in some places trebled; and this particularly happened where the Colossus was; who, after passing the stern of the French Swiftsure, and luffing up under the lee of the Bahama, supposing herself to leeward of the enemy's line, unexpectedly ran alongside of the French Achille, under cover of the smoke. The Colossus was then placed between the Achille and the Bahama, being on board of the latter; and was also exposed to the fire of the Swiftsure's after-guns. All these positions I believe to have been merely accidental; and to accident alone I attribute the concave circle of the fleet, or crescent line of battle. The wind shifted to the westward, as the morning advanced; and of course the enemy's ships came up with the wind, forming a bow and quarter-line. The ships were therefore obliged to edge away, to keep in the wake of their leaders; and this manœuvre, from the lightness of the wind, the unmanageable state of the ships in a heavy swell, and, we may add, the inexperience of the enemy, not being performed with facility and celerity, undesignedly threw the combined fleets into a position, perhaps the best that could have been planned, had it been supported by the skilful manœuvring of individual ships, and with efficient practice in gunnery.

“Of the advantages and disadvantages of the mode of attack adopted by the British fleet, it may be considered presumptuous to speak, as the event was so completely successful; but as the necessity of any particular experiment frequently depends upon contingent circumstances, not originally calculated upon, there can be no impropriety in questioning, whether the same plan be likely to succeed under all circumstances, and on all occasions.

“The original plan of attack, directed by the comprehensive mind of our great Commander, was suggested on a supposition that the enemy's fleet consisted of forty-six sail of the line, and the British forty; and the attack, as designed from to windward, was to be made under the following circumstances:—

“Under a supposition that the hostile fleet would be in a line a-head of forty-six sail, the British fleet was to be brought within gun-shot of the enemy's centre, in two divisions of sixteen sail each, and a division of observation consisting of the remaining eight.

“The lee division was by signal to make a rapid attack under all possible sail on the twelve rear ships of the enemy. The ships were to break through the

enemy's line; and such ships as were thrown out of their stations were to assist their friends that were hard pressed. The remainder of the enemy's fleet, of thirty-four sail, were to be left to the management of the Commander-in-Chief."

This able officer then proceeds to describe by a figure, the plan of attack as *originally intended*; bearing a very close resemblance to that already given in Fig. 1; but making the enemy's fleet, as arranged in a regular line a-head, to extend the distance of five miles; and the van, consisting of sixteen ships, left unoccupied; the whole comprising a fleet of forty-six sail of the line. He then observes,—

"If the *regulated plan of attack had been adhered to*, the English fleet should have *borne up together*, and have sailed in *a line a-breast in their respective divisions, until they arrived up with the enemy*. Thus the plan which consideration had matured, would have been executed; than which perhaps nothing could be better; the victory would have been more *speedily decided*, and the *brunt of the action would have been more equally felt*," &c.

"With the exception of the *Britannia*, *Dreadnought*, and *Prince*, the body of the fleet sailed very equally; and I have no doubt could have been brought into action simultaneously with their leaders. This being granted, there was no time gained by attacking in a line a-head: the only reason, I could suppose, that occasioned the change.

"The advantages of an attack made in two great divisions, with a squadron of observation, seem to combine every necessary precaution under all circumstances.

"The power of bringing an overwhelming force against a particular point of an enemy's fleet, so as to ensure the certain capture of the ships attacked, and the power of condensing such a force afterwards, as not only to protect the attacking ships from any offensive attempt that may be made by the unoccupied vessels of the hostile fleet, but also to secure the prizes already made, will most probably lead to a victory; and, if followed up according to circumstances, may ultimately tend to the annihilation of the whole, or the greater part of the mutilated fleet.

"Each ship may use her superiority of sailing, without being so far removed from the inferior sailing ships as to lose their support.

"The swifter ships, passing rapidly through the enemy's fire, are less liable to be disabled; and, after closing with their opponents, divert their attention from the inferior sailers, who are advancing to complete what their leaders had begun. The weather division, from being more distant, remain spectators of the first attack for some little time, according to the rate of sailing; and may direct

their attack, as they observe the failure or success of the first onset, either to support the lee division, if required, or to extend the success they may appear to have gained.

“ If the enemy bear up to elude the attack, the attacking fleet is well collected for the commencement of a chase, and for mutual support in pursuit.

“ The mode of attack, adopted with such success in the Trafalgar action, appears to me to have succeeded from the enthusiasm inspired throughout the British fleet, from their being commanded by their beloved Nelson; from the gallant conduct of the leaders of the two divisions; from the individual exertions of each ship after the attack commenced, and the superior practice of the guns in the English fleet.

“ It was successful also from the consternation spread through the combined fleet on finding the British so much stronger than was expected; from the astonishing and rapid destruction which followed the attack of the leaders, witnessed by the whole of the hostile fleets; inspiring the one and dispiriting the other; and from the loss of the Admiral's ship early in the action.

“ The *disadvantages* of this mode of attack appear to consist in *bringing forward the attacking force in a manner so leisurely and alternately*, that an enemy of equal spirit, and equal ability in seamanship and gunnery, would have *annihilated the ships one after another in detail, carried slowly on as they were by a heavy swell and light airs*.

“ At the distance of one mile, five ships, at half a cable's length apart, might direct their broadsides effectively against the head of the division for seven minutes, supposing the rate of sailing to have been four miles an hour; and, within the distance of half a mile, three ships would do the same for seven minutes more, before the attacking ship could fire a gun in her defence.

“ It is to be observed that, although the hull of the headmost ship does certainly, in a great measure, cover the hulls of those a-stern, yet great injury is done to the masts and yards of the whole, by the fire directed against the leader; and that, if these ships are foiled in their attempt to cut through the enemy's line, or to run on board of them, they are placed, for the most part, hors de combat for the rest of the action.

“ *Or should it fall calm, or the wind materially decrease about the moment of attack, the van ships must be sacrificed before the rear could possibly come to their assistance !!*

“ In proceeding to the attack of the 21st of October the weather was exactly such as might have caused this dilemma, as the sternmost ships of the British were six or seven miles distant. By the mode of *attacking in detail*, and the

manner in which the combined fleet was drawn up to receive it, *instead of doubling on the enemy*, the British were, on that day, *themselves doubled and trebled on*; and the *advantage of applying an overwhelming force collectively, it would seem, was totally lost!!*

“ The Victory, Temeraire, Sovereign, Belleisle, Mars, Colossus, and Bellerophon, were placed in such situations in the onset that nothing but the most heroic gallantry and practical skill at their guns could have extricated them. If the enemy's vessels had closed up as they ought to have done, from van to rear, and had possessed a nearer equality in active courage, it is my opinion that even British skill and British gallantry could not have availed. The *position of the combined fleet, at one time, was precisely that in which the British were desirous of being placed*; namely, to have *part of an opposing fleet doubled on, and separated from the main body!!*

“ The French Admiral, with his fleet, showed the greatest passive gallantry; and certainly the French Intrepide, with some others, evinced active courage equal to the British; but there was no nautical management, no skilful manœuvring.

“ It may appear presumptuous thus to have questioned the propriety of the Trafalgar attack; but it is only just to point out the advantages and disadvantages of every means that may be used for the attainment of great results, that the probabilities and existing circumstances may be well weighed before such means are applied. A plan, to be entirely correct, must be suited to all cases. If its infallibility is not thus established, there can be no impropriety in pointing out the errors and dangers to which it is exposed, for the benefit of others.

“ Our heroic and lamented Chief knew his means, and the power he had to deal with; he also knew the means he adopted were sufficient for the occasion; and that sufficed.

“ The Trafalgar attack might be followed under different circumstances, and have a different result; it is right, therefore, to discuss its merits and demerits. It cannot take one atom from the fame of the departed hero, whose life was one continued scene of original ability, and of superior action.

“ During the battle, the Neptune and Conqueror's crews were cheering each other, from the fore-castle of the one, and the poop of the other; and the Leviathan was advanced on the Conqueror's starboard bow.

“ The Victory attempted to break the line a-stern of the Bucentaur, but the Redoubtable closed up, and fell on board of her on her starboard side. The two ships went off before the wind together; and, in coming-to on the contrary tack,

the Temeraire, being too near to keep clear, fell on board the Redoubtable, on the contrary side to the Victory. The Foudgeux, endeavouring to avoid these three ships, became entangled with the Temeraire on her starboard side; and, for some time, these four ships lay in a tier, alongside of each other, continuing the action on the opposite tack to the fleet, until the French ships surrendered.

“The Victory then separated, and dropped a little a-stern, when the Conqueror hauled up under the lee of the Bucentaur.

“Through the opening thus made by the two leading ships, the Neptune followed, passing the Bucentaur, and going on to the Trinidad. The Conqueror came next, and hauled up directly alongside of the French Admiral, to the capture of whom Lord Nelson’s instructions were particularly directed.

“In a short time her main and mizen-masts fell; and, as the ship fell round off, her fore-top-sail-yard was shot away, and soon after her fore-mast came down, which prevented her from falling on board the Conqueror; and some time after, an officer appeared from the lee quarter gallery, waving his hat in token of surrender.*

“The Captain of marines, of the Conqueror, was sent on board the Bucentaur, and took out the French Admiral Villeneuve, and endeavoured to return to his ship; but, the Conqueror passing on, and the shot falling fast about the boat, he thought proper to carry his prisoner to the nearest ship, the Mars.

“No. 4 (Plate XLVIII of the present work) represents another stage of the battle; the van of the enemy in the act of waring to assist their Admiral, but moving very cautiously; the English ships lying up to protect the Victory and the captured ships. The Bucentaur had just surrendered, and the Conqueror passed on to take a station on the quarter of the Trinidad, while the Neptune continued the action with her on the bow. In a short time this tremendous fabric gave a deep roll, with the swell, to leeward, then back to windward; and, on her return, every mast went by the board, leaving her an unmanageable hulk on the water. Her immense topsails had every reef out; her royals were sheeted home, but lowered; and the falling of this majestic mass of spars, sails, and rigging, plunging into the water at the muzzles of our guns, was one of the most magnificent sights I ever beheld. Immediately after this, a Spaniard showed an English Union on the lee gangway, in token of submission. The Conqueror passed on in further pursuit, in admiration of the Neptune’s crew, who were

* “I have been thus particular, as the capture of the French Admiral has been unblushingly attributed to others, without any mention being made of the ship that actually was the principal in engaging her; wishing to do justice to a gallant officer, who, on that day, considered his task not complete until every ship was either captured or beyond the distance of pursuit.”

shifting her tattered top-sails for new ones with as much coolness as if she had been in a friendly port.

"Admiral Dumanoir, with four sail of French and one Spaniard, endeavoured to escape to the westward; and the rest bore up for Cadiz. Some straggling ships went off from the main body, and others, with Admiral Gravina, from the rear.

"The French *Intrepide* from the rear, in standing towards the van to join Dumanoir, was intercepted and engaged, first by the *Conqueror*, and then by the *Africa*, who came in between the *Conqueror* and *Intrepide*, forcing the former to leeward, and was followed by the *Orion*; when, after a most gallant resistance, the capture was completed.

"After the capture and surrender of the *Intrepide* the action ceased in the van, and the whole was closed about six o'clock, at sun-set, by the blowing up of the French *Achille*.

"Nothing remains to relate but the unhappy fate of the captured ships, and the days of suffering experienced after the action in contending against the severity of the weather. So strongly impressed was Lord Nelson with the necessity of anchoring, that the signal was made to prepare for it before the action commenced; and the last words of the dying chief, before he bid farewell, were, 'Anchor, Hardy, anchor.*' It is impossible to conceive why it was not done.

* It certainly appears very unaccountable; for, unless all the anchors of a ship be shot away, she most likely has it in her power, at least after a little preparation; for should the cables, in different places, be shot through, or much damaged, they can be speedily spliced, and are then full as good as before: if shot near the ring, the cable is then clenched anew, and the anchor ready.

For the very interesting and instructive correspondence of Lord Collingwood, naval men are greatly indebted to his son-in-law, Mr. Newnham Collingwood. Where the editor himself is professional, it is necessary to say a word. Upon the question of *anchoring* the ships after the battle, it is observed in a note (page 124) that, "to anchor a disabled ship would be, if her anchor parted, to insure her destruction." In reply, be it said, that it is *only* such ships as are disabled, or unable "*to crawl off shore*," that are under the necessity of anchoring, provided they have anchors to let go. Unfit as ships were to work off a lee shore, with some of them a prize in tow, to anchor was perhaps their best, if not their only security. Where the water shoalens a-stern, the anchor is drawn *up hill*; if the cable part, and the ship be driven from her anchor, she will then but meet the fate that probably otherwise awaited her, from her inability to do better. Lord Nelson made the signal early, "to prepare to anchor at the close of day," foreseeing what would and did take place. Powerful steam vessels at such a time would have been infinitely useful.

In the letter of *Captain Bayntun*, quoted by the editor, let it be observed, that notwithstanding some losses and disadvantages mentioned by that gallant and skilful officer, yet he says, "*I have preferred this to keeping the ship under weigh in our crippled state.*"

"The great difficulty, the first night, was in getting the hulks clear of their shattered rigging, and taking them in tow. Under circumstances like these, occasioned by the want of boats, and the disabled state of the ships, it was almost impossible to accomplish it under sail. At an anchor it might have been done with ease.

"The Conqueror was twenty hours endeavouring to take the Bucentaur in tow, and did not succeed at last, with eight hours of moderate weather.

"Most undoubtedly the fleet should have anchored; and, by so doing, every ship might have been saved, excepting such as could not swim.

"Captain George Hope, in the Defence, on his own responsibility, anchored with his prize, the San Ildefonso, on the night of the action, rode out the gales, and afterwards arrived safe at Gibraltar. The Defence had all her masts standing, and the Spaniard her fore-mast, fore-top-mast, and main-mast."

Of the five ships that attempted to make off to windward, one (the Neptune) of eighty guns, was with great promptitude and address cut off by the Spartiate, Sir F. Laforey, and Minotaur, Captain Mansfield; who cut away their studding-sails and hauled their wind to attack them. The remaining four fell into the hands of Sir Richard Strachan.

As every corroborative testimony respecting this great event must be deeply interesting; more particularly those which confirm and illustrate the character of him who this day sealed his devoted and brilliant services with his blood; the following remarks, coming from an officer greatly distinguished in the battle, need no apology. They constitute part of a letter written on seeing the manuscript remarks upon "Clerk's Essay."

REMARKS.

"In one principal thing I must beg leave to differ from Mr. Clerk, who lays great stress on the preference to the *leeward* position; whereas I am fully persuaded that of the *weather-gage* has advantages that must preponderate:

A "fresh ship," with "her masts and rigging complete," such as are rarely to be found after a conflict like this, has certainly no business to anchor on a lee shore.

It is not quite correct to say that an *anchor parts*. The ship parts from her anchor by the parting or giving way of the *cable*. The anchor may break or drag, and the ship drive.

For a mode of attack, both from the windward and leeward, see Lord Collingwood's Order of March 23d, 1808, page 313, Correspondence. It seems formed after the *original* design of Lord Nelson at Trafalgar; namely, by simultaneous attacks by columns or divisions upon parts of the enemy's line, whether to windward or to leeward.

the principal reasons I have to offer in support of my opinion are these:—By being to windward you can always choose your distance of engaging; and there is nothing equal to close work; and if your enemy chooses his distance, I have always found him fond of long bowls, thereby crippling you, and then making off himself, with his usual gasconade. But by bearing plump down, and passing through his line, and raking him as you do so; then pelting him close on his lee side, you strike a panic into him that he cannot easily recover. Another material point not unworthy of notice is, I have always observed on boarding a captured ship, that their decks are never so clear as with us; consequently much confusion must ensue; as by this manœuvre they are in some degree taken by surprise; and the result of confusion always proves fatal, particularly in great matters. I am borne out in this opinion by the events which were experienced in both Lord Nelson's actions; of the Nile and Cape Trafalgar. Had Lord Rodney pursued the same system, it is probable his victory would have been more splendid. I am willing to allow that many circumstances may occur, when it might not be altogether feasible to commence a battle in this way; but as there are numerous circumstances, such as light or variable winds, lee shores, shoal water, &c., a Commander-in-Chief often has a choice of difficulties; and fortunate it will be for his country, if he be so happy as to possess presence of mind to use and find resources as emergencies present themselves; for I know of no subject which embraces a greater variety in all its bearings than that of sea-fights; and it may be a useful reflection to bear in mind, that all the achievements of the renowned Nelson were owing to the felicity he displayed in the manner of his attacks, which were always of a novel and unexpected kind; to which may be attributed the splendour of his victories. If anything else be necessary to add lustre to his memory, or mark his zeal, it is that, with his dying breath, he recommended his successor to anchor the fleet; indicating a presentiment of the violent gale which succeeded. Had the advice been followed, it is most likely that most, if not all the prizes would have been saved."

SUBJECT RESUMED.

During the heat of the battle of Trafalgar, when, from the extreme ardour and obstinacy mutually displayed, and the close intermixture of ships in almost impenetrable masses, in various parts of the line, many of the British fleet, in the rear of the advancing columns, could not at first find an opportunity to distinguish themselves; a situation afterwards presenting itself to the keen

impatient eye of the Captain (Bayntun) of the *Leviathan*, he availed himself of it in the most masterly manner.

A Spanish seventy-four gun ship (the *St. Augustine*), one of the van ships of the enemy, having in vain attempted her escape to windward, was observed to be bearing away out of the combat, to leeward; not having sustained any material injury.

By this time the *Leviathan* had penetrated the two lines, and passing the *Conqueror*, then engaged with the *Intrepide*, went on between that ship and the stern of the *Spaniard*. Two well directed broadsides from the *Leviathan* brought instantly down alongside the main and mizen-masts of the *St. Augustine*; the *Leviathan* then luffing up, laid her on board, carried her, and in less than twenty minutes had her in quiet possession, towing her out of the action! * The *Africa*, of sixty-four guns, had also ferreted her way in, amidst the largest ships of the enemy; but unhappily exposing herself to the full effect of the broadside of the *Intrepide*, was silenced for a time, having suffered very severely.

His Majesty's ship "*Prince*" appearing in the annexed plate to be far removed from the scene of action, it seems necessary in some manner to account for it: and the following statement is by an officer, then a lieutenant of that ship, and since, for gallant services, promoted.

"The *Prince*, being employed in supplying the *Britannia* with water and provisions at the time the signal was made for the enemy's fleet, was thrown into a situation that would have been unfavourable even to a better sailing ship; and in this position she continued on the morning of the 21st of October, when she had split her fore-top-sail; and this was scarcely replaced, when at day-light the enemy was seen to leeward, and the signal was made to bear up in two divisions. In proceeding to her station, she passed under the stern of the *Defiance* (Sir P. C. Durham), who had just laid alongside and boarded the French *L'Aigle*, in

* The *Leviathan*, with her prize in tow, afterwards exchanged shots with the *Intrepide*, then closely engaged with the *Orion* and *Africa*, Captains Codrington and Henry Digby.

On board the *Conqueror* a circumstance occurred which reflected high honour on the character and feeling of Lieutenant P. Toole, of the royal marines; whose conduct attracted the admiration of those about him:—

On the stump of the main-mast of one of the enemy's ships, which she had engaged and dismasted, a man was seen most fearlessly occupied in placing the tri-coloured flag; Lieutenant Toole had three times raised the musket to his shoulder and levelled it, to bring him down; but a compassionate and generous feeling forbade him to execute his threat, and the gallant fellow was suffered to live to share the fate of his soon after, captured companions.

a manner which immediately drew forth the exulting cheers of the Prince's ship's company ; and as the fire of the *Defiance* was sufficient, and the ship so placed as to render any assistance more officious than necessary, the Prince proceeded to a two-decker that had lost her mizen-mast ; and, ranging up close to her, received her broadside. The Prince then directed her fire with such effect, as in five minutes to bring her two remaining masts over the side. The ship was on fire in several places, and the crew jumping overboard in all directions ; these it was considered an imperative duty to use every means to rescue from a watery grave. Having picked up a hundred and forty-six, amongst which were two women, she received orders to take the *Santissima Trinidad* in tow. In three days of most boisterous weather, she broke adrift several times, and notwithstanding every effort to save her, to prevent getting on shore, and in eight fathoms water, she was destroyed ; leaving six-and-twenty of the worst of the wounded to perish in her."

NOTES.

To relate all the instances of indifference to death, which occur both in seamen and soldiers, when fighting the battles of their country, would, of itself, form an interesting volume ; and when such traits of character in a British seaman, genuine and well authenticated, appear, it is a violence to one's feelings to pass them over, and would be an injustice to the merits and memory of a class of men, to whom no others under heaven bear an exact resemblance.

A seaman of the *Conqueror*, upon losing a leg, and going below to have it amputated, observed to the purser, " Ah ! Mr. Beattie, I shall live now half as cheap again as I did before, as one pair of stockings will now serve me twice as long."

Another seaman was seen to amuse himself with picking up the grape and canister shot, falling thick on board, as the ship was going down into battle, and " pitching marbles with them ;" this man was afterwards attacked by one of eighteen English deserters on the lower-deck of the *Bucentaur*, who lost his head in an instant : most of these deserters were killed.

In the accounts of our engagements with the Dutch in the wars of former times particularly related in the " *Treatise*" of Paul Hoste, the application and destructive effects of *fire-ships* frequently occur ; and they appear to have been

a means of offensive warfare much resorted to and depended on. This gave rise to the following opinion upon their merits, by the same able hand which has described the battle of Trafalgar.

OF FIRE-SHIPS.

“ With respect to fire-ships, the impression on my mind is certainly not in their favour: I think in some instances they may be essentially serviceable; in many totally ineffective. I am inclined to believe their best effect is almost incompatible with civilized warfare, when the object can be attained without such a sacrifice of life. When this can be done by firing a few broadsides more, or calling another ship to your assistance, as for instance in the case of the *Real*, in Mathews's action, I should prefer this mode of fighting rather than the burning and blowing up all hands with a fire-ship.

“ In a particular instance, where the fight was nearly balanced, a fire-ship might be lawfully and eligibly used; but even then, what an expense, to destroy one ship! not only the immediate loss, but the wear and tear of this ship, of little service otherwise, for so many previous years. Then the uncertainty of the ship being burnt effectually; and the nerve and judgment required for the service. In the Rochefort business, where there was every thing to favour the effect of the fire-vessels, I believe the French government would have gladly burnt, of themselves, the ships that were actually destroyed, if we had given them the price, to us, of their destruction.

“ The intrepidity and self-possession required under various circumstances are shown in the statement of Captain Cookesley, who was first lieutenant of the *Gibraltar*, and commanded one of the fire-vessels upon that occasion: ‘ That his vessel was the only one that grappled with the enemy, and was fired before the commander left her.’ He was a likely man to have sought in this manner, either a commission or a *fir coffin*.

“ I could cite many instances of failure, and few of success; but there are some where they may be fairly and successfully applied.

“ When the combined fleets were in Cadiz, previous to the Trafalgar action, and the harbour was filled up with shipping to the very jaws of the port, I thought a fire-ship might be effectively applied; and there could be little doubt that, if the commander possessed sufficient resolution to have entangled his ship before he left her, and had left his escape to the chapter of accidents, much mischief might have ensued; and I reckoned on the destruction of two, at least. Through the captain of the *Conqueror* was sent a list of fourteen men, with my

name at their head, to Lord Nelson, as volunteers to take in a fire-ship; but his Lordship declined the offer.

“ The Greeks have used them with great success against the Turks; but I do not think they would have succeeded to the same extent with English, French, or American ships of war. Upon the whole, I consider that on some occasions they may be useful; generally not so, and more especially in battle between fleets in the open sea.”

Of the arrangement of a fleet as in Fig. 4, Plate XLVII, or the double line convexing to *windward*, the same writer makes the following *remarks*:—


“ Your new order I think may do well for a temporary purpose, when a fleet is under the necessity of retreating in the form of the crescent, and wishes to heave-to, or come to the wind for a short time, to protect a retreating convoy, or otherwise. But I should not make choice of it to receive an attacking enemy, with whom I intended to come to a decisive action. I consider the great principle of attack is, to bring a superior force to act instantaneously on an inferior, and to capture or disable many before the enemy's remaining ships can be brought to their rescue. In the lines you have formed, the enemy would most likely attack the weathermost ships in the centre. If these should bear up immediately, and run down in a line with the horns of the crescent, to profit by their assistance, they resign the form they had taken, and might as well have been formed in line a-head in two columns in the first instance. If they do not bear up, and suffer the attacking ships to cut through and engage them at pleasure, they will be prevented from bearing up afterwards, and the horns of the crescent will find it more difficult to come to their relief.

“ From this view of it, I prefer the concave order of defence to the convex, inasmuch as it is easier to bear up and run to leeward in action, than to hug the wind and tack.”

Let it be observed in reply, that should part of the attacking fleet penetrate the centre of the crescent so formed; the rear, by *advancing*, would completely inclose it. It would neither be obliged to hug the wind very close, nor to tack; the enemy would be drifting down upon it. The van, if not engaged, might tack, and cover their centre.

He further observes—“ I should be inclined to form a defensive fleet in two or three lines, according to the orders of sailing; the Admiral in the centre of the lee column, if in two lines; and in the centre of the second, or middle, if in three. The ships at a cable and a half or two cables a-part, to allow of the lee ships firing through the openings, and the weather ships bearing up and running through if hard pressed from the windward.”

Probably the figure below may afford some idea of this officer's plan of defence: "Drawing the columns as close as they can be brought, to allow of manœuvring."



It certainly appears not only a very formidable, but a very simple one. A fleet so *anchored*, head and stern, or with springs, would be impenetrable. Under sail, *two* lines might be better than *three*, from the danger of the ships firing into each other.

We shall now introduce an extract from the log of the *Bellerophon*: and bring the whole to a conclusion, with a copy of the no less celebrated than instructive, "Memorandum;" followed by a tribute to the departed hero, from the eloquent pen of an accomplished woman, in a letter to the late Marquis of Londonderry; for which "extract," as it has been already circulated, no apology is required: to this are added some traits of character little known.

Extract from the Log of His Majesty's ship Bellerophon, Oct. 21st, 1805.

"At day-light saw the enemy's fleet E. N. E.; answered the signal 72, to form the order of sailing; and 76, to bear up and sail large, with compass-signal East. Cleared for action; answered 63, with "preparative," after close of day. At eleven answered 88, "general," from the Royal Sovereign to make more sail; set steering-sails. At noon Cape Trafalgar E. S. E. nine leagues.

"P. M. October 22d (noon of the 21st).—Light breezes with swell from the westward; 10' past noon the Royal Sovereign opened her fire on the enemy's centre;* 13' past, answered 16, general to engage closer; 20' past, the Royal Sovereign broke through the enemy's line a-stern of a Spanish three-decker, and

* "The nearest of the English ships was now distant about a mile from the Royal Sovereign."

"In about a quarter of an hour, and before any other English ship had been enabled to take a part in the action." (Lord Collingwood, pages 110, 111.)

"There is great diversity of opinion as to the exact period during which the Royal Sovereign was engaged *alone*. Admiral Collingwood considered it to be twenty minutes, while others believe that it considerably exceeded that time. In the mean while, the English ships were pressing forward with their utmost speed in support of their leader, *but doubtful at times of his fate*." (Lord Collingwood, page 113.)

engaged to leeward; being followed by the Mars, Belleisle, and Tonnant, who engaged their respective opponents.


"At 12^h 20' opened our fire on the enemy. At 30' past, engaged on both sides in passing through the enemy's line a-stern of a Spanish two-decker. At 35' past, while hauling to the wind, fell on board the French 74, L'Aigle, with our starboard-bow on her larboard-quarter; our fore-yard locking with her main: kept up a brisk fire both on her and on the Spanish ship on the larboard-bow; at the same time receiving the fire of two ships, one a-stern, and the other on the larboard-quarter. At one o'clock the main and mizen-top-masts fell over the side. At 1^h 5' the master fell, and at 1^h 11' Captain Cooke fell. Ship still foul of L'Aigle, and keeping up a brisk fire on the main and lower-decks. Quarter-deck, poop, and forecastle nearly cleared by musketry from troops on board L'Aigle. At 1^h 20' the jib-boon was shot away. At 1^h 40' L'Aigle dropt to leeward under a raking fire from us as she fell off: our ship at this time unmanageable from ropes being shot away. At 1^h 45' L'Aigle was engaged by Defiance, and at 2^h 5' she struck.

"On the smoke clearing away, observed several of the enemy's ships had struck.

"Sent an officer and took possession of the Spanish ship Monarcha. At 3^h 6', the ship being ungovernable, and in danger of falling on board the Temeraire and prizes, made the signal to Sirius for boats to tow. At 4^h 5' answered 101, general, to come to the wind on the larboard tack in succession. At 4^h 10' opened our fire on five ships making off to the southward; the sternmost of which was cut off by the Minotaur. At 5^h 7' the firing ceased; twelve of the enemy's line, four frigates and two brigs, being to leeward, and four to windward. At 5^h 20' answered signal 99, to come to the wind on the starboard tack together. At 5^h 30' took possession of the Spanish seventy-four, Bahama.

"At sun-set one French seventy-four blew up and one sunk. At 7^h 30' the Euryalus showed Admiral's lights. A.M. at day-light hazy weather with rain: some of our ships to be seen. Enemy's ships not to be seen."

By the Royal Sovereign's first broadside into the stern of the Santa Anna (a three-decker) as acknowledged by the Spanish captain to Captain Rotheram of the Royal Sovereign, four hundred men were killed and wounded, and sixteen guns were disabled. So much for British discipline and gunnery. The guns were only double-round shot. It was a favourite doctrine of Lord Collingwood, to pour in the three first broadsides as quickly as possible; for by such a shock, a panic is created which often terminates in a surrender.



The Rear of the Fleet nearly as above.

Ships coming from the Tan at 1/4 past 3.



Lord Nelson's last Instructions to his Fleet off Trafalgar.

“ MEMORANDUM.

“ Thinking it almost impossible to bring a fleet of forty sail of the line into line of battle, in variable winds, thick weather, and other circumstances which must occur; without such a loss of time, that the opportunity would probably be lost, of bringing the enemy to battle in such a manner as to make the business decisive;

“ I have therefore made up my mind to keep the fleet in that position of sailing (with the exception of the first and second in command), that the order of sailing is to be the order of battle; placing the fleet in two lines of sixteen ships each, with an advanced squadron of eight of the fastest sailing two-decked ships; which will always make, if wanted, a line of twenty-four sail, on whichever line the Commander-in-Chief may direct.

“ The second in command will, after my intentions are made known to him, have the entire direction of his line; to make the attack upon the enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or destroyed.

“ If the enemy's fleet should be seen to windward in line of battle, and that the two lines and the advanced squadron can fetch them, they will probably be so extended that their van could not succour their rear.

“ I should therefore probably make the second in command's signal, to lead through about their twelfth ship from the rear; or wherever he could fetch, if not able to get so far advanced to windward. My line would lead through about their centre; and the advanced squadron to cut through two, three, or four ships a-head of their centre, so far as to ensure getting at their Commander-in-Chief, whom every effort must be made to capture.

“ The whole impression of the British fleet must be to overpower from two to three ships a-head of their Commander-in-Chief, supposed to be in the centre, to the rear of their fleet. I will suppose twenty sail of the enemy's line to be untouched; it must be some time before they could perform a manœuvre to bring their force compact, to attack any part of the British fleet engaged, or to succour their own ships; which indeed would be impossible, without mixing with the ships engaged.

“ The enemy's fleet is supposed to consist of forty-six sail of the line. British fleet of forty: if either is less, only a proportionate number of the enemy's ships are to be cut off. British to be one-fourth superior to the enemy cut off.


“ Something must be left to chance; nothing is sure in a sea-fight above all

others; shot will carry away the masts and yards of friends as well as foes; but I look with confidence to a victory before the van of the enemy could succour their rear; and then the British fleet would most of them be ready to receive their twenty sail of the line, or to pursue them, should they endeavour to make off.

“If the van of the enemy tacks, the captured ships must run to leeward of the British fleet; if the enemy veers, the British must place themselves between the enemy and the captured ships; and should the enemy close, I have no fears as to the result.

“The second in command will, in all possible things, direct the movements of his line, by keeping them as compact as the nature of the circumstances will admit. Captains are to look to their particular line as their rallying point; *but in case signals can neither be seen nor perfectly understood, no Captain can do very wrong, if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy!!*

“Of the intended attack from to windward, the enemy in the line of battle ready to receive the attack.”



“The divisions of the British fleet will be brought nearly within gun-shot of the enemy’s centre. The signal will most probably then be made for the lee line to bear up together, to set all their sails, even steering sails.

“Vide Instructions for Signal, Yellow with a Blue Fly, page 17, Eighth Flag, Signal Book, with reference to Appendix.

“In order to get as quickly as possible to the enemy’s line, and to cut through, beginning from the twelfth ship from the enemy’s rear, some ships may not get through their exact place; but they will always be at hand to assist their friends; and, if any are thrown round the rear of the enemy, they will effectually complete the business of twelve sail of the enemy.

“ Should the enemy veer together, or bear up, and sail large ; still the twelve ships composing, in the first position, the enemy’s rear, are to be the object of attack of the lee line, unless otherwise directed by the Commander-in-Chief, which is scarcely to be expected ; as the entire management of the lee line, after the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief are signified, is intended to be left to the judgment of the Admiral commanding that line.

“ The remainder of the enemy’s fleet, thirty-four sail, are to be left to the management of the Commander-in-Chief ; who will endeavour to take care that the movements of the second in command are as little interrupted as possible.”

*Extract of a Letter from Lady Londonderry to her Son-in-law,
Lord Castlereagh.*

“ Mount Stewart, November 13th, 1805.

“ I thank you a thousand times for your interesting letter: never was there indeed an event so mournfully and so triumphantly important to England as the battle of Trafalgar. The sentiment of lamenting the individual more than rejoicing in the victory, shows the humanity and affection of the people of England: but their good sense upon reflection will dwell only on the conquest, because no death, at a future moment, could have been more glorious. The public would never have sent him on another expedition; his health was not equal to another effort, and so might have yielded to the natural but less imposing effects of more worldly honours: whereas he now begins his immortal career, having nothing left to achieve upon earth, and bequeathing to the English fleet a legacy which they alone are able to improve. Had I been his wife, or his mother, I would rather have wept him dead, than seen him languish on a less splendid day. In such a death there is no sting, and in such a grave everlasting victory.”

“ Of Clerk’s Treatise on Naval Tactics Lord Nelson was very fond, and frequently, at his leisure, would desire his Chaplain, Mr. Scott, to read a little to him, about the *wild geese*; to flocks of which, the figures of ships are thought to have a resemblance.”

The following trait of Lord Nelson sets in an amiable light the liberality and nobleness of his character :—

When the French Admiral Decr es, in the *Guillaume Tell*, captured by Captain (now Admiral Sir Manley) Dixon, Sir Henry Blackwood, and Sir E.

Berry, was carried into Malta; some circumstances occurred between him and the then commanding officer at that port, which rendered his situation extremely irksome and uncomfortable.

Lord Nelson, with Sir William and Lady Hamilton on board, arriving not long after, and being informed of what had happened, justly appreciating the gallant defence of the French Admiral, his talents, and his gentlemanly deportment, was determined to do all he could to remove the unfavourable impression, and endeavour to heal the breach that had been made between the parties in question. For this purpose, he desired Sir Manley Dixon, whose prisoner he was, to inform him, that Lord Nelson requested the honour of his company at dinner; that he was to appear in his side-arms, and was to be received with all the honours due to his rank. Admiral Decr  es, in expressing his sense of the great kindness shown him by the British Admiral, replied that, however grateful he felt for the honour intended him by permission to appear in his side-arms, as he had delivered up his sword upon surrendering himself a prisoner of war in battle, he could never resume it, until it was regularly restored to him by his country. Full dressed in every other respect, he paid his respects to the British chief, who received him with every mark of distinguished honour and respect: at the dinner table he seated him between himself and Lady Hamilton, who strove with the hero of the Nile, by the kindest marks of civility and attention, to restore him to himself. In this manner he continued to treat his brave but unfortunate enemy during his stay; and, it is hoped, succeeded in giving him a more improved opinion of the character and disposition of British naval officers. Decr  es* rose afterwards to places of high honour and trust in the French government.

One of the many proofs given by Lord Nelson in his professional life, of his extremely sanguine and zealous anxiety to meet the enemy upon all occasions, and of his considerate and kind conduct towards all around him, is thus related :—

In his memorable chase of the French fleet to the West Indies (the same he afterwards defeated and destroyed at Trafalgar) he was misled in his pursuit, by intelligence, apparently good, from General Brereton, at St. Lucia, that it had proceeded to Trinidad; upon which he immediately left Barbadoes in search of them; and while there, he was, of course, waited upon by the Admiral and

* Decr  es appears to have been Minister of the Marine when Napoleon was First Consul, by a letter to *Audibert Ramatuelle*, authorizing and approving of his “*Cours El  mentaire*.” This is probably the last scientific French work upon naval tactics, and may therefore most likely be taken as their future guide.

all the Captains of the ships of the station then present. The Captain of the flag-ship, being somewhat indisposed, sent an officer to Lord Nelson with an apology, stating the reason for his absence; upon which he replied, "tell the Captain of the Northumberland, I am sorry not to have seen him;" but, in a cheerful good-humoured manner, added, "tell him that nobody must be sick until after Friday!" On that day he calculated to have had his meeting with the French fleet, and, notwithstanding his great inferiority, would most certainly have attacked it.

SIR RICHARD STRACHAN'S BATTLE WITH, AND CAPTURE OF, FOUR SHIPS OF THE LINE.

As a becoming sequel and appendage to the great victory just detailed, may be related the vigilant pursuit and attack by Sir Richard Strachan of the four sail of line of battle ships that had escaped the fate of their companions at Trafalgar.

The gallant Admiral, with four sail of the line, and some frigates, brought them to close action, dismasting two of them entirely; and, to the others, leaving nothing but the foremast: with three ships only (the other not having come up he attacked the centre and rear.

The van of the enemy then tacked; when the British Admiral was joined by the *Namur*, and the action became close and general, and continued to be warmly contested until half-past three, when the enemy's ships, entirely unmanageable, surrendered.

They first attempted to fly in line a-breast; but, upon being attacked by the frigates in advance, they took in their small sails, and formed the line a-head upon the starboard tack, when the British squadron bore down to engage them.

The spirit and skill displayed by Sir Richard Strachan upon this occasion are eminently conspicuous, and afford an additional proof, to the numerous examples he had before given, of his unwearied zeal and unabating thirst for professional glory.

Sufficient justice will not be rendered to the gallant Admiral, unless some account of this exploit be given in the animated strain of his own letter, with the "apology for the hasty manner in which it is written."

"Caesar, November 4th, 1805.

"Being off Ferrol, working to the westward, with the wind westerly, on the evening of the 2d we observed a frigate to the N. W. making signals. Made all sail to join her before night; and, followed by the ships in the margin,* came up with her at eleven at night; at the same moment, seeing six large ships near us. Captain Baker informed me he had been chased by the Rochefort squadron, then close to leeward of us. We were delighted!

"I desired him to tell the Captains of the ships of the line a-stern to follow me, as I meant to engage them directly, and immediately bore away in the Caesar, for the purpose."

"The moon enabled us to see the enemy bear away in line a-breast, closely formed; but we lost sight of them when it set."

"At nine in the morning, we discovered the enemy, of four sail of the line, in the N. E. under all sail; we had also every thing set, and came up with them very fast."

"At day-light on the following morning, we were near them, and the Santa Margarita had begun in a very gallant manner to fire upon the rear, and was soon joined by the Phoenix.

"A little before noon, the French, finding an action unavoidable, began to take in their small sails, and form in a line, bearing on the starboard tack; we did the same, and I communicated my intentions, by hailing, that I should attack the centre and rear; and, at noon, began the battle. In a short time, the van ship of the enemy tacked, which made the action close and general; and the Namur joined soon after we tacked, which we did as soon as we could get the ships round; and, at half-past three, the action ceased."

(See the Gazette account in the 14th volume of the Naval Chronicle.)

When the numbers engaged are so few, it is unnecessary to form a figure.

* Caesar, Hero, Courageux, and Namur. Bellona, Æolus, Santa Margarita, far to leeward in the S. E. The Revolutionaire also joined when the Namur did.

SIR JOHN DUCKWORTH'S BATTLE OFF ST. DOMINGO.
1806.

Extracts from Sir John Duckworth's Letter, dated Superb, off the Town of St. Domingo, February 7th, 1806.

" I LOST not a moment in getting through the Mona Passage ; and, on the 5th, was joined by the *Magicienne*, with a further corroboration from various vessels spoken, of an enemy's force of ten sail of the line, with as many frigates and corvettes, being in these seas. I therefore continued under easy sail for the night, on my approach off the town of St. Domingo ; having given orders to Captain Dunn, of the *Acasta*, to make sail with the *Magicienne*, Captain M'Kensie, two hours before day-light, to reconnoitre ; when, at six o'clock, the *Acasta*, to our great joy, made the signal for two of the enemy's frigates ; and before seven, for nine sail at anchor ; at half-past, that they were getting under way. The squadron under my command, then in close order, with all sail set, and the *Superb* bearing my flag, was leading and approaching fast, so as to discover before eight o'clock that the enemy were in a compact line, under all sail, going before the wind for Cape Nisao, to windward of Ocoa bay ; but consisting only of five sail of the line, two frigates, and a corvette ; endeavouring, as I concluded, to form a junction with their remaining force ; and which, by *shaping a course accordingly, was rendered completely abortive*, by making an action certain a little after nine o'clock.

" I therefore telegraphed the squadron to prepare to attack the Admiral and his seconds ; and, at three quarters past nine, for the ships to take stations for their mutual support, and engage the enemy as they got up ; and a few minutes after, to engage as close as possible ; when a little after ten, the *Superb* closed upon the bow of the *Alexandre*, the leading ship, and commenced the action ; but, after three broadsides, she sheered off. The signal was now made for closer action, and we were enabled to attack the Admiral in the *Imperial* (formerly the *Vengeur*), the fire of which had been very severe on the *Northumberland*, under the Honourable Rear Admiral Cochrane.

" By this time the movement of the *Alexandre* had thrown her among the lee division, which Rear Admiral Louis happily availed himself of ; and the

action became general, and continued till half-past eleven; when the French Admiral, completely beaten, hauled at once for the land, and at twenty minutes before noon, ran on shore; her only remaining mast, the fore-mast, then falling; and the *Superb*, being only in seventeen fathoms water, hauled off to avoid the same evil.

"Not long after, the *Diomède* of eighty-four guns, having *struck her colours*,* pushed on shore near his Admiral, when all his masts went overboard.

"About fifty minutes after eleven the firing ceased; and upon the smoke clearing away, I found the *Brave*, the *Alexander*, and the *Jupiter*, in our possession, and five sail of the line were taken or destroyed in less than two hours," &c.

British Line. (See Plate L.)

Weather Division.

Superb, *Northumberland*,
Spencer, *Agamemnon*.

Lee Division.

Canopus, *Donegal*,
Atlas.

Frigates.

Acasta, *Magicienne*.

Sloops.

Kingsfisher, *Epervier*.

French Line.


One ship of eighty-four guns, and one of 120, driven on shore and wrecked: one ship of eighty-four, and two of seventy-four guns, taken. Two frigates and a corvette escaped.

OBSERVATIONS.

In this prompt and spirited attack it may perhaps be observed, that as the British Admiral had something the advantage of force, an account should have been given of the enemy's frigates and corvette; when it appears, there was little or nothing to engage the attention of ours until the action ceased.

To such an inquiry it must be replied, that the British Admiral, from the corroborated information he had received by the *Magicienne*, from vessels spoken, learned that the enemy's force in those seas consisted of ten sail of the line, and as many frigates; and that the remainder were probably lying in *Ocoa Bay*; to which place, that part of the fleet he so judiciously and gallantly intercepted,

* This was afterwards found to be a mistake; it was the "*Brave*" that had made every token of surrender.



were making all the haste they could; for this reason, he acted prudently in keeping his little force collected. Under such circumstances, it would have been by no means justifiable to have detached any part of it in pursuit of the enemy's frigates; who might probably have led them into a snare.

The following, from an intelligent officer who partook of the dangers of the day, will throw additional light upon this subject; and prove to be a full answer to every inquiry:—

“ In the Admiral's letter, it will be seen that he alludes to the information which induced him to go down to St. Domingo; and that information was, that *ten* French ships of the line and as many frigates (not forming two separate squadrons, but one collected fleet) had been met with in the Mona Passage. He received this intelligence at St. Kitt's, whither it was conveyed to him by Captain Nathaniel Cochrane, then Commander of the *Kingsfisher*. In consequence of which, he went as fast as he could to St. Domingo; and, in passing through the Mona Passage, fell in with the *Magicienne*, one of the Jamaica frigates, which had been cruising in that passage; and the Captain of the *Magicienne* corroborated it, by saying that he had received the same accounts from ‘ various vessels which he had spoken.’ ”

In this short but decisive conflict the main-mast of the *Northumberland*, bearing the flag of Sir Alexander Cochrane, when engaged with the three-decker, was shot away, and fell on board the ship; forward on the starboard side; it stove the boats that were filled with water (ready in case of fire), and at once disabled the starboard main-deck guns.

At the same time a splinter came with such force upon the head of this brave officer, as to bring him on his knees.*

The three-decked ship (*L'Imperiale*), destroyed upon this occasion, was the largest out of France; she had seventeen ports on the broadside of her lower-deck, sixteen upon the middle, and fifteen upon the main-deck, independent of the bridle-ports; her tonnage 3300!

REMARK.

“ The filling of the boats with water seems to be attended with more inconvenience than benefit; as even the effect of shot upon them might disable the guns below. Fire-buckets, engines, and the cistern-pump, are the best resources in case of fire.”

* Sir Alexander Cochrane had before distinguished himself upon many occasions;—particularly when commanding the landing of the troops in Egypt, with the ever-lamented Abercromby.

PASSING AND REPASSING THE DARDANELLES

BY SIR JOHN DUCKWORTH,*

February the 19th to March the 3d, 1807.

THE country had now become so accustomed to success in arms, obtained by the skill, enterprize, and valour of its navy, that public expectation was wrought up to an unreasonable height.

The British navy was at this time, from its numbers and state of discipline, so generally effective, that we are not surprised it should have been called upon to make still greater efforts. It seemed to be the universal opinion that nothing was unattainable by a British Squadron; that, to accomplish an object, it was but to issue a positive order to achieve it. The cruel and unmerited obloquy that for a time hung over the transaction to which the following observations relate, is a proof of the intoxicated state of the public mind at that period; and of the extravagant hopes formed by Government, from feelings of triumph and exultation, which the exploits of the British navy had created.

If we consider the magnitude of the object contemplated in this expedition, with the means given to effect it, we must confess that they appear entirely inadequate to the purpose; and consequently that the advantages then anticipated from it were presumptuous and unreasonable.

Seven ships of the line, two frigates, and two bomb vessels, without any assistance or co-operation of a land force, were, through an intricate and well-guarded navigation, to proceed directly to the capital of a great empire; and in the face of a whole people, to demand of them their fleet; consisting of twelve

* *British Force*.—Seven ships of the line (the Ajax having been burnt by accident at Tenedos), two of which were of three decks, and one of sixty-four guns; two frigates and two bomb-vessels; no troops.

Turkish Force.—Twelve sail of the line, two of which were of three decks; nine frigates, besides gun-boats, &c., and filled with troops:—two hundred thousand also said to have been in Constantinople.

ships of the line, nine frigates, and an innumerable quantity of gun-boats, fire-vessels, &c. of every description ; and defended by two hundred thousand troops ; and as the Admiral informs us, at this time the whole line of the coast presented a chain of batteries ; their fleet with their sails bent apparently in readiness, filled with troops," &c.

The Admiral continues to say ; * " With the batteries alone we might have coped, or with the ships, could we have got them out of their strong-hold ; but after combating the opposition which the resources of the empire had been many weeks employed in preparing, we should have been in no state to have defended ourselves against them, as described, and then to repass the Dardanelles.

" I know it was *my duty, in obedience to your Lordships' orders, to attempt every thing* (governed by the opinion of the Ambassador) that appeared within the *compass of possibility* ; but when the unavoidable sacrifice of the squadron committed to my charge (which must have arisen, had I waited for a wind to have enabled me to cannonade the town, unattended by the remotest chance of any advantage) must have been the consequence of it, it at once became my positive duty to relinquish it," &c.

" The Turks had been occupied unceasingly in adding to the number of their forts ; the fire of the two inner castles had, on our going up, been severe ; but I am sorry to say, the effect they have had on our ships returning, has proved them to be doubly formidable. In short, had they been allowed another week to complete their defences throughout the channel, it would have been a very doubtful point whether a return lay open to us at all."

What may have been the nature or extent of the encouragement (if any) held out to Great Britain in this enterprize, or of any favourable issue from the joint influence of threats and negotiation, we are not informed ; but, from the moment the British squadron made its appearance in the Turkish seas, it seems to have met with the most determined resistance ; and the Turks proved themselves, in all respects, fully capable to set at defiance the efforts even of a much larger force. We cannot therefore refuse our assent to the propriety of the Admiral's determination : but not without regret, that the British flag should have been vauntingly displayed before the Turkish capital, and by them dared to carry into execution the instructions of the British cabinet.

To afford some information respecting the impediments which the squadron

* Letter to Lord Collingwood.

had to encounter in passing and repassing the Hellespont, some passages of a former letter of Sir J. Duckworth are selected :—

“ Information had been given me by his Majesty’s minister and Sir T. Louis, that the Turkish squadron, consisting of a sixty-four gun ship, four frigates, and several corvettes, had been for some time at anchor within the inner castle; and conceiving it possible they might have remained there, I had given orders to Rear Admiral Sir Sydney Smith to bring up, with the Thunderer, Standard, and Active, to destroy them, should our passage be opposed,” &c.

“ At half past nine o’clock the Canopus, which had been appointed to lead, entered the narrow passage of Sestos and Abydos, and sustained a very heavy cannonade from both castles within point blank shot of each.

“ They opened their fire upon our ships as they continued to pass in succession, although I was happy in observing that the very spirited return it met with had considerably diminished its force, and that the effect on the sternmost ships was not so severe.

“ To the N. E. of the castles, and between them and point Pasquins, in which a formidable battery had been newly erected, the small squadron I have alluded to were at anchor.

“ The van division gave them their broadsides as they passed, and Sir Sydney Smith, with his division, closed into the midst; and the effect of the fire was such that in half an hour the Turks had all cut their cables to run on shore. The object of the Rear Admiral was then to destroy them; which was most rapidly effected,” &c.

“ I cannot help expressing my satisfaction that we have suffered so slightly; as, had any of their stone shot, some of which exceed eight hundred weight, made such a breach between wind and water as they have done in our sides the ship must have sunk; or had they struck a lower-mast in the centre, it must have been cut in two,” &c.

“ By the zeal and distinguished ability of Sir Sidney Smith, and under his immediate directions, the sixty-four-gun ship was destroyed by the Hon. Captain Legge of the Repulse; while the Captains Dacres, Talbot, Harvey, and Mowbray, with the boats of the different ships, executed the remainder of this dangerous service in the most effectual manner.

“ The battery on the point, of more than thirty guns; which, had it been completely finished, was in a position to have annoyed the squadron most severely, was taken possession of by the royal marines and boats’ crews of the rear division; the Turks having retired at their approach; and the guns were

immediately spiked. This service was performed by Captain Nichols of the *Standard's* marines; and Captain Mowbray of the *Active*, with Lieutenants Carrol and Arabin, and Lieutenant Lawrie of the marines, were to complete the destruction of the redoubt and guns; and the *Active* was to continue in the passage of the Dardanelles until further orders."

The ships and vessels taken and destroyed on this occasion were, burnt, one sixty-four-gun ship, four frigates, three corvettes, one brig, and two gun-boats. Taken, one corvette and one gun-boat.

On the 28th of February the Admiral writes, "It was perceived at nine o'clock yesterday morning that the Turks had landed on the island of Prota, near which the squadron was anchored, and were erecting a battery," &c.

Boats were sent, manned and armed, which drove the Turks from the island, and captured the guns: a larger force again returned to the island, which it was found necessary to attempt to dislodge; and parties of seamen and marines from the *Royal George*, *Windsor Castle*, *Canopus*, and *Standard*, were immediately sent. These were drawn into an ambush, and suffered severely. The Turks had retired to an old convent, and from loop-holes defended themselves with musketry.

The boats returned from this service after dark, having lost many valuable officers and men, and without effecting their object: the remaining Turks eluded the vigilance of the guard-boats, and escaped in the night.

The entire loss in this enterprising but unfortunate affair was forty-two killed, and two hundred and thirty-five wounded, and four missing. The main-mast of the *Windsor Castle* being more than three-quarters cut through by a granite shot of eight hundred-weight, they found great difficulty in saving it. The shot was six feet eight inches in circumference.

This subject has been so fairly and impartially considered in the 17th volume of the "*Naval Chronicle*," that little more is necessary than to observe that, upon every other enterprise of a similar, or nearly similar nature, a much larger force, and a considerable body of troops, with artillery and every requisite accompaniment, have been afforded. Of this description were the attack upon *Walcheren*, and the expedition to *Copenhagen* under Admiral Gambier and Lord Cathcart. For in the former undertaking, although it was one of unusual extent and magnitude, and nevertheless failed of entire success, yet the ships at *Antwerp* were the chief and ultimate object, and the force employed most ample:

The expedition to *Copenhagen* in 1807 is similar to that before us. Our operations commenced in negotiation, but ended in war; and the object was solely the surrender of the Danish fleet. The means in this instance being adequate to the purpose, were completely successful. The British flag here was

triumphant, and the requisitions of the British government, supported as they ever should be, were carried into complete effect.

The avowed intention of this visit to Constantinople was not simply to demand a surrender of the Turkish fleet, but to bully the Ottoman court into a compliance with our political views, rather than listen to those of the French government, at that time ably promoted by Sebastiani.

It will be evident, however, that unless we could possess ourselves of the one, we were by no means likely to succeed in the other. The subject here is considered merely as a naval enterprise.

A further example of the propriety of adapting the means to the end will be found in the liberal manner in which the executive authority furnished the supplies upon a subsequent occasion ; without which, the object must have failed, the national flag have been defeated, and the country humbled and disgraced in the eyes of all the Christian states in every quarter of the globe.

Explanation of Plate LI.

A, The British squadron.—1, Canopus ; 2, Repulse ; 3, Royal George ; 4, Windsor Castle ; 5, Pompee ; 6, Thunderer ; 7, Standard.

B, The Turkish squadron taken or destroyed.

C, Frigates and bombs.


Note.—The arrows in this plate represent the set of the current, and the little flags denote the direction of the wind.

FITTING FOR THE EXPEDITION, AND FORMS OF
ATTACK UPON ALGIERS.

August, 1816.

As this more recent exploit of the British navy is not very unlike that which precedes it, some account of it cannot be uninteresting to the naval reader : much misinformation also has, in many instances, been shown, even by professional men, upon this subject.

To make known, therefore, the nature and extent of the supplies, of the force, and of the arrangements necessary to its success, seems to be neither irrelevant, nor inexpedient.



As the chastisement of the Dey of Algiers, and the capture or destruction of his navy, defended as it was, must be considered a service of a peculiar character, such a force was to be selected as was best calculated to effect it ; and, for this purpose, the following ships were appointed, and directed to undergo preparation accordingly :—

The force consisted of five ships of the line (two of them of three decks), five frigates of the largest and second class, five sloops of war, and four bomb-vessels ; in all nineteen vessels of war.

The ships were, in the first place, supplied with ordnance stores of every description, as for foreign service ; nor were the supplies even limited to that ; but the Captains, upon proper application, were given powder, ball, &c. to any extent, consistent with their means of stowing it away.

The storehouses of Woolwich were opened, to furnish the squadron with every species of combustible (with the Congreve rockets) that was judged efficacious ; and fire-boxes, and other materials of a similar description, were served to the ships in great abundance.


Anchors of a particular class were also given in addition to the regular number, with a sufficiency of cables and hawsers for every emergency ; each ship of the line having also an iron cable.

The two-decked ships were to have “ first rates’ launches, and all the boats were to be double-banked and large ; one flat boat to each ship as a rocket-boat—frigates as well as line-of-battle ships.

“ Frigates to take a spare stream anchor and cable.

“ Shrapnell shot are ordered, such a proportion as the captain of each ship may judge necessary, say one hundred each ship.*

“ Long sights for the guns cut out of deal board, and grooved, as in the annexed figures, to be fitted on board.”†



* These are quotations from the orders issued.

† Similar sights were used by the Amazon, Captain Riou, at the attack of Copenhagen in 1801.

All these orders were punctually obeyed; and the sights, so formed and fixed, were particularly useful; every gun employed was considerably within point blank range, leaving nothing for the captain of the gun, but to direct his eye along the groove (parallel with the bore of the gun) to the object; and the greatest precision was attained.

Launches were to be fitted for the reception of "eight-inch land-service brass mortars, or the like number of eight-inch howitzers." Also, one hundred laboratory torches for the purpose of conflagration, and twelve copper explosion coffers, with locks; and the requisite apparatus for exploding, at different times, were also ordered; and the Rocket equipment to be increased to two thousand five hundred rockets.

The above accompaniments were embarked in a transport at Woolwich. The beds for the mortars having also been put on board the transport, it was not necessary that the launches should then undergo any particular preparation. The only things which remain to be noticed are the *after-bitts* fitted on board all the line-of-battle ships, and which were fixed by the dock-yard within the given time; and a sailing lighter was to attend the squadron with an additional supply of anchors and hawsers, to assist the ships in any emergency. The squadron, by the foresight and experience of its Chief, thus amply provided in every respect, left Plymouth for the destined service.

On the passage to Gibraltar, the ships' companies were mustered by the Commander-in-Chief, and the crews daily exercised at the guns, every other day firing powder, so that in the short space of ten days they became tolerably expert.

At Gibraltar every ship of the line was directed to fit-out and man a gun-boat; this, furnished with a sixty-eight pound carronade, was to attend the expedition; and a dock-yard sloop was, at the same time, converted into a fire-ship, or explosion vessel; the ships having also made good their expence of powder, and taken in what was further necessary, in four or five days, proceeded to the ultimate object in view. The squadron was clear for action in every respect, having landed all bulk-heads and other lumber at Gibraltar. Frigates' cables were also carried out of the stern-ports to anchors in the main-chains; and these, brought to the after-bitts, secured to the orlop-beams, were to bring the ships up by the *stern*.

At Gibraltar five or six Dutch frigates, under Admiral Van Capellen, requested to join the British squadron in this service, and probably had stations appointed them by the British Admiral; but, as no alteration was made in the

orders and instructions already given to the ships on the passage from England, they had such duties assigned them, as were least likely to interfere with the arrangements already determined on.*

To show that the subject had undergone a careful investigation in the mind of the gallant Admiral, and that he had attentively examined it in all its bearings, copies of his memorandums will be given, relative to his plans of attack under different circumstances; by which it will be seen, that experience had clearly pointed out all possible difficulties, whilst his judgment, professional skill, and intrepidity, were sufficient to surmount them.

Contrary opinions were, at first, entertained as to the character of the armament in contemplation; some having considered it a joint expedition with a military force. If one hundred and twenty sappers and miners, under a brevet-major, can entitle it to that name, it was so; but one company, consisting of about that number, and some artillery-men, were the whole of the military force embarked; who, had it been found necessary to land, were to be placed under the command of two senior majors of the royal marines, on board the *Superb* and *Impregnable*; and the whole subject to the direction of a post captain, should it be the pleasure of the Commander-in-Chief to appoint one. But no landing was attempted, the attack having entirely succeeded without it; and, had any landing been necessary, the force would have proved inadequate to the undertaking; consisting of but eleven hundred men, and these taken from the strength of the ships.

To place this beyond dispute, it is perfectly well known, that the British Admiral requested that two regiments might be embarked at Gibraltar; they were,† however, refused, as being unnecessary to the service contemplated, which was considered entirely of a naval description. It certainly differed in some particulars from any attempt of the kind that had preceded it; as the sinking or loss of the ships (not improbable), unlike civilized warfare, would have been followed by instant butchery, or ignominious slavery; to say nothing of the blow to our naval pride, and national glory.

This memorable battle, it may be said, bore the character of a crusade in behalf of *Europe*, rather than on the part of Great Britain alone; on which ac-

* If any additional orders were issued in consequence of the junction of the Dutch frigates, they were communicated only to those ships to which they were addressed, and not to the fleet. The Dutch attacked the batteries on the left, or S. E. side, while the British ships attacked the Mole, Light-house, and Town-batteries.

† The request was made to government before the squadron sailed.

count, in bestowing the rewards which followed, it should have been compared with nothing that had gone before it.*

To justify this opinion of it, let it be remembered that, of the 1,200 Christians rescued from slavery upon this occasion, not one of them was a British subject. A boat's crew belonging to the *Prometheus*, employed to smuggle off the British Consul and his family, a few days before the bombardment, being detected by the Dey, were, of course, stopped until the issue of Lord Exmouth's visit should be known.

GENERAL MEMORANDUM.

“ Queen Charlotte, at Sea, 6th August, 1816.

“ It is the intention of the Commander-in-Chief to take his station for the attack of Algiers, if the wind admits, as soon as the ships arrive in that bay, and the Dey's answer to his demand is returned, or the time for its reception elapsed.

“ If an attack is not immediately practicable, the ships will, after they anchor, send their spare top-masts, yards, and jib-booms to the bombs and transports, as underneath : viz.

Queen Charlotte to Belzebub.

Impregnable Hecla.

Superb Infernal.


Albion Fury.

Minden Trafalgar.

Ships will be prepared to anchor by the head or stern, as the prevailing wind may tender necessary, and follow the example of the flag-ship as nearly as possible, if no positive inconvenience arise therefrom.

“ All boats will be hoisted out, the launches prepared for the howitzers, and the flat-boats for carronades and rockets; and the jolly-boats must attend the latter with ammunition.

* In the promotions which followed, the battle of Trafalgar was said to be the example taken, and *one* Midshipman only was to be recommended by the Captains. A great many, however, not even in the battle, were advanced from other interest, in every gradation of rank. Of *nine Commanders* in battle, *THREE only* were promoted!! and not one of them received the honour of the Bath, although it was conferred on a Major in the army upon the same occasion! The three Captains, Brace, Chetham, and Palmer, were, for *former services*, Companions of the Bath. They are Companions of the Bath still (June, 1828).



“ The launches must, in the first instance, be prepared with hawsers in them ready to carry out anchors, and not prepare for other service until the ships are all placed.

“ The Commander-in-Chief leaves to the judgment of the respective captains the use of the iron cables ; he means himself to bring up with rope cables, and, when brought up, to lash the chains on the cable, to ride by, paying out so much cable as will put them under water for safety from grape-shot.

“ If the wind should oblige the squadron to anchor previous to any attack, the launches and flat-boats will be prepared for night service, and care is to be taken to afford the crews as much rest as possible ; and, as the land winds generally prevail very early in the morning, the ships will carefully watch the Admiral's motions at night, and be ready to weigh at dawn of day.

“ Twelve-pound carronades having been supplied for the barges and yawls, these boats are to be kept ready prepared to move in aid of, or to protect, the launches on the least alarm ; and will proceed to one of the two brigs, which will, by signal pointed out, have charge of the night, without delay, unless called for by any heavy fire attacking the boats already throwing shells and rockets.

“ EXMOUTH.

“ To Rear Admiral Milne, and the respective
Captains of the Squadron.”

FORM OF ATTACK.*

“ Queen Charlotte, at sea, 6th August, 1816:

“ The space for the attack on the S. E. part of the mole of Algiers being very limited, it will require the greatest attention to place the ships well in their respective stations ; and it is very desirable to avoid opening any fire from them, if it be possible, before they are placed. But, as it cannot be presumed the enemy will remain inactive, it becomes necessary to prepare for that event by endeavouring to divert their fire from the ships of the line, by opening fire from the frigates, which may under sail pass the batteries in advance, or possibly in the intervals of the line, as circumstances point out.

“ The *flag-ship* will lead, and bring up as near to the mole head as practicable ; the *Superb* and *Impregnable*, following, will anchor as close as they can to her ; the latter ship placing herself to the southward of the large arch near the centre of the works, and the *Superb* between us ; and when placed, it will be

* See the plan of Algiers (Plate LII), where the batteries are numbered according to the references. The bombardment not having been described, the ships are omitted.

of the greatest advantage if they could be made fast to each other, and hove together to concentrate their fire.

“ The rear ship, the Albion, will see if, by any failure, she can supply the place of either ship thrown out. But, if the Impregnable succeeds in getting place, it appears to me the Albion may be well situated close on her bow, presenting her broadside against the only flanking battery, marked H, of three guns; by which she may cover the Impregnable, and enfilade the north part of the works, by throwing part of her fire upon the upper tier of the light-house battery.

“ The Leander will keep nearly abreast of the Superb, and, seeing the flag-ship placed, will anchor as near to her as possible, veering towards the town until she opens the mole, when she will either fire on the round tower, or the gun-boats, and batteries on the town walls; she must run a-warp to the flag-ship, and heave as close to her as possible, to connect the fire of both, and to afford room for the Severn to get within her, or between her and the flag-ship.

“ The Glasgow will anchor, and present her broadside to the fish-market battery, No. 9 and 10, and any others she may be able to fire upon.

“ The Granicus should occupy any space in the line open between the ships at anchor: or, if either of the frigates in the mouth of the mole should meet with accident, she will endeavour to take her place.

“ The Hebrus will attack battery, No 7 and 8.

“ Minden will attack the large battery, No. 4, taking care not to pass to the southward of the N. E. angle. She will also be able to fire on No. 5 and 6. This attack need not be closely pressed, being a cover only for the ships attacking the mole from a flank fire. Captain Paterson will be extremely watchful of our operations, and be ready to *slip*, and join, in the event of any accident to the ships attacking; and he will use the schooner to the best advantage for communication.

“ Heron, Mutine, Cordelia, and Britomart, will consider it their first duty to attend and aid the ships they are named to assist, in every possible way; and they are to remember that *even their brigs are to be sacrificed, to save the ships they are ordered to attend*. Should that service become uncalled for by their being well placed, the Captains will take any position where their fire can do good.

“ Prometheus will tow down the explosion ship, as instructed, and receive her commander and crew.

“ The bombs will put themselves under the orders of Captain Kempthorne, and, as soon as anchored, prepare to open fire.

“ They will be placed by the master of the fleet to the northward of the large arch ; and take care during the attack not to throw their shells over our own ships. The light-house battery is a great object ; and, keeping that in a line with the town gate, will give two objects for throwing the shells at.

“ N. B. Ships leading into anchorage are to have the preparative flag flying at the mizen-top-gallant-mast-head, which is to be hauled down immediately they let go the anchor.

“ EXMOUTH.

“ To Rear Admiral Milne, and the respective
Captains of the Squadron.”

“ BY ADMIRAL LORD EXMOUTH, &c.

“ The marines to be put into two battalions, to be commanded by the two senior officers whenever landed.”

First Battalion.		Second Battalion.	
Queen Charlotte	170	Impregnable.....	150
Superb	125	Minden	125
Leander	84	Albion	125
Severn	64	Glasgow	64
Granicus	48	Hebrus.....	48
	<hr/> 491		<hr/> 512

“ Each three-decker will form her party into four divisions, having an officer at the head of each. The two-deckers will form into three divisions, and the frigates into two divisions in the same manner ; and, whenever one division is ordered to land from each ship, the appointed officer will take his command.

“ If the first and second divisions are ordered to land, the Captains will, in that case, land with them, taking the second subalterns, and leave the seniors on board.

“ Major Vallack to land in command of the first and second divisions, and Major Collins to remain on board to command the remaining party whenever they may be ordered to land.

“ Lieutenant Hunt, of the Queen Charlotte, will act as Adjutant, and four steady men from each division are to be selected to carry rockets and storming poles.

“ The Commander-in-Chief sees, in the intended attack, a possibility of

pushing on the mole the first, and perhaps the second, divisions of marines from each ship (under cover of their own ships) in order to support the sappers and miners who will land with them.

" The flat-boats and launches therefore are to be used as gun and rocket-boats under the shelter of, and close to the ship to which they belong, ready to take advantage of any sudden confusion of the enemy, by embarking a division in each of these two boats. They will assemble *alongside* the *flag-ship*, there to receive orders when the signal 3, A, C, is made.

" The men to land without any incumbrance, with sixty rounds of ammunition, and canteens, if they have any; and a proportion of small rockets will be distributed among them for throwing into the casemates.

" Given on board the Queen Charlotte, at sea, 6th August, 1816.

" To the respective Captains.

" EXMOUTH.

" By command of the Admiral,

" JOS. GRIMES, Secretary."

" Arrangement for the Boats of the Squadron.

Starboard Division, to consist of Launches and Barges.			Larboard Division, to consist of Yawls.	
First Part.			First Part.	
	Launches.	Barges.		Yawl.
Queen Charlotte	1	3	Queen Charlotte	2
Superb.	1	1	Superb.	2
Minden	1	2	Minden	1
Severn.	1	1	Severn	1
Granicus	1	1	Granicus	1
	<hr/>	<hr/>		<hr/>
	5	8		7
Second Part.			Second Part.	
Impregnable	1	2	Impregnable.	2
Albion.	1	3	Albion	2
Leander	1	1	Leander	2
Glasgow	1	2	Glasgow	1
Hebrus	1	1	Hebrus.	2
	<hr/>	<hr/>		<hr/>
	5	9		9

" The Starboard Division, to be under the directions of a Lieutenant, to be appointed from the Queen Charlotte.

" The Larboard Division to be under the direction of a Lieutenant, to be appointed from the Impregnable.

“ The whole to act under a Commander, who will be named by the Commander-in-Chief.

“ A separate boat, with a Surgeon's Assistant, to attend each division. The ships to provide for this service will be pointed out by signal.

“ And the Midshipmen of all boats are to copy the boats' signals.

“ To the respective Captains.

“ EXMOUTH.”

OF LORD EXMOUTH.

Of this distinguished son of Neptune and of Mars (as each might claim him for his own), it was the invariable rule, and positive injunction, never to fire a shot until after he had *hailed* the enemy, to make sure of being sufficiently *close*: this was manifested in a style and manner, upon this last great occasion, which never can be forgotten. Hailing, indeed, was unnecessary, for the British Chief had already delivered his ultimatum to the Dey; but, two shot having been fired from the batteries, the Admiral twice waved his hat to the immense crowds which lined the shore and the ramparts, to apprize them of their danger; after which he gave orders to fire. Thus commenced a cannonade that continued without any intermission for six hours; and, with intervals of rest, to a much longer period; and ending in the entire accomplishment of the object.

Another trait of this great professional character cannot be unacceptable:— Upon returning from his command in India in the *Culloden* of seventy-four guns, with a convoy of Indiamen of about twenty sail, they were caught by one of the most tremendous hurricanes that was ever known in that or any other country. Four of the Indiamen foundered in the gale, and the *Culloden* herself was in imminent danger.

Upon a proposal of the officers to give ease and relief to the ship, by a disposal of the guns into the sea, the Admiral gave his decided negative; observing that “ A man of war without guns was nothing; it were much better to sink than to be disgraced.” And many of the guns of both decks were thereupon securely housed in midships.

At this time it should be told that a French squadron was cruising off the Island of St. Helena to intercept the India fleet.

The *Culloden* survived the storm with no other material injury than the loss of the head of her mizen-mast.

Of Lord Exmouth's services to the King of France, when, with a land force of about 5,000 men under Sir H. Lowe, they preserved the city of Marseilles in

its subjection to the Royal authority, the following circumstances bear ample testimony :—

Supported by the spirit of loyalty around them, they marched, and challenged to the field the superior force of Marshal Brune, then occupying Toulon, which produced a capitulation. This was followed by the sudden *death* of the Marshal.

On the occupation of it by the British forces, by land and sea, the King of France had occasion to address a letter to Lord Exmouth ; to which the following postscript was written in his Majesty's own hand :—(in English.)

“ I cannot, my Lord, neglect the present opportunity of offering you my grateful acknowledgments for the noble efforts by which you have so powerfully assisted my loyal subjects in their successful endeavours to place again Provence and Toulon under my obedience.

(Signed)

“ LOUIS.”

The King of France also addressed a congratulatory letter to Lord Exmouth after the battle of Algiers ; to which the following postscript was written in His Majesty's own hand :—

“ I cannot omit to mention how much I was gratified by the sight of the present my good city of Marseilles has offered you. This is no longer, however, an adequate acknowledgment to you ; and the Christian world is now under an equal obligation of devising a monument of its gratitude towards the man (and very truly a man) by whom it has been rescued from the horrible fear of slavery.

“ LOUIS.”

To commemorate the battle of Algiers, it has been said that medals for distribution were actually ordered to be struck ; but by some influence at the Admiralty, *at that period*, in some respects hostile to the *general* interests of the naval service, they were stopped !

THE BATTLE OF NAVARIN.

THIS extraordinary conflict presents us with a memorable proof of what skill, discipline, courage, and unanimity can effect, against brave, but unskilful and undisciplined numbers. It is a battle distinct in character from any which have preceded it, and a display of general and individual intrepidity that may have been equalled, but never surpassed. It is also to be distinguished in other remarkable particulars; first, from its being a contest with a people with whom we have been accustomed to live in habits of commercial amity and intercourse; yet the most hostile to our holy religion. Secondly, from motives of disinterested humanity, having in view the object of reducing to reason, and of effecting a reconciliation, between two deep-rooted, ferocious, and implacable enemies; interrupting the peaceable occupations of the rest of the world. To accomplish this important, difficult, but beneficent purpose, Great Britain was so fortunate as to be assisted by the squadrons of two great mediatorial powers, who, with their chiefs, were eminently conspicuous in a generous emulation of their leader's example; and who by their unremitted and cordial co-operation nobly contributed to bring it to a glorious, and, it is to be hoped, successful issue. Let it then no more be said that any thing like natural enmity * can exist in the bosoms of the nations of Europe; let those only have enemies, who are the enemies of mankind.

Extracts from Orders and Instructions.

“Asia, off Navarin, Oct. 19, 1827.

“It appears that the Egyptian ships in which the French officers are embarked are those most to the S. E.: it is therefore my wish that his Excellency Rear Admiral the Chevalier de Rigny should place his squadron a-breast of them. As the next appears to be a ship of the line with a flag at the main, I propose to place the Asia a-breast of her, with the Genoa and Albion next to the Asia; and I wish that his Excellency Rear Admiral Count Heyden will have the goodness to place his squadron next in succession to the British ships of

* Ramatuelle speaks of the English as “nos ennemis naturels.” (Cours Élémentaire, p. 349.)

the line ; the Russian frigates in this case can occupy the Turkish ships next in succession to the Russian ships of the line, the English frigates forming alongside such Turkish vessels as may be on the western side of the harbour a-breast of the British ships of the line, and the French frigates forming in the same manner, so as to occupy the Turkish frigates, and a-breast of the French ships of the line.

“ If time permit before any hostility is committed by the Turkish fleet, the ships are to moor with a spring on the ring of each anchor. No gun is to be fired from the combined fleet without a signal for that purpose. If shot be fired from any of the Turkish ships, the ships so firing are to be destroyed immediately.

“ The corvettes and brigs are under the direction of Captain Fellowes, of the Dartmouth, to remove the fire-vessels into such a position as will prevent them doing any injury to the combined fleet. In case of a battle ensuing, let the memorable words of Lord Nelson be borne in mind, that ‘ no captain can do very wrong who places his ship alongside that of an enemy.’ ”

Extracts from the Dispatches of Vice Admiral Sir Edward Codrington, K. C. B., to J. W. Croker, Esq. Admiralty.

“ H. M. Ship *Asia*, in the Port of Navarin,
Oct. 21, 1827.

“ Sir,

“ I have the honour of informing his Royal Highness the Lord High Admiral, that my colleagues, Count Heyden and the Chevalier de Rigny, having agreed with me that we should come into this port, in order to induce Ibrahim Pacha to discontinue the brutal war of extermination which he has been carrying on since his return here from his failure in the Gulf of Patras, the combined squadrons passed the batteries in order to take up their anchorage at about two o'clock yesterday afternoon.

“ The Turkish ships were moored in the form of a crescent, with springs on their cables, the larger ones presenting their broadsides towards the centre, the smaller ones in succession within them, filling up the intervals.

“ The combined fleet was formed in the order of sailing, in two columns, the British and French forming the weather or starboard line, and the Russian the lee line.

“ *The Asia led in*, followed by the *Genoa* and *Albion*, and anchored close alongside a ship of the line, bearing the flag of the Capitana Bey, another ship of the line, and a large double-decked frigate, each thus having their proper

opponent in front line of the Turkish fleet. The four ships to windward, part of the Egyptian squadron, were allotted to the squadron of Rear Admiral de Rigny; and those to leeward, in the bight of the crescent, were to mark the stations of the Russian squadron, the ships of their line closing with those of the English line, and being followed up by their own frigates.

“The French frigate the *Armide* was directed to place herself alongside the outermost frigate, on the left hand entering the harbour; and the *Cambrian*, *Glasgow*, and *Talbot* next to her, and abreast of the *Asia*, *Genoa*, *Albion*; the *Dartmouth* and the *Musquito*, the *Rose*, the *Brisk*, and the *Philomel*, were to look after the six fire-vessels at the entrance of the harbour.

“I gave orders that no gun should be fired unless guns were first fired by the Turks, and those orders were strictly observed.

“The three English ships were accordingly permitted to pass the batteries, and to moor, as they did, with great rapidity, without any act of open hostility, although there was evident preparation for it in all the Turkish ships; but upon the *Dartmouth* sending a boat to one of the fire-vessels, Lieutenant G. W. H. Fitzroy and several of her crew were shot with musketry. This produced a defensive fire of musketry from the *Dartmouth* and *La Syrene*, bearing the flag of Rear Admiral De Rigny; that was succeeded by a cannon shot at the Rear Admiral from one of the Egyptian ships, which, of course, brought on a return, and thus very shortly afterwards the battle became general.

“The *Asia*, although placed alongside of the ship of the Capitana Bey, was even nearer to that of Moharem Bey, the Commander of the Egyptian ships; and since his ships did not fire at the *Asia*, although the action was begun to windward, neither did the *Asia* fire at her, and therefore no hostility took place betwixt our two ships for some time after the *Asia* had returned the fire of the Capitana Bey.”

Mr. Peter Mitchell the Pilot, having been sent to interpret to Moharem Bey, the mediatory intentions of the allied squadrons, was killed alongside of the Turkish ship. This act of deliberate cruelty was soon after followed by the firing of the Turk into the *Asia*; and, as the gallant Admiral proceeds to say, “was consequently effectually destroyed by the *Asia*’s fire;” sharing the same fate as his brother Admiral on the starboard side, and falling to leeward a mere wreck.

“These ships being out of the way, the *Asia* became exposed to a raking fire from vessels in the second and third line, which carried away her mizen-mast by the board, disabled some of her guns, and killed and wounded several of her crew. This narration of the proceedings of the *Asia* would probably be applicable to most of the other ships of the fleet. The manner in which the *Genoa* and *Albion*

took their stations was beautiful, and the conduct of my brother Admirals, Count Heyden and the Chevalier de Rigny throughout was admirable and highly exemplary.

“ Captain Fellowes (now Sir Thomas Fellowes, C. B., &c.) executed the part allotted to him perfectly; and, with the able assistance of his little but brave detachment, saved the *Syrene* from being burnt by the fire vessels. And the *Cambrian*, *Glasgow*, and *Talbot*, following the fine example of *Capitaine Hugon*, of the *Armide*, who was opposed to the leading frigate of that line, effectually destroyed their opponents, and also silenced the batteries.

“ This bloody and destructive battle was continued with unabated fury for four hours, and the scene of wreck and devastation which presented itself at its termination was such as has been seldom before witnessed. As each ship of our opponents became effectually disabled, such of her crew as could escape endeavoured to set her on fire; and it is wonderful how we avoided the effects of their successive and awful explosions.”

In the first public report, or dispatch of a Commander-in-Chief, of events so entirely new, it cannot be supposed, particularly when written, as in this case, so immediately, and in the very midst of the havoc and destruction it describes, that every prominent feature or circumstance attending this great achievement could have been related; as, indeed, they may not then have become known to him. By means, therefore, of some authentic narrative of those particular parts, which may on that account have been overlooked by the gallant chief, such collateral testimony of the progress of this extraordinary battle, as the writer has been able to collect, will furnish matter of additional interest and gratification, by presenting the reader with instances of individual heroism and noble conduct, with which he may not otherwise be made acquainted.

It appears from unquestionable authority, that the combined squadrons completely seized the bull by the horns, by anchoring as they did in the center of the two lines; but no choice was left them. They found the Turks in a state of preparation, anchored with springs on their cables; but the battle was commenced by them accidentally and unintentionally,* as they intended to have

* The Vice-Admiral Tahir Pacha, who went on board the ship of the British Commander-in-Chief on the morning after the battle, acknowledged that their intention had been to permit them quietly to anchor, and to treat them with great civility, watching their opportunity. A gale of wind, or midnight darkness was to be the time chosen. In the mean while, *by mistake*, they made the signal for battle!—Many of the ships and vessels which escaped the conflagration and summary destruction of the first splendid day, were set on fire by the Turks themselves afterwards, at the

taken the treacherous, but, in their opinion, the most certain method of destroying the combined squadrons, by first treating them with curtesy, until a favourable opportunity should offer for putting their diabolical project in execution, favoured by a strong breeze, or a dark night, of sending their fire-ships amongst them. Had they commenced with their batteries as soon as their guns could act, it would have been next to impossible for the ships to have got in, for they must have suffered severely by a heavy raking fire long before they could have brought a gun to bear upon them in return, for as the wind was light they advanced but slowly.

When the Asia and Genoa had anchored in the stations appointed them, the Albion, Capt. I. A. Ommanny, was proceeding to that which she was directed to occupy, and was passing the Genoa, when the flag-lieutenant was sent on board of her, to order that ship to take a different position, which made it necessary that she should immediately haul close to the wind on the larboard tack, and the Turkish ships were so closely placed that it was with difficulty she could find room to pass between them; however, in this way, she had nearly reached her berth, when the wind died away, the ship became unmanageable, a very heavy firing had commenced upon her, (the Russians at that time not being able to get up), so that she was compelled at once to anchor, and in bringing her up, she swang on board a Turkish frigate,* whose sprit-sail-yard was over her hammocks, between the main and mizen rigging. While in the act of swinging, she contrived to get about half a dozen guns, treble shotted, to bear, and which nearly cut her in two; she was then instantly boarded, and upon the Albion's getting possession of the forecastle, the barbarians set fire to their ship in the cabin. The sails of the Albion were still loose, and in the utmost danger of being caught by the flames, but by the extraordinary exertions of her men, the cables of the frigate were cut, and after *burning for thirty-five minutes alongside*, she dropt clear. In five minutes afterwards, at the distance of a cable's length, *she blew up*.

The Albion had thus a very narrow escape, the concussion breaking two panes of her light-room window, and so immediate was the explosion, that many of the boarders were obliged to take to the water and swim back to their ship. The Russians not having yet been able to reach their stations, the fire was consequently more severe upon the Albion from that part of the line to which they

head of the bay, far removed from the scene of their disgrace, and of the signal punishment which was so justly their due. It is supposed they were destroyed as having been rendered unfit for any further service.

* A double-decked frigate of the largest class.

were to be opposed. In this perilous situation she was observed by the *Breslaw*, a French ship of the line, who immediately altered his course and most gallantly came to her assistance, and anchored a few minutes before the Russians.

An officer of the *Asia* writes—"During the conflict many of the enemy's ships took fire, and blew up with tremendous explosions. Upwards of *fifty ships* fell victims to the devastating fury of the flames, before the engagement had entirely ceased. Lieutenant Sturgeon, of the Royal Marines of the *Cambrian*, fell by a cannon shot from one of the batteries. Lieutenant Maïne Lyons has lost a leg. The *Asia* and *Genoa* have lost their mizen masts, and the masts and yards of the *Albion* have also sustained considerable injury. During the battle we were frequently in the most imminent danger of coming in contact with the *burning ships of the enemy*, which were *drifting about, and awfully exploding in all directions.*"—(*Hampshire Telegraph*.)

A German paper contains the following paragraph:—"The Turkish batteries on the island of Sphacteria were silenced and taken by the Russians. It is said that the Turkish Admiral's secretary, who was taken prisoner, has declared that the Admiral wished for, and sought an engagement, having received orders from *Constantinople*, by the aid of *his fire-ships to destroy the Christian ships on the first opportunity.*"

The spirit of enterprize, of address, and of intrepidity in the British seaman is well known; that of the French and Russian may be equal to it; but the situation of the allied fleets, as described by the *officer of the Asia*, is truly appalling. Many a manly heart can brave any thing but a conflagration like this. In such a tremendous scene nothing but the hand of a merciful Providence could have rescued the Christian Allies from the fate of the infidel.

Extract of the Log of H. M. Ship Talbot, Oct. 20th 1827.

"At 2^h 10' p. m. saw a blank gun fired * from the Tower; 2^h 25' *Asia* anchored; 2^h 45' came to on the west side of the harbour, and furled sails; observed firing between the Dartmouth and a fire-brig; 2^h 50' commenced action with two large frigates and a corvette. At 3^h L'Armide, French frigate, anchored on the starboard quarter, and took off the fire of one frigate; fired at a fire-brig with the larboard guns; 3^h 45' action became general; saw the frigate strike to L'Armide; 4^h 5' frigate struck to us; 4^h 50' ceased firing, to allow the

* This must have been the signal for battle, made by mistake.

Rose to pass inside to attack the corvette; fired at the corvette as the guns would bear clear of the Rose and L'Armide: 5^h 45' ceased firing, with the loss of five killed and eighteen wounded; spars, hull, and rigging much struck. Sent a boat to the Admiral. Enemy's line driven in, and nearly all his large ships driven on shore and blown up. Heard the explosions of several of the enemy's ships. Employed refitting the ship."

By an authenticated statement of a Greek boatswain, who was pressed to serve on board a Turkish frigate from Constantinople, and one of those engaged by the Talbot, it is shown and declared that the "corvette (H. M. ship Talbot) anchored alongside of us, and did not begin to fire until the other ships fired. The shot from the corvette came in upon us like rain; our men, after fighting about twenty minutes, all run on the lower deck. I myself hoisted the English colours to stop their (the corvette's) firing."

The frigate had on her upper-deck twenty-six brass guns, eighteen-pounders; main-deck thirty-two ditto, thirty-six-pounders, long guns. Of these guns two were pointed out of the stern-ports, both on the main and upper-decks. This Greek called her a sixty-four, although she carried but fifty-eight guns, saying they had removed the guns from her gangways, on account of the ship being weak.

The cool and deliberate conduct of Captain Hugon, of L'Armide, in advancing to the support of the Talbot, contending with a force of such magnitude, was brilliant, skilful, and highly complimentary to the gallantry displayed by that little ship. Under an easy, yet commanding sail, L'Armide, slowly proceeding in her course, contrived to worm herself through the Turkish inside line of ships, but always cautiously avoiding to obstruct the Talbot's fire. In this manner, closely engaged, she arrived at the position described in the log, and afforded the most seasonable and effectual support. This manœuvre of the French Captain is as much to be admired for the design as, in its execution, for the gallantry and truly delicate feeling towards the British frigate, and will ever remain a striking example of professional ability. When the Turkish frigate surrendered, he claimed a share only in the honour of the capture, by hoisting the British ensign with his own.

After a dreadful conflict of five hours, an awful stillness ensued; in this interval a report had gained ground that the Arabs, having secured some of the Turkish boats, were determined to attempt a boarding. In consequence of this, the crews of the ships, particularly the smaller ones, were on the alert all night,

and, "*armed to the teeth*," were ready to receive them, while other ships took the precaution of sending boats to row guard.

The frigate so beaten by the Talbot had 150 men killed and wounded on her decks, and shot pointed for sinking her rebounded, ripping up large pieces of her decks; she went down in about twenty-four hours after the commencement of the action.

The Talbot was for the first ten minutes in a very warm berth, having the fire of three frigates and a corvette upon her. The Armide then came and took off one of the frigates, and a Russian line of battle ship another, leaving the third to be disposed of by herself. This was gallantly effected, but with considerable loss.

When she had pretty well finished her business, she sent a boat across the harbour to inquire after the Admiral. In this boat were two fine young men, Aides-de-camp to the Captain, and "*Old Mills*, the signal man:" the shot were then falling like rain upon the water, and taking a momentary shelter under the stern of a six-gun French schooner, gave an opportunity for the exchange of many compliments and civilities between these parties, now so cordially united in one common cause. Old Mills was very desirous of making a fine complimentary speech to the Commander of the schooner, but which consisted of little more than "*Bono Francis*," often repeated, and as often acknowledged by the bows and smiles of the gallant Frenchman; they then proceeded on their mission, and in the course of an hour returned to their ship with the gratifying intelligence of the Admiral's safety, who, nevertheless, had much cause of uneasiness in the sufferings of a son severely wounded, who only regretted that he was unable to ascend the deck to enjoy the sight of the general conflagration of the Turkish fleet.

Good discipline and expert gunnery were never more conspicuous, nor brought to a more severe test than upon this occasion; nor was the effect of the latter more strongly displayed than upon the hulls of the Turkish ships and the lives of their men.

By means of the quadrants affixed to the guns, the Talbot fired them with *unerring precision*, and such was the effect that, with only part of her broadside, the remainder being engaged with other vessels, the slaughter on board the Turkish frigates opposed to her was beyond all precedent, *not one* shot from her guns having missed the hull! The Asia's fire, and the Albion's, were of a similar description, making the most sensible and rapid destruction of every ship within their range, the two colossal ships of the Mussulman Admirals having been very quickly disposed of.

The Cambrian, Captain G. W. Hamilton, having been detached upon

other service, did not get into the bay until twenty or thirty minutes after the battle had commenced ; the wind was light, and every stitch of canvas was spread on both sides. In this manner, the lower studding sails being first taken in, to be clear of the fire from her own guns, all the rest of her sail was in an instant reduced by the men quartered upon the upper decks, and the ship brought to an anchor, while, at the same time, she was engaging on both sides with her main-deck guns ! Nothing can more strongly denote the high state of discipline and interior arrangement to which this ship's company must have arrived, by performing with skill and address, in the very focus of a tremendous cannonade, so complicated a manœuvre. Where examples like these were so eminently displayed, what enemy could withstand it ?

Extract from the Log of H. M. Cutter the Hind.

" At 2^h 20', observed a boat from the Dartmouth board a Turkish brig which, blew up. 2^h 30', passed within hail of the Asia. Came-to with the best bower under the stern of a Turkish frigate with a spring, and brought the starboard guns to bear on her, within forty yards, double shotting the guns. 3^h 30', suffering greatly from the fire of a corvette raking us a-head, a brig on the larboard bow, and a two-decked frigate on the larboard beam. Found the B. B. chain shot away, and S. B. anchor shot in two pieces ; let go the shank of it, with spring fast to it. Veered to thirty fathom of chain and endeavoured to spring the larboard broadside to bear on the frigate, but found the anchor *coming home*.* Let go the spring, and swung broadside and broadside with the corvette and brig. Kept up a heavy fire from both sides. 4^h 15', observed the brig to be on fire, and having two larboard guns dismounted, manned the starboard guns with all hands and continued firing at the corvette. 4^h 30', suffering much from the fire of the enemy ; the small bower chain was shot away from the windlass, and the cutter was drifting about, not being able to get a gun to bear on enemy's ships. At 5^h, ordered all hands below from fire of enemy hulling us in all parts. 5^h, 15' drifted alongside a Turkish frigate with the main boom *in at one of her main-deck ports*. Got all hands under arms, effectually repulsed the enemy with great loss in his repeated attempts to board. Observed enemy crowding into a launch a-stern of the frigate. Loaded the

* An anchor is said to be coming home when it no longer preserves its first position in the ground, and either from the depth of water, the badness of the holding, or nature of the ground, it is dragged through, and the vessel drives.

starboard guns with grape, cannister, and round shot to the muzzle. A light breeze taking us on the larboard bow, swung round and got two guns to bear on enemy's boat, which was immediately sunk, and many of the Turks destroyed. 5^h 45', drifted clear of the frigate and hoisted a red ensign, the others being shot away. 5^h 55', found the cutter hanging by the starboard spring. Veered and brought up by it to prevent drifting alongside two Turkish frigates on fire. At 6^h 15' they blew up. 6^h 30', cut the spring and swept (i. e. rowed with the *sweeps*) a-stern of the Asia, and got a hawser from her, both anchors being lost. Sent the surgeon and wounded men on board; found the casualties to be four killed and ten wounded; three guns dismounted, twenty-three shot in the hull; masts, bowsprit, &c. &c. &c. all shot away, except the spring stay and the shrouds; booms and boats quite destroyed. Midnight calm and cloudy, pumps constantly at work, but keeping her free."

The Hind is a cutter of 165 tons, of ten guns, and thirty men. Lieutenant Robb took the command about two months before the action, and had exercised the men at the guns twice a day, and made every disposition and arrangement with small arms for the most effective warfare.

The Capitana Bey, of 84 guns, the Asia's first opponent, had 650 men lying dead upon her decks when boarded by an English boat the day after the battle. The Turks are stated to have lost about 6,000 men.*

Extract of a Letter from the Dartmouth.

" This circumstance brought on a general action : we were then engaged with a double-decked frigate and the forts ; not more than half of our ships were at this time at anchor. The fire-brig having no ballast, lightened as she burnt, and we could not sink her, although we kept a brisk fire on her ; her cables burnt, and she was dropping down fast upon us, we were obliged to *slip our cable*, and set the fore-sail to shoot a-head, or she would have fallen on board of us. She was so close that we boomed her off with spars ready for the purpose ; the heat of the flames was very great, being to windward of us ; our boats towed her out of the way, till after some time she sunk. We then poured a heavy raking fire into the double-decked frigate ; the corvette annoyed us a good

* For a beautiful illustration and description of this dreadful but splendid triumph over the bigotted enemies of Christendom, the reader is recommended to a magnificent series of engravings from drawings by G. P. Reinagle, who was present during the conflict on board the *Musquito*, Captain G. B. Martin, and whose talents as an artist are beyond the reach of eulogy from the writer.

deal, as they struck their colours and hoisted them again. The French Admiral coming in at this time protected us a good deal, and soon silenced the frigate's guns: we then directed our larboard broadside to the corvettes, *and sank them all*: with our starboard guns we engaged the forts and some small vessels in shore, and about five o'clock, it being dusk, we ceased firing. The Turks fired high. It was pleasant to hear the cheers of our men when a Turkish ship blew up or was sunk.

"Thousands of Turks perished; an immense number attempted to swim on shore from the ships. In the heat of the action a French seaman swam on board from his frigate for a hawser; he was a very fine fellow. Some of our ships being boarded by the Turks, the Greek prisoners who boarded with them, the instant they gained the English decks, turned upon the Turks: a Greek who swam on board of us in the battle, supplied the place of a man who was shot at one of our guns."

* * * * *

"The *Asia* and the rest of our ships have suffered much: the *Asia* was engaged with two ships of the line, one double-decked frigate, and a corvette, at the same time: *she sunk the frigate and all her crew, and killed 1050 men in the line of battle ships*. Our loss upon the whole was severe. The French and Russians also fought remarkably well. Many of the Turkish ships blew up in the night; it was a most magnificent sight. We lay at our guns every night, in case of surprise. *The next two days a number of ships blew up and sunk*. We expected some *hunting* after the *pirates*, but it has proved to be a large *shooting party*, and the game has been very plentiful."

More strongly to confirm what the writer advances upon the events of this battle, short extracts from the logs of some of the ships engaged will here be presented, as interesting to the naval reader, as it must be gratifying to the feelings of the brave men to whom such a tribute is so eminently due.

In a plan of a battle like this (and indeed of any battle), "there must be," as the gallant contributor admits, "many inaccuracies as to the position of the Turkish, or other ships, particularly as they so soon began to change their places by cutting and otherwise." Again he observes (and to which the writer mostly entirely assents,) "no one person could give a decidedly correct plan of the battle; and if two or three were to attempt it, they would most probably differ as to the position of each and every ship. I have no doubt many will find their ships not *exactly* placed."

Extract from the Log of H. M. Ship Asia.

“ At 3^h 15' having completely silenced the Capitana Bey, got the starboard broadside to bear on Moharem Bey's double-tier frigate, and some other vessels that were raking us. At 4^h 40' the mizen-mast went. At 5^h 20', having silenced every vessel our guns could reach, ceased firing. Sent a hawser to the Genoa, ready to haul clear of a *frigate burning close to us*. At 5^h 50' *she blew up*. At night guard boats rowing round the fleet; people at quarters. Turkish ships *blowing up occasionally*.” *

Extract from the Log of H. M. Ship Rose.

“ At 3^h 20' the action became general: sent boats to tow *fire-vessels* clear of our ships and of a *French line of battle ship*. At 4^h 20' slipt the small bower, and ran to close with a corvette firing on the Talbot. 4^h 40' anchored with b. bower in nineteen fathom, and opened fire on the corvette. 4^h 50' *driving*, veered cable and brought up alongside a Turkish frigate with English colours flying; veered past her and engaged the corvette. Five corvettes parted or slipped. About this time *several Turks blew up*, and others were *in flames*.”

Extract from the Log of H. M. Ship Dartmouth.

“ At 1^h 40' came-to with the b. bower in fifteen fathoms, between the S. E. and headmost ship of the Turkish line, a *razée* of sixty-two guns, and the fire-vessel. Veered cable and hove on the spring to bring the broadside to bear upon her, being across her hawse. At 1^h 45' the Asia anchored a-breast of a line of battle ship, furling sails. Observed Genoa, Albion, and Talbot anchor. Rose and Philomel, Musquito and Brisk, watching fire-vessels anchored across the entrance of the harbour. At 1^h 55' sent the pinnace to endeavour to persuade the nearest fire-brig to shift her berth. She fired on the boat, and immediately *set the vessel on fire*. Sent boats to tow the vessel clear, and fired musketry to cover them. French Admiral anchored within hail,” &c.

“ At 2^h the action became general. Commenced firing the larboard guns upon the bow of the *razée*, and upon some Turkish corvettes in shore, and starboard quarter-deck guns upon the fire-vessel to endeavour to sink her. At 2^h 30' slipped the cable and spring, and hoisted the head-sails, to clear the fire-brig close to us. Sent the boats a second time to tow her clear: the small sails on fire in the main-top, and also the mizen-top-gallant-sail. *Cut away the*

* The Plate describes the Asia, *moored* with *springs* to her anchors.

head-sails, they being on fire. At 2^h 40' the fire-vessel sunk. Sent boats to tow off one that was foul of a French line of battle ship. Let go the s. bower, and veered to forty fathoms of cable. Opened the larboard guns upon a brig and a schooner in shore, and sunk them. Hove on the spring, and re-commenced firing upon the corvettes and others in shore. A Turkish raxée slipped her cables, was on fire, and her crew were quitting her. At 3^h ran a warp to the French Admiral, to assist him clear of the raxée on fire; at 3^h 40' she blew up. Four corvettes cut or slipped, and ran on shore. Cambrian and Glasgow engaging the batteries on the western side of the harbour. At 5^h 50' firing ceased. Observed the Asia, Genoa, and French Admiral had lost their mizen-masts."

Extract from the Log of H. M. Sloop Philomel.

" At 2^h 5' sunk fire-ship alongside of us, which exploded as she was going down. 2^h 10' disabled a twelve-gun brig, which cut her cables and caught fire: continued to engage two corvettes and a large Turkish frigate. Russian frigates came to our assistance. Observed a fire-ship under the bows of a French line of battle ship; sent the cutter to tow her clear, which service she executed and returned. At 4^h slipped and made sail nearer to the town to engage the fort: came-to in thirteen fathoms. Several of the enemy sunk or blown up."

Extract from the Log of H. M. Sloop Brisk.

" At 2^h 10' anchored close to a Turkish fire-ship. 2^h 20' commenced firing at the fire-ship, and starboard broadside at corvette and frigate in shore; sent boats to take possession of fire-ship. Opened larboard broadside on a large Turkish frigate. 4^h 40' the same was silenced by a French line of battle ship."

Extract from the Log of H. M. Ship Glasgow.

" At 3^h 45' came-to in thirty-two fathoms, half a cable from the Cambrian, with our starboard broadside on four corvettes and a frigate, about two cables' length from the island of Sphagia. Engaged on both sides with batteries, corvettes, and frigate. At 4^h four fire-brigs exploded, two corvettes struck, others ran on shore."

From a French account we learn, that " at noon on the 20th the wind being favourable, the signal was made to prepare for action; every one took his

station, the English Admiral's ship, the *Asia*, leading." The British line of battle ships were followed, first by the French Admiral de Rigny and his squadron, and then by the Russian Admiral Count Heyden, with the ships of the line and others under his command.

"The Turks had formed a crescent on the contour of the bay in a triple line, making a total of three ships of the line, a *razée*, sixteen frigates, twenty-seven large corvettes, and as many brigs.

"Six fire-ships were placed at the extremities of the crescent, to be able to fall upon the combined squadrons if an engagement should take place, and to the windward of which they were naturally placed.

"The principal force was assembled towards the right on entering, and composed of four large frigates, two ships of the line, a large frigate, a ship of the line, three frigates of various sizes finishing the line, and strengthened in the second line by corvettes and brigs.

"At two o'clock the *Asia* entered the port, and had passed the batteries; at half-past two it anchored alongside the Turkish Admiral, and was followed by the other English ships.

"The *Syrène* followed, and at twenty-five minutes past two, Captain Robert anchored it within pistol shot of the first frigate of the Turkish line; at this moment a boat from the *Dartmouth* was fired at from one of the fire-ships, which killed the officer commanding it.

"The *Syrène* was then so near the fire-ship, that it could have sunk it, could it have been done without endangering the English boat. The *Dartmouth* then opened a fire of musketry at the fire-ship, at the same time the *Syrène* was yard-arm and yard-arm with the Egyptian double-decked frigate the *Esnina*. At the same instant two cannon shot were fired from one of the vessels a-stern of the *Syrène*, on board of which a man was killed; the other appeared to be directed at the *Dartmouth*. The battle now began, and soon became general.

"The Russian ships had to sustain the fire of the forts, which only began to fire upon the fifth, which was the *Trident*. At five o'clock in the afternoon, *the first line of Turks was destroyed*; the cut-down frigates and ships of the line *sunk or burned*, the remainder ran upon the coast, and were set fire to by the enemy themselves.

"In this unforeseen engagement, there were of course some vessels which, by their position, have suffered more than the others; what is certain is, that in each squadron all have rivalled each other in doing their duty.

"His Majesty's frigate the *Armide*, which, at the beginning of the action, was placed with the English frigate, the *Talbot*, at the left extremity of the horse-shoe, was exposed with his brave comrade to the fire of five Turkish fri-

gates, till the arrival of the Russian frigates. Captain Hugon has received unanimous felicitations for the boldness of his manœuvre, and the gallantry with which he fought the vessels opposed to him.

“ The Scipion, Captain Millius, whose bowsprit was entangled with a fire-ship that was in flames, had to extinguish the fire on board four times without ceasing to fight, firing at the same time to right and left, on the enemy's line and on the forts.*

“ In consequence of the position taken by the Trident, Captain Maurice, Admiral de Rigny received the most powerful assistance from that ship.

“ Captain La Bretonniere, of the Breslaw, fought first under sail, and then at anchor, going wherever his presence might be useful. The Russian Admiral has returned especial thanks to Admiral de Rigny for the support he received from the Breslaw, at the moment when the Azof suffered severely from the cross fire of the enemy.

“ The Alcyone and the Daphne, schooners, bravely participated in the attack upon the fire-ships made by the English brigs and corvettes.

“ In a word, whatever opposed the allied squadrons was speedily overcome, notwithstanding the desperate bravery shown by the 'Turks.

“ Admiral de Rigny has felt himself bound to return particular thanks to Capt. Fellowes, of his Britannic Majesty's frigate the Dartmouth, which was appointed to watch the fire-ships, for the timely succour which he afforded him, when one of the fire-ships in flames was on the point of falling on board the Syréne.

“ Our squadron had forty-three killed, and one hundred and seventeen wounded. Captain La Bretonniere was slightly wounded. The squadron has suffered great damage, the Syréne in particular has sustained great injury, its main and mizen masts are shot away, the two lower yards and the main-topsail-yard are shot away, and it has six shots between wind and water.

“ Chevalier de Rigny speaks in high terms of the cordiality and efficacious co-operation of the Admirals his colleagues.

“ Our crews have justified the confidence of the King ; in each vessel the cry of ‘ *Vive le Roi* ’ spontaneously accompanied the first broadside.

“ The squadron had before it for some hours a dreadful scene. Conceive 150 ships of war, of all rates, firing in a narrow basin, in a triple line, the burning of some, and the explosions which ensued.

“ When the first frigate, yard-arm and yard-arm, with our vessels took fire and blew up, the Syrene was so near a-stern, that its mizen-mast fell on that

* This ship was in the most imminent danger of falling a prey to the devouring element, when, with intrepidity and address, she was timely rescued by cutting away the burning limbs.

frigate, which was soon followed by the main-mast." (From the *Gazette de France*, Nov. 10th.)

In another French account it is observed, "Admiral de Rigny, whose firm spirit and wisdom will have so powerfully concurred to the safety of Greece, by the services which he has rendered for several years in these latitudes to the cause of humanity, has acquired in this glorious affair new titles to public esteem and recognizance."

"The conflict was long and serious. It covered the Christian fleet with glory. The Turko-Egyptian fleet is annihilated. An admirable concord reigned among the Allies. Each of the Admirals in his dispatches does homage to the other two. We learn with regret that a son of Sir Edward Codrington, a brave officer, has been wounded; one Captain is killed." The British Captain who fell upon this occasion was Captain Walter Bathurst, of the *Genoa*, a distinguished veteran in his country's naval service.

In the letter of Admiral de Rigny to Sir E. Codrington he states, from a detailed report of Captain Hugon, of the *Armide*, "that the excellent manœuvre of Captain Davies, when the *Rose* came up and resolutely cast her anchor within pistol shot of two Turkish corvettes, relieved the *Armide* in a few minutes from her unfavourable position; and it is my duty, and at the same time a great pleasure to me, to assure your Excellency that on this occasion Captain Davies did every thing that could be expected of a brave and experienced officer." He goes on to say, "Allow me to take this opportunity of returning my thanks to Captain Fellowes for the assistance which the *Syrène* received from the boats of the *Dartmouth*, when, with much skill and bravery, they attacked and turned off the fire-ships ready to come down upon us."






In his reply to the letter of Sir E. Codrington, expressive of his approbation of the good management of the French squadron, Admiral de Rigny modestly observes, "In the action of the 20th, you set us the example; we could not do better than follow it."

When thus we see great rival powers striving, not only in deeds of arms, but with liberality of mind and gentlemanly deportment, to rival each other in acts of courtesy and kind feeling, we may still cherish the belief that the "days of chivalry" are not yet past. May succeeding generations bear in perpetual remembrance the noble example of the **HEROES OF NAVARIN**.

"*Circumstances constitute the essence of every case.*"—(Debate on the blockade of Oporto by Don Miguel, 1828.)

NAVARIN.
the
27.
tion



-  *English.*
-  *French.*
-  *Russian.*
-  *Turks Egyptian.*
-  *Ships of the Line.*


BEGINNING

Before **MOHAREM** fired

a **Moharem** } **Bay**
to **Capitan**



When **MOHAREM** began and
Capitan Bey was silenced.



END

When first line was cleared away and
the rest were sunk or cut their cables.



BATTLE OF NAVARIN.

349

Two Plates, No. LIII. LIV. are given to represent the scene of action : the first exhibiting the position of the ships in the general engagement; the latter showing some detached parts of it.

Although the united squadrons are represented as in their proper places, yet the action had commenced, and continued twenty to thirty minutes before the sternmost of the French or headmost of the Russian squadrons had anchored, and nearly two hours before the Cambrian, Glasgow, and Constantine were able, from the lightness of the wind, to take up their positions.

UNITED SQUADRONS.

Ships.	Guns.	Men.	Killed.	Wounded.	Ships.	Guns.	Men.	Killed.	Wounded.
1. Asia (V. Admiral)	84		14	48	Brought forward..			96	255
2. Genoa	76		26	35	14. Scipion	80		2	36
3. Albion	74		10	56	15. Breslaw	84		1	14
4. Dartmouth	42		6	8	16. Armida	42		14	25
5. Cambrian	48		1	1	Alcyon	10		1	9
6. Glasgow	50			2	Daphne.....	6		1	5
7. Talbot	28		5	18	17. Azoff (R. Admiral)	74		24	67
8. Rose	18		3	15	18. Gangoute	84		14	37
9. Mosquito	10		2	4	19. Ezekiel	74		13	18
10. Brisk	10		1	3	20. Alex. Newski	74		5	7
11. Philomel	10		1	7	21. Provonoy	42		1	2
Hind, Cutter	6		5	9	22. Elena	38			5
12. Sirene (R. Admiral)	60		22	42	23. Castor	32			
13. Trident	74			7	24. Constantine	46			1
Carried forward..			96	255	Total....			172	481

TURKO-EGYPTIAN SQUADRONS.

Ships.	No.	Guns.	Men.
Of the Line, Turks	3	{ 84 74 96 }	850
Double-deckers, Egyptians	5	64 to 60	550 to 500
Frigates, all Turks	15	50 to 48	450
Corvettes, 18 Turks, 2 Egyptians	26	26 to 20	200
Brigs, 4 Turks, 7 Egyptians.....	11	19	150 to 130
Fire-brigs	5		40
Total.....	65	2,082	18,700

CONCLUSION.

IN taking leave of the subject it is expedient to call the attention of the young officer to what may be considered the leading and most important points in the present inquiry ; and these will naturally fall under four separate heads ; namely, first, of the best modes of attack at sea ; secondly, of the attack at anchor ; thirdly, of the modes of defence at sea ; and lastly, of the best defence to be made at an anchor.

By a reference to the Plates before us, in which it is attempted to display the plan of attack in all our principal battles, with the reasoning and judgment given upon them ; it may probably appear that, for attack at sea, the examples of Hawke, Rodney, on the 12th of April, Howe, Nelson's *intended* plan of attack at Trafalgar, with those of Duncan at Camperdown, and Duckworth at Saint Domingo, may be selected as the best models for imitation. And of plans for defence at sea we have but two ; they are that of Van Tromp off Portland,* and a masterly one by Sir Edward Hughes, in his first engagement with Mons. Suffrein.

For resolution, steady bravery, and perseverance, we may indeed include the celebrated retreat of Admiral Cornwallis ; although it does not appear that he had formed any regular disposition of his little force. Even without this, he proved himself invincible.

For the attack at anchor, we have the never-to-be-forgotten battles of the Nile and of Navarin ! for the attack of *batteries*, although not described in this work, there are the bombardments of Copenhagen and of Algiers.

For the defence at anchor, there is the skilful and seaman-like example of Lord Howe at Sandy Hook ; the determined position taken by Admiral Barrington at the Cul de Sac, St. Lucie ; and that of Lord Hood at St. Christopher's.

Of the methods proposed, either for attack, retaliation, or defence, it is for skill, judgment, experience, and bravery to decide.

The writer has now the grateful office of making his cordial acknowledgments

* More particularly described in Part 3, Plate VII, of the former edition, and not shown in this.

to all those friends, professional and others, who not only have contributed very essentially to the work, but, by their criticisms and corrections, as well as by their encouragement, have most kindly assisted him in its completion.

To those (of whose judgment he entertains the highest respect) who consider that a work of this nature is more calculated to benefit other maritime states than our own, it is answered, that a Treatise upon Naval Battles can be looked upon only in the same light with those of a military character; disclosures or discoveries, favourable or otherwise, may be available to all who will be at the trouble to examine them; but it has not appeared by experience that the "Essay" of *Mr. Clerk* has yet taught *our enemies* the secret, to a knowledge of which the successes of the British navy have hitherto been attributed; and it is hoped that the period is still far distant for apprehending any such danger.

Military achievements have found able commentators from the days of Julius Cæsar to the present; from these, it will not be denied, much advantage has been reaped in conducting the British arms continually to victory: and from these there can be no doubt the greatest benefits must arise in future wars. The cruel lesson taught to the British army by the sufferings of the unfortunate and gallant Moore is known to have had (as well it might) a most salutary influence upon the execution of the arduous duties of every succeeding campaign; and ultimately at Waterloo under the first Captain of the age, crowned their services with imperishable fame, and Europe with long-desired repose.

If then it be admitted that works of such a tendency are beneficial in one case, they may be equally so in another. Upon this, much as the subject is capable of enlargement, the writer rests his defence. With deference and respect, therefore, he offers to the naval profession, and to his country, the result of his inquiries; with a confident hope that, under the guiding and protecting hand of the Almighty, the brave sons of Britain will ever be found to do their duty.

1828.

REMARK.

“ I have attentively read over the First and Second Parts of this work, but I do not think the character of the British navy has been rescued from the imputation of ignorance cast upon it by Doctor Adam Smith at the time such remark was made ; although the conduct of our Admirals, since Clerk published his ‘ Essay,’ has generally indicated a wish to practise the system therein given.

“ By a work of this nature the Profession is invited to give to Naval Tactics the attention they deserve ; and the description of the different battles gives opportunity to officers to study them, to observe the errors committed, and to profit by the knowledge of them in similar situations, in which they may probably afterwards be placed.”


APPENDIX. No. I.

DESCRIPTION OF CAPT. DE STARCK'S INVENTION FOR
MOVING A SHIP IN A CALM.

THE method made use of by Captain Manby for conveying a rope from the shore to a stranded vessel in distress, namely, by means of a mortar, powder, and shot, is similar to that which, in the year 1785 (being then on the coast of Guinea), suggested itself to my mind, for a purpose certainly far less meritorious, though not less important than that of Captain Manby's; his immediate and very humane object being to save the lives of shipwrecked mariners, while mine was only to advance my ship progressively in a dead calm, either in the prosecution of her voyage, or to the attack of an enemy similarly becalmed. To effect this, I constructed a parachute, the stem and spreaders of which were of iron, and the spread of oiled canvass; and connecting this, from the head-ring thereof, by a six-foot iron chain, to a bolt-ring affixed to a cylindrical wooden-shot, I fired my mortar at 33° elevation, charged only with as much powder (for my projectile force) as should throw the above described apparatus about 300 yards a-head of the vessel, when so soon as the wooden-shot fell into the water (carrying along with it a small rope) the buoyancy of the wood prevented the sinking of the iron work, and upon hauling in the said rope, attached to the lower end of the parachute, the latter became immediately out-spread and in contact with a column of water, and consequently caused the vessel to move a-head by the continued effort of running in the rope, which, in this instance, is, in fact, the tow-line; and as my design was to work with a double apparatus, and a mortar on each bow, firing them alternately, I think even a large ship might be moved through the water at the rate of perhaps one mile and a half, or two miles an hour.

The proportions of the mortar, parachute, shot, &c. were as follows:—The parachute was, in length, three feet six inches, and only three feet in spread, weighing, together with the connecting six-foot iron chain, about twelve pounds; the wooden cylindrical shot weighed twenty-eight pounds, and measured fourteen inches in length; the calibre of the mortar nine inches. In fact, the mortar which I employed was hired of the engineer of Vauxhall Gardens, who used it

for throwing up his balloon fire-works, and was so portable that it could be carried on a man's shoulders, being made only in the form of a large cylindrical tube of sheet-copper, well woolded with rope, and inserted at the breech in a block of oak.



A represents the starboard mortar ; B the starboard parachute suspended from the shot in the loaded mortar ready for discharging ; C the parachute in use ; D represents the wooden-shot acting as a buoy ; G the chain connecting the shot to the parachute ; E represents the larboard mortar recently fired ; F the quoil of small rope by which the vessel is worked a-head.

With the above described contrivance, I humbly presume that I proved the practicability of my invention ; having, in the year 1789, upon the broad part of the Thames above Battersea bridge, made repeated experiments with a large luggage-boat, though of no more than five tons burthen, which, of course, was rapidly worked with great facility. Among the friends who honoured me with their presence on the occasion, was a naval officer now of high rank and distinction, who expressed himself of opinion that the plan might be useful.

M. A. DE STARCK.

APPENDIX. No. II.

ON THE PARTIAL RE-ADOPTION, BY THE NAVY, OF
DEFENSIVE ARMOUR.*

By E. T. C., Lieutenant R. N.

IN contemplating the nature of the art of war, two opposite principles obviously present themselves to notice, under which, indeed, the whole system may be considered as comprehended, i. e. *offence* and *defence*. It is the importance which each of these principles respectively assumes that constitutes the main difference between the modes of ancient and modern warfare.

The ponderous and solid shield, helmet, and cuirass of the Roman legionaries, especially during the civil wars, were admirably adapted to resist the heavy pilum, and short strong-bladed sword. In the middle ages, and to a late period, the scale seems to have inclined even in favour of the defensive, at least the close and complete covering of almost impenetrable armour then used would justify the supposition; still, however, as from the earliest recorded times, the art of war continued to exhibit these two principles. It was reserved for that tremendous engine, gunpowder, effectually to destroy the balance; opposed to the musket, as well as the cannon, the shield and cuirass became an unavailing incumbrance. Formidable as these powerful instruments must be deemed, yet experience has fully proved that they cannot entirely usurp the province of the sword and lance. When man is personally opposed to man, gunpowder is far from being a substitute for the blade; for not only do the sword and pike continue to maintain their wonted rank among offensive implements, but the musket itself is admitted to be incomplete till furnished with that most effective weapon, the bayonet.

To the great esteem, then, in which the blade is still universally held, and as if in some measure to restore the defensive principle, which had so deeply declined, must be ascribed the resumption of the ancient and valuable cuirass. The utility of re-adopting this excellent piece of armour has been allowed by the greatest Captains of the age—has been acknowledged by the example of the continental powers, and has, at length, been admitted by ourselves. The advantages of body-armour thus generally proclaimed by its re-adoption, the object of this essay is to direct the attention to the benefits which might be derived thence to the *British sailor* as well as to the *soldier*, to the *boarder* as well as to the *dragoon*.

* Referred to in page 147, n. upon the subject of *l'abordage*.

As before observed, the cuirass offers no protection against the cannon or musket shot ; but it must be granted that there can be few, very few situations in which the dragoon is not exposed to both ; whereas, when the sailor is summoned to act as a boarder, fire-arms are, for the most part, laid aside. The cannon then becomes an useless engine to both parties, and the musket nearly so. In the close combat that ensues, with the sword, the bayonet, the tomahawk, and pike, we see again the ancient offensive warfare restored, but unaccompanied by its naturally opponent principle.

It has been asserted, and probably with truth, that no people have yet been discovered uninfluenced by a belief in a Supreme Being. The history of the world might with equal propriety be challenged to produce an instance of a people acquainted with *offensive*, but ignorant of *defensive* arms. Yet such is the surprising fact that, naked as his single weapon (of which, at best, he possesses but an indifferent knowledge), the boarder rushes on a host of opposing pikes, bayonets, and swords, his body and head exposed to every random blow and thrust, while, at the same time he is fully unprepared to resist a chip from a shattered block, or a fragment of falling cordage.

That the most brilliant achievements have been performed by a defenceless man is a fact indisputable ; but will any one gifted with common sense and humanity affirm that, because a man be brave, it is an advantage for him to be exposed to death from an unparried blow or thrust ? With equal reason it might be asserted that courage and nakedness were synonymous. Of such a one I would ask, whether our brave ancestors, who won the fields of Cressy, Poitiers, and Agincourt, considered armour an index of fear ? It is to be hoped, for the sake of our modern cuirassier, that they had no such notion. On the contrary, the circumstance which most forcibly exposes the decay of that fearless and manly spirit which had subdued the ancient world, is the petition preferred to the Roman emperor (Gratian) to relieve his dastardly and effeminate soldiers from the no-longer tolerable burthen of their armour !

In considering the kind of defence to be adopted by the boarder, the cuirass must be deemed too unwieldy for one who needs so much freedom both of body and limbs ; besides, the cuirass, in form and quantity of metal, is chiefly adapted to resist the rested lance. Again, inconvenience would arise from its consisting of two plates, which cannot be put on and off without assistance. The hauberk is preferable on account of its flexibility ; but the mailed sleeves, with which it is furnished, are unnecessary, and a stout under-garment is required to render the upper one a sufficient protection. This piece of armour, therefore, is likewise objectionable.

The defence recommended should be considerably lighter than the cuirass, and more convenient than either the hauberk or habergeon. It should consist, simply, of a vest,* with a kind of epaulette reaching to the elbow, covered with thin plates of steel, laid on like the scales of a fish, and its principal fastening, a broad belt attached to the back and buckled in front, to sustain at the same time a cutlass; so that nearly as little time would be required to put on both mail and sword as is now taken to buckle on the sword alone; this, with a light head piece (or morion) would not inconvenience even a slight man at his gun, nor prevent his running aloft and pulling with ease and comfort. A single trial would certainly afford a sufficient test of this assertion. The sword exercise lately adopted in the British navy, with a view, doubtless, of furnishing a defence to the hitherto unprotected persons of the boarders, unquestionably affords a most unequivocal support to the principle herein advocated. But who can fail to perceive the consequent diminution of the *offensive* character of the sword, from its use as a *defensive* instrument? A very slight acquaintance with the art of fencing will suffice to point out the immense advantage of being enabled to act *offensively*, even at the very instant of *receiving a thrust*! Thus armed, the boarder would be completely protected from pike, bayonet, and sword. An unskilful swordsman would thus become a formidable opponent even to a skilful fencer, and a strong and dexterous one invincible but by odds.

The writer is aware of the prejudice to which innovation must be exposed; but in this instance there is nothing novel save the proposed application and extension of a benefit already, in part, acknowledged.

Should a plan so likely to prove advantageous to the nation in general, and to our seamen in particular, be deemed worthy an experiment, the expense, it may be presumed, will not be a bar to the accomplishment of so excellent a purpose as the preservation of the lives of our brave countrymen under circumstances of imminent and unnecessary exposure.

1824.

* Each plate in steel (according to the pattern exhibited by the writer), weighs only 3 dwts. 6 grs. so that exclusive of the cloth on which they would be sewed, a vest, containing 500 plates, and large enough to protect a well-sized man from the throat to the hips would only weigh six pounds ten ounces! consequently not half the weight of a musket and bayonet!

When, therefore, this trifling burden of light plates, dispersed, too, over the whole body, and combined with a flexibility that accommodates itself to every movement, be considered, it may well be presumed that no rational ground can be raised on which to found the important objection of incumbrance.

THE END.



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